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ABSTRACT.
British industrial investment in China before 1895 was slight -  mainly marine 
engineering (51% share) and silk processing (25%), The liberalising Treaty of 
Shimonoseki then led to an upsurge of British investment which by the late 1930s was in 
real terms about a third of that currently. The profile of British investment changed 
rapidly -  by 1897 cotton textiles accounted for 19% to be outstripped by mining (63% by 
1903). By 1912 the tobacco industry took first place with a peak share of 70% in 1920. 
These three sectors account for less than 2% of current investment with 74% being in 
oil/gas and chemicals.
The analysis then considers the various sectors of this British investment by 1940 and 
their differential impact on the Chinese economy. In terms of interface with other 
investing countries, there was modest competition with other Western countries -  indeed, 
there was, especially with French and Belgian interests, significant cooperation with 
British investors. The greater competitive interface with Japan was marked in cotton 
textiles and tobacco.
The effect of UK (and other foreign) industrial investment on Chinese development is 
a contentious area. In terms of alleged financial exploitation (high profitability well in 
excess o f that in the investors’ country and most of these profits being siphoned off 
abroad) analysis of the financial evidence suggests that these charges must be 
considerably tempered.
This conclusion coupled with the prior analysis of the sectors of British investment 
implies that many of the charges concerning the impact of British industrial investment in 
China by 1940 must be given a more favourable verdict. It would seem that the reason for 
the disrepute in which UK industrial investment has been held by both Chinese and 
Western sources is more due to the arrogant manner in which, in many cases, these 
investments were carried out rather than the nature of the investment itself.
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INTRODUCTION.
BRITISH INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA 1895 -  1940
Since 1978 UK industrial investment in the PRC has assumed significant proportions. The markets for 
this investment have not only been in China but, increasingly, have represented efforts of British firms to 
source their products from China rather than the UK. Industrial investment by the UK and other foreigners 
was, of course, long-standing in pre-Communist China although, in contrast to post-1978, there was, with 
the exception of Japan in Manchuria, no intention to supply the output to the investor’s home country.
The aim is to analyse in depth this pre-1941 UK investment with emphasis on >
- Its scale and geographic and sector distribution. This is contrasted with post-1978 investment.
- The interface, either competitive or collaborative, with similar investment by other nations.
- The financial aspects of UK investment.
- The extent to which such UK investment was, in economic terms, favourable or otherwise, to 
China.
Thus (following a review of literature pertaining to this study)
PART /  gives an account of development before 1895.
PART II  gives the scale and distribution of UK investment.
PART III  gives details of such investment by branch of industry -  with consideration of the 
impact on the Chinese economy.
PART IV  analyses the interface with other investing nations.
PART V considers the financial evidence concerning these UK industrial enterprises to ascertain 
their profitability and the utilisation of such profits.
PART VI attempts to assess the impact of the above investments on the Chinese economy 
utilizing, in particular, information in PARTS III  and V.
The analysis is on a narrow front but, hopefully, the conclusions bear on the wider issue of the impact of 
foreign investment in China which included, apart from industrial investment, the financial and commercial 
sectors, real estate, transport, utilities, etc.
This study is based to a large extent on financial and other statistics -  many derived from archival sources. 
To ensure the dialogue flow, the majority of this information, which buttresses the analysis and conclusions 
of various sectors o f this study (and also supplies the raw material used in compiling the graphic 
illustrations) is put in the Statistical Annex.
(1) Transliteration of Chinese names.
All Chinese place names are given in the modem Pinyin system of Romanizing Chinese adopted by 
the People’s Republic of China. Again, all original works in Chinese and the names of the authors and 
publishers are given in Pinyin. In the case of British (and European) companies incorporating Chinese 
names in their title their legal name (i.e. that given at their registration) is used here. In the period 
when these companies were formed the pattern of transliteration was predominantly the Wade-Giles
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system derived by two British diplomats/linguists. The Pinyin equivalent is given in parentheses as a 
guide in these cases.
(2) Translation from Chinese Currency into Sterling
For most of the period covered by this study the silver based currency of China was complex and an 
irritation to economic growth. Details of the conversion factors used in translating into Sterling are 
given in PART II.
(3) Tonnage.
All tonnage figures refer to metric tons.
(4) Numbering of Tables and Graphs.
In the main text the Tables are represented by the number being expressed in words while in the case 
of the Figures Arabic numerals are used.
(5) Style Sheet.
That used is that of the SOAS Chinese Department ( http://www.soas.ac.uk/ciafiles/stylesheet.pdf.)
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LITBRATURE REVIEW.
This review is in two parts. PART ONE covers the literature directly germane to the study of British 
industrial investment in China before the Second World War. PART TWO covers a much wider field. The 
general question of whether foreign economic penetration into China (either by trade or local investment) 
was beneficial or not for the Chinese economy has given rise to a considerable amount of literature. 
Reference to this literature is essential in conducting a survey of a particular economic sector in China (as 
in this exercise). For instance, it helps to marshal the heads of arguments that can be used in assessing 
whether as regards the sector under consideration, the foreign (in this case British ) economic impact was 
beneficial or the reverse. There are also contributions in this literature that point to the dangers of scaling 
up from a study with, as in this study a limited objective, to conclusions relating to a much larger universe.
These two PARTS are not watertight. Thus, one of the important areas o f dispute in the literature 
concerns the impact of foreign economic penetration on traditional handicraft industries. The largest front 
in which this battle was raged, if it might be so termed, was in cotton textiles. Thus, literature sources of 
interest concerning the history of this sector in China (see page 14) in many cases provide very valuable 
analyses of this issue. Again, some studies of other industries or individual firms conclude with an analysis 
relating the area o f study to the wider issues referred to in PART TWO. Again, to take the work of Shannon 
R. Brown on technology transfer to China (see page 10) his work is based to a large extent on primary data 
on British firms of great specialist value to this study but his conclusions relate to these wider issues.
PART ONE -  THE OPERATION OF BRITISH AND OTHER FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA.
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND.
A large proportion o f this study utilises statistics, principally financial statistics, taken mainly from 
primary sources (company reports, archives, etc.) but also from secondary collations as described below.
In terms of studies looking at UK investments in China during the period under review the amount of 
information available in terms of figures arising from the UK end flatters to deceive. The key sources in 
this connection are various studies presented in the Journal o f the Royal Statistical Society and, after a 
twenty year gap, in the Economic Journal. The pioneer studies were, firstly, that by Sir George Fatsh. (a) 
with the work being carried on by Sir Robert Kindersley. (b).
The key problem in using Paish’s figures lies in the fact that his data only covered companies registered 
in the UK. This was pointed by the then Mr. J.M.Keynes who suggested in the discussion following the 
second paper (page 195) that the paper should more properly be entitled “Estimated Capital Subscribed in 
London” rather than “Estimated Foreign Investments”.
Apart from the problem noted above, the 1933 article by Sir Robert Kindersley concedes these gaps in the
(a) Sir George Paish: “Great Britain’s Capital Investments in Other Lands”, in: Journal o f the Royal 
Statistical Society, Volume LXXII, Part III. Pages 465-495,
(a) Sir George Paish: "Great Britain’s Capital Investments in Individual Colonial and Foreign 
Countries”, in: Journal o f the Royal Statistical Society, Volume LXXXIV. Part II. Pages 167-200.
(b) Sir Robert Kindersley. “A New Study of British Foreign Investments.”, in: The Economic Journal, 
Volume XXXIX, No. 153, March, 1929. Pages 8-24.
(b) Sir Robert Kindersley. “British Foreign Investments in 1928.”, in: The Economic Journal, Volume 
XL, No, 158, June, 1930, Pages 175-183,
(b) Sir Robert Kindersley.“British Foreign Investments in 1929.”, in: The Economic Journal. Volume 
XLI, No. 163, September, 1931. Pages 370-384.
(b) Sir Robert Kindersley. “British Foreign Investments in 1930.”, in: The Economic Journal, Volume 
XLH, No. 166, June, 1932. Pages 177-195.
(b) Sir Robert Kindersley. “British Foreign Investments in 1931.” in: The Economic Journal, Volume 
X1HI, No. 174, June, 1933. Pages 187-204.
coverage of the figures :-
- It omitted the overseas activities of British companies whose main assets were situated in the UK.
- ”... total investment in India and China would have to be substantially increased if proprietary 
holdings by British nationals permanently resident in these countries are included.”
The result is that the figures arising from the above series of articles are highly unrepresentative of British 
investment in China. The only sector where this is not so is the mining sector where the great majority of 
British participants in mining ventures in China were UK registered companies and specifically dedicated 
to operations in China.
This under reporting of British investment in China was perpetuated in much later studies than the above. 
Thus in the 1975 study by A.K.Cairncross (c) there is no mention of China in Table 42 (page 186) -  
“British Investments in Foreign Countries between 1871 and 1914”.
A much more extensive and better conceived (in that it took account of investment by foreigners in 
China in a much more comprehensive and meaningful basis than the above) set of data is contained in the. 
seminal work of Charles F. Remer (d). Remer “came to the study weary o f unsupported qualitative and 
subjective statements”, (e).
Remer5 s analysis was comprehensive in the sense of including loans as well as direct foreign investment. 
His figures were principally for three snapshot years -  1902, 1914 and 1931. The highlight of Remer’s sub- 
classification of the data is that given for 1931 (see page 86) where he splits direct investments into eight 
categories, including mining and manufacturing as two of these categories, for investment by the UK,
Japan, Russia and the USA. For 1914 figures relating to mining and manufacturing are unavailable except 
in a total for all countries with one exception being data for Japan. For 1902 no split is given even as a total 
for all countries for mining and manufacturing.
A complication in Remer5 s figures for investments by the UK is that China in his work includes Hong 
Kong and the Hong Kong figures are not separately specified. This was one of the reasons for Remer5s 
figures for UK industrial investment not being adopted by the present author. However, Remer5 s figures are 
invaluable in assessing comparable investment by other nationalities. Apart from the statistical angle 
Remer5 s work is also of considerable interest in terms of his descriptions of the various foreign industrial 
enterprises operating in China in the period covered. A reconciliation of the writer’s figures for UK 
industrial investment in China with those of Remer and also those of Wei Zichu (see below) is given in 
PART / / o f  this study.
Remer5 s pioneer work has been complemented by PRC writers. Early in the field (June, 1951) was a 
publication by the Peoples5 Publishing Company, Beijing by a Party economist (Wei Zichu) entitled 
“British Enterprises in China and their Profits”. Extracts in English were published in the Far Eastern 
Economic Review (f) a year later. Apart from giving the Party’s (derogatory) view of the record of British 
economic interests in China it also contained a statistical investigation into the extent and distribution
(c) A.K.Cairncross: Home and Foreign Investment 1870-1913. Studies in Capital Accumulation. The 
Harvester Press, 1975,
(d) Charles F. Remer: Foreign Investtnents in China. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933. A 
new edition was published in 1968. New York: Howard Fertig..
(e) Remer Op. cit. Page xxviii in the 1968 edition.
(f) Wei Zichu: “British Enterprises in China and Their Profits”, in: Far Eastern Economic Review, 
June 5th, 1952. Pages 724-729.
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(including a geographic split into Hong Kong, Shanghai and other centres) of these interests in 1936. 
Another, near contemporary, publication is by Wu Chenming (g). This contains for 1936 estimates for the 
distribution o f British investments for mines and industry which in total are very close to those of Wei 
Zichu. Beyond this there are most interesting estimates from the point of view of this study giving more 
statistics for 1936 concerning comparable estimates of industrial investments by the UK, USA, France, 
Japan , Germany, Italy and other countries (Pages 63, 64 and 159). Another later Chinese publication of 
great interest which throws great light on the upsurge in capital investment in industry after the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki is by Wang Jingyu (h). In terms of the statistics presented in these two volumes, the basis for 
these is contained in a listing of enterprises by size of their initial capitalisations established 1895-1913. 
The analysis was conducted for 549 Chinese enterprises (State and private) as well as 136 foreign 
enterprises (including 40 joint ventures with Chinese interests). The latter statistical base is given on pages 
7 to 11 in the first volume. From this the study goes on to further analyse this data base by giving the split
by >
Nationality of the investing country -  England, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and Other.
Branch of industry -  mining, engineering and shipyards, utilities, spinning and weaving,
foodstuffs and other.
Location -  Jiangsu, Hebei, Hubei, Shandong and Other.
Size of initial capital.
The figures are aggregated year by year by country so it is possible to establish the “take off point” in an 
individual country’s performance -  this is revealing in the case of Japan.
The figures presented as above do not give data for investment by country and industry branch at any 
particular date as they just refer to initial capital only (and thus neglect capital increases, the build up of 
reserves and enterprise failures during the period). Nevertheless they are an invaluable signpost to the 
above.
Another, very detailed publication (six volumes -  starting in 1958), is by Chen Zhen (i) and others. 
Particularly of interest are pages 850-877 (Volume Two) which give details of the accounts of British 
industrial enterprises in China.
Finally in this regard there is the 1957 publication by Sun Yutang and others (j).This is indispensable to 
any study of industrial development in China before the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In terms of statistics the 
key figures in terms of gauging industrial investment by the UK and other foreigners are given on pages 
242-247 presenting for 1894 the capital and assets of foreign industrial enterprises by individual firm and 
classified into seven industrial sectors. These estimates are an invaluable jumping off point for analysis of 
industrial investment in China by the UK from 1895 onwards. There is some degree of underestimation due 
to lack of financial information but it is not serious.
(g) Wu Chengming: Diguozhuyi zai jiu  Zhongguo di touzi. (Investments of Imperialistic Powers in the 
Old China) Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1955.
(h) Wang Jingyu: Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliaol895-J914 nicm. (Source materials on the histoiy 
of modem industry in China, I895-I9I4), 2 volumes; Beijing; Kexue chubanshe, 1957.
(i) Chen Zhen and others. Zhongguo jindai gotigye shi ziliao. (Source material for history of modem 
industry of China). 6 volumes; Beijing, 1957.
(j) Sun Yutang and others: Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao, 1840-1895. (Materials on the history of 
modern industry in China, first collection 1840-1895). 2 volumes; Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1957.
- 10-
PROGRESS BEFORE 1895.
As noted, it is impossible to study the early growth of industry in China without recourse to the 
preceding publication edited by Sun Yutang. Especially valuable for the present study are pages 234 -241 
which give a particularly useful checklist of British and other foreign enterprises before 1895. Beyond this 
there are various chapters giving the history of various industrial sectors in considerable detail.
Direct foreign investment before 1895 was inhibited by an, at best, lukewarm attitude by the authorities 
which in some cases meant a complete ban on foreigners engaging in certain industrial activities. There was 
also opposition from vested interests existing in various industrial sectors. Even in those areas where 
foreigners could operate there was resistance to the introduction of technical innovations by Western 
companies. As British concerns were in the forefront of a movement to challenge official obstruction and 
prominent in efforts to introduce new technology, the work of the two authors below are of double interest 
as giving the background to industrial investment before 1895 and also information on some of the main 
industrial ventures by UK companies in that period. A high proportion of the studies of these two authors 
are based on the archives of Jardine Matheson.
The first publication is that of Edward Le Fevour.(k). Of particular interest to the present study is 
Chapter H concerning “The Cotton Trade” which illustrates the frustrations of Jardine Matheson in 
attempting to erect a cotton mill in China.
The inhibitions on foreign direct investment introducing new technology to China are closely analysed in
the works of Shannon R. Brown. In particular, his case studies of the progress or otherwise of technological
transfer from Western countries, in particular the UK, to China covering such sectors as processing of soya
beans, silk reeling, sugar refining, etc. are especially o f interest. These case studies form the major part of
the last three studies listed below :-
"The Partially Opened Door: Limitations on Economic Change in China in the 1860s”, in: 
M odem Asian Studies XU : 2 (1978). Pages 177-192.
“The Transfer of Technology to China in the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Direct Foreign 
Investment”, in: Journal o f Economic History, Volume XXXfX, No. 1, March, 1979. Pages 
180-197.
- “The Ewo Filature: A Study in the Transfer of Technology to China in the Nineteenth Century.” 
in: Technology and Culture X X ; 3, July, 1979. Pages 550-568, (1),
“Cakes and Oil-Technology Transfer and China Soybean Processing 1860-1895”, in:. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, July, 1981 .Pages 449-463.
Brown’s overall conclusion is that the transfer of technology to China until 1895 was significantly 
impeded by official obstruction. Foreigners were not allowed to enter many economic activities and, more 
importantly, their activities were, strictly speaking, confined to the Treaty Ports. Even here their activities 
were often frustrated by arbitrary interference.
(k) Edward Le Fevour: Western Enterprise in Late Ch 'mg China -  A Selective Survey o f Jardine and
Matheson and Company’s Operation 1842-1895. Cambridge, Mass, : Harvard University Press,
1968.
(1) Studies of the progress o f silk filature technology without a specific UK context include :-
- Robert V. Eng: Economic Imperialism in China Silk Production and Exports, 1861-1982.
Berkeley C A: University o f California Press, 1986.
- Mai Chuan-Hui: “L’lntroduction en Chine des techniques europeennes de 1’Industrie de la soie 
de la guerre de 1’ Opium au debut de XX siecle”, in: Revue de I Association Frangaise d ’Etudes 
Chinoise. Vol. XX, No, 1-2, Spring-Autumn 2001, Pages 201-235.
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Brown examines the situation that would have developed if officialdom had given a free hand to foreign 
enterprise. His conclusion is that the potential for the introduction of Western technology would not 
initially had been much larger. Capital was expensive and labour cheap thus inhibiting the introduction of 
capital intensive Western Products. The demand for such products was limited by poverty. Nevertheless in 
this situation “China could have enjoyed a larger, and most importantly, a growing use of foreign 
technology.” (m).
These studies by the two authors dovetail each other very well as Shannon R. Brown in contrast to 
Edward Le Fevour does not cover the very important cotton trade in any detail while Edward Le Fevour 
concentrates more on an account of official obstruction rather than the difficulties experienced in 
technological transfer.
STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL FIRMS OR INDUSTRIES.
House journals and other publications by the firms concerned (usually in celebration of an anniversary) 
are useful and have been used in this study. An excellent example is "1902- Celebrating our First Hundred 
Years -  2002” by British American Tobacco. However, what is discussed below concerns academic studies 
bearing on individual firms or industries.
(1) THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY.
By far the most up to date and authoritative account (it received the full support of the Company) of the 
British American Tobacco Company (B.A.T.) is by Howard Cox: The Global Cigarette. Origins and 
Evolution o f British American Tobacco 1880-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, Apart from 
giving the historical background of B.A.T., its international development and an insight into the 
Company’s competitive and marketing philosophy, Part Three on pages 147-201 gives an account o f the 
Company’s operations in China. In writing this Cox engaged in research at the Economic Research 
Institute, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and this “represented a quantum leap forward in my 
understanding of the company’s organisation", (n). A useful publication giving the history of B.A.T. in its 
American context is by Richard B. Tennant: The American Cigai'ette Industry -  A Study in Economic 
Analysis and Public Policy. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950.
The extensive B.A.T. archives held at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences that Cox consulted form 
the basis of a publication by the Institute -  Shanghai shehui kexue yuan jingji yanjiu suo: YingM ei Yan 
Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian (Collected materials on B.A.T. business activities in China) 4 volumes; 
Beijing, 1983. Covering well over 1,500 pages, this is a gold mine giving detailed statistics on B.A.T.’s 
financial performance in China, its local production capacity and labour force, its production and sales of 
cigarettes together with the same information for other companies in China, its production costs, sources of 
tobacco, etc.
Apart from the work of Cox the other leading publication on B.A.T. in English is an earlier one by 
Sherman Cochran: Big Business in China. Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. This book broke new ground in that it contrasted the 
fortunes of B.A.T. (one of the first truly multinational companies) with the leading Chinese tobacco
(m) Shannon R. Brown: “The Transfer o f Technology to China in the Nineteenth Century: The Role o f 
Direct Foreign Investment ”, in: Journal o f Economic History, Volume XXXIX, No. 1, March, 1979. Page 
197.
(n) Cox. Op. cit. Page x in the Preface.
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company of Nanyang Brothers (o). Thus Cochran’s work has wider implications than a mere study of
B.A.T. in isolation. Nevertheless Cochran’s book gives an exhaustive account of B.A.T. in China and is
still the leading work in the field despite the fact of that when published it lacked the statistical input that
would later have been available from Chinese archives as described above.
One of the many interesting features of Cochran’s book is his account of B.A.T. ’s distribution system,
utilising Chinese agencies, and its allied promotion and advertising effort. In this area of expertise Sherman
Cochran has supplemented his book by fiirther submissions including :-
“Commercial Penetration and Economic Imperialism in China: an American Cigarette 
Company’s Entrance into the Market” in: Ernest R. May and John K. Fairbank (editors): 
America's China Trade in Historical Perspective. The Chinese and American Performance. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986, Pages 151-203.
Chapter 3 (pages 44-69) entitled “ British -  American Tobacco Company”, in: Sherman 
Cochran: Encountering Chinese Networks, Western, Japanese and Chinese Corporations in 
China 1889-1937. Stanford, CA: University of California Press, 2000.
B.A.T. recognised during the Nationalist era the importance of cooperation with the higher echelons of the 
Guomindang -  in particular as how the cigarette tax regime favoured them or their Chinese rivals. Apart 
from the work of Cochran an excellent account of this relationship is given in Parks M. Coble. Jr.: The 
Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government 1927-1937. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1980.
Foreign incursion into Chinese agriculture was a rare occurrence. One o f the exceptions was by B.A.T. 
in its efforts to develop a local source of American “bright” tobacco, (developed in the American South and 
eminently suitable for cigarettes). There developed differing views as to the benefits o f this move for the 
peasants induced to grow this type of tobacco. A critical view was taken by Chen Han-Seng: Industrial 
Capital and Chinese Peasants : A Study in the Livelihood o f Chinese Tobacco Cultivators. Shanghai: Kelly 
and Walsh, 1939, An opposite view was taken by Ramon Myers: The Chinese Peasant Economy : 
Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890 -1949. Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University 
Press, 1970.
The charge by Chen Han- Seng was essentially that by initially providing strong inducements to the 
peasants to grow American type tobacco B.A.T. attracted peasants to a dangerous degree of dependence 
on commercial agriculture where the peasants growing tobacco were in the hands of the local gentry and 
merchants for cash loans (see, in particular, pages 54, 67 and 85). They were as a consequence weak 
sellers. In contrast, Ramon Myers argued that in Shandong -  then the main American type tobacco 
growing province -  that the key problem was not as depicted by Chen Han-Seng but the absence of any 
strong technological progress in local agriculture.
(2) MINING.
In terms o f industry studies rather than studies of individual companies the major publications in 
English are:-
(o) Previous Works to Cochran on Nanyang Brothers were :-
Wang Shijan: Nanyang xiongdi yancao gongsi shiliao. (Source material for the history of the 
Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company,).. Shanghai; Renmin chubanshe,. 1958,
Y.C. Wang: “Free Enterprise in China: The Case of a Cigarette Concern, 1905 -  1953.”, in: Pacific 
Historical Review, 29 (4), 1960. Pages 395-414.
- 13-
Tim Wright (p): Coal Mining in China’s Economy and Society, 1895-1937. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
C.Y. Hsieh and M.C. Chu: Foreign Interest in the M ining Industry in China. Shanghai: China 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931.
William F. Collins: M ineral Enterprise in China. Tianjin: Tientsin Press, Limited, 1922,
En-Han Lee: “China’s Response to Foreign Investment in Her Mining Industry (1902-1911)”, 
in: The Journal o f Asian Studies, Volume XXVIII, No.l, November 1968, Pages 55-75.
A.B.I. Konnikov: The Coal Industry o f China. Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1977.
Wang Kung-ping: Controlling Factors in the Future Development o f the Chinese Coal Industry. 
New York: King’s Crown Press, 1947,
The work by En-Han Lee is indispensable in covering the “Rights Recovery” movement, which was to a 
large extent directed against British mining ventures in the last decade of the last Century.
In terms of company studies the field is mainly concentrated in seven studies in French, English and 
Chinese concerning the history of The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company and its joint venture with 
its Chinese partner -  The Kailan Mining Administration. One Belgian publication which gives an excellent 
account of the acquisition of this company by Western interests and its early history after the takeover is 
given more consideration in a later section. This work by Madame G. Kurgen Van Hentenryk: Leopold I I  et 
les groups financier beiges en Chine -  La politique royale et ses prolongments (1895-1914). Brussels: 
Academic Royale de Belgique, Thesis for Docteur et Lettres, April 3rd, 1971 is of wider interest as it gives 
an outstanding account of Belgian imperialist ambitions and their fulfilment in China and the collaboration 
between Belgian and British interests in China. An earlier study -  J.M.Frochisse: La Belgique et la Chine - 
Relations Diplomatiques ei Econamiques (1839- 1909). Brussels: L’ Edition Universalle S.A., 1936 - is 
also of interest in this last regard as well as the specialist interest,
Ellsworth C. Carlson: The KaipingM ines (1877-1912). Cambridge, Mass.: East Asia Research Centre, 
Harvard University, 1971, gives an account of the company under Chinese ownership (Chapters I -  III), 
the move to foreign control (Chapter IV), Chinese efforts to recover control (Chapter V), the competition 
offered by the Luanzhou Mining Company (Chapter VI) and the formation of the Kailan Mining 
Administration. A very professional account of the acquisition of the Chinese Engineering and Mining 
Company and its early years under foreign control is given by George H. Nash: The Life o f Herbert Hoover 
~ The Engineer 1874-1914. London and New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983. Particularly of 
interest are :-
Chapter 7 -  China : The First Year 
Chapter 8 -  The Kaiping Mines are acquired.
Chapter 9 -  A Mine Manager in China.
Chapter 10 -  The Celestial Empire Strikes Back,
(p) Other works by Tim Wright relating to the Chinese coal industry include ;-
“Entrepreneurs, Politicians and the Chinese Coal Industry, 1895-1937”, in: Modern Asian 
Studies. 14, No. 4. Pages 579-602.
“Sino-Japanese Business in China. The Luda Company, 1921-1937.”, in: Journal o f Asian 
Studies. Volume XXXIX, No.4, August, 1980. Pages 711-727.
“The Nationalist State and the Regulation of Chinese Industry during the Nanjing Decade, 
Competition and Control in Coal Mining.”, in: David Pong and Edmund Fung (Eds.): Ideal and 
Reality -  Social and Political Change in Modern China 1860-1949. Lanham, Maryland, New 
York, London: University Press of America, 1985. Pages 127-152,
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Chapter 11 -  Chang Yen-mao versus Moreing.
Hoover was the main agent in the field for the acquisition by an Anglo-Belgian gang of the original 
Chinese company by very dubious means and this makes Nash’s account particularly valuable.
Articles o f interest concerning these mines include :-
Xiong Xingmei: “British Capital and the Management o f the Kailuan Coal M ines”, in: Tim 
Wright: The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Century. Recent Chinese Studies. 
Basingstoke and London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1992. Pages 177-192.
Wang Yura: “Capital Formation and Operating Profits of the Kailuan Mining Administration 
(1903-1937).”, m: Modern Asian Studies 28.1, February, 1994. Pages 99-128.
Particularly useful insights into the development of labour costs and the standard of living of the workers 
at the Kailan Mining Administration are given in Nankai daxue jingji yanjui suo, jingji shi yanjiu shi (Ed.); 
Jilt Zhongguo Kailuan meikuang de gongzi zhidu he baogong zh idufThe wage and contract system for 
workers in the Kailuan mines in Pre-Communist China), Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1983.
(3) TEXTILES.
In most countries historical statistics o f the local cotton textile industry are usually the most complete -  
reflecting the industry’s early start. This is true of China. Useful historical studies available in English 
include :-
Ralph M. Odell: Cotton Goods in China. Washington D.C.: US Department of Commerce, 
Special Agent Series No. 107, 1916.
Arno S. Pearse: The Cotton Industry o f Japan and China. Manchester, U.K.; International 
Federation of Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers Association, 1929.
H.D. Fong: Cotton Industiy and Trade in China. Tianjin: Nankai Institute of Economics. Chihli 
Press, 1931,
F.S. Blanchard: The Textile Industries o f China and Japan. Post-War Opportunities and 
Problems fo r  America. New York: Textile Reseach Institute, 1944.
A leading, more modem, study is that of Kang Chao: The Development o f Cotton Textile Production in 
China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.
A particularly important topic, on which considerable academic effort has been expended, is to gauge the 
extent to which the traditional handicraft industries of China were affected by imports of manufactured 
goods and the local development of factory products by foreigners or Chinese. As hand cotton spinning and 
weaving was the leading handicraft pursuit, this meant that work on this sector was an essential 
contribution to understanding this controversial subject. Contributions to the debate include :-
Albert Feuerwerker: “Handicraft and Manufactured Cotton Textiles in China, 1871-1910”, 
in: Journal o f Economic History, June, 1970. Pages 338-378.
Kang Chao: The Growth of a Modem Cotton Textile Industry and the Competition with 
Handicrafts.”, in: Dwight H. Perkins (editor): China's M odem Economy in Historical 
Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975. Pages 167-201.
Xu Xinwu: “The Process of the Disintegration of Modern China’s Natural Economy. ”, in:Tim 
Wright: The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Century. Recent Chinese Studies. 
Basingstoke and London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1992. Pages 113-133.
These studies trace the much faster decline of hand spinning in the face of the machine spun equivalent to 
that of hand weaving which displayed much resilience in the face of the power loom equivalent (either 
from foreign or Chinese sources).
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A parallel study but with more emphasis on the silk sector rather than the cotton sector is Alvin Yiu- 
Cheong So: “Foreign Capitalism and Chinese Rural Industiy: A Re-examination of the Destruction 
Thesis.”, in: Asian Profile, Volume 9, No. 6, December, 1981. Pages 477-489.
LABOUR RELATIONS.
Little reference is made in the following study of labour protest in British factories and mines in China 
except when it affected performance against local competitors. In any case, the field is amply covered by 
specialists in this area. Publications in English of especial interest in this connection are :-
Jean Chesneaux: The Chinese Labour Movement 1919-1927 (translated from  the French by 
H M . Wright). Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1968.
Emily Honig: Sisters and Strangers. Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949. Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1986,
Elizabeth J. Perry: Shanghai on Strike ~ The Politics o f Chinese Labor. Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993,
COUNTRY ORIENTATED STUDIES.
Publications of interest on the development of rival foreign industrial enterprises to the UK include :-
Russian investment.
The mainstream of Russian investment was in Manchuria. Publications on the economic development 
of Manchuria often straddle both the periods of Russian and Japanese hegemony but those with a slant 
towards the Russian presence include :-
Bank of Seoul: Economic History o f Manchuria. Chosen, 1920.
Chinese Eastern Railroad Printing Office: North Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
Harbin, 1921.
R.K.I.Quested: ‘M atey” Imperialists. The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria, 1895-1917. Hong 
Kong: Centre o f Asian Studies, University o f Hong Kong, 1982.
B.A.Romanov: Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906). Ann Arbor, Michigan: J.W.Edwards, 1952.
Outside Manchuria the only significant industrial investment was in the making of brick tea. Apart from 
an analysis in Sun Yutang (Op. cit.) there is also an account of the development o f this business contained 
in Robert P. Gardella: “The Boom Years of the Fukien Tea Trade 1842-1888.”, in; Ernest R. May and John 
K. Fairbank (editors): America's China Trade in Historical Perspective. The Chinese and American 
Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986. Part One, 2. Pages 33-75. The decline of 
this business is shown in Boris P. Torgasheff: China as a Tea Producer. London: Commercial Press, 1926. 
German investment.
A key study is John E. Schrecker: Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism -  Germany in Shantung. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Although the study did not focus primarily on 
economic matters, Chapter IV -  The Germans and Development in Shantung, especially pages 225 -  231 
concerning industry, is of interest. A study o f the major German mining investment in China is Rainer 
Falkenberg: Der Kohlenbergbau in Boshan-Xian, Shandong in ersten Drittel des 20 Jahrhunderts. Bonn: 
Wilhelm Matzat, 1984. (q).
(q) Another study of note is Zhao Zenmin: “Die Usurpierung Bergbaurechte in Shandong durch 
Deutschland und die Volksbewegung zu ihrer Ruckeroberung.” in: Kuo Heng yu (Editor); Von der 
Kolonialpolitik zur Kooperation. Munich: Minerva Publikation, 1986. Page 63-100.
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French investment,
A useful background to the early days o f French investment in China is given in Robert Lee: France 
and the Exploitation o f China, 1895-1911 -  A Study o f Economic Imperialism . Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989. Of specific interest is his account (pages 251-266) of the French end of what became the 
French/British joint venture o f the Syndicat de Yunnan.
Belgian investment.
J.M. Frochisse: La Belgique et la Chine, Relations Diplomatiques et Economiques (1839-1909). (see 
above) gives an interesting background to the buildup of Belgian companies to take advantage of the 
apparent opportunities offered by China at the threshold of the Twentieth Century. It also in Chapter VIH 
(pages 374-407) gives an account of early Belgian ventures in mines in China.
As noted above, the work o f Madame G, Kurgen van Hentenryk; Leopold I I  et les groups financiers 
beige en Chine -  La politique royale et ses prolongements (1895 -1914) is an excellent and very 
painstaking account of an era when Belgium under Leopold was run almost as a private company. It traces 
the role o f the King in encouraging investment in China and his personal stake in such investments. It gives 
the Belgian side of the takeover of the Kailan mines and Belgian participation in other mining projects in 
China - some in conjunction with British interests.
Japanese investment.
A leading source in English o f the distribution of Japanese industrial investments in China arose from 
a paper prepared for a 1929 conference in Kyoto of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This paper prepared 
by a Japanese committee was most complete and authoritative being headed by a Mr Masunosuke Odagiri, 
a director of the Yokohama Specie Bank in charge of its China branches and business. This paper was 
published in The Far Eastern Review of January, 1930 (Pages 15-18).
The course of the burgeoning Japanese industrial investment in Manchuria is contained in many 
publications. Those of particular interest are shown in the footnotes to this page.
Of particular interest in tracing the development of the Japanese moves in the 1930s in creating a heavy 
industrial base in Manchuria are those works noted below by The Japan Economic Federation and Ann 
Rasmussen Kinney.
Herbert Bix: "Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy 1900-31”, in: The China 
Quarterly. July/September, 1972. Number 51. Pages 425-443.
The Japan Economic Federation: The Heasy Industry ofManchoukuo. East Asia Economic 
Intelligence Series. No. 3. Tokyo, January, 1940.
Ann Rasmussen Kinney; Japanese Investment in Manchurian Matmfacturing, Mining, 
Transportation and Communications, 1931-1945. New York and London: Garland Publishing 
Inc., 1982.
Edward Stuart Kirby: The Economic Organisation o f Mcmchukuo, with special reference to 
specific features exemplifying the special characteristics o f the modem economic system in the 
Far East. Ph. D. Thesis, London University, 1938.
Kungtu C. Sun: The Economic Development o f Manchuria in First H alf o f the Twentieth 
Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.
Ramon Myers: "Economic Development in Manchuria under Japanese Imperialism. A 
Dissenting View”, in: The China Quarterly. No. 55. July, 1973. Pages 547-550,
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PART TWO
THE DEBATE OVER THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ON THE CHINESE ECONOMY.
A salient question relates to whether the net result of British industrial investment in China in the period 
under review was to the advantage or otherwise of the Chinese economy. British industrial investment was 
only a part, albeit an important part, of foreign industrial investment while this last occupied a minority part 
of total foreign direct investment. Thus it is essential that recourse be made to the considerable volume of 
important literature on the general topic of the impact of foreigners on the Chinese economy. This much 
discussed and controversial subject has often been a highly polemical and politicised topic. Perusal o f this 
literature brings inter alia benefits from the categorisation of the arguments advanced by participants thus 
helping when one is dealing with the benefits or otherwise of foreign investment in a micro-economic 
sector such as industry. There are many facets to be considered in this controversy and a considerable 
number of contributors to the argument but it is hoped that the following is a reasonable representation of 
the important works in the last four or five decades.
Part o f these submissions have already been mentioned in the section above on studies of individual 
firms or industries. Thus, for example, the final chapter -  Conclusion, Imperialism, Nationalism and 
Entrepreneurship (beginning on page 201) of Sherman Cochran’s work on Big Business in China. Sino- 
Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 gives an excellent assessment of the behaviour of
B.A.T. under such heads as imperialist exploitation and the “oppression” argument. Again, the validity of 
the “destruction” argument is considered in the works of Albert Feuerwerker (r), Kang Chao, Xu Xinwu 
and Alvin Yiu Cheong in the section above on Cotton Textiles. Again, in the section above concerning 
Country Orientated Studies, John Schrecker’s study o f Germany in Shandong is another example (He finds, 
for instance, -page 258- that the German experience in Shandong had a “favourable impact on economic 
growth”).
An important input to this field o f study is the work of Chi-ming Hou: Foreign Investment and Economic 
Developmerrt in China, 1840-1937. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. (s). This was a 
challenge to generally accepted views that economic imperialism in the form of foreign trade and local 
investment by foreigners had a serious debilitating affect on the Chinese economy. These views were 
reiterated by Chinese scholars and politicians such as Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, as 
well as finding acceptance in the West (t). The principal points of condemnation of foreign penetration 
were listed by Chi-ming Hou as follows (u) :-
(r) The work o f Albert Feuerwerker bearing on the foreign presence and the handicraft sector is more 
extensive than the above indicates including such excellent studies as >
- The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Centre 
for Chinese Studies. No. 29. The University o f Michigan, 1976.
- Studies in the Economic History o f Late Imperial China -  Handicraftf Modern Industry and the 
State. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1995.
(s) This incorporated two earlier works by Chi-ming Hou :-
- “The Oppression Argument on Foreign Investment in China, 1895-1937.”, in: Journal o f Asian
Studies, 20.4, August, 1961. Pages 435-448.
- “External Trade, Foreign Investment and Domestic Development: The Chinese Experience
1840-1937”, in\ Economic Development and Cultural Trade, 28-29,1961. Pages 21-41.
(t) Chi-ming Hou. Op.cit. Pages 1-3.
(u) Ibid.
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The ruination of the traditional handicraft industries.
The draining of wealth by remittance of profits to the investing countries.
Local foreign enterprises enjoyed many unfair advantages and thus stifled the growth of modem 
Chinese enterprises.
Chapter 1 gives a general picture of foreign investment in China with Chapter 3 giving more detail on 
direct foreign investment (v). Chapter 4, a short but very useful chapter, entitled Framework of Analysis of 
the Effects of Foreign Investment, provides a good listing of points to be taken into consideration when 
judging the effect of foreign investment on a specific economic section.
A feature of the work of Chi-ming Hou is his employment of financial analysis in Chapter 5 of the 
available accounts of foreign firms in China from 1872 to the 1930s. Figures that were derived from these 
accounts are given concerning profitability (page 113) and retentions as compared with dividends (page 
102). In the case of the latter reinvestment ratio no less than 775 financial statements were analysed -  in the 
case of profitability only 478. This approach by Chi-ming Hou was a great amplification of earlier work by 
Remer (w) and was praiseworthy as representing a departure from earlier works by making an effort to 
analyse the empirical evidence in the form of financial statements. Chi-ming Hou not only analysed the 
financial progress of foreign enterprises in China but also attempted to contrast their performance with that 
of enterprises in their own investing countries. Further analyses made by Chi-ming Hou include those 
relating to whether foreign trade and investment retarded modem investment by Chinese enterprises 
(Chapter 6) and whether Chinese handicrafts were adversely affected by foreign economic penetration. 
(Chapter 7).
The broad findings of the study (Chapter 9 — page 220) were :-
“ It can be said that foreign investment played an important role in bringing about whatever economic 
modernisation or “preconditions” for development China experienced, that the Chinese-owned enterprises 
and the traditional sector survived the destructive effects of foreign competition, and that foreign 
investment did not result in a lop-sided export development and all its accompanying evils such as 
excessive external instability”.
Before considering the counter-arguments that were unleashed by the work o f Chi-ming Hou and others 
of the so-called “Harvard School” (x) it is worth mentioning other studies that broadly agree with the main 
conclusions but with cogent reservations. A leading contribution to the debate is Thomas G. Rawski: 
Economic Growth in Prewar China. Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1989:-
“Chinese and foreign observers have often claimed that the special privileges available to 
foreign businesses... led to an artificial distortion of both the spatial and sectoral dispersion of 
pre-war industry. The available data provide little support for this view” (Page 86).
“The idea that growing sales of manufactures, however detrimental to the interests of 
particular groups of craftsmen, destroyed large portions of China’s handicraft sector is not 
substantiated by available evidence.” (Page 76).
(v) In addition Chapter 7, Pages 65-79 gives an account o f foreign investment in mining and
manufacturing.
(w) Remer. Op. cit. Page 294.
(x) See the second paragraph of Joseph Esherick: 'Harvard on China: The Apologetics of
Imperialism”, in: Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol.4. No. 4, December, 1972. Pages 9-16.
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Another work by Thomas G. Rawski on the first shoots of Chinese industrialisation is China’s Transition 
to Industrialism. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1980 which focussed on three 
industries -  engineering, chemicals and ferrous metallurgy with the emphasis in the case of engineering on 
backward linkeage from foreign enterprises and adoption of new technology providing opportunities for 
Chinese enterprises. In the case of ferrous metallurgy there was, in contrast, a history between 1900 and 
1945 of “declining output, foreign takeover and idle capacity”(y).
A very cogent contribution is that of Robert F. Demberger: “The Role of the Foreigner in China’s 
Economic Development 1840-1949.”, in: Dwight H. Perkins (Ed.): China’s Modern Economy in Historical 
Perspective. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1975. Pages 20 -47. Demberger, while generally in 
sympathy with the work of Chi-ming Hou, charges him with employing arguments based on examples that 
are contrary to the hypothesis being criticized. This “argueing by counter example” while possibly a 
procedure that is applicable to mathematics and natural sciences is not valid in the case of social sciences. 
(Demberger, pages 23-24).
The counterblast to the arguments by Hou and the “Harvard School” was, to a degree, centred on the 
Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars (z). The major contributions were by Joseph Esherick (aa), Cherl 
Payer (bb) and Elizabeth Lasek (cc).
Joseph Esherick accepted the “scholarly quality” of the “Harvard School” and that those interested in 
developing alternatives to the Harvard paradigm would have to produce studies of similar quality in various 
key areas such as the handicraft industry and the Treaty Port economy. He set out to identify pitfalls in the 
Harvard approach and to advance some suggestions for an alternative paradigm. In this task he thus stated 
that “The inescapable fact remains that imperialism transformed a remarkably stable albeit 
“underdeveloped” Chinese economy into an increasingly unstable and dependent economy in which 
millions of peasants would experience displacement and deprivation.. (Page 11). Again, on this page, he 
asserts concerning industrial investment that “In the areas where foreigners concentrated...they 
overwhelmed all native competition”. Concerning another facet of the issues at stake, he argues that 
“Foreign investment...led to a degree of geographic concentration which was clearly inimical to the best 
interests of China’s balanced economic development”. (Page 12). On Page 13 he diminished the alleged 
beneficial "imitation effect” of foreign investment.
Esherick then goes on to state his views as to the political, social and cultural aspects of imperialism, as 
well as the economic aspects, in the context of China.
(y) Another relevant contribution by Thomas G. Rawski is “The Growth of Producer Industries, 1900- 
1971”, in: Dwight H.Perkins: China’s M odem Economy in Historical Perspective. Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1975. Pages 203-233.
(z) In 1968 as a reaction to, in particular, the Vietnam imbroglio, a group o f scholars in the USA formed 
the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars and began publishing this bulletin with a distinctly radical and 
anti-imperialism approach, For a description of this movement see Paul A. Cohen: Discovering History in 
China. American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1975. Pages 97-111..
(aa) Joseph Esherick: ‘Harvard on China: The Apologetics of Imperialism.”, in: Bulletin o f Concerned 
Asian Scholars, Vol. 4, No.4, December, 1972. Pages 9-16.
(bb) Cheryl Payer; “Harvard on China II -  Logic, Evidence and Ideology.”, in: Bulletin o f Concerned 
Asian Scholars, Vol. 6, No. 4, April-August, 1974. Pages 66-68.
(cc) Elizabeth Lasek: “Imperialism in China: A Methodological Critique.” in: Bulletin o f Concerned 
Asian Scholars, Volume 15, No.l, January-February, 1983. Pages 50-64.
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Payer alleged that one of Hou’s main contentions i.e. “foreign capital was largely responsible for the 
development o f whatever economic modernisation took place in China before 1937” was a tautology. Also, 
when he inferred that one cannot claim Chinese industry was “oppressed” by foreign capital Payer argued 
he had missed the point. “The point is that autonomous development of the Chinese economy was 
prevented by the distortions of the treaty port economy” (page 67). However, as pointed out by Tim Wright 
(dd) in his later article in the same Journal (discussed below) this is “essentially a political argument” (page 
38) and amounts to charging all foreign investment as having a necessarily adverse effect on the recipient 
economy.
Elizabeth Lasek begins by by contrasting Eurocentric and Sinocentric interpretations which characterise 
the historiography of modem China analysing in turn Chinese conceptions of imperialism and 
modernisation theory and imperialism. She then analyses in a critical manner what she thinks are the 
limitations o f such a dualistic analysis and suggests “an alternative approach to understanding the 
intertwined problems of imperialism and development in China” (page 50). One example she gives (page 
54) of the interaction is the fashioning of collaborator classes e.g. compradores which linked China and 
imperialist powers. Lasek develops her alternative framework from page 53 onwards and concludes 
“understanding imperialist penetration in China...requires going beyond the dualistic and often mechanical 
methodologies shared by a wide range of recent writers...The study of imperialist expansion must focus 
upon the articulation of imperialist commercial and industrial capital, supported by the imperialist state, 
with the indigenous class structure and the state in the periphery” (page 64).
The work of the three writers above could be argued to be entwined with political factors rather than 
concentrating on disputing the issues raised by Chi-ming Hou and others of the “Harvard School” which 
were predominantly economic issues.
Wright’s article is a contrast to the generality of articles in the Bulletin o f Concerned Asicnr Scholars in 
that it gave some support, albeit critical, to the arguments of the “Harvard School”. Wright confines the 
argument of the debate on the impact of imperialism on China to the most interesting and relevant question 
-  the impact on the economy of foreign trade and investment. After a review of the arguments advanced by 
the protagonists concerning the various sides o f the argument as to the beneficial effects or otherwise of the 
last on China, he concludes (page 37) that there were three major factors that had clouded the debate
(a) Political and moral views overshadowed the assessment of the economic balance of advantage.
(b) Vagueness as to the total universe in which foreign trade or investment operated.
(c) The failure of most authors to tackle the question of counter - factual situations implicit in the various 
arguments -quoting Huenemann (ee) that “we often have to use a “before” and “after” model but we 
need a “with” and “without” one. This failure, Wright states, is the most serious problem of the three.
(a) Wright argues that because imperialism may be accounted as wicked it must not necessarily be, on 
balance, harmful to the local economy. He takes the extreme case of the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company with its tawdry takeover by British and Belgian interests as an example. He pleads
(dd) Tim Wright: “Imperialism and the Chinese Economy: A Methodological Critique of the Debate.”, 
in: Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars, Volume 18, No.l, 1986. Pages 36-45.
(ee) Ralph Williams Huenemann; The Dragon and the Iron Horse: The Economics o f Railroads in 
China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. Page 24.
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for the “clear separation of economic and political issues.” (page 38)
(b) On pages 38-41 Wright points out the risks of arriving at conclusions drawn from sector analyses, 
valuable as they may. “In general, a factor that influences one sector of the population or the economy 
in a harmful or beneficial way does not necessarily have the same effect on the economy as a whole 
(page 39).
(c) Wright gives four major examples of the counter -  factual situation implicit in the previous literature 
on the subject (for example, the debate on the “oppression” hypothesis).
Wright concludes (page 45) :-
“However clearly the question is specified, the intractable problem of counter -  factuality remains. 
Careful and explicit consideration of the counter-factual implications o f our arguments might warn us 
against statements which imply some of the more extreme and plausible scenarios. But beyond that, the 
lack of predictability and the impossibility o f conducting controlled experiments in the social sciences will 
always leave room for different judgements on the likelihood of a particular counter -  factual hypothesis”. 
A salutary caution to upgrading conclusions from a limited study to apply to a greater universe.
Another facet o f the argument concerning the impact of imperialism on Chinese economic development 
is the argument that Western and Japanese economic presence was only at the margin. In which case, the 
balance of arguments whether foreign economic presence was favourable or unfavourable is of reduced, 
albeit still of some importance, potency in considering China’s economic development. Victor D.L.Lippit 
advances this thesis in two submissions in July, 1978 and January, 1980. (ff). He argues in the first 
submission that :-
- Imperialistic expansion is “a contributory but distinctly secondary factor retarding Chinese 
development” (Page 255).
-.... “the development of underdevelopment in China is more properly attributable to the domestic 
class structure and relations of production than to external influence”. (Page 323).
Again, in the later submission :-
- .... “this historical process must be accounted for primarily by domestic factors rather than the thrust 
of colonialism and imperialism, and further, that the class structure and uses of the surplus, ..were the 
key domestic factors”. (Page 90).
It was the gentry class that, according to Lippit, frustrated economic development :-
- “China became an underdeveloped country in the late imperial era because the interest of the 
gentry class was in preserving the status quo, because the economic and social changes associated 
with economic development would have undermined the social order that provided everything it 
wanted”, (Page 322 in first submission).
Lippit rejected in his July, 1978 article (Pages 287-294) Mark Elvin‘s (gg) theory of the high level 
equilibrium trap. This trap was alleged to be activated by technological and resource constaints in the
(ff) Victor D.L.Lippit (with comments by Mark Elvin, Albert Feuerwerker and C.Riskin): “Development 
of Under Development”, in: Modern China, Volume 4, Number 3, July, 1978. Pages 251-375.
Victor D.L.Lippit: “The Development of Underdevelopment in China. An Afterword.”, in: Modern 
China, Volume 6, Number 1, January, 19S0.Pages 86-93.
(gg) Mark Elvin: The Pattern o f the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation. Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1973.
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context of a rising population. (Foreign economic penetration could then in this environment be regarded as 
beneficial in terms of releasing the trap).
On pages 329-330 of the July, 1978 article Mark Elvin replies to Lippit’s criticisms but the really 
detailed refutation of Lippit’s work occurred in the succeeding comments by Albert Feuerwerker (pages 
331-339) and Carl Riskin (pages 360-375) .The criticisms by Feuerwerker -  “A White Horse May or Not 
be a Horse but Megahistory is not Economic History” - were absolutely withering, hi a sole word of 
comfort he had for Lippit he states that Lippit “...correctly concludes that the economic consequences of 
imperialism in China were ambiguous. “ (Page 332). This was a minor concession in a series of criticisms.
Firstly, he alleged that Lippit’s attributing of “the development of underdevelopment” in China to class 
structure and “relations of production” was a restatement that the interests of the gentry and Confucianism 
were inhibiting to economic development ... hardly a novel proposition (in Feuerwerker’s words, “ ....the 
wide-eyed discovery o f what is already widely known.” -  Page 334).
Secondly, by assuming that the gentry were a homogenous entity, Lippit ignored the development of a 
younger branch of the gentry who were not so adverse to economic change.
Thirdly, Feuerwerker argues that there is “an enormous distance that exists between Professors Lippit’s 
mega-historical approach and the need to come to grips with the complex dynamics of China’s economy 
and society.” (Page 334). To understand the issues involved requires patient and detailed analysis of the 
factors involved linking empirical data and theory. (Page 336),
So far we have considered studies which have considered Chinese underdevelopment and its connection 
with Western and Japanese economic penetration with little comparison with the equivalent in other Asian 
countries. This balance is corrected in two studies of note but with radically different conclusions :-
In the first study Frances V. Moulder (hh) asks why Japan was the only non-Westem country in the area 
to be a major capitalist nation and addresses the comparison with China. She argues that imperialism made 
it impossible for the Chinese State to begin an effective development program. China’s failure to undergo 
capitalist style industrialisation during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century was because of its 
incorporation into the capitalist World economy.
In this regard Moulder takes the “World economy” approach -  that the impact of industrialised capitalist 
countries on non-industrialised nations is to the detriment of development in the latter. Thus the exposure 
of developing nations to a capitalist World economy leads to an unequal system with the benefits accruing 
to the industrial nations. Thus, according to this, the greater development of Japan compared with China 
was attributable to its lesser links to the World economy than China.
In contrast to Moulder, Rhoads Murphey (ii) examines why the impact of imperialism was so limited 
in China in comparison with India. On Page 1 he asserts that “The network which centred on the colonial 
ports in India came to encompass and substantially shape the evolution of modern India. The parallel effort 
based on the Chinese treaty ports (jj) largely failed to penetrate the indigenous system and produced very
(hh) Frances V. Moulder: Japan, China and the Modern World. Towards a Reinterpretation o f East Asian 
Development ca. 1800 to ca. 1918, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
(ii) Rhoads Murphey: The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China. Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University o f Michigan Press, 1977.
(jj) Also see:- Rhoads Murphey: “The Treaty Ports and China’s Modernisation.”, in: Mark Elvin and
G.W.Skinner (Eds.): The Chinese City Between Two Worlds. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 
1974. Pages 17-71.
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little change.” On Page 8 he states “The relations between the treaty ports and their supposed hinterlands, in 
contrast with the Indian experience, were severely limited. They were confined for the most part to the 
extraction via Chinese agents of a few predominantly agricultural goods for export and the distribution, 
again through Chinese agents, of imported or treaty port manufactured goods.” Murphey argues in this 
connection that the compradore was a “symbol of the continued self-sufficient viability of the traditional 
Chinese economic system.” (Page 104).
Not being a sovereign state like China “India was in a condition to accept not merely colonial rule but 
fundamental change along the lines offered by the British.” (page 65). In this case “The colonial ports did 
indeed transform India.” (Page 74).
This question of the impact on the Chinese economy of foreign penetration is, clearly, a very complex 
one and the jury is still out -  probably for a long time. One thing, however, seems clear. Any conclusions 
pertaining to the larger problem arrived at from a case study of a particular sector must be regarded as very 
tentative and it is dangerous to assume that they equally relate to the total picture.
This limitation applies in the forthcoming analysis of British industrial investment in China. The 
coverage of the data contained in this analysis below is such as not to go near proving or disproving any of 
the arguments advanced by the authors above and others. Thus, if one just takes only foreign direct 
investment, I would roughly estimate that, for instance, in 1931, British industrial investment only 
amounted to around 5 percent of total FDI. Beyond that the total picture must also take into account trade 
with China by foreigners not accompanied by local investment. To draw firm conclusions regarding the 
overall picture from such a small base would be hazardous in the extreme.
Nevertheless, attainment of a limited objective is still viable. After examining the empirical evidence 
presented in the text an attempt is made at the end of the study to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the 
effects of British industrial investment on the Chinese economy was, on balance, favourable or otherwise. 
Such an exercise can be described as, hopefully, providing a few spoors on a long trail. In other words, 
such an exercise, albeit worth pursuing, can only be a small building block in assessing the overall issue of 
the effects of foreign trade and investment on the Chinese economy in the period under review.
An analytical framework is followed throughout this study, incorporating an analysis under the main 
heads of argument (kk) revealed in the various works reviewed above and elsewhere as to the beneficial or 
otherwise consequences o f foreign industrial investment in China. The principal heads of argument 
examined can be classified as follows 
The “Imperialist Oppression” Argument.
The charge is that the imperialist powers exerted (mainly successful) pressure to give their economic 
interests in China -  either engaged in direct investment or import trade -  an advantage over indigenous 
enterprises. Aided by the “Unequal Treaties”, this process could be exercised by securing low tariff 
protection for Chinese enterprises, favourable treatment for foreigners in terms of domestic taxes and 
pressure by the Powers to facilitate the securing of mining concessions (or favourable redemption 
arrangements) for their nationals. These advantages by foreigners are thus believed to have inhibited the
(kk) Chi-Ming Hou gives an excellent encapsulation of these arguments in Chapter Four -  “Framework of 
Analysis of the Effects of Foreign Investment ”, in; Foreign Investment and Economic Development in 
China, 1840-1937.
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growth of Chinese enterprises.
A related charge is that Western and Japanese presence in the Treaty Ports and the Leased Areas led to 
a lopsided geographic distribution of both Western/Japanese and Chinese industrial undertakings, primarily 
in the coastal strip.
The “Destructive Effect” Thesis.
It is alleged that a combination of local production by foreigners and imports exerted a calamitous 
influence on the traditional Chinese handicraft sector.
The “Drain Effect” Thesis.
Foreign enterprises in China -  either in the form of industrial enterprises or enterprises engaged in 
trade, utilities, financial services, etc, are supposed to have made high profits, well in excess o f the 
equivalent in their native countries, and that these high earnings were preponderantly transmitted to the 
parent country.
The “Imitation Effect” Argument.
It is argued that Western investment was a catalyst in hastening Chinese economic modernisation. 
The founding of local Western enterprises led to the development of imitative Chinese enterprises in the 
same sector. This was hastened by trained Chinese personnel transfering from Western competitors. Also, 
there developed backward linkages with local Western firms increasingly outsourcing components, repairs, 
etc from Chinese enterprises.
The “Instability Effect" Argument.
Westeners developed an export trade in Chinese agricultural products which had been further 
processed in their Chinese factories. This process is charged with exposing sectors of Chinese agriculture 
to the vagaries of the international market leading to local producers of natural products suffering distress 
in periods of recession.
There are obviously other facets to the controversy as to the effect o f Western (and Japanese) incursion 
on the Chinese economy. Some of these emerge as the empirical evidence is studied.
The analytical framework discussed above is mainly deployed in the following sectios of the main text >
- PART III where in each separate chapter conclusions are drawn as to (the often differential) impact 
on the Chinese economy of each particular sector of British investment.
- Part V which analyses the financial evidence.
- PART VI attempts to balance the various arguments, mainly in the light of the analysis contained in 
the above two PARTS and comments on the issues raised in this Literature Review.
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PARTI  - PROGRESS BEFORE 1895.
By no standards could China before the 1895 signing of the Treaty o f Shimonoseki ending the Sino- 
Japanese War be adjudged as an unhindered environment for inward industrial investment. In a period of 
vibrant British investment overseas in mines, railways, industrial establishments, public utilities, etc China 
did not figure to any significant extent. It was not until 1897 that any British registered industrial company 
was formed with the object to invest in China. (This was the Pekin Syndicate, Limited ~ see PART III -  
Chapter Two -  Mining, below).
The economic and political background in China (1) in the last half of the 19th Century was not 
conducive to modem industrial development even that undertaken by the Chinese Government or private 
Chinese sources. In the political sphere the country was hit in the earlier part of this period by grave 
internal strife. The most important of these conflicts was the Taiping Revolution, lasting from 1850-64, and 
this was compounded by the Nien Rebellion (1851-68) and Moslem revolts in Yunnan (1855-73) and the 
North West (1862-78). On the suppression of these and a strengthening of the ruling dynasty, it was 
unfortunate that effective power fell, until the early years of the new century, into the hands of the narrow­
minded Empress Dowager who acted as a brake on modernisation.
The efforts of the less traditionally minded exponents of modem industries, as embodied in the Self- 
Strengthening Movement, did have some success in developing modem industries in armaments, mining, 
light industries, etc (particularly the former) but this success was very limited. Throughout, however, all 
efforts to develop Westem-style industrial enterprises were liable to be stifled by a large segment of the 
officials and gentry. Another limiting factor was a shortage of capital.
The very limited progress in foreign direct investment in industry (here defined as including mining but 
excluding utilities, construction, etc) contrasted with the much greater progress made in opening up China 
to foreign trade. With treaties signed with the UK, USA and France in 1842-1844, these powers gained, 
inter alia, abolition of a monopolistic system of trade, opening of certain ports to trade and residence of 
their nationals and an import tariff fixed at such a relatively low rate that it precluded future levels that 
would provide meaningful protection to native industries either established or infant. Further treaties in 
1858-1860 also secured for Western maritime countries further trade concessions and the access to more of 
these Treaty Ports. At the same time Russia gained considerable commercial concessions along with 
territorial gains.
Official obstruction compounded by resistance from vested interests was responsible for this situation of 
very limited foreign investment in industry. This became increasingly frustrating to Westerners who 
contrasted this slow development with other countries where the process of inward investment was well 
advanced. Foreign investments in industry existed in the margin and in the case o f projects outside the 
Treaty Ports were definitely illegal. In the case of the Treaty Ports there was a conflict over the legality of 
foreign industrial investment between Chinese officialdom and foreigners which was not resolved until 
1895 (see below). The increasing arbitrariness of Chinese bans on certain projects by foreigners was a 
deterrent to such investment - see page 32 onwards below. In any case whole sectors such as mining were 
out of bounds irrespective of location. In many cases investments introducing new technology to China 
were stifled. Most of these attempts to introduce superior technology were British. In this regard the work, 
utilising, in particular, the Jardine Matheson archives, of Shannon R. Brown, as outlined above, is
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particularly of interest. (2). It forms an invaluable, detailed background to the British projects in silk 
reeling, soya bean processing and sugar refitting referred to below.
Despite these handicaps, there was some industrial investment by foreigners, albeit generally on a small 
scale in terms of size of enterprise and the total amount of investment involved. In the case of the UK this 
investment was concentrated in two areas
that connected with external trade -  servicing of shipping and improving of Chinese products 
for export.
that connected with supplying products to the small but fast growing Western community in- 
China, those Chinese developing Western tastes and establishments producing products for the 
developing infrastructure in terms of buildings, port facilities, etc in the burgeoning seaports, 
especially Shanghai.
Altogether there were 47 UK industrial enterprises that were set up in China before 1895. A listing of 
these is given in APPENDIX ONE. These enterprises were started by British merchant houses or by other 
British nationals resident in China. Many o f  these enterprises went out o f business or were merged into new 
groups and thus by 1894 there were 29 only still in existence. These two categories were distributed by 
branch of industry as follows
Total of enterprises -in Shanghai Existent in 1894 -in Shanghai 
started before 1895.
Processing of silk 5 5 4 4
Engineering
- Marine 14 11 7 5
- General engineering 2 1 1 1
Chemicals 3 3 2 2
Drink 8 6 7 5
Food 5 2 2 2
Cleaning and packing of
agricultural products 4 2 4 1
Other 6 6 % 7
Total 47 36 29 22
In terms o f industrial enterprises started before 1895, covering a period of four decades, the UK was a 
clear leader. Enterprises started over the same period by other Western countries totalled 2 5 - 7  by "USA 
interests, 6 by Russian interests (all engaged in making “”brick tea” i.e. compressing tea dust and low 
quality tea into bricks) and 12 by other Europeans (virtually all French or German) (3).
The'total value'of investment by British enterprises in industry in 1894 can be estimated here- as totalling 
£0.80 Million. In terms of current values this would be in the region of £55- 60 million.
The split by industrial sector is estimated as follows - £ million
Total O f which in Shanghai
Processing of silk 0.20 0.20
Marine engineering 0.41 0.39
General engineering 0.01 0.01
Chemicals 0.04 0.04
Drink and food 0.04 0.03
Cleaning and packing of
agricultural products 0.08 0.02
Other 0.02 0.02
Total 0.80 0.71
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As can be seen, the share of Shanghai in 1894 was high both in terms of enterprises (76 percent) and the 
value of investment (89 percent).
The processing of silk
The introduction into China of steam (or water) power into the reeling of raw silk lagged behind that of 
Western countries by -many years. The first water-powered reeling mill was established in Lyon in 1785 
followed by the introduction in France of a steam powered filature in 1805 (4). The first modem Chinese 
filature was established in Guangdong in 1872 by a local entrepreneur (5). But this filature, after resistence 
by vested interests, was shut down by order of the sub prefecture magistrate (6). The machinery was 
trasferred to Macau (7). However, this was only an interruption to progress in the province and by 1881 
there were ten modem filatures there with 2,400 basins (8). Progress in Shanghai was slower but a Chinese 
filature was established in Shanghai in 1882 sharing an Italian* technician with'two Western filatures (the 
Jardine Matheson and Iveson ventures -  see below).
Output from Western style filatures was in terms of regularity much in advance o f manual output. An 
attempt to exploit this superior technology had*been made in 186Tby a Mr -John Major (no connection with 
the later, well-known bearer of this name), backed by Jardine Matheson, with the erection of a Western 
style filature with 100 basins in Shanghai (9). This venture -  The Silk Reeling Establishment -  was, after 
teething troubles, technically successfully but
“The innovation met with so much opposition from the Chinese middlemen and people who would, 
through its adoption, be thrown out of work, that the enterprising foreigners....were unable to obtain a 
supply o f  cocoons at anything like reasonable rates.” (10).
(The multitude of hand cotton spinners meant that there was no organised resistence to the advent of new 
technology whereas the silk merchants, manual reeling establishments and weavers were much smaller in 
number and close knit).
After Mr Major’s death in 1869, Jardine Matheson eventually decided to close the filature. On its closure 
in 1872 The North China Herald commented that “altogether the filature never had a fair chance.” (11).
In 1882-Jardine Matheson returned to the attack with the formation o f  the Shanghai Silk Manufacturing 
Company -  shortly renamed the Ewo Filature -  with an initial capacity of 108 basins -later 500 (12). 60 
percent of the capital was held by Chinese silk merchants and half of the Board members were Chinese 
(13) -  a sensible move to ease the supply o f cocoons from the interior. At the same time another-British 
concern -  Iveson and Company -  opened a similar sized filature with 108 basins which however were not 
expanded much, also in Shanghai (14). This was joined in 1891 by a third British concern -  the Lun Chung 
Silk Filature -  with 188 basins and 250 workers (15).
The renewed Jardine Matheson venture and the Iveson filature had a difficult time for the first five years 
due to the lack of skilled workers and the difficulty of marketing the product but after 1887 matters 
improved (16). This success o f  the Ewo Filature encouraged Jardine Matheson to start up in 1888 a 
Schappe process mill -  Ewo Silk Spinning, Weaving and Dyeing Company -  for spinning silk waste 
(produced in reeling or from cocoons not suitable for reeling) and further processing. (17).
In 1894 British investment in  silk-reeling-and further processing (but not as far as silk weaving which
never developed) can be estimated to be as follows :-
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Number of Number of Investment
Employees Basins Thous. Taels £ Thous.
Ewo Silk Filature 1,100 500 700- 98
Iveson and Company 350 200 280 39
.Tun Chung Silk Filature 250- 188 250- 36
Ewo Silk Spinning, Weaving
and Dyeing Co. 1.000 - 210 29
TOTAL 2.700 888 1.440 202
- % of foreign presence in
the industry 45 39 38 38
(Figures from Sun Yutang et.al. Op. cit. Pages 240 and 244)
Despite a leading position against American, French and German competition, only the Ewo Filature out 
of three British firms survived in the silk reeling sector into the next century. Indeed, by 1911 the Ewo 
Filature was the only filature under foreign management (18). By 1920 the Ewo Filature reached its peak 
capacity of 540 basins but this was only 0.8 percent of National capacity (19). In 1932 with a capacity of 
508 basins it was taken over by the firm’s compradore (20). This tapering off of British involvement in the 
silk industry contrasts with the situation in marine engineering where British interests played a prominent 
part until the Second World War.
Engineering- 
Marine Engineering.
The increased opening in the 1840$ and 1850s of China to foreign trade and residence, albeit restricted 
to the Treaty Ports, saw an upsurge in Western shipping frequenting Chinese ports -  exemplified by the rise 
of Shanghai as a port (see the chapter on Engineering in Part III below). With this rise in shipping it 
obviously did not take long for foreigners to seek maintenance and repair facilities in the local ports. The 
introduction of steamships and metal hulled ships and the fact that the rate of technical innovation in sailing 
ships was at its peak during the period when it was challenged by the steamship (21), meant that local 
facilities and expertise were much needed and in the event supplied. Shipbuilding yards were a natural 
outcome of these facilities built for the repair and maintenance of vessels calling at Chinese ports. In 
Shanghai shipbuilding commenced in the 1860s.
Although British firms were not the pioneers of marine engineering in China -  the American company 
of Purvis and Company established the first dockyard for ship repairing in 1852 (22) - they soon 
established a commanding presence in the key port of Shanghai. Altogether, up to 1894 there were 14 
British enterprises that entered this field (see APPENDIX ONE). Apart from a short lived venture in 
Fuzhou, the only significant British presence outside Shanghai was a dock started in 1858 in Xiamen (23). 
Floated as a limited company in 1892 (The New Amoy Dock Company with issued capital of $67 thous - 
£14 thous.), the Company had a dry dock which by then had been extended to 340 feet in length, 40 feet 
wide and 15 feet deep (24). There was also attached facilities in the form of a foundry and a machine shop 
(Amoy Engineering Company with a capital of $30 thous. - £4 thous.) (25). This British interest in Xiamen 
was terminated in 1918 when it was sold to the Chinese Government for £67,000 (26).
The first major British enterprises in Shanghai were the Pootung Dock Company (1853) (27) and the 
Shanghai Dock Company (1858) (28) followed by the Shanghai and Pootung Foundry and Engineering 
Company (1872) (29). By the early 1870s these three companies were major listings in The North China 
Herald of the infant Shanghai Stock Exchange and possessed three dry docks
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Capital Dry Docks -  feet
Th. taels £’000 Length Breadth Depth
Pootung Dock Company 95- 28- 380- 50 21-
Shanghai Dock Company 220 66
I 374- 70- 14
II 375 52 14
Shanghai and Pootung Foundry
and Engineering Company 100 30 - - -
(The dock dimensions are from Sun Yutang et. al. Op. cit. Page 17)
The major facilities in Shanghai had towards the end of the Century been incorporated into two British 
companies (which amalgamated in 1900) >
Boyd and Company.
S.C. Famham and Company;
Boyd and Company was founded in 1863 and by 1874 were employing nine British staff (30). By 1880 
with the completion of the New Dock the concern employed over 1,000. (31). Apart from the New Dock 
the Company’s other main asset was the Pudong engine works, described above, that was incorporated in 
1891. (32). In August, 1891 this engineering, shipbuilding and docking business was incorporated into a 
limited company. (33).
In 1865’two shipwrights “ S.C. Farnham and C.P. Blethen -  started a general shipbuilding and repairing 
establishment in connection with the Old Dock. By 1874 S.C.Famham and Company employed 13 
Europeans. (34). In August, 1892 the business was turned into a limited liability company (35). In 1893 it 
completed the largest steamer -  one of 2,522 tons -  so far built in China (36). With its 3 docks S.C. 
Famham and Co. had by then considerably more docking capacity than Boyd and Co.
By 1894 British investment in marine engineering can be estimated as follows :-
Numb er o f Investment
Emplovees Thous. Taels £ thous.
S.C.Famham and Co. 2,200 760 145
Boyd and Co. 2,200 895 125
The Hongkew Engine Co. 350 300 42
Acum’s Boat Building Yard (a) 250 300 42
Shanghai Engineering, Shipbuilding
and Dock Company (b) n.a. 5T0 72
Thous. $
New Amoy Dock Co. 200- 200- 20'
Amoy Engineering Co. 100 37 4
TOTAL ma-. 410
(a) Only probably British owned.
(b) Founded 1892. After an unfortunate history (see PART V) it was acquired by S.C. Farnham 
and Co. in 1900.
{Figures from Sun Yutang et, al‘. Op; cit. Page'243)- 
Controlling all the dry docks that were used for commercial and not military purposes, British firms had a
dominant position in shipbuilding / repairing in Shanghai.
General Engineering.
British presence here was slight. The first entry by a British firm into this sector was in 1881 in Xiamen. 
Two firms -  one British, one German — commenced the manufacture of iron pans “to satisfy considerable 
local demand”. Both ran into considerable local opposition including plant seizure by the authorities in 
November, 1882 (37). The only significant British entry (1882) was the engineering company of G.A. 
Wood and Co. with a capital of 100,ftOO taels and 100 employees (38).
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British efforts to introduce modern technology were successful in these cases of marine engineering and 
silk processing -  albeit delayed in the last case. In other areas this success was not matched due to a large 
degree to Chinese opposition :-
Sova bean processing, (for oil and cakes) (39)
In 1866 Thomas Platt and Company -  local British merchants -  ordered machinery from Britain for a 
mill in Niuzhuang to process beans using steam power rather than the local technology using animal or 
hand power. Jardine Matheson partly financed the purchase of the machinery and on the default of Thomas 
Platt on their loan took over the venture. Trial production began in 1868 and full output began in the next 
year. The venture was technically successful but the mill was beset by severe labour problems -  many 
inspired by local competitors. Local dealers stymied attempts to secure bean supplies directly from the 
growers. The plant closed in 1870.
Sugar refining.
In 1869 Jardine Matheson erected a modem sugar refinery at Huangpu near Guangzhou. Organised 
opposition from those involved in traditional sugar making closed the venture down within a year (40). In 
1878 the Swatow Sugar Refinery was formed by Jardine Matheson and construction o f a refinery began in 
Shantou. This started work on March 1st, 1878 and capacity was increased in 1879 (41). This unit was a 
branch of Jardine Matheson’s China Sugar Refining Company (formed 1877) in Hong Kong. Technically 
the Shantou plant (with 200 workers) was successful but (42) >
- Javanese raw sugar became cheaper than the local variety and, unlike the Hong Kong 
refinery, the Shantou plant had to pay import duty on this.
- further onerous taxes were imposed by the Government.
Early in August, 1886 the refinery was closed.
Tanning.
The cheapness of hides induced a British merchant to establish a tannery in Shanghai (Pudong) which 
came on stream at the end of 1879 (43). 200 Chinese were employed in the plant which had modem 
machinery and tanning techniques. Some Chinese businessmen offered 100,000 taels (£26,000) for the 
business but this was turned down. A specially formed British company -  The Shanghai Tannery Company 
-w ith  an issued capital o f 112,500 taels (£28,000) took over the 360 metric tons per annum leather plant in 
September, 1881.(44). At first the venture was successful -  working hides in the pit rose from 246 in 
September, 1881 to 4,193 in April, 1882 (45). However, by early 1883 the situation, for uncertain reasons, 
had deteriorated and in February the Company was wound up voluntarily (46).
Chemicals.
British investment pre-1894 in chemicals - confined to the efforts of the two Major brothers, Ernest and 
Frederick -  typifies the small scale and tentative nature of much of British industrial investment in China in 
this period. The Major brothers were “two gentlemen who have been associated with the introduction of 
many.. .new and useful undertakings.” (47).
In the early 1860s the brothers took over a Shanghai plant for refining gold and silver from old coins and 
ornaments. Major Brothers -  a private limited company in 1875 -  began more and more to concentrate less 
on this refinery (increasingly managed by Chinese) and more on the feedstock acids (nitric and sulphuric). 
At first they made their acid in large glasses or jars but by 1879 a substantial lead chamber plant was in
-31-
operation -  the first such plant in China (48). This plant -  the Kiangsu Chemical Works -  employed 250 
workers by the 1890s.
By the 1890s the product profile of Major Brothers, Limited (a public company in 1889 (49)) was 
diverse. Apart from industrial acids/refining of precious metals, it comprised
soap. Production began in 1890 but this activity was given up in 1896 (50).
matches. Major Brothers were, together with a Chinese venture in 1879, pioneers in the
manufacture of matches in China. This venture -  Sui Chong Match Factory -  which started in
1880 employed 400 workers (51). ft was sold in 1894 (52).
a tiny industrial alcohol plant.
in 1893 “another outlet was sought in the preparation of a chemical fertiliser.” (53) but nothing 
came of this.
a small mill making cotton seed oil and cake (1892) that was sold in 1907 (54).
Apart from these undertakings Major Brothers had other interests in >
a photo-lithographic establishment that was founded in 1877 (55) -  Tien Shih Char Photo -  
Lithographic Publishing Works. This enterprise with 200 employees was sold to Chinese 
interests in 1886 (56).
in April, 1872 Major Brothers started the “Shun Pao” Chinese newspaper (57). Together with a 
bookshop it employed 100 people and was second to the acids/refining business in its 
importance to the Company (58). It was divested in 1907 (59).
Drink, food and cleaning and packaging of agricultural products.
With the failure of the ventures to introduce improved technology in the processing o f sugar cane and 
soya beans, investment in food  was tiny. Investment in drink manufacture was more significant but limited 
in the sense that the main customers were in the foreign community plus a small number of Chinese in 
contact with this community.
The first UK owned brewery was established in Shanghai by a Mr H.Evans (60). After his retirement it 
was taken over by the 1883 established Hall and Holtz Co-operative Company -  mainly a retail concern but 
also possessing a furniture factory (61). In 1888 the brewery was enlarged and an export trade developed to 
Hong Kong and Mainland ports. Unfortunately, the brewery (The Empire Brewery) became unprofitable 
and this business in Yangshupu was sold in 1893 (62).
The manufacture of aerated waters was early established in China. The “China Directory for 1874” 
recorded three British manufacturers. The scale of this industry was increased by the entry of retail 
chemists, in particular, J. Llewellyn and Co. and AS. Watson and Co. In 1892 the industry took a further 
step forward when the Aquarius Company was established. This meant that “this industiy is therefore 
emerging... from the class of local industries to the class of those which manufacture for an extensive area” 
(63).
In contrast to the drinks sector, British investment in cleaning and packing o f agricultural products was 
primarily an export orientated industry. By rendering the products more acceptable to export purchasers 
and introducing new technology for machine pressing, which evaded high shipping costs, this industry 
enabled China to develop a significant export trade in commodities such as wool, hides and skins, etc. In 
1876 a British firm in Hankou began using a press for compressing cow hides “to save freight in their
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transport to England” (64). Around the same time another British company -  Collins and Company, a firm 
of merchants -  commenced wool-cleaning and press packing in Tianjin (65). The pioneer in Shanghai was 
Birt’s Wharf Hide-curing and Wool-cleaning Company (1881), By 1894 the Company had an issued capital 
of 105,000 taels (£15,000).
Westerners contrasted the very limited progress made by the Chinese in industrialisation with the 
restrictions on their development of an industrial base. This frustration of the Western community in China 
over the deterrents to foreigners erecting factories in China was especially marked, as described below, in 
the case of the cotton industry. This frustration became extreme as Chinese plans for a cotton industry at 
last began to be realised. British interests were prominent in fighting to achieve the relaxation of the 
prohibition on foreign investment in the cotton industry.
Given the local supply of raw cotton and the growth of very large imports of yam to feed the hand 
weavers, the introduction of modem machine spinning and weaving into China was surprisingly late 
compared with, for instance, India -3.9 million spindles in 1895 - and Japan -  677,000 spindles in the same 
year (66). The first modem mill in China did not come on stream until 1890 and by 1895 there were only 
six mills (all Chinese) with 175,000 spindles (67).
Official obstruction and a half-hearted approach to technical modernisation were major factors in this 
discrepancy of experience. Another important factor was the impressive resilience of hand weaving in 
China against the machine made product. Against the higher productivity of the power loom other cost 
factors favoured the hand loom weavers. Due to the generally small scale of farms and seasonal 
fluctuations, adult agricultural workers had considerable free time while the very young and old were 
available ail the year. Thus, the opportunity labour cost in such handicraft manufacture as cotton weaving 
was, to all intents and purposes, nil. Also, for a considerable time the rural consumer favoured hand woven 
cloth. As the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce in 1896-7 reported - “ the people 
find that their own native cloths are warmer, stronger and more durable...”. This observation repeated an 
assessment by various perspicacious British observers going back over forty years. Thus, the “Report on 
British Trade with China” in the Blue Book of 1857-59 noted the preference of most Chinese for the robust 
native cloth (68). Moreover, traditional garments were designed to use narrow cloths. The British Consular 
Report in 1888 on the Trade of Shanghai for 1887 noted that -  “The native cloth is... exactly suited for 
cutting out garments, whereas the extra width of the foreign cloth would probably be wasted in the 
operation...”
Thus, it was in the cotton spinning sector, as against the weaving sector, that the introduction of power 
operation was a priority in any move to industrialisation. The low level of spindleage in China in 1895 
illustrates the lack of progress made as against India and Japan. What mills there were in operation were 
Chinese for the authorities successfully resisted the establishment of mills with foreign participation for 
nearly two decades.
In 1877/8 Jardine Matheson was in negotiation with a group of Chinese merchants about starting a mill -  
to be called the Anglo-Chinese Shanghai Steam Cotton Mill Company but this was superseded by an 
alternative scheme (69). In October, 1878 Li Hongzhang was petitioned for a proposal for a Chinese mill
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but with Jardine Matheson as consultants (70). However, the project floundered (71). In 1882 a group of 
foreign merchants in Shanghai, including Jardine Matheson, commenced the organisation of another cotton 
mill venture. After opposition by local officials, the various consular officials addressed a joint note to the 
Chinese foreign office. They argued that the right to develop foreign industrial enterprises was secured to 
all of them by Article 7 of the French Treaty of 1860, Article 6 of the German Treaty of 1861 and Article 
11 of the German Treaty of 1865 -  particularly the former. The Chinese foreign office refuted this, arguing 
that the key word signified “handicrafts” not “industry” (72). Also, in 1883 John Swire & Co. considered a 
cotton mill in China but rejected it (73).
The exasperation of the Western community can be illustrated by an episode in 1893. In October of that 
year the leading Chinese mill -  the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill -  was destroyed by fire. The English 
manager at the mill asked for the aid of the Shanghai Volunteer Fire Brigade “which was refused, the 
locality of the fire being out o f the Settlement.” (74). The North China Herald speculated as to the reasons 
for this refusal. Although it did not agree with the sentiment it concluded that -  “The Mill belongs to Li 
Ilung-chang and his friends and as he has been and still is putting every possible obstacle in the way of 
foreigners being allowed to import machinery... .it would be absurd for foreigners to try to save the Mill...”
(75).
In 1894 Jardine Matheson, showing admirable resilience and patience, returned to the attack. They were, 
in fact, not the only British merchant firm interested in founding a mill. Ilbert and Company were also 
interested. The Chairman of the Laou Kung Mow mill that was eventually founded by them said in 1897
(76) that it was “ten years since I first interested myself in a cotton mill in Shanghai but Chinese official 
obstruction intervened and we were obliged to drop it.” Jardine Matheson imported cotton spinning 
machinery into Shanghai in June, 1894 to test the prohibition of foreign owned manufacturing (77). 
Another confrontation took place but this overtaken by the outbreak of the Chinese war with Japan. The 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 ending the War contained a provision (Article vi, Section 4) that granted the 
Japanese “the right to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in the open cities, towns and ports of 
China.” Other countries quickly gained the same right under the “most favoured nation clause” in their 
previous treaties with China.
. In his commercial report for 1895 the British consul in Shanghai recognised the great significance of this 
watershed
“It is no longer a question of a few mandarin owned mills but the whole industry has by the Japanese treaty 
been thrown open to the capital of the World.” (78).
Now investment in industrial operations in China was a much more feasible proposition and, albeit still 
subject to restraints and harassment, was beginning more and more to resemble the openness of many other 
overseas outlets for British capital at the turn of the Century.
Also, another effect of the Sino-Japanese War was the exposure of China under the Manchu dynasty as a 
weak and decadent power. Sensing weakness, the major powers engaged in a “scramble for concessions”. 
Thus, the Germans acquired a lease and railway rights in Shandong. Russia acquired a lease for the 
Liaodong Penisular and the right to construct the South Manchurian Railway (both lost to Japan after the 
Russo-Japanese War). France acquired a lease on Guangzhou Bay and established a sphere of interest in 
Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan -an  obvious target after their acquisition of Indochina. The French
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acquired a right to construct a railway line linking Indochina to Yunnan. The British leased Weihaiwei 
(which apart from a short-lasting gold mine attracted no British industrial investment in this concession 
which was given up in 1930) and also secured a promise that China would not alienate the Yangzi Valley to 
other powers.
This process of carving up China (which contrary to some contemporary expectations diminished in 
intensity and did not lead to the breakup of China) exerted a profound influence on the differing geographic 
pattern of industrial investment by the various powers in Mainland China -  as illustrated in PART TV 
below.
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PART//.
THF. SIZE. DISTRIBUTION BY BRANCH OF INDUSTRY AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF
BRITISH INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
Coverage.
Throughout this study, as noted, industry is taken as including extractive industries but excluding utilities, 
transport and construction. In terms of geographic coverage, Hong Kong and Macau are excluded 
throughout but the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria, carved out in the 1930s, is included. 
fAl THE NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES.
APPENDIX ONE (the basis for the statistics in this section) gives a roll call o f British industrial 
enterprises in Pre-Second World War China. Altogether there were 180 individual enterprises that entered 
operations in China or, as happened in some (seven) of the mining ventures, were dedicated to Chinese 
operations but never got beyond the company formation stage or the next stage when a concession was 
acquired. Most o f these concerns were short-lived but some survived for a long time as “shell” companies. 
Thus, the Yangtse Valley Company survived for forty years while the Yang-tse Corporation survived from 
1898 until after the Second World War.
Only a small proportion -  8 percent -  of these concerns were in the form of UK registered companies 
specifically dedicated to operations in China. These were preponderantly in the mining area where they 
never accounted for less than 95 percent of the total value of British investment in this field in the period 
under review. 28 percent were the local subsidiaries o f UK registered companies. The balance of 64 percent 
were companies in which there was British participation and were registered in China / Hong Kong. 
(Including participation by residents in China possessing British nationality. Given the special legal 
position of foreigners in China there is justification for this). The distribution o f these concerns was
Number of enterprises.
UK registered companies Subsidiaries of UK Other Total -of which
concentrated on Chinese registered companies extant in 1940
operations.
Tobacco industry* - 32 - 32 28
Extractive industry 11 1 6 18 4
Cotton textiles - 1 8 9 3
Non-cotton textiles 
-Silk 5 5
- Other - 1 3 4 4
Engineering 
- Marine 1 20 21 3
- Other 1 1 9 11 4
Chemicals 1 5 7 13 3
Sound reproduction+ - 4 - 4 1
Drink - - 17 17 10
Food - 2 12 14 5
Packing, etc. of agricultural 
items 9 9 8
Miscellaneous industries 1 2 20 23 8
TOTAL 14 50 116 180 81
* All founded or taken over by British American Tobacco Company.
+ All part of Electric and Musical Industries or its constituent companies.
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Out of these 180 enterprises, only 81 (45 percent) were extant in 1940 due to the consolidation of 
enterprises, liquidation of enterprises and transference of control from British hands.
By date of foundation the split of these 180 enterprises was as follows :-
Number Percent
Pre 1895 47 26
1895-1914 73 40
1915-1922 16 9
1923-1930 19 11
1931-1940 25 14
Total 180 100
Given the hindrances to inward industrial investment before the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki the number 
of enterprises founded before that date seems high. However, these enterprises were generally on a small 
scale, many were short lived (by 1894 only 62 percent had survived) and were mainly concentrated in two 
areas :-
- those connected with serving shipping and improving Chinese products for export.
- those connected with supplying products to the growing Western community in China and 
with servicing the developing infrastructure of the Treaty Ports, especially Shanghai.
(PART /  has given details of this limited progress before 1895).
Of the 180 enterprises listed, 106 confined their production operations to Shanghai (59 percent of the 
total), 16 (9 percent of the total) combined operations in Shanghai with other centres and 58 (32 percent) 
had their production operations in other locations (or in some cases in the mining sector their projected 
operations). These last were particularly prominent in the mining and soft drinks industries.
In terms of those enterprises extant in 1940 (i.e. the last full year before the outbreak of the Pacific 
War) 72 percent had their production operations in Shanghai or combined these with other centres. This 
was only slightly lower than the similar proportion of the number of firms extant in 1894 -  76 percent. 
With its advantages as regards not only sea transport but also inland water transport giving access to raw 
materials, Shanghai and its environs became not only a centre of British and other foreign industrial 
enterprises but also a centre of Chinese industry. The foreign enterprises were also attracted by the 
existence of the International Settlement and the French Settlement. Even if the factories concerned were 
outside the Settlements they provided office facilities and Western style hotels, flats and houses for 
expatriate staff.
(B) THE FINANCIAL DIMENSION AND ITS DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR AND GEOGRAPHIC 
AREA OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
(1) APPROACH.
The yardstick adopted in this study for calculating the value of British industrial investment is that of 
shareholders’ equity -  broadly speaking, issued capital plus reserves, etc. This is used in APPENDIX TWO 
which gives the detailed figures by industrial sector and in this PART. An example is given below in this 
section on APPROACH of the detail of the method of deriving the data.
There are, however, alternative yardsticks that must be considered and the balance of advantage of the 
yardstick adopted, not only in terms of being conceptually the most meaningful but also how it fits with the 
financial data available, must be discussed.
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A different yardstick, for example, stock market capitalisation would often give significantly different
figures. Thus, if we take the two major British coal mining companies in China
Valuation criterion used here. Compare market capitalisation.
£mn. £mn,
1910 Pekin Syndicate 1.68 4.15
1929 Chinese Engineering and Mining Co. 1.62 7.30
An example of a divergence in the opposite direction is that of the two pioneer British cotton mills in their
early days (August, 1901):-
Valuation criterion used here. Compare market capitalisation,
£ mn. £ mn.
Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning
and Weaving Co., Ltd 0.09 0.04
The Ewo Cotton Spinning and
Weaving Co., Ltd. 0.19 0.08
Apart from its extreme volatility, as displayed above, the criterion o f stock market capitalisation cannot 
be used in this exercise as many o f the British companies studied were not quoted on Stock Exchanges 
either in the UK or in China. For example, a large proportion of UK industrial investment in China was in 
the hands of non-quoted local subsidiaries of British registered companies.
A much greater challenger than the criterion of stock market capitalisation for the role of the yardstick to 
use in assessing the scale of British industrial investment is to, in addition to shareholders’ equity, take into 
account loan finance from British institutions. These were from two sources >
(/) Loans bv managing agencies, for example, trading houses such as Jardine Matheson.
These, often of substantial proportions, were given for two reasons. The first was to assist the subsidiary 
companies in the Group on the occasion of large capital investment. Thus, in 1916 the Yangtszepoo Cotton 
Mill, Ltd. moved into the weaving sector with an order for 416 looms. The General Managers (Jardine 
Matheson) provided the necessary capital for this at bank rate of interest (1). The second reason was to tide 
over Group companies during periods of bad trading conditions. For example, at the 1919 Annual General 
Meeting of the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Ltd. (2) it was stated that 
“In fact, had not the financial resources ofMessrs Jardine Matheson and Company been available, it must 
inevitably have collapsed.”
(One example quoted was that in the Revolution year of 1911)
The amount of these subventions could be large, albeit fluctuating significantly
- Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited - 
Loans from As % Loans from As %
Jardine Matheson of issued capital Jardine Matheson of issued capital
Thous taels. % Thous. taels. %
1897 246 25 1906 350 47
1898 712 63 1907 507 68
1899 316 21 1908 n.a. n.a.
1900 556 37 1909 (166) (22)
1901 175 12 I9IG 778 104
1902 337 22 1911 264 35
1903 387 52 1912 732 98
1904 272 36 1913 323 43
1905 43 6
(Sources : as per TABLE NN in the STATISTICAL ANNEX)
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It is worth noting that the traffic was not completely one way (note the loans to the parent company in 
1909) and it is possible that in the golden years in terms of profits during and immediately after the First 
World War that this reverse traffic increased.
One difficulty in incorporating these inter-company loans into an assessment of British industrial 
investment is that sometimes they give the “wrong” result. Take the example o f another cotton mill in the 
Jardine Matheson stable -  the Kung Yik Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited which Jardine 
Matheson nursed through its infant years. From TABLE 0 0  in the STATISTICAL ANNEX the investment 
in terms of shareholders’ equity may be assessed in Taels as follows >
- Thous. taels - 
30.11.1911 30.11.1914.
Capital (paid up) 536.5 750.0
Reserves - 57.0
Amount carried forward 11.7 5.4
548.2 812.4
Over this period overdrafts from Jardine Matheson developed as follows
Thous. taels.
End November, 1911 392 (3)
End November, 1912 240 (3)
End November, 1913 160(3)
End November, 1914 nil (4)
Applying these figures to the figures for shareholders’ equity we arrive at
- Shareholders’ equity plus loans from Jardine Matheson -  Thous, taels - 
End Nov. 1911 End Nov. 1914
940.2 812.4 (-14%)
This implies on account of the Kung Yik mill an absolute decline in the position of the UK in the Chinese 
cotton industry. But, in fact, if we consider the capacity of the mill over the two dates it increased. 
Spindleage was steady at 25,376 but the number of looms rose from zero to 400 over the period. The
essence of investment in industrial concerns is tangible fixed assets in terms of factories, land and
machinery and to incorporate what are transient factors in how they are financed (not only by shareholders’ 
equity but also loans, etc.) can, as in this case, be misleading.
A final point as regards these loans by trading houses is that, except in the case of the cotton firms of 
Jardine Matheson, information is not available on them. Even in the case of Jardine Matheson the 
information is not available since the years before the First World War.
(if) Loans from British Banks.
Shareholder and Group finance were not, of course, the only British sources of finance used by British 
industrial enterprises in China. Loans from British banks were a third source of finance. (Of course, as with 
loans from the Group trading company, the element of double counting must be eliminated before arriving 
at a figure of total British investment covering all activities as well as industrial investment)
Thus, at end 1913 the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation had advances outstanding with the 
following British companies in Shanghai (5) >
- China Flour Mill Company, Limited. The debt to the Bank amounted to 100 thous. taels -  a fifth of the 
issued capital. (6),
- Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited. By early 1925 this company had 
an overdraft with this bank of 1,078 thous. taels -  135% of the issued capital. (7),
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- Major Brothers, Limited.
- New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Limited. In 1919 the Company had an overdraft with the 
Bank of 410 thous. taels -  51% of the issued capital. (8).
- Shanghai Tanning Factory.
In total loans to public companies were a relatively small part of the Bank’s business. At end 1913 loans 
to public companies in China (excluding Hong Kong) only amounted to $4.1 million (£360 thous.) (9). 
These loans to public companies in China in 1913 included loans to non-industrial companies and non- 
British companies such as the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works and the International Cotton 
Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Even if all these loans to public companies were to British industrial concerns then 
they would only account for a small proportion of the £13 million that is estimated here for total UK 
industrial investment in 1913 in China calculated on the basis of shareholders’ equity.
Before considering the practicality o f acquiring data to develop a series giving bank loan finance to 
British industrial companies in China it is worthwhile noting a conceptual difficulty in using this approach. 
This is well illustrated by again taking the example of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. 
Their balance sheet structure, for instance in 1906, was as follows (percentage) (10) :-
Assets. Liabilities.
Cash 15 Capital 4
Bills discounted, loans Reserves 7
and credits 35 Notes in circulation 5
Bills receivable 38 Current accounts 41
Other 12 Fixed deposits 38
Other 5
Total 100 100
A hardly surprising conclusion is that the Bank’s loans were covered mainly by current accounts and 
deposits. However, a large proportion of these would have by made by Chinese (and also other non-British 
nationalities). It certain seems reasonable that a large proportion of loans made by British banks in China to 
local British industrial enterprises should be discounted as they originated in Chinese capital. These monies 
could not be accounted as captive to British interests as there was no element of a legal link. Depositors 
could easily take their funds elsewhere. There was local competition from foreign or Chinese banks (11).
There are great difficulties in tracking the course of British bank lending to British industrial firms in 
China. There is a paucity of balance sheet data on the relevant companies -  particularly marked after the 
First World War, In any case even when a company’s bank borrowings are shown there is in the majority 
of cases no indication o f precise origin. Multi-source borrowing was frequent. Thus, at end February, 1909 
the China Import and Export Lumber Company, Limited owed the following amounts to financial 
institutions (12)
Thous. taels.
Deutsche -  Asiatische Bank 107
Shanghai Land Investment 165
Russo -  Chinese Bank 20
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. 20 
Total 312
At end February, 1912 the Company owed 292 thous. taels to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation and the Russo-Asiatic Bank (no split given). (13),
Two final points
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In any case if one includes loan finance from British sources in the calculation of UK industrial 
investment then logically one should also include trade finance from British sources for buying raw 
materials and intermediates, etc. However, even if one had balance sheet information on creditors it 
would be impossible to ascertain how much is related to supplies and services from British sources. 
Although it would be informative to possess a series including loan finance from British sources to 
contrast with that derived from shareholders’ equity it is clear that it is impracticable to obtain one. 
Many of the enterprises included in the figures for British industrial investment in APPENDICES ONE 
and TWO had, from their inception, a high proportion of Chinese shareholders and Board representation. 
Over time some of these concerns had a majority of Chinese shareholders. Many of these concerns were 
quoted on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and hence open to all. Also, Chinese investors sought sanctuary in 
foreign companies in troubled times (see PART IV  (C)). The main reason for regarding these concerns as 
British is one of control rather than ownership. Throughout, the general managers (discussed immediately 
below) were British and also the companies regarded themselves as British. For example, in 1918, 
commenting on subscriptions to War charities the general managers of one such company -  the Ewo 
Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited (General Managers Jardine Matheson) -  stated that “as 
we are a British Company the least we can do is to support the British Government.” (14).
The method of control favoured was the managing agency system. This system developed in the case of 
British international trading houses in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. From their agency 
business they began to integrate backwards into industrial and agricultural properties (in sharp contrast to 
other Asian countries this last did not occur in China). By this device trading companies were enabled to 
control industrial (and other) concerns by having “permanent control written into the articles of association 
of various companies.” (15). The writer estimates that such companies accounted for 30 percent of UK 
industrial investment in China in 1900 -  falling to under 15 percent in 1937,
Enshrined in the articles of association was the permanent place of the agency houses as general 
managers of the various concerns for which they would, apart from dividends, receive a commission based 
on profits. This device enabled concerns such as Jardine Matheson to spread resources over various 
industrial (and other) sectors and hence reduce risk. Thus, over time, Jardine Matheson, for example, built 
up effective control of industrial concerns in Mainland China in such areas as cotton textiles, silk textiles, 
sugar refining (short lived), egg processing, marine engineering, brewing, etc.
Some of the British managing agencies in China relied not only on their articles o f association to keep 
up their British connection. Thus, in 1919 the shareholders of the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Company approved the following resolution :- 
“...in the event of said Jardine Matheson and Company, Limited... ceasing to be the General Managers 
another British firm or company shall be appointed in their place.” (16).
This example was followed by the shareholders of at least one other British firm who were controlled by a 
British managing agency (Arnhold Brothers) -  The New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works (17).
The usual level of management commission was of the order of 10 percent on net profits after 
depreciation. However, in difficult times this could be waived -  for example, Jardine Matheson waived 
their commission from the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited in 1897 and 1898 (18).
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Also, on occasions (as noted above) the trading company buttressed the various concerns in the group by 
loans to assist capital expenditure and tide over periods of poor trading.
For some reason it has been accepted that the managing agency system was almost an Indian preserve. 
This is strongly challenged by the leading authority in this field -  Professor Stanley D. Chapman. Quoting 
an Indian historian that the managing agency “has no counterpart in any part o f the world”, he goes on to 
say that “this cannot be right, for the active record of agency houses in several parts of the world, apart 
from India, is perfectly clear -  Mathesons and Swires in China, Wallace Brothers in Burma”, etc,etc. (19).
There were substantial differences between the position of managing agencies in India and China. In
India the managing agency was by no means confined to foreign enterprises. Thus, for example, cotton mill
agencies in Mumbai in 1927 were split by Freda Utley (20) as follows :-
Thous. Spindles.
Parsis 978) Sassoon group 652 19%
Hindus 832) 69% Europeans 422 12%
Muslim 588) Total 3.472
In India the main industries where the British managing agencies were very strong was in the jute 
industry and, to a lesser extent, collieries. (21). The first industry did not exist in China and in the case of 
the coal industry only the Shanghai Exploration and Development Company (a poor third ranking of the 
British collieries in China) belonged to an agency house.
A complication that arises occasionally in using the concept of shareholders’ equity in this study is the 
reorganisation of certain British interests in the form of a newly created company. This arises particularly 
in the case of the British American Tobacco Company (B.A.T.). In 1919 B.A.T. formed a new concern -  
British American Tobacco Company (China), Limited -  to incorporate the former local flagship company 
of the British Cigarette Company, Limited. This provided the opportunity of a revaluation of the assets 
involved with goodwill forming a major part of the assets of the new concern. Also, the new company 
incorporated as interests in subsidiaries other local Group companies not included in the accounts of the 
British Cigarette Company, Limited.
The figures given for the year 1919 for the shareholders’ equity for both concerns was, thus, as follows > 
British American Tobacco Company (China), Limited - £26.42 million.
British Cigarette Company, Limited - £5.22 million.
The solution adopted here is to recast the figures (with account taken of what we know to be the key years 
of capital investment as revealed by the balance sheet) -  calculated from the latter company’s accounts -  
for the relevant years prior to this revaluation. However, it has to be admitted that these recast figures are 
rough estimates.
Another example was the case of the consolidation of the three Jardine Matheson cotton mills in 1920 
into the Ewo Cotton Mills, Limited. The book value of the tangible fixed assets of the new concern was on 
formation 4.3 million taels (£770 thous.). This was only 51 percent of the valuation made by experts at the 
time of amalgamation o f 8.4 million taels (£1,500 thous.) (22). However this “invisible reserve” has not 
been taken into account here as the valuation was made during the boom years of the local cotton industry 
and would be of little relevance to the depression years of the mid-1920s.
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(2) COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS ESTIMATES.
Given the different criteria that can be used it is instructive to see how the estimates given in this 
document match those of other authors. The key comparisons are with the pioneer work of Charles F. 
Remer in Foreign Investments in China (23), first published in 1933 and that of Wei Zichu (24), first 
published in 1951 in China.
(0 Comparison with Remer.
Remer gives for 1931 his estimates for the distribution of “British Business Investments in China.” (25). 
His figure in this compilation for mining and manufacturing totalled £39.6 million. His estimates for 1931 
were to a large extent based on an enquiry in 1929 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs to 
contribute to a conference in Kyoto of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Remer’s figures for 1931 are in 
fact similar to those of the British institute for 1929,
As Chi-ming Hou observes (26) Remer’s “method of estimation is not fully explained” but is believed to 
be a combination of >
- fixed tangible assets plus stocks plus market value of other assets. Loans from British banks to finance 
these assets were included.
-“the sum of paid-up capital, surplus and undistributed profits” which coincides with the author’s 
yardstick.
In comparison with Remer’s above estimate of £39.6 million the author’s figure for 1929 is £32.55 
million. This seems at first sight an alarming gap of over a fifth between the two figures. However, 
Remer’s figures include Hong Kong which was not separately specified for the figure quoted above. 
Industrial activity by British firms in Hong Kong was by no means negligible including marine 
engineering, sugar refining, cement, flour, cordage, etc. An estimate for British industrial investment in 
Hong Kong for 1936 is given by Wei Zichu (27). His figure is £6 million. If  this figure applied in 1929 
then the above gap is only o f the order of 4 percent of the author’s estimate.
(ii) Comparison with Wei Zichu.
The basis for his calculations are not exactly clear but it is likely that it is closer to that of the writer than 
to that of Remer. His estimate for British industrial investment in China (excluding Hong Kong) in 1936 is 
£29.1 million (28). This compares with the writer’s figure of £26.4 million. This gap of 10 percent is 
reduced considerably as one of main differences in the two figures seems to lie in the chemical area where 
it looks as if Wei Zichu includes ICI China as an industrial enterprise whereas its sole involvement in local 
manufacture was tiny and short-lived (see PART I I I -  Chapter Five -  Chemicals). ICI China, a substantial 
company, has been treated as a trading rather than an industrial enterprise by the writer.
(3) THE FINANCIAL DIMENSION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT.
APPENDIX TWO gives the estimated distribution of British industrial investment by sector for the 
years 1895 to 1939. Figure I (A) shows the split by broad industrial category year by year over this period. 
The main basis of calculation covering around 85% of the data is as follows. (The balance, which does not 
include any major industrial sector, is calculated on the basis of the development o f issued capital alone). 
The sources for this main body of the figures are the tables in the STATISTICAL ANNEX. Thus, to take 
an example for one year (1921) the figure quoted in APPENDIX TWO for UK investment in the
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cotton textile industry is £2.04 million. This is derived as follows
1921 - Thous. taels.
Companv. Capital 
Paid up
Reserves Balance c.f. Total Statistical AoDendix 
Table
The Ewo Cotton Mills, Ltd. 4,900 3,711 8 8,619 QQ
The Laou Kung Mow Cotton
Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd. 800 410 15 1,225 RR
The Oriental Cotton Spinning
and Weaving Co., Ltd. 660 604 223 1,487 SS
TOTAL 6.360 4.725 246 11.331*
* If converted to Sterling at average rate for the year = £2.04 million.
As inferred immediately above, the figures for each year are converted from the relevant Chinese currency 
units at the average exchange rate for the year concerned. This should not therefore affect the relative 
shares of the various sectors in relation to the total, However, this is not strictly true in the case of the 
mining sector. The key players in this sector -  the Pekin Syndicate and the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company were UK registered companies. Thus their capital was expressed in Sterling and therefore 
was unaffected by the variations in the parity with Chinese currency (although the figure for the amount 
retained in the relevant year would be affected). Thus in years when the Chinese currency weakened the 
share of the mining sector would rise on this account and contrariwise fall in periods of strength of the 
Chinese currency. However, this factor does not significantly affect the general picture.
Of course, converting into Sterling at the parity of the year is a misleading yardstick for assessing the 
growth in contrast to the distribution of investment. For most of the period covered here the silver based 
currency of China was complex and an irritant to economic growth. The Tael used varied according to 
location -  that used in this study is the Shanghai Tael (based on silver) used by the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and in company accounts. An alternative used was the silver dollar. In April, 1933 the 
Nationalist Government abolished all forms of the Tael and the Chinese dollar became universal and, 
shortly, a paper currency. From 1895 to 1916 the annual average value of the Shanghai Tael hovered 
around the 14 pence/£ mark and this did not distort the comparison of growth in terms of Sterling between 
years. However, beginning in 1917, there was a sharp rise in the parity of the Tael associated with the price 
of silver and it reached a peak in 1921 of 31 pence/£. For the rest of the 1920s it was around 15 pence/£ 
sinking to 7 pence by 1931, The new dollar was around 6 pence to the pound before the outbreak of war in 
1937. It had shrunk to 2.5 pence by 1939. An attempt to counteract this is given in Table One (See also 
Figure 1 (B)) with conversion into Sterling being made at a fixed rate -  that of 1895 as well as the average 
rate for the individual years.
In considering the Sterling figures quoted in this study it should, of course, be realised that an 1895 £ was 
worth around 70 times a current £ and a 1938 £ around 45 times. During the period under review, in 
contrast to the experience after the Second World War, there was relatively little UK inflation. By 1914 the 
general level o f UK prices was about 30 percent higher than in 1895 and in 1938 about 60 percent higher.
Reverting to Table One, the figures in the last two columns are subject to a considerable degree of 
reservation. In an environment of floating exchange rates the problem o f intertemporal comparability looms 
large even for consideration of individual companies’ performance. Even in the period before the First 
World War, when the currencies of most of the major trading nations were linked to a common standard i.e. 
the gold standard, the international value of the Chinese currency was out of kilter with that of other
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TABLE ONE
ESTIMATED TOTAL UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
£mn,. -  Converted at average exchange £mn. -  Converted at average exchange Index
rate for the vear concerned. rate for 1895. 1895-100
1895 0.81 0.81 100
1896 0.93 0.86 106
1897 1,08 1,16 143
1898 1.25 1.35 167
1899 1.65 1.78 220
1900 2.09 2.25 278
1901 3.95 4.25 525
1902 4.02 4.33 535
1903 4.46 5.20 642
1904 4,79 5,16 637
1905 5.40 5.82 719
1906 5.88 5.88 726
1907 6.40 6.40 790
1908 7.83 9.14 1128
1909 q "in 9.71 1198
1910 9.03 10.53 1300
1911 9,32 10,87 1342
1912 12.35 13.30 1642
1913 13.07 14.08 1738
1914 14.47 15.58 1923
1915 15.31 17.86 2205
1916 18.58 17.34 2141
1917 21.30 14.91 1841
1918 25,12 15,29 1888
1919 41.05 19.82 2447
1920 53.56 24.19 2986
19ZI 35.94 27.95 3451
1922 38.94 32.06 3958
1923 34.01 31.74 3919
1924 36.85 32.24 3980
1925 37,30 34,81 4298
1926 35.15 35.15 4340
1927 33.35 35.92 4435
1928 35.62 38.36 4736
1929 32.55 37.95 4685
1930 24.79 43.38 5356
1931 21.40 42.80 5284
1932 26,78 41,65 5142
1933 27.26 44.22 5459
1934 30.30 45.13 5572
1935 33.49 45.79 5653
1936 26.36 44.04 5437
1937 27.78 47.40 5852
1938 22.27 51.36 6341
1939 17,76 70,98 8763*
* The rise was to a large extent due to the large profits and consequent retentions made by British firms 
in the immediate years before the Pacific War.
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currencies . The parity of the Chinese currency against other nations was a function of the international 
value of silver (and this lasted until November, 1935) and not dependent on relative inflation or capital 
movements.
In the current environment of floating exchange rates an individual company can supplement its reporting 
of its financial performance for the last year (or half year or quarter) by restating major indicators in terms 
of the parities of the previous reporting period. There is also the possibility of repeating this exercise using 
the parities of any year which seems attractive to use as a base year. This would not usually be 
unreasonable. This statement must be seriously modified in the case of the series presented in Columns 
Two and Three in Table One. This series is comprised of data originating from a large number of individual 
enterprises each with, on the whole, differing starting dates and also with a significant number of these 
going out of business during the period 1895-1939. In no sense is the data homogeneous.
Having obtained the desired series of investment in terms of the currency of the investing country i.e. the 
UK converted at a fixed exchange rate it is tempting to modify this by changes in the internal value of the £ 
i.e. inflation/deflation in order to arrive at an indication of real growth in UK investment in China. Thus, 
for example, taking indices of UK retail price development over the period under review. However, these 
are derived from the splicing together of various UK Government series which are not comparable and, in 
the early years seriously not comprehensive in coverage, (the basket of goods covered increased with every 
revision o f the enquiries). Thus, the temptation to construct a fourth column in Table One to indicate real 
growth over the period under review should perhaps be eschewed as it would be a combination of two 
rather shaky series and be regarded as spurious accuracy.
However, given the fact that the growth in UK retail prices between 1895 and 1938 was of the order of 60 
percent, the temptation in this case cannot be resisted. Deflating Column Three of Table One by this rough 
figure of inflation gives an indication of the real growth of British industrial investment in China of the 
order of forty times over the period 1895-1938. One can quibble about this figure but it gives evidence that 
there was very substantial real growth in British industrial investment during the period under review.
(a) Distribution by industrial sector.
Abstracting from APPENDIX TWO, the percentage split for selected years can be summarised overleaf 
roughly as follows, (the figures for “Other Engineering” are underestimated to a certain extent -  see PART 
III, Chapter Four below). The profile of British investment changed within a few years of the 1895 Treaty 
of Shimonoseki which greatly reduced the restrictions on inward industrial investment. A major 
consequence was felt in the rise in investment in cotton textiles where, as noted in PART I, there had been 
no inward investment before 1895. Even more remarkable was the rise in the importance of the mining 
sector which accounted for two fifths of the total by 1900 (rising to a peak of 63 percent in 1903). Thirteen 
mining ventures associated with British interests were launched 1896-1900. (see PART III ~ Chapter Two). 
The British presence in the silk industry had by 1900 begun to fall both absolutely and relatively. After a 
long delay in adopting modem techniques of silk reeling (see PART I  above) Chinese interests began to 
embrace this technology on a large scale. In 1894, for example, eight filatures using equipment and
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- Percentage-
1895 1900 1912 1924 1937
(A) Tobacco Industry. - - 44.4 61.0 55.4
<B) Mining. - 41.1 26.6 11.4 11.5
(C) Cotton Textiles. - 12.9 3.4 5.5 7.3
<P) Non-cotton Textiles. 24.7 51 0 6 03 16
-Silk 24.7 5.7 0.6 0.3 -
-Worsted spinning and weaving - - - - 3.6
(B) Engineering. 50.6 21.6 8J> 43 M
-Marine 48.1 20.6 7.9 4.0 2.9
-Other 2.5 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.5
(F) Industrial Chemicals. 4 9 2,4 03 0 1 03
-Coatings - - - - 0.3
-Other 4.9 2.4 0.3 0.1 -
(G) Consumer Chemicals. z z 2A 4J. M
-Soap, etc - - - 2.7 1.9
-Candles - - 2.4 1.4 0.9
(H) Sound Reproduction. - - - - 0.2
(I) Drink. Food and Packing, etc of
Agricultural Products. 17.3 15.3 12.5 11.6 13.4
-Drink 4.9 1.9 1.1 0.3 1.8
-Food - 1.4 4.1 7.8 7.8
-Packing, etc of agricultural products. 12.4 12.0 7.3 3.5 3.8
(J) Miscellaneous Industries. 23 LO 13 1 7 1 1
-Wood processing 1.3 0.5 0.8 1.5 1.7
-Musical Instruments 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
-Other - - 0.3 - 0.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.C
techniques imported from Italy were founded in Shanghai by Chinese entrepreneurs. (29). These had in 
total 2,567 basins outstripping the capacity of 888 basins in the hands of the three British concerns. (30).
By 1912 investment in mining took second place to the large British investment in the tobacco industry 
with British American Tobacco expanding its initial cigarette plant in Shanghai plus new plants in Hankou 
and Manchuria, Production of cigarettes in B.A.T. factories in China rose from a very small level in 1902 
to 5,135 million in 1912. (see Table Three in PART I I I -C hapter One). In contrast, the British investment 
inniining was.adversely.affectedJbyJoca1.and.natiQnal_hastiUty_and.the “rights.rec.o.very’^ mov.ement.Jn.the 
mining sector British interests were particularly vulnerable in that the main locations tended to be in fairly 
remote inland areas where Western influence was weakest and subject to vested interests in the form of 
already established Chinese mines.. In contrast B A T , production facilities were in areas of strong Western 
influence and the Chinese cigarette industry was in its infancy.
By 1924 the share of B.A.T. in total investment exceeded 60 percent -  having reached a peak of 70 
percent in 1.920, The consumer chemicals and wood processing sectors were the only other sectors to 
increase their share of total British investment during the period. The large Unilever enterprise for soap, etc 
was initiated while the large lumber enterprise o f the Chinese Import and Export Lumber Company 
expanded its facilities and also made a large revaluation of its assets.
The share of the activities of B.A.T. in total investment declined slightly by 1937. (The B.A.T. cigarette 
machine park in China peaked in 1930 at 505 machines and had declined by 12 percent by 1937 -  see 
PART JJJ -  Chapter One), This was mainly due to the entry of two new British firms in the cotton industry 
sector and the introduction of new sectors into the portfolio of British investment -  worsted spinning and 
weaving, coatings, sound reproduction., etc.
(bl Distribution by geographic area.
Utilising, the.foundations „ofthe. data_hase.givenin Appendix „Twojhe ,geographic_split _of UK-industrial 
investment can be estimated for the same selected years as summarised above >
- Percentage -
1895 1900 1912 1924 1937
Manchuria - - 4,5 6.7 11.2
Hebei - - 8.8 5.9 8.0
Tianjin 11.1 7.7 4.8 14.3 11.2
Shandong - - 0,8 2,4 7,5
Anhui - L0 - - -
Jiangsu - - 0.4 4.4 4.1
Shanghai 84.0 49.2 38.2 45.2 44.2
Fujian 3.7 1.4 0.6 - -
Henan - 22.5 14.1 5.6 3.0
Hubei 1.2 f>.5 24.1 15.0 10.-3
Yunnan - 16.3 3.5 - -
-Sichuan - 1.4 0.2 0,5 0,5
TOTAL. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
In 1895 British industrial investment was overwhelmingly in Shanghai, After its opening to foreign trade 
in 1843 the rise of Shanghai as a port and a commercial and financial centre was rapid. To take but one 
example, the tonnage of ships handled by the port rose by 11.5 percent per annum between 1856 and 1900. 
(See PART III  -  Chapter Four) . The two largest industrial sectors -  silk processing and marine engineering
-50-
-  were, in the case of the former, entirely based in Shanghai and in the case of the latter predominantly 
based in Shanghai with the only significant exception being dry docking and other facilities in Xiamen 
(sold in 1918 (31)). Of the lesser sectors the only significant presence outside Shanghai was in soft drinks 
and the cleaning and press packing of agricultural products in Tianjin and Hankou -  particularly the former
The above situation changed sharply by 1900 with the share of Shanghai dropping to around a half. This 
was principally due to the inauguration of ambitious mining projects in Anhui (London and China 
Syndicate, Limited), Henan (Pekin Syndicate, Limited), Yunnan (Anglo-French Quicksilver and Mining 
Concession (Kwei-chau Province) of China, Limited and the Syndicat du Yunnan, Limited -  see below) 
and Sichuan (various enterprises). As evident from the above table, often these enterprises were short-lived.
By 1912 the share of Shanghai had sunk below 40 percent due principally to
the establishment of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited with the successful
aim of taking over the Kaiping coalfield in Hebei.
the establishment of B.A.T. cigarette factories in Manchuria and Hankou.
the start of what became a major business area -  the freezing of food for export -  with the 1908
established plant at Hankou of the International Export Company, Limited.
Despite the establishment of new centres for freezing agricultural products at Nanjing (a very large plant 
with fixed assets of £1,500 thous.), Hankou and Qingdao and increased B.A.T. presence in Manchuria and 
new cigarette plants in Tianjin and Qingdao, the share of Shanghai revived to around 45 percent in 1924 
and this share was virtually maintained in 1937.
The rising insecurity in the 1920s (the era of the Warlords and civil and military strife) of operating
outside the established centres for Western enterprises led to some degree o f a revival o f concentration in
Shanghai. Also, the continued infrastructure development of Shanghai meant expansion in the wood
working sector and the introduction of production of coatings, metal windows, etc. The Orient Paint,
Colour and Varnish Company noted that “the markets for British paint” were “mainly organisations with
foreign control or interest” (32). Thus by 1936 it had developed sales to, amongst others (33)
the Shanghai Municipal Council. (37% of total sales).
E.D. Sassoon -  “for their many properties” .
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. (“Practically all their supplies”)
Moller and Co.
Jardine Matheson Engineering Corporation.
Asiatic Petroleum Company (Shell) -  “special drum paints”.
New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works.
74.5 percent of the Company's sales in the year to end September, 1938 were to Shanghai and only 8.5
percent to the rest of Mainland China (See Table EE in the STATISTICAL ANNEX)).
Also new industries to China such as sound reproduction and worsted spinning and weaving were centred 
in Shanghai, Shanghai also saw a revival of British involvement in the cotton industry, the start up of the 
Ewo Breweiy and the development of the large Unilever complex (soap, margarine, etc.).
(4) COMPARISON OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT BEFORE THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR WITH THAT SINCE 1978.
Since 1978 over 60 percent of British direct investment used in the PRC has been in industry. (34). This
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compares with around 15 percent of total British investment in Mainland China in 1936. The most reliable 
estimate of the distribution o f total British direct investment in Mainland China in that year is by Wei Zichu
(35). His estimates were :-
Industry 15%
Finance (banking, insurance, etc.) 34%
Commerce (including retail) 24%
Real estate 21%
Transportation 3%
Public utilities 3%
Many of these non-industrial business areas were not open to foreigners for a long time after the initiation 
o f the Open Door policy in 1978 (or there was a limit o f their share participation in joint ventures with 
Chinese interests).
In 1937 British investment in industry was, in real terms, about a third o f the 1978 - 2003 level. (36). 
Despite this, investment by British interests in Chinese industry was, due to the underdeveloped nature of 
industry in China at that time, much more significant in many sectors in terms of share of output, capacity, 
etc. than in recent years. Against nil or very modest shares in British presence in 1978-2003 the following 
was the situation prior to the Pacific War
Output of cigarettes (1937) -  66.3% of national output. (See PART I I I -  Chapter One, Table Three).
Output of coal -  25% of national output in 1915 (peak) and 14% in 1936. (STATISTICAL ANNEX,
TABLE R).
Percentage of total operable cotton spindles -  21.7% in 1918 (peak) and 4.5% in 1937. (STATISTICAL
ANNEX, TABLE LL).
Percentage of power looms at spinner/weavers -  24.5% in 1918 (peak) and 6.7% in 1937.
( STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE MM).
Worsted yarn production -  45% of national output in 1941. (37).
Share of area of commercial dry docks in Shanghai -  100% in 1900, 83% in 1920 and 47% in 1937. (See
PART I I I -  Chapter Four).
Gramophone records -  39% of record sales in early 1935. (See PART I I I -  Chapter Six).
Soap -  largest single producer.
Egg products -  about 40% of national output. (See Part I I I -  Chapter Seven).
Pianos and organs -  sole producer.
Part of the modest UK shares experienced in the post-1978 period can be explained by increased 
competition from investing areas not present in pre-War years -  for example Hong Kong and Taiwan.
(a) Distribution bv industrial sector. (See also Figure 2)
Table Two gives the writer’s estimated split by sector of British investment in industry since the 
watershed year of 1978 with a comparison with 1937 (The last, almost normal, year for China in the 1930s. 
It thus takes account of the “new industries” such as sound reproduction, speciality paints, worsted textiles 
etc. that developed in the 1930s). The figures for 1978-2003 are presented with diffidence and the writer 
acknowledges that they are subject to a margin of error. They cover around 200 separate investment
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TABLE TWO.
ESTIMATED SPLIT OF UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1937-%  1978-2003 - %
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY. 55.4 0JL
(B1 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES. 11.5 37.2
(a) Oil and gas extraction and refining - 36.1
(b) Mining and quarrying 11.5 1.1
(Cl TEXTILES / CLOTHING. 10.9 M
(a) Cotton textiles 7.3 0.3
(b) Wool and hair textiles 3.6 0.5
(c) Other - 1.2
iT» METAL PRODUCTS. ENGINEERING. MACHINERY. M 1 1
(a) Metals/ metal products 0.5 1.7
(b) Marine engineering 2.9 neg.
(c) Automotive products - 2.6
(d) Aerospace products - 1.5
(e) Other machinery - 1.4
(El INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS. 03 15.8
(a) Basic industrial chemicals neg 10.1
(b) Bulk plastics - 0.7
(c) Coatings 0.3 1.7
(d) Fine chemicals (pesticides, etc) - 2.4
(e) Plastic products - 0.9
(FI CONSUMER CHEMICALS. 23. 11.1
(a) Soap, toiletries, etc 1.9 11.1
(b) Candles 0.9 -
(G> PHARMACEUTICALS. z 10.8
(HI SOUND REPRODUCTION. OJ -
m  DRINK AND FOOD. 9J> 92
(a) Alcoholic drinks 1.5 2.6
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.3 1.0
(c) Food 7.8 5.6
(J> PACKING. ETC. OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 3j> _
(K1 ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES AND ELECTRONICS. OJ. M .
(LI MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES. M 22
(a) Wood processing 1.7 0.1
(b) Musical instruments 0.2 neg.
(c) Glass 0.1 1.1
(d) Other - 1.6
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projects by British enterprises in China. They have been gleaned from a variety of sources -  in particular 
the “running score” of British investments kept by the China-Britain Trade Centre, British company 
reports, trade publications, Chinese sources, etc. (A full list is contained in the bibliography). The figures 
have been aggregated to give a snapshot, in the absence of an alternative, to the extent and distribution of 
British industrial investment in 2003 for comparison with the earlier year. The figures do not take account 
of subsequent divestments e.g. the Bass beer joint venture (Bass invested over £30 million for a 53% stake 
in a brewery in Jilin. It subsequently sold its stake to its Chinese partner). Also, no account is taken of the 
subsequent transfer of some British companies to foreign ownership e.g. Courtaulds.
Certain salient points immediately spring to mind as compared with 1937 :-
B.A.T’s involvement is now very modest (a small facility acquired on merging with 
Rothmans International). Two other UK firms (Gallacher and Imperial) have projects to produce 
locally. However, these are modest. Of much more potential significance is a venture announced 
as follows by B.A.T. in July, 2004. (38) :-
“ ... the Central Government of China has approved a major strategic investment by the Group in 
China which is the largest market in the World with annual sales of around 1.8 trillion cigarettes 
We have approval to build a new factory with an eventual manufacturing capacity of 100 billion 
cigarettes in a joint venture with our partners, China Eastern Investments.,..”
B.A.T. will spend £800 million in setting up the factory and has rights for 237 acres in Sichuan. 
However, in August, 2005 B.A.T. announced that they were writing off £50 million costs in 
view of “ the uncertainty of the timetable and the significant hurdles in establishing a major 
strategic investment in China.” (39).
The large presence in hydrocarbon extraction and refining since 1978. This share will increase 
further as current projects by British oil and gas majors materialise. Of particular importance is 
the project announced in late 2003 for an offshore oil / gas project in the East China Sea by a 
consortium of China National Offshore Corporation / Sinopec (60%), Unocal (20%) and Shell 
(20%).
The small share o f mining and quarrying compared with 1937. This should, however, be 
redressed to a certain extent when the large BHP Billiton zinc joint venture in Yunnan comes on 
stream. There are further prospects in coal mining. The mining sector has been gradually opened 
to the outside World.
In the field o f textiles/clothing the lower relative British presence in mainstream cotton and wool 
textiles in comparison with 1937 has been to a modest extent counter-balanced by involvement 
in specialised sectors such as non-wovens, elasticated fabrics, etc.
The development of engineering products for the vehicle and aerospace industries, virtually non­
existent in pre-War China, has more than counter-balanced the termination of British 
involvement in marine engineering.
Apart from specialised chemicals e.g. pesticides, most of which have been developed in recent 
years, the key growth since 1978 has been in the field of industrial gases (by BOC Group) and 
bulk petrochemicals and plastics. This last sector will further increase in importance when 
projects by Shell and BP materialise. The Shell project, with construction commenced in
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November, 2002, is a very large $4,350 million 50/50 investment with China Offshore Oil 
Corporation in Guangdong. The BP joint venture project with Sinopec is for a similar 
petrochemical project costing $2,700 million near Shanghai. Both these petrochemical and 
plastics projects are so large, involving a total investment by the partners of around £4.5 million, 
that they will in the near future affect significantly not only the size but also the industrial and 
geographic composition of UK investment.
As regards consumer chemicals, Unilever have brought their investment in China in recent years 
well above their pre-War level. By the end o f2002 it had invested £640 million in this field (plus 
ice cream) and the number o f employees is almost ten times the pre-War level.
The strong position of the UK pharmaceutical industry has been reflected in recent growth in 
China.
The presence of British firms in the electrical sector has been relatively very much higher than in 
pre-War years
British presence in press packing, egg processing and sawmills has not been revived.
Due to the efforts of Pilkingtons the British interest in the glass industry has risen sharply. It has 
recently raised its shareholdings in its joint ventures with Chinese interests 
Much of the investment since 1978 has been in product sectors where there was no pre-War parallel or 
where pre-War presence was minimal. In some sectors e.g. bulk petrochemicals and plastics investment has 
been made in industries which are currently slow growing and experiencing over capacity in Western 
Europe and North America.
An important feature of current investment that was not present in the pre-War period is investment by 
British industrial firms to source all or most of their products from China and close down their UK 
production facilities or substitute expansion in the UK for setting up in China. Two of the many examples 
of the former are the cases of Kenwood Appliances, Pic and the R. Griggs Group (Dr. Marten’s boots) and 
of the latter Newport Components with a wholly owned subsidiary in Guangdong that exports 99 percent of 
its output of electronic components to the UK and other European markets.
(b) Distribution by geographic area. (See also Figure 3)
The next page gives a comparison of the estimated geographic split of British industrial investment since 
1978 compared with that in 1937. In considering the relative importance of the Shanghai area it should be 
borne in mind that in 1937 all the UK investment in the adjacent province of Jiangsu was in Nanjing. 
However, investment since 1978 has not been confined to this Western part of the province and much has 
been in the Eastern part near Shanghai. Also the estimated geographic split given below excludes offshore 
oil and gas -  a location for investment that was obviously not present in 1937.
The decline in the proportion of British investment in Manchuria can be explained by the termination of 
B.A.T. presence there. This, coupled with the demise of the egg trade also explains the relative decline of 
Hubei, The decline in the relative importance of Hebei and Henan was due to the cessation of British coal 
mining in China
Shanghai is still by a considerable margin the largest single area of British investment although its 
relative importance has decreased. The Number Two position is now held by Guangdong -  there was no
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presence in 1937. Guangdong was originally the main conduit of foreign direct investment in China after 
the Open Door policy aimed at attracting foreign investment was initiated. Three of the four Special
-Percentaae-
1937 1978-2003 fa!
Manchuria 11.2 5.3
Hcbci 8.0 2.0
Beijing - 5.1
Tianjin. 11,2 8,4
Shandong 7.5 3.3
Anhui - 1.0
Jiangsu 4.1 13.0
Shanghai 44.2 28.1
Zhejiang - 9.0
Fujian - 3.1
Guangdong - 13.6
Henan 3.0 0.5
Hubei 10.3 0.6
Western Region
- North West Area (b) - 1.2
- South West Area (c) 0,5 4.5
Other - 1.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
(a) Excluding offshore oil and gas.
(fa) Shaanxi, Gansu, QInghai, Inner Mongolia,
(c) Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi.
Economic Zones that were set up in 1980 were in Guangdong of which the most important was Shenzhen. 
The proximity to Hong Kong was an attraction not only to Hong Kong investors but also to British firms.
Although presence in Western China has relatively increased it still accounts for a modest proportion of 
total investment. The main contributor to British industrial investment in the South West Area since 1978 is 
Sichuan which accounts for 3.5 percent of total British investment -  by far the leading UK investment here 
is the BP plant for acetyl chemicals (currently being expanded).
Finally, given the vast changes since pre-War years in the structure of British industry and commerce, 
there still remains a significant number of present day British firms (or their historically constituent 
companies) who had interests in Chinese industry, albeit in many cases (e.g. ICI) tiny and short-lived, 
before the Second World War and have resumed their presence. These include
John Swire Sc Sons 
B.A.T.
Marconi (GEC)
Coats
Unilever
Shell
Courtaulds (see above)
ICI
Jardine Matheson
Two existing UK firms with previous interests in Mainland China have not extended their present 
operations to China -  Electric and Musical Industries and the Vestey family empire.
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PART III  -  CHAPTER ONE - THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
British investment in this area was in the hands of the British - American Tobacco Company. Limited -  
hereafter referred to as B.A.T. This company became by far the largest single British industrial investor in 
China in the period under review
In the years before the Second World War B.A.T. did not reveal financial and other details on its 
operations in China. Fortunately there have been studies by Chinese scholars in recent years compiling data 
from the archives of B.A.T. companies in China (held at the Centre for Chinese Business History at the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences). Particularly valuable has been Ying Mei Yan Gongst zai Hua qiye 
ziliao huibian (Collected materials on B.A.T. business activities in China -  Beijing, 1983). The great 
majority of the statistical data quoted in the text and in the STATISTICAL ANNEX has been taken from 
this most useful source.
One of the reasons for Chinese interest in B.A.T. was the well publicised labour disputes and constant 
trials of strength in its factories. In the period 1918-1940 B.A.T.’s Shanghai factories suffered 56 strikes 
(1). This does not, however, seem a reflection on B.A.T. as a bad local employer. In terms of working 
conditions the British investigator in 1925 -  Dame Adelaide Anderson - was “completely satisfied” with 
B.A.T.’s Shanghai factories (2), The great financial strength of B.A.T. made it an obvious priority target. 
As noted by Elizabeth J Perry -  “A host of studies link economic prosperity to strike activity. Thus it is not 
surprising that the economic prosperity of B. A.T. was accompanied by extraordinary labour unrest” (3). 
Also the proportion of wages to the total manufacturing cost of cigarettes was small -  usually less than 
10% and dwarfed by the cost of tobacco and packaging (see below). No reference is made in this chapter to 
labour protest in B.A.T.’s factories -  amply covered not only by historians in China but also by Western 
authors (for example, Elizabeth J. Perry (4)).- except where it affected B.A.T.’s performance against local 
competitors.
Another omission is any discussion of the effect in terms of health on Chinese society of the explosive 
growth in cigarette consumption. B. A.T. with its highly developed promotion efforts was mainly 
responsible for this growth. In favour o f B. A.T. it might be said
the health risk in smoking was not appreciated in the early years o f the last century, 
cigarettes could wean some Chinese from opium. (In 1925 the Company claimed that one of 
their founding companies (American Tobacco Company) had “combined business with humanity by 
weaning the Chinese from opium by teaching them to smoke North Carolina cigarettes” (5)).
To understand B.A.T.’s performance and behaviour in China it is necessary to briefly examine its 
foundation. The Company employed in China the same techniques that one of its parent companies had 
employed in the USA with conspicuous success. These included exploiting technical innovation, mass 
production, surprisingly modern marketing techniques -  to not only defeat competitors but to expand the 
total market -  and aggressive selling. The transfer of these techniques to China was facilitated by the fact 
that the top management position of the Company in China was occupied successively by two Americans 
in B.A.T.’s first twenty years in China.
(A) THE COMPANY.
B.A.T. originated from Anglo-American rivaliy in the tobacco industry when James Buchanan Duke
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and the American Tobacco Company , frustrated by the level of import duties, invaded the UK market 
with the aim o f acquiring local producers. Starting from a small family business, Duke by exploiting the 
invention (patented in 1881 by James A, Bonsack) of continuous process cigarette machinery, aggressive 
pricing and strong promotion and advertising built up an ascendancy in the USA cigarette market in 1890 
by the merger of the five leading firms into the American Tobacco Company. By 1910 (the year before its 
dissolution) it had 86.1% of US cigarette output and commanding positions in other sectors except cigars 
(14.4%) (6). Thus, suppression o f competition was part of the Company’s ethos.
There are many accounts o f the foundation and development of B.A.T. By far the most authoritative (it 
was given the support o f the Company) and up to date is “The Global Cigarette. Origins and Evolution o f 
British American Tobacco 1880-1945.” by Professor Howard Cox (7). This has been of great value to the 
writer. Like the writer he owes much in the analysis o f B.A.T. in China to the work of the Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences.
In Autumn 1901 Duke landed in Liverpool and took over the large UK tobacco company of Ogden’s, 
Ltd. (8). From this base he launched a strong competitive war with cut prices and extravagant deals to 
retailers. Very shortly, 13 UK producers (later 16) led by the leading firm of W.D. and H.O. Wills 
combined to form the Imperial Tobacco Company (of Great Britain and Ireland) and counter-attacked by 
threatening to commence manufacture in the USA market.
In late 1902 the two warring parties reached an agreement. Imperial and Duke’s interests would not 
invade each others markets (Ogden’s was sold to Imperial Tobacco in exchange for 14% of the shares in 
Imperial). A joint company was formed to sell their combined products, either from local production by 
their subsidiaries or from exports from UK or USA plants, throughout the rest of the World (except for 
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines). This joint venture was, thus, from the outset an early example of a 
multi-national manufacturing corporation. The only other comparable British multi-national company with 
significant operations in China (much smaller, however than those of B.A.T.) before the Second World 
War was Lever Brothers/Unilever.
B.A.T. was thus formed on September 29th, 1902 and registered in London. Although registered in the 
UK, two-thirds of the capital was allotted to the American Tobacco Co. and J.B.Duke was Chairman 
although II  out of the 18 directors were British (6 representing Imperial Tobacco Company and 5 
Ogden’s). Thus in its early years B.A.T. was more American than British. 1911 saw a watershed when the 
USA Supreme Court ruled that the American Tobacco Co. was a monopoly in violation of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act and the trust was broken up. In the case of B. A.T. the holding of the American Tobacco Co. 
was distributed to their shareholders. This enabled the coordinated British minority to, in effect, control the 
Company rather than the large number o f individual American shareholders. B.A.T. thus “became an 
instrument of British rather than American tobacco interests” (9). Many American shareholders sold their 
shares and by 1914 a majority (69.8 percent) of the shares belonged to British interests and only 23.8 
percent were held in the USA (10). Bearing in mind the substantial British interest in B.A.T. from its 
inception and its eventual control, for the purpose of this study it is regarded as if it were a British company 
throughout.
(B) THE EARLY YEARS OF B.A.T. IN CHINA.
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Tobacco was no stranger to China. However, cigarette smoking was slow to develop with pipe smoking 
being the predominant use o f the plant. The modem cigarette was brought to China by Mustard and 
Company, then an American owned firm engaged in the general importing business in China and who 
became the agents of the American Tobacco Company (11). Mustard and Company had from 1891 a 
pioneer cigarette factory in Fudong working for it under the control o f a Danish partner named Laurits 
Andersen (12). Progress in developing the market was slow -  it was not until 1894 that imports of 
cigarettes warranted separate classification by the Imperial Maritime Customs. Progress, however, was 
enough to encourage the entry of another Western producer -  the American Cigarette Company. Connected 
with the American Trading Company, this had an initial, issued capital of 75 thous. taels (£11 thous.) on its 
formation in 1896 (13) which was soon increased to 150 thous. taels (£23 thous.). The factory was also in 
Pudong. In 1898 the Company was able to pay a dividend of 6% (14) and in 1899 2% (15). In 1900, 
however the Company made a loss o f 22 thous. taels (£2.8 thous.) (16).
A number of British manufacturers also began to export to China -  in particular, starting in 1892, W.D 
and H.O. Wills through the agency of Rex and Co. In August, 1902 W.D. and H.O. Wills acting for the 
Imperial Tobacco Co. purchased the American Cigarette Co. for 190 taels (£23 thous.) (the factory had 
been shut for some time) (17).
Thus both partners in B.A.T. had small footholds in China and B.A.T quickly began to rationalise this 
inheritance. The American Cigarette Co. with its Pudong factory was taken over and in September, 1905 
was reformulated as the British Cigarette Company, Ltd. (18). In November, 1903 B.A.T. purchased a 
controlling interest in Mustard and Company, Ltd., forming a company o f the same name (19). (Appendix 
One gives a chronology of the various companies that were in the B.A.T. Group in China). The agency 
arrangements with Rex and Co. were thus terminated in 1904 (20).
These operations in China taken over by the newly formed company were modest -  employing only 
171 persons in 1902 and 300 in 1903 (21). However, by 1906 the Company employed 2,500 in China (21). 
Frustrated by Government action in Japan (see under Murai Brothers Co., Ltd. in Appendix One) B.A.T. 
concentrated its considerable strength and skills in the Chinese market. It utilised the techniques, described 
above, that were successfully used by one of its parent companies -  that in the USA :-
(i) Mass production.
Utilising imported modem machinery, the Company vastly increased its production base in China :- 
... the property of the British Cigarette Company in Shanghai turns out 8,000,000 cigarettes a day, 
and the same company has just erected a factory in Hankow capable of a similar output. The .. .factory in 
Shanghai... has a staff of some 33 foreigners (British and American) in addition to a large number of 
travelling agents in the interior...” (22).
This factory in Pudong, built up from the original American Cigarette Company plant, was followed, as 
noted, by an even larger one (capacity of 10,000,000 cigarettes a day) in Hankou (in the tri-city of Wuhan) 
-  further extended in 1911. In Manchuria B.A.T. faced strong competition from the Japanese Tobacco 
Monopoly (23). (The long lasting competitive interface of B.A.T. with Japanese tobacco interests in 
Manchuria is described in PART IV  (C )). To contain these Japanese incursions B.A.T, opened a cigarette 
factory in Shenyang in 1908 with a capacity o f 2,000,000 cigarettes a day (24). This presence in Manchuria 
was supplemented by acquisition. In 1914 B.A.T. acquired a majority interest in the Russian company of
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AXopato & Sons. (25). Their factory in Harbin had a capacity for Russian type cigarettes of 250,000 a 
day (26).
Production of cigarettes in China by B.A.T. reached 5,135 million by 1912 (see Table Three) but such 
was the upsurge in demand for cigarettes, particularly instigated by B.A.T., that for a long time the firm 
had to  rely for a substantial part of its sales coming from its dedicated export plants in the USA and UK, 
From import/export figures and a comparison of production figures with B.A.T. sales figures for China (see 
Tables Three and Four) the proportion of B.A.T. cigarette sales in China supplied by Group imports was 
roughly as follows :-
1910 60%
1912 30%
1915 40%
1920 22%
1925 19%
1930 11%
1935 0.5%
1940 0.3%
B.A.T. from its early days in China integrated its manufacturing backwards to produce items previously 
imported. As soon as the Company had its first modern cigarette factory operating satisfactorily it installed 
a modem printing plant (before the First World War the largest in the World) on the same site. Apart from 
producing the printed matter used in wrapping and packing the Pudong plant’s cigarette output the 
department had a large staff of designers and lithographic artists who produced posters, calendars, hangers, 
etc for the Company’s advertising work. The Company also began to manufacture in Pudong cardboard 
boxes, tin boxes and cases used for transporting its cigarettes. It later produced tin foil for packaging. 
Another move was the installation of an engineering department at Pudong making spare machine parts, etc 
-  again reducing imports.
(ii) Strong and effective selling effort.
Although written by a sympathetic source (the local Branch of Reuters) it is fair to state
that:-
“Probably no foreign company has done more to open up direct trade with the interior than the 
British- American Tobacco Company....” (27).
The Company showed remarkable energy in setting up an extensive distribution system. Sales offices, 
headed by Western sales representatives, were set up in regional centres. Backing this was a network of 
supporting warehouses
- in 1912 there was “probably not a city of any size in the eighteen provinces where such warehouses 
have not been established by the British-American Tobacco Company.” (28).
This effort at local level was backed up by Chinese staff and agents. The wholesale dealers had 
restrictions keeping them to B.A.T. brands and small dealers had similar arrangements with these wholesale 
dealers. Agents were appointed on a commission basis and were closely supervised by B.A.T. inspectors. 
The relationship with Chinese staff and agents was vital to B.A.T. in its distribution network. B.A.T. 
adapted credit policies and currency payment methods to suit Chinese requirements.
(in) Advertising and promotion.
The sales effort was backed up by a surprisingly modern sales promotion and marketing 
effbrt.This novel effort extending to many areas made a strong impression on contemporaries :-
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TABLE THREE- 
PRODUCTION OF CIGARETTES BY B.A.T. - Million
Shanehai Hankou Tianiin Oingdao Manchuria* Total Hong
Kon«
Total
1912 2,885 1,924 - - 326 5,135 - 5,135
1913 3,259 2,008 - - 456 5,723 - 5,723
1914 2,818 770 - - 293 3,881 - 3,881
1915 3,326 1,279 - - 4,605 - 4,605
1916 3,761 1,702 - - - 5,463 - 5,463
1917 4,156 1,595 - - - 5,751 - 5,751
1918 6,141 1,430 - - 115 7,686 - 7,686
1919 9,161 2,386 - - 475 12,022 - 12,022
1920 9,-440 2,-756 - - 1,-170 13,-366 - 13,366
1921 9,266 3,246 - - 1,385 13,897 - 13,897
1922 9,152 3,121 1,186 - 1,935 15,394 - 15,394
1923 10,634 3,538 2,868 - 2,934 19,994 - 19,994
1924 14,273 5,801 4,986 100 2,722 27,882 - 27,882
1925 9,356 5,253 5,991 800 3,058 24,458 - 24,458
1931 12,601 5,739 6,583 4,935 2,907 32,765 290 33,055
1932 15,326 33 6,033 3,950 2,255 27,597 439 28,036
1936 16,475 7,228 6,188 4,756 9,571 44,218 569 44,787
1937 18,449 9,537 8,871 6,736 11,618 55,211 1,017 56,228
1938 11,914 7,521 7,003 4,370 10,716 41,104 1,822 42,926
1939 17,852 813 6,637 6,082 9,983 41,367 1,497 42,864
1940 17,247 1,857 7,187 5,935 9,285 41,511 1,948 43,459
1941 18,144 1,775 8,038 6,552 8,224 42,733 3,260 45,993
Source: YingM ei Ycm Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 1635-6 
* Shenyang plant out of action because of fire in 1914 -  output not resumed until 1918. Production by A. 
Lopato and Sons not included until 1922.
Note in 1935 production in Mainland China with the exception of Manchuria was distributed as follows :--
B.A.T.
Other foreign producers 
Chinese producers
- in Shanghai
- Other locations
Note : The B.A.T. share of total output was :-
Percent
1931 58.7
1932 61.4
1933 58.4
1934 52.4
1935 55.6
1936 62.5
1937 66.-3
1938 76,6
1939 69.8
1940 62.4
1941 65.5
Source: YingM ei Yan Gonsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian - pages 235-6.
50.5%
0 .8%
48.7%
46.2%
2.5%
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TABLE FOUR.
SALES OF CIGARETTES IN CHINA BY B.A.T. -  Years ending September 30th
Million As percentage of
1902 634 n.a.
1909 4,468 n.a.
1910 5,277 n.a.
1911 6,497 n.a.
1912 7,147 n.a.
1914 9,398 n.a.
1915 8,956 n.a.
1916 9,649 n,a.
1918 13,360 n.a.
1920 17,021 n.a.
1921 17,781 46,8
1922 20,285 50.8
1923 25,474 52.1
1924 31,731 53.6
1925 29,398 48.2
1926 29,021 43.2
1927 28,135 38.9
1928 25,821 33.6
1929 41,022 41,8
1930 43,895 44,3
1931 41,188 45.6
1932 39,857 44.3
1933 39,598 41.9
1934 35,408 35.8
1935 37,639 29.3
1936 43,869 35.3
1937 55,931 37.9
1938 45,097 31.6
1939 43,597 30,3
1940 44,276 30.5
1941 44,745 29.4
♦Figures for total B.A.T. sales derived from Cox op. cit. page 11.
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in Yingkou (Liaoning) in 1905 B.A.T. put up 2,000 large placards and 200 signboards (29). 
in Kaifing (Henan) in 1907 “the whole city has been placarded with thousands of staring B.A.T. 
advertisements” (30)
in Chengdu (Sichuan) in 1911 “cigarette men have. ..invaded the city and threaten not to leave 
until the place is well infested with cigarettes” (31).
By the 1920s advertising costs were about half of B.A.T. China’s selling costs. In the year ending 
September, 1.919 they were 40.9% of selling costs and by June, 1922 they were 50.6%. (32) -  a similar 
ratio pertained in mid 1921 and mid 1923.
In later years B.A.T. extended its advertising efforts to include film production at their Motion Picture 
Department (a plant came on stream in Shanghai in 1924 producing newsreels, documentaries, etc -  a 
“miniature Hollywood” (33) - although this was a short-lived venture) and outdoor electric signs. (The 
illuminated B.A.T. clock in Shanghai had a diameter of 22 feet (34)).
B.A.T. was very conscious of the need to establish and protect Group brand names. Over the years these 
amounted to an extraordinary amount -  the number of B.A.T. Group trademarks registered in Nanjing 
amounted to 534 in October, 1928 and 603 in June, 1941 (35). At first the emphasis was on translated 
brand names from the UK and the USA but these were followed by specific Chinese brands. As early as 
1907 B.A.T, was involved in legal action against the San Shing Tobacco Co. for alleged infringement of 
their “Sweet Caporal”, “Pirate” and “Three Castles” brands (36).
The development of local B.A.T. output and the strong sales/marketing effort led to a sharp upsurge in 
B.A.T. sales of cigarettes in China although there was a slight setback in profitability with the Anti- 
American boycott in 1905 -  hence the change in the name of the main Group company in China from 
American. Cigarette Company, Limited to British Cigarette Company, Limited in September, 1905 (37). 
The ratio of net income to sales in 1905 was slightly down on the average for 1902-4 (38).
In terms of quantity, sales o f cigarettes by B.A.T. by 1909 were 7 times higher than in 1902 and by 1912 
11 times higher -  see Table Four. In addition to cigarettes B.A.T. also sold other tobacco items in China 
although these were small in comparison (39).
(C) THE ZENITH OF B.A.T. IN CHINA.
Despite interruptions to growth caused by military action and civil disturbances (for example, in 
1923 two employees were seized by bandits (40)), labour disputes and boycotts, etc B.A.T. dramatically 
expanded its interests in China and by the mid-1930s these were, indeed, considerable. (By far the most 
critical for BA.T. of these disturbances was the May Thirtieth Movement o f 1.925 -  see below).. 
Production and sales of cigarettes peaked in 1937 (see Tables Three and Four). Production of cigarettes in 
1920 was two and a half times greater than in 1912. 1937, in turn, was over four times that in 1920. The 
total increase 1912 to 1937 was 995% (Table Three).
By 1937 B.A.T. had registered over 30 companies in China (see Appendix One) with a capital totalling 
$288 million (£18 million at current exchange rate). As Appendix One shows some of these were in fields 
not directly connected with the tobacco industry ;- 
- import/export business.
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- non-life insurance and other financial services. (A UK based subsidiary of B.A.T. was Tobacco 
Insurance Company, Limited).
The capital o f the flagship company o f the tobacco operations -  British American Tobacco Company 
(China), Limited -  was $216 million (£13 million) in the same year. B.A.T.’s first lead company in China 
-  The American Cigarette Co., Ltd., reformed as the British Cigarette Co., Ltd. in 1905 -  was the first such 
body. It was replaced by the British American Tobacco Company (China), Ltd in 1919 which was 
originally 97.5% owned by the B.A.T. parent company. There were alterations to the organisation in the 
1930s -  the first being the setting up of a separate company to comprise the bulk of operations in 
Manchuria -  the Chi Tung Tobacco Company. From November 1st, 1934 the following two companies took 
over the business o f the British American Tobacco Company (China), Ltd. in Mainland China except the 
Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo :-
Yee Tsoong Tobacco Company, Ltd. -  manufacturing operations.
Yee Tsoong Tobacco Distributors Company, Ltd.
(This move disguised to some small extent the fact that the companies were British owned. The main 
reason was, however, to attempt to give the Company more of a local identity).
Apart from operations in Hong Kong the British American Tobacco Company (China) Ltd. thus mainly 
became a holding company. Its 1937 issued capital of $216 million, as noted above, was an increase of the 
following on that o f its counterpart, the British Cigarette Co., Ltd
(a) (b)
In dollar terms In £ terms -  converted
at average for the year 
On 1905 6,859% 4,382%
On 1918 1,859% 279%
Total assets (less goodwill) (41) on the same comparison developed as follows :-
(a) (b)
On 1907 3,958% 2,426%
On 1914 1,673% 1,095%
By 1937 B.A.T. had in China :-
-10 cigarette plants plus one in Hong Kong.
- 6 leaf-curing plants.
- 6 printing plants (at Capital Lithographers).
- a foundry (Acme Foundry, Ltd).
- an engineering department at the original Pudong factory. This was a centre of innovation
and excellence in the B.A.T. Group. Its skilled workforce assembled machines for B.A.T. 
factories -  not only in China but elsewhere in the East (42).
Major expansions in cigarette making capacity were as follows. In 1917 the Thorbum Road factory was 
opened in Shanghai and in 1921 a large plant came on stream in Tianjin (43). In 1924/5 another factory was 
opened in Qingdao (44) near the American style tobacco fields that B.A.T. was mainly instrumental in 
creating (see below). In 1929 a satellite plant with 25 cigarette machines was established in the Hankou 
area (closed in 1938) and a small factory was set up in Hong Kong to serve primarily the South China 
market (45) (Hong Kong was the location of its leading Chinese owned competitor’s original plant - see 
below). In 1934 another small plant (only six machines) was opened in Liaoying in Manchuria -  replaced 
in 1939 by a larger plant (20 machines) in Yinkou, also in Manchuria (46). In 1937 a third factory was 
established in Shanghai (47). During the 1930s the capacity of the original cigarette factory at Pudong was
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run down in favour of expansion at the Thorbum Road plant and the creation of this factory (See TABLE C 
in the STATISTICAL ANNEX).
In 1937 the position was as follows as regards B.A.T.’s cigarette factories in Mainland China, which in 
total employed 17,047 workers, had 442 cigarette machines, and produced 55,211 million cigarettes (48) >
Cinarette Machines Cigarette Number of
Installed Production Workers
% % %
Shanghai 38.4 33.4 36.9
- Pudong factory 16.5 16.2 18.0
- Thorbum Road factory 18.1 16.6 15.4
- Number 3 factory 3.8 0.6 3.5
Hankou factory 8.8 10.4 10.5
Hanshui factory 5.9 6.8 6.1
Tianjin factory 15.2 16.1 10.5
Qingdao factory 12.2 12.2 9.7
Manchuria 19.5 21.1 26.3
- Shenyang factory 11.3 11.3 12.7
- Liaoying factory 1.4 2.7 4.0
- Harbin factory 6.8 7.1 9.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
The B.A.T. machine park had peaked in 1930 at 505 machines and had declined by 12% by 1937 (49) 
(an obviously different figure in terms of cigarette output capability as any new machines installed were 
presumably more productive). This was despite a rise in Manchuria. The main falls were at Tianjin and the 
original plant at Shanghai -  not outweighed by the rise at the Thorbum Road factory and the new factory.
In terms of the labour productivity of the various B.A.T. plants in China the star plant, as one would 
expect, was the new factory in Shanghai -  in 1940 1,901 cigarettes per worker per hour (50). Both at this 
plant and at Thorbum Road (1,479 cigarettes per worker hour in 1940 (51)) output per head was well above 
the level of the long established pioneer factory. Output per head was very low at the Manchurian factories 
(for example 706 cigarettes per worker hour in 1940 at the Shenyang factory (52) and 691 at the Harbin 
factory (53)) but a large element o f this can be explained by the large proportion in their output of Russian 
type cigarettes.
Table Five gives the geographical split of B .A T .’s cigarette sales. What is instantly apparent is the wide 
distribution of sales -  these figures contradict firmly any suggestion that the activities o f British companies 
were confined to the Treaty Ports and the coastal strip generally. Admittedly, there were some regions of 
relatively low presence like, for example, Guangdong where, until the outbreak of war in 1937, B.A.T. 
faced severe competitive pressure from its leading Chinese competitor of Nanyang Brothers Tobacco 
Company -  see below. The effect of the outbreak of hostilities in 1937 was obviously to increase B.A.T.’s 
market share in certain areas such as Guangdong and Shanghai due to the physical destruction of Chinese 
owned cigarette factories. One area, however, where the B.A.T. presence in the cigarette market declined 
both proportionately and absolutely after 1937 was Manchuria . This is described in PART /F  (C).
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TABLE FIVE
B.A.T'. -  SALES OF CIGARETTES IN CHINA BY REGION* -  MILLION
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Manchuria 5,985 4,386 6,518 7,618 8,738 8,912 10,998 10,878 9,034 9,033 8,296
Border Region 715 757 809 878 767 850 1,342 1,355 1,561 1,169 498
Northern Region 2,-390 2}239 2,054 2,624 2,743 3,105 3,350 4,665 4,737 6,423 5,879
Luhan Region 3,216 3,359 2,567 1,799 2,017 2,243 2,953 1,923 2,763 5,230 3,049
Beijing Region 1,003 1,108 1,139 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Shandong Region 5,738 4,785 3,985 2,843 2,881 3,376 4,435 2,089 3,609 2,994 4,583
Henan Region 2,231 2,355 2,158 1,719 1,632 2,150 2,630 1,310 117 463 n.a.
Hubei Region 4,663 3,867 4,197 3,597 3,619 3,721 5,653 4,434 1,634 1,709 1,556
Hunan Region 824 889 1,026 913 876 955 1,337 1,138 324 860 n.a.
Jiangxi Region 638 532 573 668 534 584 869 239 6 8 5
Shanghai Region 3,018 2,208 2,280 2,062 2,624 3,197 3,355 7,987 8,898 4,487 8,058
Eastern Region 4,663 5,654 5,377 4,518 4,868 5,713 6,277 2,178 2,465 2,980 2,167
Nanjing Region 3,865 4,412 4,162 3,236 3,577 4,802 6,427 473 2,553 7,911 4,687
Sichuan Region 752 948 775 637 439 998 1,541 1,156 429 125 194
Guangdong Region 321 405 416 530 334 740 1,470 1,860 1,067 1,070 1,322
Guangxi Region n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 129 56 72 n.a.
S. China Region 1,099 1,020 778 1,028 1,202 1,290 1,561 1,525 2,195 616 978
Yunnan Region 194 193 255 166 168 207 301 198 541 99 n.a.
Hong Kong 517 433 517 475 568 590 766 870 881 1,511 1,861
* Including sales via Wing Tai Vo Tobacco Corporation,
Source: YingM ei Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 734-746.
TABLE FIVE - Continued 
B.A.T.- SHARE OF SALES OF CIGARETTES BY QUANTITY IN VARIOUS REGIONS*
- PERCENTAGE -
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Manchuria 77.8 72,3 74.0 71.0 71.9 69.1 74.1 67.2 53.2 49.9 45.6
Border Region 91.6 96.0 90.3 86.4 80.4 82.1 82.5 87.3 75.0 67.3 46.2
Northern Region 79.8 82.3 73.7 75.7 78.0 83.2 84.0 71.2 67.9 81.0 53.4
Luhan Region 87.1 94.8 81.3 70.0 70.3 72.1 70.0 97.7 88.0 74.6 67.9
Beijing Region 79.8 83.5 77.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Shandong Region 86.0 80.7 76.2 69.9 81.0 89.4 89.0 91.7 82.3 59.7 68.8
Henan Region 88.6 85.9 83.6 86.5 82.3 83.2 78.1 90.6 91.4 72.7 n.a.
Hubei Region 84.9 86.0 86.0 79.9 81.1 80.1 74.4 87.3 60.6 35.3 36.6
Hunan Region 63.8 74.0 80.3 76.6 72.6 79.9 81.4 85.7 94.2 81.8 n.a.
Jiangxi Region 52.1 43.0 44.9 41.0 56.1 60.8 63.8 47.3 87.9 40.3 34.6
Shanghai Region 49.1 42.1 42.1 33.9 42.4 53.4 54.5 78.1 67.4 47.6 69.1
Eastern Region 44,6 54,7 54,6 50,5 47,2 66,1 62,4 57,8 46,0 58,6 56,5
Nanjing Region 40.8 55.7 52.4 43.6 48.7 53.9 57.9 66.7 63.7 73.9 72.2
Sichuan Region 91.4 96.2 70.9 37.6 21.6 42.0 57.4 75.7 75.0 38.6 41.2
Guangdong Region 8.2 9.0 9.1 12.5 8.3 17.3 32.9 60.7 73.8 70.2 60.5
Guangxi Region n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 52.1 48.2 83.4 n.a.
S. China Region 36.7 32.0 23.6 36.0 43.8 46.8 54.7 69.6 74.0 46.0 53.0
Yunnan Region 66.6 57.2 65.2 62.7 56.9 68.0 63.7 69.7 71.6 49.2 n.a.
Hong Kong 37.2 28.3 41.2 31.0 38.3 44.2 44.6 48.0 40.0 55.5 63.7
* Including sales via Wing Tai Vo Tobacco Corporation.
Source: YingM ei Yon Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 734-746.
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(D) THE INTERFACE OF B.A.T. WITH CHINESE INTERESTS IN THE
TOBACCO INDUSTRY.
It is important to realise that this issue is not clear-cut in that considerable Chinese interests were 
linked to B.A.T.. Chinese participation in B.A.T. in China took two forms
(a) As shareholders.
As they were private companies it was impossible for anyone in China to buy shares in the 
B.A.T. subsidiaries in China. They could, of course, buy shares in the parent company in London. With 
the primary object to influence the Chinese elite in its favour after the May Thirtieth Incident, the British- 
American (China) Tobacco Securities Company, Limited was incorporated in May, 1926. Divisional 
managers were requested to suggest influential individuals to be offered the $100 shares at a 15% discount 
(54). The authorised capital was $20 million. By its constitution every $ invested in this company was 
applied to purchase the equivalent amount in the shares of the British-American Tobacco Company 
(China), Ltd. Four out of the eleven directors o f this finance company were Chinese -  the balance from 
British-American Tobacco Company (China), Ltd. (55 ).
By January, 1927 the issued capital was $7,000,000 and by January, 1928 $9,866,200 (56). It then 
remained at this figure. Thus, the share of the issued capital of the British-American Tobacco Company 
(China), Ltd. held by this route was relatively small -  varying around 5 percent >
1927 3.9%
1928 5.1%
1933 onwards 4.6%
(b) As participants in B.A.T.’s Chinese Operations.
It was not until the formation of the Yee Tsoong Tobacco Company in 1934 that a Chinese 
director (C.S.Chen) was appointed to the Board of a main B.A.T. company in China (57). Also, there was 
no Chinese in the senior management of the factories. It was in the selling function that Chinese presence 
was important -  without it the Company could not have achieved its wide geographic coverage. Thus, the 
Group’s selling company o f Yee Tsoong Tobacco Distributors Company, Ltd. had in 1938 17 out of its 24 
sales offices headed by Chinese managers or agents (see Appendix One). The role o f the Chinese 
employees included recruiting and maintaining relations with agents and, in some cases, sub-agents. B.A.T. 
mainly built on a traditional network of merchants already versed in handling commodities other than 
cigarettes (58). The inhibition on foreign firms acquiring property outside the Treaty Ports favoured this 
approach as it restricted B.A.T. building up their own warehouse network. The wide extent of this 
marketing network, as confirmed by the area sales figures in Table Five, would appear to run contrary to 
assertions that there were many geographic areas of China where traditional non-factory tobacco products 
(mainly for pipes) or Chinese factory or workshop production of cigarettes were not subject to direct or 
non-direct competition from B.A.T. (The assertion in mind is that by Albert F. Feuerwerker that “Anyone 
who would claim that the Hunan or Szechwan peasant in the 1930’s dressed in Naigaiwata cottons, smoked 
BAT cigarettes and used Meiji sugar has a big case to prove.” (59)).
Beyond the marketing network described above, B.A.T. also had distribution channels in which 
Chinese participation was paramount and which covered a large area -  in particular via the Wing Tai Vo 
Tobacco Corporation (there were other examples such as the Union Tobacco Company for a short period 
(1912-1920) - see Appendix One - and the San Ho Cigarette Company (60)). Wing Tai Vo, a long
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established merchant concern, had an agency connection with B.A.T. or one of its predecessors (Wills) 
going back to the 1890s (61). In 1921 a joint venture (51% B.A.T./ 49% Chinese) -  the Wing Tai Vo 
(Yongtaihe) Tobacco Corporation -  was formed to carry on this operation. This move was described by 
B.A.T. as “an example of a foreign company turning over one of the principal branches of its business to a 
Chinese organisation.” (62).This agreement became lucrative to the owners o f the Chinese concern, in 
particular the general manager Cheng Po-chao -  Zheng Bozhao. -  in addition to the profits of the operation 
they received commissions on the results (63). The company had rights in particular for the distribution of 
the very popular “Ruby Queen” brand and the “Victory” brand (64). The proportion of B.A.T. sales of 
cigarettes (in terms of quantity) in China accounted for by this company was at its highest in 1941 (38.2%) 
followed by 1923 (35.5%) and at its lowest in the early 1930s -  especially 1934 (18.5%) (65). By 
geographic area the proportion of B.A.T. sales accounted for by this company was at its highest in 
Shanghai (77% in 1937), the “Eastern Region” -  the area near Shanghai (65% in 1937) and Nanjing (34% 
in 1937) (63). The Company made little sales to Manchuria and Southern China (66).
The Company’s strength in the lower Yangzi and the reduction in local competition after the 1937 
hostilities was an important influence in its share of total B.A.T. business. Thus, cigarette sales by the Wing 
Tai Vo Tobacco Corporation to Shanghai increased from 2,608 million in 1937 (and 2,456 million in 
1936) to 6,641 million in 1941(67). In 1941 the share of the Company in the Shanghai cigarette market was 
56.9 percent as against 42.4 percent in 1937 while that o f other B.A.T. sales remained virtually constant at 
12.1 percent in 1937 and 12.2 percent in 1941 (68).
(1) Development of Chinese competition to B.A.T.
Over the whole period under review the principal competitor to B. A.T. in the Chinese market 
was local Chinese manufacturers. Excluding the position in Manchuria, competition to B.A.T. from 
foreign interests was modest until the Japanese incursion in 1937. In 1935, for example, production of 
cigarettes in China excluding Manchuria by foreign competitors to B.A.T. accounted for only 0.8% of the 
total (Table Three).
(i) European competition, (see PART IV  (B))
Competition from European sources was slight and diminished over time. By 1914 there were seven 
competitive enterprises operating -  4 Greek and 3 Russian. By 1939 there were only two (See Table Eight). 
Competition in Manchuria from Russian enterprises was reduced by the merger of interests with the Lopato 
company and the other Russian company o f any importance (Tschurin Tobacco Company) was relatively 
small (See PART IV (B) below).
(ii) American competition (69).
A subsidiary of the American based company of Tobacco Products Corporation set up a cigarette 
factory in Shanghai in 1917 but by 1925 their Chinese operation was making a loss and was taken over by 
B. A.T. In addition, one of the leading American tobacco firms -  Liggett and Myers -  attempted in the early 
1920s to seriously penetrate the Chinese market (without, however, setting up local production). In 1927, 
however, B.A.T. bought control of Liggett and Myer’s business in China. Part of the consideration was the 
issue to Liggett and Myers of $2.5 million in ordinary shares in British-American Tobacco Company 
(China), Ltd. -  1.9% of the enlarged total. B.A.T.’s strength in marketing and distribution were key factors 
in beating off competitors.
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(iii) Japanese competition.
From the early days Manchuria was the main area in which Japanese interests competed with B. A.T. It 
was not, as noted, until after the Japanese full invasion of China that Japanese involvement in the tobacco 
industry in China other than Manchuria became significant. (PART IV  (C) gives a fuller account of the 
competitive interface between Japanese interests and B. A.T.).
Shortly after B. A.T. entered the field in China a small domestic producer started up. The boycott wave 
against the USA in 1905 was a catalyst. There sprang up about 20 local producers (70). Also in 1905 the 
Nanyang (literally “South Seas”) Tobacco Company, of which more below, was founded and opened a 
factory in Hong Kong. However, after the boycott died down B. A.T. succeeded in driving a considerable 
proportion of these Chinese enterprises out of business by its well tried methods of price slashing, exclusive 
dealing agreements, vigorous protection o f its brands, etc (71).
The Nanyang Tobacco Company shared the fate of other Chinese companies and folded in 1908. It was, 
however, reorganised as the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company (Nanyang Xiongdi Yancao Gongsi)* in 
1909 and production was resumed (72). By 1911 the Company was making profits and by 1916 the Hong 
Kong factory had 31 machines and was producing 4 million cigarettes a day (73). From 3.5% of B.A.T.’s 
sales by quantity in 1912 it had risen to 13.6% in 1916. Until the First World War the Company had sold 
virtually all its output to South East Asia and, to a lesser extent, Hong Kong. However, by 1915 it had 
started to develop sales to Mainland China -  “even North China invaded to some extent” (74) -  although 
the main initial thrust was in Guangdong. In 1917 the Company vastly increased its presence in the Chinese 
market by opening a factory in Shanghai. B.A.T. reacted sharply to this first serious attempt to end its 
hegemony in the Chinese market. The usual techniques o f price cutting, matching the opposition’s most 
profitable brands etc were employed plus more disreputable tactics such as buying Nanyang’s cigarettes 
and then reselling them when mouldy and playing the xenophobic card by exaggerating Nanyang’s 
Japanese connections (75). Serious discussions for a merger between the two companies took place in 
1914, 1917 and 1919-1921 but did not come to fruition (76). To overcome a chronic shortage of capital the 
Chinese company became a public company in 1919. The authorised capital was initially $5 million but 
increased to $15 million by 1923 -  all issued. This was 9% of the issued capital of British-American 
Tobacco Company (China), Ltd. at the same date. The Company had by then survived the B.A.T. attacks 
using vigorous competitive methods itself. By 1918 its total sales of cigarettes were about a third of those 
of B.A.T. In the early 1920s the Company enjoyed excellent progress -  in 1920-1923 its sales in value 
terms rose by 28% and dividends in 1920-22 were 17% per annum (albeit tapering off to 12% in 1923 and 
only 4% in 1924). The Company also built up its financial strength -  retentions were 42% of net profits in 
1923 and 60% in 1924. In the peak year of 1920 net profits were 19.4% of sales -  26.5% in the case of the 
Shanghai operation.
In the years 1920 to 1923 dividends by Nanyang Brothers were well in excess o f those of B.A.T, 
(China). However, comparison of dividends paid between Nanyang Brothers and B.A.T. (China) is very 
misleading as a guide to the relative profitability o f the two enterprises. B.A.T. adopted a very cautious 
policy as regards dividends paid by the various companies in the Group. The ratio of retentions to earnings 
*A particularly useful source, widely used here, on Nanyang is Wang Shijan: Nanyang xiongdi yancao 
gongsi shiliao. (Source material for the history of the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company). 1958.
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TABLE SIX-
COMPARISON OF CIGARETTE SALES IN CHINA BY B.A.T. AND OTHER COMPANIES 
B.A.T. OTHER COMPANIES TOTAL
Million % Million % Million %
1923 25,474 79.3 6,632 20.7 32,106 100.0
1924 31,731 82,1 6,935 17,9 38,666 100,0
1925 29,398 77.1 8,744 22.9 38,142 100.0
1926 29,021 70.4 12,202 29.6 41,223 100.0
1927 28,135 67.7 13,425 32.3 41,560 100.0
1928 25,821 61.1 16,422 38.9 42,243 100.0
1929 41,022 68.4 18,951 31.6 59,973 100.0
1930 43,895 65.3 23,341 34.7 67,236 100.0
1931 41,188 60,1 27,298 39.9 68,486 100.0
1932 39,857 62.3 24,141 37.7 63,998 100.0
1933 39,598 59,9 26,492 40,1 66,090 100,0
1934 35,408 54.9 29,061 45.1 64,469 100.0
1935 37,639 56.9 28,473 43.1 66,112 100.0
1936 43,869 63.3 25,478 36.7 69,347 100.0
1937 55,931 67.2 27,324 32.8 83,255 100.0
1938 45,097 73.0 16,691 27.0 61,788 100.0
1939 43,597 64.1 24,397 35.9 67,994 100.0
1940 44,276 58.5 31,350 41.5 75,626 100.0
1941 44,745 59.8 30,136 40.2 74,881 100.0
Source:- YitigM ei Ycm Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian. Page 733.
-71-
was generally high. Thus, the operating performance of B.A.T. in China was overall markedly better than 
that of Nanyang Brothers. One factor in this was B.A.T.’s greater access to  locally grown American 
“bright” tobacco (see below). Thus, in the four years 1933-1936 the share of raw materials in B.A.T.’s total 
manufacturing costs was 3 percentage points lower than that of Nanyang Brothers (77).
Despite the emergence o f this first serious, and seemingly well established, competitor to B.A.T. 
progress by local competitors was overall slow. By 1924 there were only 16 Chinese owned tobacco 
factories and in that year the B. A.T. share of sales of cigarettes in China was 82% (see Table Six).
The May 30th Incident of 1925 markedly changed the situation to the detriment of B.A.T. The firm’s 
plants in Shanghai and also the factory in Hankou were hit by strikes. The Shanghai workers stayed on 
strike for 124 days helped by a subvention of $100,000 from Nanyang (78). B.A.T. was also hit by a more 
serious move -  a boycott in which its products were declared unpatriotic. This lasted until 1926. Nanyang 
were prominent in the May 30th movement - playing the patriotic card to the utmost and organising a 
vigorous campaign against B.A.T. with no holds barred -  including violence
 ” the Nanyang Tobacco Co. are more responsible than any other agency in the promotion of the
Boycott movement” (B. A.T. to British Consulate General (79)).
The effect of the boycott on B.A.T.’s sales was significant but apparently not nearly as serious as 
suggested by contemporaries or more recent studies e.g. by Sherman Cochran in Big Business in China. 
Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 (80). Here, after quoting contemporary sources 
reporting on various areas o f the country, he concludes that “throughout China B.A.T. sales came crashing 
down” and “ .... the market for B.A.T. goods collapsed”. (Part of the difference in view could lie in the fact 
that the B.A.T. sales figures quoted below would refer to shipments to dealers not to final offtake at the 
consumer level. It is obviosly impossible to assess the build-up of stocks between the factory and final 
consumption.). Sales o f cigarettes by B.A.T. fell by 7.4% in the twelve months to end September, 1925 as 
compared with the previous financial year to September, 1924 and by a further 1.3% in the financial year to 
September, 1926 (Table Six), Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company clearly benefited from B.A,T.’s 
problems -  its net profits in the financial year to end October, 1926 at $2,301 thous. were 89% above the 
1925 financial year figure o f $1,220 thous. although below the levels of 1920-23. Sales in value terms were 
up by 45 percent over the previous financial year (81).
Another serious effect on B.A.T. of the May 30th Movement was the mushroom growth of Chinese 
cigarette companies. Admittedly, these tended to be small and poorly capitalised but in aggregate they 
further threatened B.A.T.’s preponderance. No less than 28 such companies were listed in Shanghai 
between May 30th, 1925 and July 8th, 1925 (82). Chinese owned factories developed thus (83) :-
Shanghai area** Other Total Shanghai area** Other Total
1924 14 2 16 1931 64 23 87
1925 51 1 52 1932 60 23 83
1926 105 n.a. n.a. 1933 n.a. n.a. 95
1927 186 n.a. n.a. 1934 84 26* 110
1928 94 34 128 1935 67 n,a. n.a,
1929 79 n.a. n.a. 1937 45 12 57
1930 65 n.a. n.a.
* Of which 8 in Qingdao -  no other location with more than 3.
** In 1935 accounting for 95% of cigarettes produced in Chinese factories.
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The net result of the above movements was that by 1928 B.A.T.’s share of cigarette sales in China was 
down to 61% against 82% in 1924 and the volume of sales 19% down ~ see Table Six.
However the situation was completely reversed with B.A.T. sales increasing by 59% in 1929 coupled 
with a seven percentage point increase in its share of cigarette sales -  see Table Six. There was a mass 
failure of Chinese cigarette companies -  see the table immediately above. Even given favourable trading 
conditions many o f the recent entrants would have failed being small and under capitalised but the crisis 
was strong enough to adversely affect the larger companies. Thus, to take the bellwether of the Chinese 
cigarette industry -  Nanyang -its sales fell from $27.3 million in 1927 to only $13.4 million in 1929 -  a 
decline of 51%. Losses in 1929 were $3.2 million (1928 $2.25 million) -  23.8% of sales -  29.5% in the 
case of the Shanghai operation. In December, 1928 the Company closed the smaller of its two factories in 
Shanghai with a loss of 2,700 jobs (84). This factory in Pudong had only been opened three years 
previously. In February, 1930 the Company’s factory at Broadway East was mothballed (85). (Production 
in Shanghai was resumed in 1932), All sales were to be supplied from Hong Kong. The company attributed 
its misfortunes to as follows (86) :-
“Taxation is more than five times what it used to be. We have to compete with the better financed 
foreign cigarette companies. We have been unable to increase our prices because every time we increase 
them, the Government.., .has hampered us by imposing heavier taxation.”
The Company also blamed the high cost of raw materials, “exchange against us” and “wages never so 
excessive”
The Company experienced considerable labour trouble in Shanghai in 1929/30 and the North China 
Herald (87) could not resist pointing out that :-
“Certain officers of the company took a very ill-advised step when they gave encouragement to the 
labourers of rival firms, thus eventually preparing a rod for their own backs.”
This weakening o f the Chinese cigarette industry was due to the following factors :-
(a) Price reductions by B.A.T.
(b) A Government ruling against offering of prizes by private concerns which affected the smaller 
Chinese companies.
(c) Due to its strong position in obtaining supplies of American -  breed tobacco from Shandong, 
Anhui, etc (see below) the proportion of imports in B.A.T.’s consumption of tobacco was much 
less than other companies. Thus, it was not hit as seriously as the great majority of Chinese 
tobacco firms by any deterioration in the exchange rate.
(d) Military and other disturbances affecting transport was less o f a burden on B.A.T. with its 
dispersed plants than on Chinese competitors who were overwhelmingly in Shanghai.
(e) The introduction of a regressive tax schedule on cigarettes which benefited B.A.T. and penalised 
the great majority of Chinese firms -  see below.
By 1935 the number of Chinese cigarette factories in Shanghai had shrunk to 67 as against 186 at its 
peak, (see above). The leading Chinese cigarette firm was a partly revived Nanyang Brothers which had 
restarted paying dividends in 1931 but was now only a relatively insignificant competitor to B.A.T. Its sales 
o f cigarettes by quantity in 1937 were only 8% of those of B.A.T. as compared with around 26% in 1928.
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Profitability o f Nanyang was restored in 1931 but remained at a low level in the succeeding years. The 
other leading Chinese cigarette firms were even smaller in relation to B. A.T. (88) :-
1934/35
Capital - $thous. No. of cigarette machines
B.A.T. 215,540 407
Nanyang Bros. Tobacco Co* 11,250 85
Hwa Ching Tobacco Co. 3,-600 33
Foh Chong Tobacco Co. 300 8
China Tobacco Mfg. Co. 300 15
Hwa Tung Tobacco Co. 200 12
Hwa Dah Tobacco Co. 200 10
Men Chung Tobacco Co. 200 6
Wha Mei Tobacco Co. 150 5
^Capital reduced from previous $15,000 thous. Figures include Hong Kong operation.
The outbreak o f hostilities in 1937 caused great damage to the Chinese-owned cigarette industry. In 
Shanghai out of the largest 18 concerns of the 45 then in operation, 8 were destroyed with a loss estimated 
at over $5 million (89). The two largest factories -  Nanyang and Hwa Ching, - employing 6,000 between 
them were heavy sufferers. By 1938 B.A.T.’s share of cigarette sales in China at 73% was at its highest 
level since 1924 (Table Six).
(2) Assessment of the Record of B.A.T. in its Dealing with the Competition of 
Local Producers.
With the financial strength of the B.A.T. Group, its strong technical lead, advertising and 
marketing flair coupled with its clever use of pre-existent Chinese channels o f widespread distribution, it is 
clear that competitors would not find matters easy. What is at issue is how far B.A.T.’s defence against 
Chinese cigarette companies was also buttressed by >
(a) Oppressive business practices.
(b) Utilising their strength and diplomatic connections to gain favourable treatment from the 
authorities with resultant competitive advantage.
(a) There seems no doubt that on occasion B.A.T, did use practices which were ruthless exploitation of 
its strengths -  price wars, exclusive dealing arrangements, denigration of competitor’s products, 
poaching of staff, etc. These tactics were not, as mentioned, unique to the Group’s operations in 
China having been an essential part o f the armoury of the American parent. Also, Nanyang Brothers, 
as the main competitor, were also culpable in this regard.
(b) The crux here is how far B.A.T, were able to pressure the Chinese Government of the day into 
granting them favourable treatment.
A tax on tobacco products performs a useful function of being an inexpensive and effective tax-gathering 
mechanism with its utility being particularly marked where the writ o f the State extends only weakly to 
certain geographic areas. Hence its attractions to Chinese Governments during the period under review. By 
the mid 1930s the tobacco tax was the third largest source of revenue for the Government (90).
From its early days in China -  1904 (91) -  B.A.T. was engaged in a constant fight with the various 
authorities (central and local) on taxation. On balance the advantage and the results lay with B.A.T. (92). It 
was, however, shortly after the advent of Guomindang rule and the return to the post of finance minister of
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T.V.Soong (Song Ziwen) that the apparent result of B.A.T.’s influence and importance as a contributor to 
taxes led to a situation where it seemed that the Government was prepared to disadvantage the indigenous 
cigarette industry against B.A.T.
In a attempt to reform the chaotic tax system and ensure a large tax income the Government in 1928 
introduced the “Consolidated Rolled Tobacco Tax” (93). When first introduced in February with 7 rates for 
7 grades of cigarettes the incidence was fairly neutral between the various grades -  slightly more 
favourable for lower priced products (in which local producers tended to specialise). The same applied in 
the next 7-grade tax system (at higher rates) from December 1st, 1928 to September 30th, 1930. However, 
the new 3 tier system introduced from October 1st, 1930 meant that the burden on low grade cigarettes was 
higher than that on higher grade ones (i.e. on B.A.T.). This was followed by another 3-grade system which 
lasted from February 1st, 1931 to March 20th, 1932 and restored the balance slightly in favour of the lower 
priced cigarettes. It was the introduction o f the 2-grade system as from March 21st, 1932 that tipped the 
balance decisively in favour o f B.A.T.’s products. This advantage was raised by a revised 2-grade system 
effective from December 5th, 1933. It is hard to analyse the precise differential as it involves Selecting the 
price points within the tax bands but the following gives a good guide (94)
Indicative Tax Rates -  Percent-
High grade Medium grade Low grade 
Cigarettes Cigarettes Cigarettes
9.2.28 to 30.11.28 17.9 16.0 14.7
1.12.28 to 30.9.30 25.8 23.4 21.2
1.10.30 to 31.1.31 22.5 14.0 23.2
1.2.31 to 20.3.32 30.5 20.2 28.3
21.3.32 to 4.12.33 9.5 23.8 39.9
5.12.33 to 1.4.37 16.0 40.0 58.0
It is likely that the elasticity o f demand for low grade cigarettes was higher than for the more expensive 
grades and Chinese producers found it hard to shift the burden to the customer. In 1934, 24 Chinese owned 
cigarette firms in Shanghai, where shortly after the last tax rise 12 tobacco factories failed, petitioned the 
Government pointing out :- 
"... .the majority o f Chinese factories are engaged almost exclusively in the production of low-grade 
cigarettes. Past experiences have shown that the original seven-rate system of taxation was most favourable 
to Chinese firms ; the revised three-rate system was less favourable, but the present two -rate system is 
favourable only to the foreign factories.”(95).
The increasing tax burden meant that there was increasing competition from small-scale producers of 
hand-rolled cigarettes. (In some cases the raw material came, to some extent, from cigarette stubs picked up 
in the street) (96). Often imitating well-known brands this affected the legitimate manufacturers including 
B. A.T. Enjoying lower rates of tax from provincial authorities (if they paid tax at all) the hand-rollers 
undercut manufacturers. In the early 1930s these producers were affecting B.A.T.’s market share in 
Northern China and the Yangzi basin. After representations by B.A.T. and the British ambassador 
competition from this source was sharply reduced by Government action. (97).
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The desperate need for finance by the Nanjing Government meant it sought prepayment of taxes. Only 
B. A.T. had the financial strength to do this. It was alleged (98) that B. A.T. enjoyed a discount of 20 percent 
on these prepayments. If  this was so this does not represent the total advantage to B.A.T. as from the 
discount must be deducted the interest B. A.T. would hypothetically gain if  it placed the money on deposit 
for the prepayment period.
There thus seems little doubt that B.A.T. -  by the mid 1930s the largest single taxpayer -  reached an 
accommodation with the Guomindang ruling elite. In 1928 it appeared to have had advance knowledge of a 
tax rise and preempted this by stepping up shipments at the existing rate (99). Also in 1928, the 
Government exempted B.A.T.’s imports from all other Guomindang taxes such as import duties on raw 
materials, surtaxes and luxury taxes. This gave B.A.T. an advantage of 10% in comparison with the tax 
burden facing their Chinese competitors (100). In 1935 the Ministry of Finance is believed to have received 
an advance payment of $10 million from B.A.T. and, in return, is alleged to have agreed that the present 
advantageous (from B.A.T.’s point of view) tax system would continue until it had been repaid (101).
However, the shady side of the Nationalist administration then came into view in 1937, In March of that 
year, T. V. Soong acquired around 27% of the share capital of Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company. Soong 
purchased 200,000 shares at $5 per share and was granted power of attorney for an additional 200,000 
shares, (although not a majority interest, in effect a controlling interest). (102) He became Chairman of the 
Board of Directors. It cannot be a coincidence that in the next month the Ministry of Finance announced a 
new cigarette tax structure with a four-tier system. Taxes were raised but the proportionate rise in higher 
grade cigarettes was much higher than on the lower grades. This favoured Chinese owned companies -  who 
had been campaigning for such a situation for a considerable time but had been ignored. This action by 
Soong is equivalent to a British Chancellor buying a substantial interest in a whisky company and then 
halving the duty on whisky while maintaining the rates on competing spirits.
(E) FINANCIAL RECORD.
(1) Cost Structure.
Pages 1515 and 1517 to 1519 of Ting M ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian give an 
account of the development of the cost structure of B.A.T.’s cigarette production in China relating to the 
British Cigarette Company in 1909-11, the Pudong factory 1919-1938 and B.A.T. factories in China 1933- 
1940. As a proportion of manufacturing cost the key elements were the labour costs, packaging costs and 
raw material costs. Packaging costs were always an important item but were clearly controlled by B.A.T.’s 
backward integration -  these varied from a high of 46.0 percent of total manufacturing cost in 1919 to lows 
of 19.0 percent in 1929-31 and 23.7 percent in 1940. Labour costs were a relatively small proportion of 
manufacturing costs. At no time did they exceed 11.3% of total manufacturing cost -  in 1909. Despite all 
the labour troubles, this action did not push up significantly the share of wages. Indeed, by the 1930s the 
share of labour costs was declining (faster and more efficient machinery was clearly a factor). Even during 
the turbulent 1920s the share o f wages in manufacturing costs only advanced by 2 and 3 percentage points. 
The key element in costs was tobacco leaves and B.A.T. took energetic steps to control this all-important 
factor in their costs. These costs were at a low in 1909 (33.2 percent of manufacturing costs) but generally 
well above 50 percent and reached peaks of 75.4 percent in 1929-31 and 65.4 percent in 1940.
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In its early days as a cigarette producer in China B.A.T. relied on imports of tobacco - virtually all from 
the USA. The local crop variety did not meet their standards. An obvious cost saving was to develop local 
production of American “bright” tobacco originally developed in Virginia and North Carolina and 
eminently suitable for cigarettes. This would save on shipping costs, reduce risk of damage in transit and 
tap a low cost labour source. As early as 1906 the Company sent out specialists from the USA to 
investigate the possibility of growing this variety in China. (103). After investigating various provinces 
B.A.T. chose Shandong, Hubei, Anhui and Henan -  particularly the former -  as the most promising areas 
for growing American type tobacco. The attempt to grow “bright” tobacco was aided by :-
The long experience in China in growing tobacco. However, the American style crop involved 
additional inputs in the form of iron pipes and coal to be used in on-site curing sheds.
The Chinese were well used with the highly intensive cultivation which tobacco needs. Also, 
the Chinese bean cake fertiliser proved surprisingly effective.
B.A.T. provided many initial incentives for Chinese farmers to cultivate Virginia tobacco seeds 
distribution of free seeds.
lending apparatus for the preliminary curing process.
promises and guarantees were given by B.A.T. such as promising to buy the first crop regardless 
of quality.
By 1915 this programme began to produce results. In that year B.A.T. purchased 222 tons of American 
type tobacco (all from Shandong) -  by 1920 this had grown to 22,350 tons from Shandong, Henan and 
Anhui in that order of magnitude. (104). By 1924 purchases by B.A.T. of Chinese grown “bright” tobacco 
had further grown to 26,216 tons. It, however, tapered off -  one of the reasons being the cessation of 
supplies from Henan for nearly a decade. Purchases, however, rose sharply in the early 1930s and by 1935 
were at the record level o f41,044 tons. In that year virtually all of the needs of B.A.T. were met from local 
production. Also usually in the period 1931-1941 B.A.T. relied less on imported tobacco than competitors. 
(105).
B.A.T. established a network of leaf collection stations in Shandong, Henan and Anhui where the farmers 
could sell their leaves. These included foreign staff- usually a tobacco expert with experience in the USA 
tobacco growing sector. The expert graded the tobacco leaves and set the price at which the Company 
would buy. There were contemporary accusations, crystalised in the work of Chen Han-Seng, that by 
manipulating grading, arbitrarily reducing leaf weights, currency manipulations, intimidation etc B.A.T. 
abused its market position (106). Apart from three Japanese companies buying for export, the only other 
companies to have regular collecting agencies were Nanyang Brothers (established in Henan and Shandong 
in 1922 (107)) and Hwa Ching. It is hard to assess the potency of these accusations at this remove in time.
In addition to the collection stations B. A.T. established factories in the growing provinces to further bake 
collected leaves to reduce the bulk and prepare leaves for further storage, dressing and packing. The largest 
of these was at Erh-shih-li-p’u (Ershilpu) in Shandong. Employment here was obviously very seasonable 
but at the peak time high (108) e.g.
January, 1928 62
October, 1928 1,167
November, 1928 1,341
December, 1928 1,163
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Similar plants existed in Henan and Anhui -  the former seriously affected by military action. Further 
handling facilities existed in Shanghai, Qingdao and Hankou.
The interests of B.A.T. in supplying its cigarette factories with Chinese “bright” tobacco were highly 
dependent on support from Chinese interests (109). Each collecting station had a compradore who 
supervised the Chinese staff and maintained liaison with the tobacco growers. Before the First World War 
the Company could buy land for its collecting stations and curing, etc factories in the key growing area of 
Shandong from the German administration who controlled land along the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway. After 
the War this alternative was no longer available -  foreigners were not legally able to buy land in the 
interior. B.A.T. circumvented this by setting up ostensibly Chinese owned companies whose owners were 
in fact B.A.T. compradores. These companies were the Hung An Land Investment Co., Ltd. and the 
Hsuchang Leaf Tobacco Co., Ltd. -  see Appendix One.
After the development period when B.A.T. subsidised the growers, the business developed predominantly 
into the B.A.T. compradores or agents providing the growers on credit with seed, fertiliser and fuel for 
curing. The credit was usually extended via the local gentry or, alternatively, the local gentry made the 
loans. Even with the advent of banks in the area credit was usually extended via local merchants or gentry. 
This incursion by B. A.T. into the agricultural sector was a rare occurrence. Foreign incursion into 
Chinese agriculture was very unusual -  in great contrast to the development of foreign plantations in fully 
colonised countries in Asia and Africa.
This post-honeymoon period after the growers had been induced to growing “bright” tobacco gave rise to 
weighty contemporary criticism -  in particular by Chen fian-Seng in “Industrial Capital and Chinese 
Peasants: A Study in the Livelihood o f Chinese Tobacco Cultivators” He argued (1939) that (110):- 
“The high cost of producing tobacco has a very significant social and economic aspect. It means that 
without the assistance of Chinese trade capital and usury capital, foreign industrial capital in the form of 
B.A.T. cannot go very far in China. The compradore and collectors having a huge quantity of ready cash 
from the Company, are able to dictate to the tobacco peasants because of their dire need of cash.”
The weakness of the growers was “made possible by the extra-economic power derived by the B. A.T. 
from its close alliance and mutual co-operation with the Chinese bureaucrats and the influential Chinese 
gentry” (111). This meant that “those who cultivate American seed tobacco generally speaking have lost 
more than they nominally gained” (112). In essence, the charge was that B.A.T. attracted peasants into a 
dangerous degree of dependency on commercial agriculture.
The peasants needed loans in the form of seed, bean cake for fertiliser and fuel for curing and it was 
asserted that these conditions “increased and intensified usury” (113). With the exception of rich peasants 
the growers were very weak sellers and according to Chen Han-Seng were unable to recoup a large part or 
even all o f the cost of their labour. (To be fair B.A.T. claimed that farmers who received their seed from 
B.A.T. were not required to sell their product to the company. (114)). This work of Chen Han-Seng in this 
regard represents the “distribution theory” of Chinese agriculture in the first half o f the last century. 
Opposed to this is the “technologist” approach as particularly represented by the work o f Ramon Myers in 
“The Chinese Peasant Econom y: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949" (1970) 
(The last province was, of course, the leading growing area in the period of American type tobacco). In
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very broad terms, he argued that the absence of any strong technological progress in agriculture was the 
key problem and if applied to tobacco growing this view of his would divert much responsibility from 
B.A.T. and its allies in the North China countryside. Discussion of the two approaches has been a well- 
beaten path and it is not intended to proceed further here. It is, however, worth pointing out that even if the 
former hypothesis applied it would be rather unfair to blame B. A.T. for socio-economic relationships in the 
North China countryside. In any case, if tobacco cultivation was so unattractive to peasants why did they 
persevere with it?. Also, as access to local “bright” tobacco was economically advantageous to B. A.T. why 
would they jeopardise its cultivation?. (Similar contemporary development of local cultivation of “bright” 
tobacco under the auspices of B.A.T. took place in India, Argentina, Brazil and Africa and seems to have 
progressed well -  in the case of India leading to a substantial export trade (115)).
(2) Profits and profitability.
Throughout its period in China up to the Pacific War B.A.T. was never in a loss situation and normally 
made attractive profits. Even during boycotts and other disturbances and the height of its interface with 
Nanyang Brothers, B.A.T. had plenty in reserve. Also, over the period, B.A.T. typically retained a 
generous portion of these profits in its Chinese subsidiaries. Using data from the accounts of its successive 
flagship companies o f The American Cigarette Company, Limited, British Cigarette Company, Limited 
and the British-American Tobacco Company (China), Limited then the general position was as follows >
Net Income -  (A) Before transfers to reserves, provisions, etc. (B) after transfers to reserves.
provisions, etc. ('116).
As % of Sales. As % of Issued Capital Dividends as
(M (A) m
1902-05 26.3 18.8 70.9 50.7 n.a.
1906-10 15,0 10.4 28,2 20,0 n.a.
1911-15 36.9 n.a. 82.3 58.8 n.a.
1916-20 24.2 17.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1921-25 31.5 24.2 17.8 13.7 8.0
1926-30 32.9 23.5 18.7 13.6 7.4
1931-35 34.5 23.0 18.1 12.1 5.8
1935-41 50.0 25.0 65.8 32.9 19.9
-1937 n.a. n.a. 20,2 13.-1 8,0
-1938 n.a. n.a. 25.4 15.3 8.6
-1939 n.a. n.a. 74.0 26.1 15.3
-1940 n.a. n.a. 80.3 46.3 32.2
-1941 n.a. n.a, 115,5 84.2 49.2
The small initial business was very profitable but there was a decline in profitability during the years of 
rapid expansion -  especially in 1908. The period 1911-15 saw high levels o f profitability but the next 
period showed a lower, albeit good, profitability. The period up to the 1925 boycott was also a satisfactory 
one for the Company. Surprisingly, profitability generally held up well in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
although dividends were restrained. 1935 was, however, a very poor year. Profits at the main operating 
companies were very poor and the ordinary dividend of the parent company was slashed to a nominal 1% 
(117).
Profits, albeit in the context of a rapidly depreciating currency, were at record levels in the period leading 
up to the Pacific War. The Company made large stock profits on its holdings of tobacco (although the
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interest costs in holding stocks of tobacco at the production company of Yee Tsoong Tobacco Co. were 
high (118)). Sales margins were very attractive -  for example, the profits as percentage of sales price for 
six representative brands varied between 37% and 46% in September, 1941 (119). Even when translated 
into Sterling, profits in these immediate pre-War years kept up well -  those in March, 1940 being a record 
( 120).
In this period 1937-1941 around two thirds of profits were earned at Yee Tsoong Tobacco Distributors 
Company, Limited (121). Profits in 1940 as a percentage of capital at this company were 117% and in 1941 
203%. In the latter year this company paid a dividend of 188% to its parent. Profits at the production 
company of Yee Tsoong Tobacco Company, Limited were, in contrast, relatively low (122). This 
difference was obviously dependent on the transfer prices agreed within the Group. Useful profits were 
made at the packaging and printing subsidiaries and the tobacco importing firm of Tobacco Development 
Company, Limited (123). The only relatively weak spot was the Manchukuo company of Chi Tung 
Tobacco Company, Limited (see PART IV(C)). It was, of course, in Manchuria that the main initial impact 
of rising competition from Japanese owned cigarette companies was felt.
(3) The Position o f the B.A.T. Chinese Interests as Part of the B.A.T. Group.
In terms of unit sales of cigarettes the share of China in B.A.T.’s total sales peaked in 1924 at 54% 
(Table Four). The share fell markedly from the early 1930s partly owing to the difficulties described above 
but also to increased B.A.T. presence in the Americas. By the immediate years before the Pacific War 
China accounted for less than a third of Group sales (Table Four) although still remaining the largest single 
market for the Group.
In terms of financial ratios the position is not as clear-cut but some progress can be made. In terms of 
profitability o f the Group it is clear that the Chinese operations were a very important profit centre. The 
B.A.T. Group was very profitable, particularly in the first quarter century of its existence. Apart from 
dividends on the ordinary shares, which in some of the financial years ending March were in excess of 30% 
(e.g. 37.5% in 1910/11) shareholders also received bonus share issues, etc. in several years (1911/12, 
1917/18, 1918/19 and 1925/26) (124). Also, in September, 1928 B.A.T. formed Tobacco Securities Trust 
Company, Limited. Shareholders were given shares in this B. A.T. subsidiary which took over a portion of 
the publicly quoted shares of Group companies in Australia, Canada and South Africa plus a portion of the 
unquoted shares held by B. A.T. in its subsidiaries and associates (already recently hived off into Tobacco 
Investments, Ltd.). Thus, for example, 17.5% of the ordinary shares o f British-American Tobacco (China), 
Limited were transferred to this company (125). It is probable that by the early 1920s B.A.T.’s China 
operations accounted for roughly 40% of these high Group Frofits. By the mid-1930s this had shrunk to 
around 20% although this proportion increased to around 30% just before the outbreak of the Pacific War.
(4) Financial Structure.
Pages 1567/8 and 1470-1478 of YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian give valuable 
information on the financial structure of the following important B.A.T. companies in China 
British Cigarette Company, Limited.
British-American Tobacco Company (China), Limited.
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Yee Tsoong (Yizhong) Tobacco Company, Limited.
Yee Tsoong (Yizhong) Tobacco Distributors Company, Limited.
Chi Tung Tobacco Company, Limited.
From this balance sheet information it is clear that the first two (flagship) companies tended to rely 
relatively little on loan finance. The main exception was 1911 when loans accounted for 40.7% of the total 
finance of the British Cigarette Company, Limited (126) but by 1914 this had been reduced to 13.1% (127). 
Borrowings in the case of British-American Tobacco Company (China), Limited were initially at a low 
level -  only 4-5% of total finance in 1920 and 1923 (128). By 1931 they had risen to 17.9% (129) but were 
at a modest level until 1938 when they reached a peak of 21.4% of total finance (130). The immediate pre- 
War years had, however, borrowings at a low level -  4.3%, 5.0% and 10.1% respectively in 1939 to 1941 
(131). Borrowings at the three subsidiary companies above, however, increased sharply in the period 1938- 
41 (132) -  presumably this was mainly inter-Group borrowings.
B.A.T.’s cautious financial policy can be illustrated by the example of British-American Tobacco Co. 
(China), Ltd. in the years before the Pacific War. Apart from transfers to reserves the Company built up 
provisions, particularly “general provisions”, to a very high level. In the years 1937-41 provisions 
amounted to 70.5% of profits after transfers to reserves and provisions -  in one year -1939 - they were 
184.1% (133).
This balance sheet information also provides an invaluable basis for estimating the development in 
B.A.T.'s investment (issued capital plus retentions) in China as given in PART II  above. There was, 
however, a step change that needed correcting in using this company data. This change, as described in 
PART II, is associated with the formation in 1919 of British-American Tobacco Company (China), Limited 
and was due to two factors -  the incorporation of B.A.T. companies in China not consolidated previously in 
the accounts of the British Cigarette Co., Ltd. plus a large revaluation of the assets of B.A.T, in China. 
Thus, associated companies amounted to 32.6% of total assets of the new company in 1920 and goodwill 
49.7% (134).
(F) POSTSCRIPT.
By 1952 all the assets of B.A.T. in China had been, in effect, sequestrated. (In 1950 B.A.T. had 
stated that it held “directly or indirectly 80% of the capital of the China companies whose assets are worth 
c. £13,000 thous.” (135)). Thus ended a half century of B.A.T. presence in Mainland China. In its half 
century presence B.A.T., on the positive side, introduced to China mass production technology and 
sophisticated marketing and advertising techniques coupled with the management expertise necessary for 
the efficient running of such a large organisation. B.A.T.’s large and extensive sales network in China 
offered employment and wealth making opportunities to many Chinese (without whose cooperation this 
network would have been impossible). The effect on the development of a Chinese owned tobacco industry 
of B.A.T.’s strong financial and market position was not favourable and B.A.T. undoubtedly, on occasion, 
abused its strength. However, this should not necessarily be regarded in a imperialistic context as B.A.T. 
employed such tactics in Western markets until restrained by regulatory authorities (which were absent in 
Guomindang China). B. AT. also developed an import substituting crop in a controversial fashion but again
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this backward integration by the Company was not peculiar to China either before the Second World War 
or currently by the Company in many countries.
The survival for so long of B. AT. as a profitable enterprise in trying conditions in China in the 1920s and 
1930s was not only due to the competitive advantages advanced above but also to the way it played on the 
desperate need of the Guomindang Government for tax revenue. The Government was prepared for a long 
period to sacrifice the interests o f the indigenous industry in return for tobacco tax revenue. B.A.T. 
recognised, as other UK companies also began to realise, that cooperation with the Guomindang elite was a 
major factor in prospering in pre ~ Second World War China.
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FART III -  CHAPTER TWO -  MINING.
“it is probable that the anthracite coal field of north-eastern Honan covers an area similar in extent to
that of Pennsylvania”
Shansi is one of the most remarkable coal and iron regions in the World...the World, at the 
present rate of consumption of coal, could be supplied for thousands of years from Shansi alone.” (Letters 
of Baron F. von Richthofen to the Committee of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 1870-1872).*
British investment in China in extractive industries before the Second World War was, in contrast to the 
post-1978 period, confined to the mining sector. There was no UK investment, or indeed any foreign 
investment, in oil (or gas) extraction despite some exploration effort apart from Japanese ventures utilising 
shale and lignite in Manchuria (see PART TV (C) below). Marketing, as distinct from local output, of 
kerosene, etc was the main activity by the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Shell) and American companies. 
Mineral mining was, thus, the predominant UK interest in extractive industries -  mainly o f coal but also of 
other minerals.
The investigations of Baron von Richthofen and others exaggerated the prospects but for a long time the 
impression persisted of an El Dorado. Thus, the “Battle of Concessions” at the end of the Nineteenth 
Century involved many British enterprises in the field of mining. Of the 17 mining enterprises that were 
associated with British interests (see Appendix One) the majority were established in this period
1896 1
1897 1
1898 4
1899 3
1900 4
1903 2
1909 1
1919 1
Unusually for British industrial investment in China, investment in mining was predominantly of UK
registered companies specifically dedicated to mining development in China. These accounted for the
following proportion of the value of total UK investment in this field
1901 100%
1905 98%
1910 97%
1915 98%
1920 91%
1930 95%
1940 98%
However, although important in a Chinese context, and also in terms of UK companies for coal and iron
ore mining projects overseas, these UK registered companies dedicated to mining operations in China were
a small proportion in terms o f capital o f total UK registered companies for mining abroad
% of total share capital and loan capital o f UK registered mining companies for operations abroad HI
1907/8 1929 1930 1931
Coal and iron 20 37 30 31
Total mining 1.5 4.5 4.5 4
UK mining investments in South Africa, West Africa, Australia, etc. -  particularly in the case o f  the
former, were considerably in excess of those in China ( and were a reflection of Imperial interests).
* Although he was wildly optimistic it is fair to von Richthofen to point out that in the year 2000 Shanxi
produced 246 million tons of coal (25% of total PRC output) and Henan 77 million tons (8%).
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Of the 17 mining concerns, many never got beyond the company formation or concession stage. Some of 
them had their concessions redeemed by the Chinese authorities in the “rights recovery” movement in the 
first decade of the last century. Coupled with this was the failure of ventures to realise expectations in terms 
of the poor yield or operating difficulties. Only seven companies entered full mining operations. Of these, 
two were small coal mining concerns :-
- The Tung Hsing Coalmining Company in Hebei which was founded in 1896. After a record output of 
80 thous. tons in 1915 (2), the mine closed when completely flooded in 1917.
- Kiangpei Ting Coal and Iron Mining Company. In 1898 Mr Archibald John Little began to work this 
concession in Sichuan in conjunction with some Chinese. In 1906 the above company was formed (3). 
Output o f coal amounted to 28 thous. tons in the eleven months to end January, 1908. Mining operations 
very shortly ceased and in July, 1909 the Company was “successfully jockeyed out of its holding” (4). The 
shareholders received 220,000 taels (c.£29,000) to buy out their claim -  about 70 percent of their outlay. 
The “Chinese did not intend the Company to work” (5). It was claimed that the death of Mr Little in 1909 
was hastened by “anxiety over bad faith by officials” (6).
Other two concerns out of the seven that did not last long were the Anglo-French Quicksilver and Mining 
Concession (see PART IV  (B)) and the short-lived Weihaiwei Gold Mining Company. This last company 
was formed in early 1903 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange by British investors. The issued capital was 
$600,000 (c. £50 thous.). The shares fell sharply in December, 1904 on disappointing results on the first ore 
crushing (7). In spite of this the shareholders resolved to put in more money via debentures with option to 
convert into ordinary shares (8). This proved to be throwing good money after bad and in January, 1907 a 
meeting agreed to wind up the company (9).
There were other examples of British mining enterprises being affected by local opposition and the desire 
to retrieve mining rights already granted. It is, however, worth noting that in one case, at least, this process 
did not work necessarily to the disadvantage of the British company concerned. The London and China 
Syndicate, Limited was formed by Sir LP.L.Kaye in 1900 with a wide range of possible projects in mining, 
railways, waterworks and wharves (10). In 1902 a prospecting agreement was made by the Syndicate and 
an iron ore deposit was delimited 55 miles North of Wuhu. In 1904 the Company obtained an agreement on 
mining rights for this iron ore deposit from the Governor of Anhui which received Imperial sanction (11). 
The Syndicate ran into strong harassment from the provincial authorities and the local gentry. At the 
beginning of 1909 the Chinese Government offered to agree to a scheme o f joint working of the mines (12). 
On this understanding Sir John Kaye came out to Beijing in May, 1909 only to be told that the Chinese 
Government could not induce the Anhui local interests to concur (13). The Chinese Government then 
proposed to buy back the mines for £50,000. This compared with the £47,000 claimed by the Syndicate to 
have spent on the project by the end o f June, 1909 and their valuation o f the ores in sight of over £850,000 
(14), The new formed Chinese company to which the concession was transferred failed to successfully 
exploit the site.
Doubts were raised concerning this claim by the Syndicate both before and after the settlement was 
reached. The she was visited by a Swedish expert -  a Dr. Felix R.Tegengren in 1917 who asserted
“How the preparatory work done could have consumed the high sum of £50,000 sterling is almost 
incomprehensible” (15).
-84-
This suspicion is given further credence by an earlier comment made in 1907
“It will be interesting in the future to see what claim Lister Kaye will present to the Chinese on account 
o f “these costly operations” involving an expenditure o f fifteen shillings (£0.75) a day.” (16).
Negotiations were broken off in August, 1909 after which the Chinese Government increased its offer to 
£52,000. Through the intervention o f the British Foreign Office this revised offer was accepted by the 
London and China Syndicate in February, 1910 (17). The Syndicate was wound up in 1912.
In terms of British mining organisations that engaged in sustained operations in China running from the 
early years of the last century until the outbreak of the Pacific War then we are thus left with three coal 
mining companies
(A) The Shanghai Exploration and Development Company, Ltd. (Mentougou Coal Mining Company).
(B) The Pekin Syndicate, Limited.
(C) The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited. This was until 1922 the largest coal mining 
enterprise (via the joint venture Kailan Mining Administration) in China. After then it occupied second 
place to the Japanese owned Fushun mines.
These three companies occupied a significant place in the coal mining industry in China. Just before the
First World War their share o f total national output was around 25 percent. In the early 1920s it was around
20 percent -  declining to around 15 percent by the mid 1930s. Also they accounted, after early years, for
the lion’s share of total UK investment in value terms in mining in Mainland China
1910 83%
1920 92%
1930 96%
1940 96%
(A) The Shanghai Exploration and Development Company. Limited.
Incorporated in 1919, the main activity of the Company was an anthracite mine at Mentougou, about 
16 miles from Beijing. An early project to establish mining in the Philippines was abandoned (18) and a 
later mining venture (1934-36) in Indochina proved to be disastrous with £29 thous. written off (19).
The hillsides around the mine (by early 1924 output had reached a rate of 220 thous. tons per annum) 
was “honeycombed with native owned mines (about 100).... They have no pumps at all as their workings 
are at a higher level than this company’s, and, thus, water drains down to the pumps of this mine”. In the 
early days of the mine, to reduce competition from the small mines when the Company had large stocks 
and had not got proper rail transport they “ceased pumping and prayed for rain in abundance” ! (20).
The Company was regarded as a British company -  Messrs George McBain and Sons were their general 
agents (as they were of the large mining, timber, oil and rubber company of Lankats) and annual meetings 
were held at their Shanghai office. There were, however, a large number of Chinese shareholders -  
probably up to 50 percent -  and by 1935 the Company had a Chinese director and the engineer-in chief at 
the mine was Chinese.
The mine’s record was chequered and it was unfortunate for the Company that its best years were close 
to the outbreak of the Pacific War. From the outset the Company suffered flooding and transport 
difficulties. In 1924 the mines were closed for five months due to railway disruption and flooding. In 
1925 the supply o f power from the plant of the Peking Electric Company (5 miles away) caused “great
-85-
anxiety” (despite the mine supplying the power company with 100 tons per day of coal) and the directors 
decided to install their own generating plant (21). In 1927 losses were made “due entirely to civil war, 
transport and insatiable demand for money by local military authorities” (22) while in 1928 the mine was 
closed for the entire year (23). The Company took advantage of this by being one o f the relatively few 
mines in China to abolish the vicious “contract system” -  all the labour contractors were discharged in the 
year and twenty foremen were appointed in their place to hire labour directly (24).
Although the mines reopened in April, 1929 progress was slow and at the general meeting that year a 
shareholder commented that the Company should “retire from the barren field with what grace we find 
courage to muster” (25). However, the Company held on and, apart from a very bad year in 1931 (the 
capital was halved in 1933 (26)) profits were made in every year before the Pacific War. Problems at the 
mines were eased -  except in a very wet year -  and transport was more in keeping with requirements. 
Given no interruptions the colliery was very competitive -  in 1935, for example, its mining cost was 
$2,400 per ton, slightly higher than Kailan ($2,200) but well below that of the Zhongfu Mining Company 
(see below) - $3.170 -  and the Chinese average of $3.800 (27).
In 1938 to 1940 profits and dividends were high (see PART V ) and this encouraged speculation in the 
shares. From a low of $4.50 in 1939 the peak o f $34 per share was reached in May, 1940. By November, 
1940 output was running at 515 thous. tons per annum (a record level) and things seemed set fair. The 
outbreak of war changed that.
(B) Pekin Syndicate. Limited.
The prime mover in the Syndicate’s formation was the well connected Italian businessman Angelo 
Luzzatti who arrived in Beijing in 1896 with a view to initiate some enterprise in China. On return to 
Europe he made contact with British financiers and, thus, in March, 1897 the Syndicate was registered in 
London with a modest issued capital o f £20,000. Luzzatti returned to China and concentrated on securing 
mining concessions in Shanxi and Henan, influenced by the work of Baron von Richthofen. The selection 
of these areas had a profound influence on the future characteristics of the Syndicate
- mining by modem methods and on a large scale in these remote areas necessitated the construction of 
long railways.
- unlike the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, near British presence in the Treaty Port of 
Tianjin, the operations of the Syndicate lay well outside the feasible radius of British protection.
Luzzatti’s quest for concessions was aided by “the liberal distribution of bribes” (and alcohol) to 
officials (28) and support by British (and Italian) diplomats and British public opinion as instanced, for 
example in the Times (29)
“....the interests involved are of sufficient magnitude to justify her Majesty’s Minister at Peking on 
insisting that foreigners shall be given the same access to coalfields in other parts o f China which has 
already been given to the Russians in Manchuria.”
In May and June, 1898 respectively concessions were obtained by the Syndicate to open and work coal 
and iron ore mines in Shanxi (30) and Henan. In the case of Henan the agreement was signed with the 
Yu-Feng Company which had been sanctioned by the provincial governor to work all mines in Henan 
North of the Yellow River (31). This company was organised by some light fingered local officials. Their
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rights were made over to the Syndicate in return for an initial loan -  their managers later absconded with 
the money.
1898 also saw the transformation of the Syndicate into a substantial and well connected enterprise 
(there was a link with those previously involved in South African mines. The Chairman (Carl Meyer) was 
associated with Cecil Rhodes while one of the other directors (George Cawston) was a founder o f the 
British South Africa Company). The issued, fully paid, capital rose to £495 thous. at end 1900 to £1,243 
thous. at end 1905. An engineer on the Board of the company (Mr J.H.G.Glass) reported in very 
optimistic terms in November, 1899 that “the coalfields and iron ore deposits” of the Syndicate were “of 
enormous extent and value” (32). The construction of railways linking the mines to navigable waters was 
considered to be tractable. There was an ambitious plan to transverse four provinces (Jiangsu, Anhui, 
Henan and Shanxi) with a line of over 450 miles linking Shanxi to Pukou opposite Nanjing. The financial 
prospects presented by Glass were mouth-watering. Annual profits were estimated as follows
£ thous.
On sales o f2,500 thous. tons of coal 750
On sales o f225 thous. tons of iron 500
On working railways 400
Total 1,650
The cost of the railways, mines and foundries would mean a capital outlay of £6-7 million (33),
The Syndicate decided to open up the concession in Henan first, starting with a railway. Nevertheless,
the “chief industrial operations of the syndicate will be as always intended on the Tzechow plateau*
where coal and iron are found in close proximity...” (34). Although justified on logistic grounds the
decision to concentrate initially on Henan rather than Shanxi plus the general delay caused by the Boxer
troubles was grist to the mill o f local interests opposed to the Syndicate’s presence. It was not until 1905
that the Syndicate sent out prospecting teams to Shanxi. These teams “gave great stimulation to the
nationalistically minded provincial officials and gentry to take action for impeding the British goal” (35).
A blocking move was to set up a rival enterprise, the Tung-chi Mining Company -  later organised into the
Paochin (Baojin -  literally Protect Shanxi) Mining Company. Popular opposition was organised and in
negotiations with the Syndicate the Shanxi representatives demanded complete abrogation of the
Syndicate’s rights (36). Deadlock ensued and on January 24th, 1907 the British Government presented to
the Chinese Government a demand for compensation on behalf o f the Syndicate for £200 for every day’s
delay by the provincial authorities in issuing a permit for the Syndicate to begin mining operations (37).
Due to the influence of Beijing, the local gentry and officials reluctantly agreed on redemption rather than
abrogation -  influenced no doubt by visions o f the anticipated mineral reserves in the concession area. In
January, 1908 it was agreed by the Company and the provincial authorities that the Syndicate’s mining
rights in Shanxi be redeemed for 2,750 thous. taels (£356 thous. as recorded by the Syndicate on receipt)
in four instalments (38). This was probably a good agreement for the Syndicate. Their expenditure in
Shanxi had been slight -  for example, only £1,200 in 1906. The prospects for coal and iron mining in
Shanxi were not nearly as rosy as thought in the euphoria of 1898 -  in the case of coal the seams were
thinner than hoped and the iron ore deposits were smaller than expected (39). The progress of the Chinese
*The Syndicate, however, later baulked at the expense of the 34 mile extension of their proposed railway
onto this plateau in South Shanxi over very difficult terrain - see below.
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owned Baojin Mining Company which took over the concession was poor. A similar history applied to 
the railway project. By the end of 1904 90.5 miles had been completed at a cost o f £614,600. The 
Syndicate shrank from extending the line into Shanxi with the expense involved in overcoming difficult 
terrain (40). In 1905 the Syndicate sold the railway to the Chinese Government for £800,000 in 
Government bonds.
The Company thus concentrated in developing the Jiaozuo site in Henan -  sinking o f a shaft had begun 
in 1902. Due to water difficulties output of coal (semi-anthracite) did not start until August, 1908 (41). 
Output of coal rose encouragingly until in September, 1912 it was running at 2,000 tons per day. Then 
disaster struck in terms o f inbursts of water. In the twelve months to end June, 1912, output of coal was 
478 thous. tons -  this output was not regained until 1915/16 (489 thous. tons). If  this, and an outbreak of 
miners’ hookworm was not enough, operations were adversely affected by debilitating conflicts with the 
local authorities and vested interests in the form o f local coalmines. (In 1904 the Provincial Government 
had established a Bureau of Mines with the object of checking the Syndicate’s expansion (42) and in 1909 
there was a boycott against their sales in the Province (43)). Three of these local Chinese mines were 
operated in serious competition with the Syndicate and were supported by the authorities. In May, 1915 
the conflict was ended with an agreement between the Syndicate, the Henan Government and the Chung - 
Yuan (Zhongyuan) Company, comprising the three mining companies. While retaining their identities all 
coal produced by the two concerns would be sold via a 50/50 venture -  the Fu Chung (Fu-Zhong) 
Corporation -  as “Honan Anthracite” . Profits were, after 5-10% to the Henan provincial authorities, to be 
split in proportion to coal sales.
The formation of the Fu-Zhong Corporation, which had the approval of both the Chinese and British 
governments, had a beneficial effect on the Syndicate’s coal operation and this was freely admitted by the 
Syndicate. In the short term these benefits were not fully realised due to a shortage of railway stock with 
military interference plus production difficulties -  explosions and fire together with further difficulties 
with water inflow. However, by the early 1920s the benefits of the joint selling company were realised. In 
the financial years 1922-23 and 1923-24 the return on fixed capital employed in the mines was 15% and 
16% respectively.
Apart from the Henan mines the Syndicate made moves to diversify into other mining ventures, 
merchanting and banking -  this last was disastrous (see PART IV  (B)), However, by the early 1920s with 
the lack of success of these diversification moves it was clear that the Henan mines would be the 
Syndicate’s core business for the foreseeable future..
In the financial year ending June, 1924 the future seemed set fair ~ at the rate of profits on the mines in 
that period the remaining capital expenditure on the mines would be amortised in six years. It was a false 
dawn. After 1924/25 when the business was hit by railway dislocations due to struggles between rival 
military leaders (44) and profits were halved, the next decade saw losses on the mining venture (see 
PART V). The Syndicate was hit by a nine month strike after the May 30* Incident (45), strong local 
opposition, the uncertainties o f operating in one o f the most lawless provinces in China and the local 
ascendancy of the Warlord Feng Yuxiang. He took over the property of the Zhongyuan Company, 
prevented the Syndicate from operating its mines and crippled its rail outlets. The Syndicate decided to 
discontinue coal output and in April, 1927 nearly all o f the 10,000 workers were paid off.
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It was not until October, 1932 that the mines reopened and under Government auspices a new joint 
company was formed -  the Chung Fu (Zhongfu) Mining Company with the Zhongyuan Company having 
51% of the capital and the Syndicate 49% (46). The two companies retained their properties and merely 
merged them for joint working and sales purposes (47). The initial experience of the Syndicate with the 
new joint venture was very disappointing. The Chairman claimed at the Syndicate’s 1934 ordinary 
general meeting that there was over-staffing, waste, lack of cooperation from the Chinese mines and high 
freight charges by the railways (48). The joint venture was in early 1934 losing about $160,000 a month -  
c.£l0,700.
The Chairman o f the Syndicate arrived in China in May, 1934 and saw the British ambassador. After an 
approach by the ambassador, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) took draconian steps by arranging, inter alia, 
for (49) :-
- suspension of the directors o f the Zhongfu Company and the Zhongyuan Company.
- appointment of a Special Readjustment Commissioner to pursue a strict retrenchment policy.
- over 2,000 troops to be sent to the mining area for protection purposes,
- the labour unions in the mining areas concerned to be dissolved.
Jiang Jieshi was clearly concerned about dangers to the livelihood of 70,000 Chinese and Chinese credit in 
Europe (The Syndicate was in constant touch with the French and Belgian legations as well as the British). 
Also, he probably welcomed the excuse to send troops into an area where Communist influence had been 
strong.
The situation rapidly improved from the viewpoint of the Syndicate. The 1935 profits of the Zhongfu 
Company were $920 thous. and sales of coal were 30 percent higher than in 1934 (50). 1936 was an 
excellent year -  sales were 54 percent higher than in 1935 and stocks were reduced (51). Following these 
results the Syndicate decided to pay its first (and only) dividend -  although this was in the context of a 
capital reduction of a third with net assets being written down to reflect the declining parity of the dollar 
compared with Sterling (52). The dividend payment took £27.3 thous. out o f the Syndicate’s net income of 
£34.5 thous.
1937 opened well -  “The Chung Fu Administration was finding no difficulty in obtaining transport for 
and disposing of its coal at the rate of 1,500,000 tons per annum at prices giving a satisfactory return.” (53). 
Due to the hostilities and the consequent lack of rail transport, it was decided in October to close down the 
mines. In February, 1938 the mines were occupied by the Japanese military (see Annex A to PART IV). 
Some machinery was evacuated and the Zhongfu Company started to develop three new mines in Sichuan. 
With the confiscation o f the Henan mines the Syndicate became primarily an investment and trading 
company. With its close relationship with the Guomindang Government (for example the Nationalist 
Minister for Natural Resources was a Board member of the Zhongfu Company (54)) the Syndicate’s 
attempts to find fresh fields of activity were linked with the Central Government. In 1939 the Syndicate 
was appointed sole selling agent for exports of wolfram from Free China (55). Later the Syndicate became 
during the Second World War the purchasing agent of the Chinese Government in respect of goods 
purchased with UK Government credit from the Sterling Area other than the UK.
(C) The Chinese Engineering and Minina Company.
There were successively three companies of this name :-
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(1) The Original Chinese Company.
The “Chinese Engineering and Mining Company o f Tientsin in the Empire o f China” - 1878- 
1901. This was the official English rendition of the Chinese name although the Kaiping Mining Company 
and other variants incorporating Kaiping were also used (Kaiping was the name of the coalfield).
(2) The Original UK Registered Company.
The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited -  21st, December, 1900 -  1st, July, 1912.
Consequent on the Company pooling its mining interests in the Kaiping coalfield with the Lanchow 
(Luanzhou) Mining Company into the Kailan Mining Administration the Company went into voluntary 
liquidation.
(3) The Successor UK Company o f the Same Name -  1912-1956.
Shares were given to the shareholders of the preceding UK company on a one-to-one basis. This 
new company acquired all the assets and liabilities of the old company.
The original Chinese company was formed as a “government supervised merchant enterprise” to exploit a 
very good coalfield (inland from Tianjin) in terms of quality o f coal (bituminous) and potential (56). The 
mining engineer, Herbert Hoover, estimated in 1900 that the reserves amounted to 325 million tons or at 
2.5 (new) pence per ton £8,125,000 (57). By 1900 there were three mines operating on the coalfield and 
land had been purchased for a new colliery. Also, in 1899 the Company began the development of an ice- 
free port at Qinhuangdao. Apart from its mainstream activity the Company also had other activities -  
accounting for 30 percent of the capital employed -  in bricks, cement, silver mines, wharves, steamers, etc 
(58). The attraction of the company to any predator was increased by the fact that its performance could be 
rapidly improved at little cost by eliminating wasteful and corrupt management practices. Thus, it was 
discovered by the Western interests when the concern was taken over that 6,000 of the theoretical 25,000 
employees were fictitious (59). The Company’s shareholders were mainly Chinese but there was also some 
of the capital in the hands of foreigners.
In the last years o f the Nineteenth Century the Company began to run seriously short of fixed and working 
capital -  a major factor being its ambitious expansion plans. Recourse was made to foreign borrowing in 
1898 from, firstly, the Deutsche -  Asiatische Bank and then, more threateningly for the Company’s future 
independence, a larger loan (£200,000) to be raised by Charles Algernon Moreing (of whom more shortly) 
of the firm of Bewick, Moreing. At the end of the following year two London financiers ~ Edmund Davis 
and Walton F. Turner -  formed the Oriental Syndicate, Limited. This was formed to finance Moreing’s 
mining ventures in China if they materialised. The largest share o f the initial issue of ordinary shares was to 
investors in the UK -  50.1% (over half directly or indirectly, to the two founders), 37.7% to investors in 
Belgium and 12.2% to investors in Germany (60). Because o f these large foreign borrowings, the Chinese 
concern was in a weak financial position with loans, when fully called up, amounting to 176% of share 
capital (61). The high “gearing” was dangerous in view of the high interest charged -  12% in the case of 
the loan arranged by Bewick, Moreing (62) (The average rate of discount charged by the Bank of England 
in 1900 was 3.9%). “In 1899 people on the inside track began to hear rumours of a British company 
acquiring the whole concern...” (63). In modem Stock Exchange parlance the Company was “in play” and 
a “concert party” was being organised. The Boxer Rebellion was the catalyst that threw the Company into 
the arms of unscrupulous predators.
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The takeover of the company by what can be most charitably described as financial sleight of hand was an 
ingenious and complicated affair. The writer’s research notes on the process utilising the archives of the 
British company (64) amount to 25 pages and only a summary can be provided here. However, before 
turning to this, it is worthwhile to gave a brief account of the leading members of the unsavoury team 
involved in the acquisition
Dramatis Personae
fa) Based in the UK.
- Charles Algernon Moreing. A civil engineer. Senior partner of Bewick, Moreing -  mining engineers, 
mine managers and financiers. Moreing had a bad reputation in the City o f London. J.M. Frochisse notes 
that how the disdain that those large firms that had a marked interest in Chinese business held him turned 
into hostility. “Une veritable campagne est menee contre le nouveau proprietaire de Kai-ping.” (65). On 
Moreing’s general character even one of his fellow conspirators (Leon Trouet) described him as a 
“brigand” (66). Also, his bad reputation was shared by those who worked for him. One of his mining 
managers stated that he was “a ruthless old villain... he had absolutely no ethics” (67).
- Edmund Davis. Financier. One of his many interests (which in the past had included cornering virtual 
control of World chrome supplies) was directorship of the Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate, Limited 
which specialised in holding shares in mining companies. Described by a contemporary as a man who 
would cheat his blind grandmother at cards (68).
- Walton Fitzjames Turner. Chartered Accountant. Director of the Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate.
- Alfred William Berry. Company secretary of :-
- The Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate, Limited.
- The Oriental Syndicate, Limited.
- The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited.
All these companies had the same registered office -  22 Austin Friars, London EC.
(b) Based in Belgium. The background to Belgian involvement in this and other British/Belgian joint 
ventures in China is given in PART TV (B) below.
- King Leopold II. “Le roi est un grand homme d’affaires”. (Anon)
- Colonel Albert Thy s. Engineer. Joint Managing Director of the Compagnie Internationale d’Orient - 
the main Belgian coordinating and facilitating agency for investment in China.
(c) Foreigners in China.
- Gustav Detring. German. 1877 appointed Commissioner o f Customs at Tianjin. In 1895 he also 
became a director of the Chinese mining concern.
- General vonHanneken. German military adviser to the Chinese Government. Son-in-law of Detring.
- Chevalier de Wouters d’ Oplinter. Belgian lawyer. In 1895 he became legal adviser to the Chinese 
foreign office. Agent for the Compagnie Internationale d’Orient for the Far East.
- Herbert Charles Hoover (President USA 1928-32) (69). Mining engineer. In 1897 he joined Bewick 
Moreing. In March 1899 he arrived in China from his first assignment in Australia. His assignment was to 
be a technical consultant to the Director General of Mines in Zhili and Jehol -  Zhang Yanmou (see 
immediately below). However, in addition to this well paid job (£2,500 per annum) Hoover was given 
another assignment (paying £1,000 per annum) to supervise for Moreing the interests of the foreign 
bondholders in the Chinese company and, in general, to act as the eyes and ears of Bewick, Moreing in
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China. It seems clear that Hoover bit the hand that fed him the most i.e. his Chinese employers. Hoover, 
who played a leading part in the takeover, had little scruples about working against the national interests 
of his Chinese employers. Coupled with a shrewd eye for the main chance, Hoover was undoubtedly a 
racist. In a paper read to the Institution o f Mining and Metallurgy in London on June 19* 1902 
(reproduced in the Colliery Guardian o f June 25th, 1902) Hoover made explicit racist statements 
concerning Chinese workers at the Kaiping mines. He added, with complete insensitivity, that -  “The 
disregard for human life permits cheap mining by economy in timber, and the aggrieved relatives are 
amply compensated by the regular payment of $30 per man lost”.
(d) Chang Yen-mao / Zhang Yanmou. Director from 1892 and then head o f the Chinese concern. In 
November, 1898 his responsibilities were enlarged when he became in addition Director- General of 
Mines for the province of Zhili and the district of Jehol.
THE “STING”.
- Spring. 1898. Moreing visits China and, amongst others, meets Zhang Yanmou and Detring. A loan to 
finance capital projects was discussed and also the possibility of engaging a mining engineer to survey 
mining possibilities in North China.
- August. 1898. Zhang Yanmou signed a letter authorising Moreing to raise a loan of £200,000,
- March. 1899. Hoover arrives in Tianjin.
- December. 1899. The Oriental Syndicate, Limited was formed by Davis and Turner.
- 1900. The Boxer Rebellion and the Russian incursion into North China. Some of the Company’s 
distribution facilities had been occupied by Russian (and Japanese) troops) and disorder ran around the 
mines. Production collapsed almost completely with the miners having run away. An already weak 
financial situation now became desperate and the shares with a par value of 100 taels were being offered 
at 35 taels (70). Also, there were justifiable fears that on occupation by one of the allied armies (in 
particular Russian) the mines could be sequestrated.
- March 28*. 1900. Compagnie Internationale d’Orient formed (71).
- June. 1900. Detring and Zhang Yanmou meet. In Detring’s own words -  “After much consideration 
they decided that the only course was to admit foreign capital and register the Company as an English 
Company. This registration could have been effected in a very short time in Hongkong but they wished at 
the same time to secure foreign capital for the undertaking as the Mining Company had hitherto been 
hampered by under-capitalisation” (72).
- August 1st. 1900. In the presence of a local British lawyer (engaged by Hoover) and Detring’s son- in 
law Von Hanneken, Detring (who had been given full powers of attorney) and Hoover signed an 
indenture dated 30*, July which did “grant, convey, sell, assign and transfer” to Hoover the assets of the 
Chinese company. The new British registered company envisaged was to have an authorised capital of £1 
million. This document was in many respects an extraordinary one
- There was no consultation or authorisation with the shareholders in China. The disorder in North 
China was, of course, a convenient excuse.
- There was no provision for the directorate of the new company and other organisational matters.
- Most important, there was no stipulation as to the distribution of shares in the new company after 
allocation to existing shareholders. It was believed but not specified that the British promoters could get
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£150,000 and Zhang Yanmou £50,000. To give carte blanche to Moreing seems such an act of naivety 
that one suspects a hidden motive by Detring in particular (see below).
However, the document was flawed from the conspirators’ point of view and needed to be amended. In 
the re-working of the agreement (see below) there were salient alterations. Crucially, there was in the 
amended document no mention of Hoover in the role of a trustee. Also, in the first version Hoover was to 
use methods of forming the new company as were “ordinarily used and usually regarded as proper”. Now, 
Hoover could use “such means and agencies as he deemed proper” (73).
- August 11th. 1900. Hoover, after formally registering the deed in Shanghai, sent a cablegram to 
Moreing stating “Have obtained necessary agreement placing under offer to you Kaiping” (74).
- October 8th. 1900. Hoover arrived in England with relevant papers for Moreing.
- October 13th. 1900. Moreing notified the ratification of the July 30th agreement to Detring and started 
to arrange financial support for the new venture. There was, as noted above, no support from the 
establishment in the City of London. Moreing turned to Davis and Turner and the Oriental Syndicate. 
Recourse was made to Belgian sources of finance after Davis and Moreing met Thys in Brussels and 
agreed a strategy.
- November 10*. 1900. Hoover left for China to retrieve the situation in that the July 30* agreement was 
not in the form that the UK and Belgian financial interests wanted to maximise their promotional profits.
- December 13th. 1900. Moreing formally agreed, as arranged in Brussels, to sell to the Oriental 
Syndicate the rights to the Chinese company when (and if) acquired and the Belgian interests acquired a 
majority in the Oriental Syndicate (75).
- December 28*. 1900. The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited was registered in 
London. The Memorandum of Association (76) was a curious document. There was nothing apart from 
the name of the company to indicate the specific purpose for which it was formed. There was a reference 
to coal mining but also to 13 other activities such as brewing, textiles, shipbuilding, building, dredging, 
etc. One significant item was that which allowed the Board to borrow without sanction of a General 
Meeting up to half the issued capital. Nothing concerning the new company was disclosed to China.
- February 19*. 1901. After acrimonious discussions in Beijing, Hoover and Wouters d’Oplinter on the 
one part and Zhang Zanmou and Detring for the old company sign two documents ;-
- The Transfer Agreement (77). This gave the Western interests what they wanted to secure financial 
control of the Chinese concern -  no mention of Hoover’s role as a trustee, etc. As a fiction the document 
was also dated July 30*, 1900.
- The Supplementary Memorandum (78). This related to the control and management of the new 
company. Inter alia, this stipulated that there were to be two Boards - one in China and one in London and 
that Zhang Zanmou would be Director General resident in China. The London board would be elected by 
all shareholders -  Chinese and foreign. The Westerners involved completely ignored this document 
claiming it had “no legal effect whatever” (79) and this attitude was reflected by the cavalier attitude of 
the management sent out to China by the new company. (Their intention to ignore such a document was 
clear in that there was no mention in the Memorandum of Association of the new company of such a 
Board in China).
- May 2nd. 1901. Three agreements were signed >
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- Moreing transferred to the Oriental Syndicate the benefits o f the amended contract of July 30*
1900.
- The Oriental Syndicate transferred to the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited the 
benefits of the contract of July 30*, 1900.
- The Oriental Syndicate contracted to give 50,000 (£1) shares in the new company, free of charge, to 
Moreing for onward transmission to Zhang Yanmou and Detring.
- May 25*. 1901. First moves in the allocation of shares in the new company commenced. This 
financing was a complex affair and this complexity erected a screen behind which the European interests 
could disguise their financial manipulations. By the 11*, December of that year the issue of £1 shares in the 
new company was complete. The following shares were allocated (80) >
- Numbers 1-7. These were originally the necessary first subscription on setting up the Company. At 
first subscribed by clerks and secretaries associated with the Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate and later 
transferred to Belgian interests, these were the only shares issued for cash.
- Numbers 8-375007 -  to the old company’s shareholders in China. These were deliberately the last to 
be issued.
- Numbers 375008-425007 -  to Moreing for onward transfer to Zhang Yanmou and Detring.
- Numbers 425008-575007 to the Oriental Syndicate. This represented the amount scheduled for 
promotional profits. The Syndicate was wound up voluntarily in July, 1902 and these shares were 
distributed to the Syndicate’s shareholders.
So far so good -  the Europeans could claim that, on the surface at least, they had acted in reasonably 
good faith. It is with the creation and distribution of the balance of 424,993 £1 shares that the most flagrant 
abuse of the rights o f the shareholders in China occurred. These shares, numbered 575008-1,000,000 were 
to “nominees of the Oriental Syndicate”. 250,000 of these were linked to the issue o f debentures. At a 
Board meeting of the new company on the 5* June, 1901, the issue o f £500,000 in 6% debentures was 
approved (81). For every £2 subscribed there was a right to one free share in the Company. These 
debentures were to be allotted by way of subscription or in exchange for bonds of the old company. The 
Western promoters claimed that the debentures issued were needed to pay off the debts of the old company 
and provide working capital but
- the “new money” raised via the debentures was £334,000 but the balance sheet o f the new company 
showed a cash balance of £268,000 at end February, 1902 (82),
- given the increased tranquillity of China with the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, it should have been 
possible to raise money by the cheaper alternative of a share issue in Shanghai and also perhaps in London.
The balance of 174,993 shares that were nominated by the Oriental Syndicate were, predominantly, given 
to the main organisations and individuals involved in the takeover. For example the Anglo-Continental 
Gold Syndicate received 25,075 shares, Mrs Moreing 25,100 shares and Messrs Davis and Turner 3,500 
each.
The general conclusion concerning the financing of the new company must be that the original 
shareholders (who had their share reduced to 37.5% of the new company) ran into some of the more 
disreputable techniques in contemporary company formation It was an operation which did not just lead to 
stock “watering” but flooding of Biblical proportions.
-94-
The main individuals involved in the financial operations relating to the formation were handsomely
rewarded. Thus in late 1902 (after the winding up of the Oriental Syndicate) the individual holdings (i.e
excluding beneficial holdings via companies with shares in the new company) were for some of the main
persons involved were as follows
C. A.Moreing/Mrs Moreing - 83,925 £1 shares -  face value c. £5,5 million at present sterling value. 
Herbert Hoover -  17,375 £1 shares.
W.F. Turner -  15,500 £1 shares.
Edmund Davis -  12,720 £1 shares.
Colonel Albert Thys -  9,855 £1 shares.
On these shares, if retained, the above would receive in dividends in the decade after the takeover nearly
one and a quarter times the par value of the shares and in the last half of this decade the market price of the
shares hovered around the £2 mark. Also, they and others involved in the takeover would receive directors’
fees (£250 per annum for Board members other than the Chairman) plus 10% of the balance of profits after
a dividend of 10% for shareholders had been declared - this happened in 7 out of the first 10 years of the
Company’s operations.
A further point -  to what extent were Zhang Yanmou and Detring willing partners in this financial 
manipulation ?. The evidence is not conclusive but gives some support to the view that Detring, at least, 
was guilty o f sharp practice. The Company later showed considerable solicitude to its two adversaries in a 
Court battle (see below). In 1911 the Company lent 50,000 taels (£6,400) to Zhang Yanmou at 5% annual 
interest (83). Detring’s actions were particularly suspect. His son-in-law, von Hanneken had acquired some 
of the old company’s bonds immediately before the debenture issue plus additional debentures. It is hard to 
believe that this move was done without collusion. Again, the Board minutes o f the Chinese Engineering 
and Mining Company, Limited for 15,11,1901 read “resolved offer Detring job at £250 per month with the 
company” (This was sent by private cable) (84). Also the Board minutes o f the successor company contain 
the following entry
“26.6.1913. Agreed that subject to executors of the Will of the late G. Detring formally withdrawing all 
claims against the company to concur in an allowance of £400 per annum for life to Madame Detring” (85). 
Reaction to the takeover
Initial reaction to the swindle (in which the original owners of the Company saw their share fall to a 
minority after issue o f fully paid up shares to the European promoters or their nominees) came at meetings 
(two in Shanghai and one in Tianjin (86)) o f the original shareholders in China. A Committee was formed 
of five Chinese and six Europeans, including Detring and von Hanneken, to bring about by negotiation a 
“just observance”. In addressing the meeting in Tianjin in November, 1902, the latter, having acquired 
shares and debentures in the new company, was clearly sailing under two flags :-
“ I therefore venture to propose our unlimited support in every direction for the interests of H.E. Chang and 
the shareholders of the old company” . (87).
Much more weight was given to legal protests against the actions of the British and the Belgians by the 
Chinese Government -  activated by the influential Yuan Shikai. However the legal actions of 1905/6 in 
British courts were inconclusive -  the Defendants had on their side two of the stars of the Edwardian Bar -  
Rufus Isaacs (later Lord Reading) and Richard Haldane (88).
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The Chinese returned to the attack by the creation of a rival mining venture on the Kaiping coalfield. 
Yuan Shikai instructed one of his followers -  Zhou Xuexi -  to establish the Lanchow (Luanzhou) Mining 
Company which came on stream in 1908. There followed four years of acrimonious controversy between 
the two competitors. In the contest between the two companies the British company showed no reluctance 
to use extremely questionable practices to defend its interests. The following extracts from the Board 
minutes illustrate this :-
2.4.1910. Letter submitted from Nathan (the local manager) saying that they “had subscribed $2,000 to a 
new Chinese newspaper... against an undertaking ... to support our cause in every possible way” (89). This 
followed a loan to 12 local salt merchants in exchange for similar support (90).
4.5.1911. -  from Nathan 22.3.1911 enclosing translation o f the Secret Memorial submitted to the Throne 
by Duke Tsai Tse and Sheng Hsuan Huai on the 5* January, 1911 (91).
24.8.1911. Telegram sent... authorising advance of 25,000 taels (c.£3,250) to Tang Shing Pu “ to 
purchase shares in the Lanchow Company in order to have a voice and insist on settlement... he should be 
given to understand that shares must be deposited with this company as security for loan and in the event of 
settlement with Lanchow Company they would be transferred to us but that if his services should materially 
assist settlement Board would consider making him a present of part or whole o f the shares “ (92).
There were other examples.
At the end o f 1910 the British company decided on a price war. On the 15* September, 1910 “a cablegram 
to Nathan on the subject of the reduction of the selling price of coal was settled.. .instructing that reduction 
of selling price must be decided by political rather than pecuniary considerations...” (93). This move had 
Government backing -  “Letter from Foreign Office stating that they had communicated with Sir John 
Jordan (The British Minister in Beijing) with reference to our proposal to entertain a war of prices with 
Lanchow Mining Company and he entirely approved this course...” (94).
The price of coal where the two companies interfaced fell sharply. The British company was in a far better 
condition to withstand this attrition
- Unlike its financially stretched competitor the British company had large cash reserves (£105 thous. at 
end February, 1911) and low “gearing” (95).
- The British company trimmed its costs (96).
- A significant proportion of its sales did not interface with its rival. In the calendar year 1911 out o f total 
sales o f coal of 1,381 thous. tons shipments through Qinhuangdao port amounted to 39%. Apart from price 
cutting the British company also put pressure on its rival by granting generous credit terms. The effect of 
this policy on the Company’s profits was serious but nowhere near a loss situation
Net Profit on Coal-$ Thous. 197).
April, 1910 289
December, 1910 221
August,1911 127
December, 1911 187
January, 1912 165
The rival company increasingly realised it was engaged in an unequal struggle. In January, 1912 a 
preliminary agreement was made between the two companies. In March both Governments gave their 
formal sanction (98). The two companies were to combine to form an association called the Kailan Mining 
Adminstration (KM A) -  i,e an abbreviation of Kaiping and Lanchow -  which would administer the assets
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of the two companies in China and their sales. Both companies were, however, to retain their individual 
identities -  Boards of directors, share capital, etc. The British company was, however, to be dissolved and a 
new company with a similar name (in the event the same) formed. The British company held the strongest 
position in the KMA in terms of share of the profits and management control.
Progress of the First UK Company.
On the vesting date o f 19* February, 1901 the mines were in a “truly lamentable condition” (99). 
However, the recovery in output was rapid coupled with a vigorous attack on wasteful and corrupt 
practices. With a great shortage of coal after the disruption of the Boxer Rebellion, the mines’ output was 
readily saleable and profits were made even in the early months. The Company was, thus, able to pay a 
dividend of 7.5% in its first financial year although this was to some extent “window dressing” in that in 
this year and the following year no allowance was made for depreciation. The Company, however, realised 
quickly that despite its initial success it needed to invest considerably in its mines and transport facilities. 
The Company spent in the period 19.2.1901 to 28.6.1912 £755 thous. on tangible fixed assets -  this was 
nearly twice depreciation in the same period. Apart from spending on the mines (particularly on electrical 
equipment), spending on steamers accounted for 12% of total spending while spending on the harbour at 
Qinhuangdao was much higher accounting for 29%. Unfortunately, these port facilities developed an 
unsavoury trade in human cargo. On 7th December, 1904 the Board “granted to Major Nathan, 10% of the 
net profit arising from the engagement of coolies for South Africa” (100). (Major Walter S. Nathan was for 
many years the very capable General Manager of the Company in China). In the previous July, Nathan on 
behalf of the Company had signed a contract with the Chairman of the Witswatersrand Native Labour 
Association giving these labour recruiters the right to rent 1,222 acres at Qinhuangdao for building 
recruiting offices and labour depots. In return the Company were paid recruiting and delivery fees on a per 
capita basis - £1.875 for recruiting and £4 for transportation. Including the rent for the land, the estimated 
total income was c.$2 million (c.£190 thous.) (101).
The Rand mines faced an acute labour shortage after the War -  hardly surprising as the death rate amongst 
locally recruited workers was 80 per thousand in 1903 (102). Apart from the arduous conditions in these 
deep mines, the Chinese workers could only work in the mines, only live in compounds and could be 
punished by a special court. The Chinese workers needed a special permit to leave the mining premises and 
were forbidden by law to do skilled work. The “Chinese Slavery” cry by the opposition in Parliament was 
one of the factors in the Liberal landslide in the 1906 General Election. A majority o f shipments of 
labourers was under the auspices of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited. From May, 
1904 to November 25th, 1906 when the last shipment of labourers left, embarkations from Qinhuangdao 
amounted to 43,258 out of a total of 63,811 -  67.8 percent (103).
The Company enjoyed unspectacular profits during its 10 year existence — in many years the Chinese 
market was depressed and towards the end there was, as described above, significant local competition :-
Financial Years to end February 
Net Income - £thous. Dividends - % Net Income - £Thous. Dividends - %
1902 84 7.5 1907 156 15.0
1903 72 5.0 1908 149 15.0
1904 76 7.5 1909 154 15.0
1905 108 10.0 1910 155 15.0
1906 103 10.0 1911 101 10.0
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In the period 1.3.11 to 27.6.12 before the Company was dissolved there was a dividend of 7.5 percent.
Retentions were small -  in the period 19.2.01 to 28.2.11 dividends accounted for 95.1% of net income. 
Progress of the Second UK Company.
The period from the formation of the KMA to the late 1920s (see below) was the golden age of the 
Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited. Despite the disruptions o f the War years, sales of coal 
by the KMA joint venture rose from 1,756 thous. tons in the year to end June, 1913 to 3,045 thous. tons in 
the year to end June, 1918. Operating profit per ton of coal raised at the KMA increased by 47 percent from 
1913/14 to 1919/20. The net profit (i.e. after interest, depreciation, allocations to reserves, etc.) of the KMA 
rose sharply from $1,636 thous. in 1912/13 to $8,918 thous. in 1919/20 -  a rise of 495%. The share of this 
profit going to the UK company when translated into Sterling was, because of the exceptionally high value 
of the Chinese currency during the later period, even faster growing -  a rise of 1,007 percent. At £1,118 
thous. the UK company’s share of the Administration’s net profits in 1919/20 was at a level never equalled. 
Unfortunately for the shareholders, dividends in this year and the two previous years, albeit high, were 
restrained by the need to pay excess profit duty.
The profits and dividends up to the Pacific War by the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited 
developed as follows (104)
Years to End June.
Net Income - £thous. Dividends -  Percent.
1912/13 86 8
1913/14 147 10
1914/15 149 10
1915/16 177 10
1916/17 160 12.5
1917/18 172 15
1918/19 278 20
1919/20 451 30
1920/21 299 22(31)*
1921/22 171 13.5(19)*
1922/23 229 16 (22.5)*
1923/24 452 20 (28)*
1924/25 191 10 (14)*
1925/26 132 10(14)*
1926/27 221 15(21)*
1927/28 399 25 (35)*
1928/29 272 20 (28)*
1929/30 149 9(16)*
1930/31 43 2.5 (4.5)*
1931/32 167 7,5 (13,5)*
1932/33 19 2.5 (4.5)*
1933/34 -3 - (-)
1934/35 30 - (-)
1935/36 25 2.5 (4.5)*
1936/37 168 5 (9)*
1937/38 185 7.5 (13.5)*
1938/39 224 7.5 (13.5)*
1939/40 54 3.75 (6.75)!
1940/41 257 - (-)
* The figures in brackets are the equivalent on pre-scrip issued capital -  issues made in 1921 and 1930.
Despite problems arising in the 1920s 
- Labour problems. There were, particularly in 1920 and 1922, very serious strikes.
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- Military operations. There were two periods of direct harassment at the pits. That of June, 1928 was 
the most serious with the mining area being occupied by undisciplined soldiery. On June 26th the First 
Battalion o f the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment arrived from Weihaiwei (105). After stabilising 
the area the troops were withdrawn in November.
- The influence of the military on railway transport was the most serious problem. To alleviate this 
problem o f appropriation of rolling stock by the military, the KMA purchased coal wagons and 
locomotives. In the financial year 1927/28 no less than 78% of shipments by the Administration were in 
their own cars and only 22% in cars supplied by the Peking -  Mukden Railway. (106).
After the bumper financial years o f 1927/28 and 1928/29 the net income of the Company fell by nearly a 
half in 1929/30, Things became much worse until a measure of revival in 1936/37. Dividends were either 
small or, in 1933/34 and 1934/35, were passed. Fortunately, the Company was in a strong position to face 
such a lean period. Cash at June 30th, 1929 amounted to £725 thous. (107).
Factors influencing this decline in financial performance were :-
- The impact of the World depression on China.
- The declining value of the Chinese currency.
- Military and other disruptions. The Manchurian Incident affected the Company’s distribution facilities 
and the Japanese expedition to Shanghai in 1932 its market.
- An expensive dispute with the Peking -  Mukden Railway in 1931. (108).
- Further labour troubles. There was a particularly serious series o f strikes from the middle of January, 
1934 to the middle of April, 1934 which “caused serious interruption and disorganisation in the working of 
the mines” and “had been a more dangerous threat to the Administration than any previous dispute...”
(109).
- Price erosion. The average price of KMA coal fell by 24% from 1927/28 to 1934/5.
- Electric power was gradually replacing steam generation in factories and oil replacing coal in ships.
Apart from these financial difficulties (which the British company weathered very well -  at end June,
1937 cash, securities and debtors at £606 thous. were nearly 12 times current liabilities of only £51 thous.
(110)) the Company also faced a revival of Chinese nationalism from the late 1920s similar to the earlier 
“rights recovery” movement. In both February, 1931 (111) and December, 1933 (112) the Luanzhou 
Mining Company complained, very reasonably, to the British company that their share of the KMA profits 
was unfair. In August, 1934 a new agreement called the Supplemental Agreement was entered into by the 
two companies. This was ratified by the Chinese Government in September and the British Government in 
November (113). The original agreement was that all profits of the KMA up to £300,000 was split 60% to 
the British company and 40% to the Luanzhou Mining Company -  over £300,000 they were to be equally 
divided. The revised agreement was to split profits equally at all levels of total profits. Changes were made 
in the management structure of the KMA which loosened to some extent the British control of the KMA.
During the period between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War the Company’s 
fortunes improved to a modest extent. The share price and dividends revived moderately. The main reason 
was the value of the mines’ output to the Japanese and the Company’s willingness to accommodate the 
invaders. An account o f this shabby episode is given in PART IV  (C).
Assessment.
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There are certain aspects of the mining sector which add extra dimensions in assessing the beneficial, or 
otherwise, impact of foreign industrial investment on the Chinese economy
- the very high rate of return, if successful, in the mining sector leads in some cases to conduct which is 
unethical -  bribery, corruption, etc.
- mining, by definition, involves a depreciation of a country’s physical resources and this leads to 
Government interest and participation in the form of granting of concessions. In some cases the concession 
may often be too generous and turn out to not fully compensate for this depreciation. Also, in the case of 
redemption of a concession, the sum paid may often exceed considerably the actual worth of the assets and 
rights redeemed. In the case of mining companies of foreign origin their national government is in many 
cases o f initial concession or redemption liable to be drawn in to advance the interests of its nationals 
involved by putting pressure on the Government of the host country.
In the case of China the golden age o f granting concessions was from 1896-1903. The Treaty of 
Shimonoseki did not explicitly permit foreign investment in mines and thus it was desirable for foreigners 
to seek help from their Governments via diplomatic representations. In the case of the concessions granted 
to British interests, they would seem on paper to be reasonably balanced between the parties concerned and 
in the light of modem experience would not be regarded as particularly exploitative. After 1903 Chinese 
interests both in the Capital and the provinces promoted a policy of withdrawing new permits and 
recovering alienated mining rights. In the case of the London and China Syndicate, Limited (see above), at 
least, it does seem that the influence of the British Government did lead to overpayment by the Chinese 
Government when the concession was redeemed. The diplomatic efforts of the British Government on 
behalf o f the interests of British industrial enterprises in China were mainly confined to this mining sector.
All the British mining enterprises engaged in long sustained operations in China were mining coal. This 
meant that unlike other contemporary mining investments by British interests in developing countries the 
products were not predominantly destined for export but for local consumption. The smallest of these three 
enterprises was the Shanghai Exploration and Development Company. Limited. This company had, as 
described, in its early days a cavalier attitude to its small Chinese competitors but by the mid 1930s about 
half its shareholders were Chinese and there was Chinese involvement on the Board and senior 
management.
A comparison of the Pekin Syndicate. Limited with the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, 
Limited in regard to the formation of both companies would , in terms of acceptable practices, be clearly in 
favour o f the Syndicate. Although the Syndicate did employ bribery o f officials, this was understandable, if 
not excusable, given such a venal bureaucracy and, in any case, it did not employ such techniques of 
unscrupulous financial manipulation as brilliantly employed by its counterpart. In fact financial 
manipulation by the Syndicate was at the expense o f its Western shareholders -  a case in point being the 
affair of the Banque Industrielle de Chine -  rather than of Chinese nationals. (See PART IV  (B)).
The Syndicates’s early transformation from a small enterprise into a large (capital £1,500 thous.) firm was 
with the aim of establishing a' significant British company with presence in mining, etc. in China. The 
Company persisted for nearly forty years with this aim at the expense of the shareholders’ anxiety for 
dividends. The Company was, however, unsuccessful or unfortunate throughout its career both politically 
and technically in achieving its aims. The troubles of the Syndicate, in particular the difficulties with
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provincial authorities and mining companies, were not to a large extent of its own making but, also, they 
were a result of its own deficiencies. For example, the Henan mines were badly sited in terms of water 
inflow and the pumping needs were one of the reasons for the relatively high cost structure. Also, in the 
early years, the Syndicate suffered from a complicated and inequitable share structure and internecine strife 
between the British and French/Belgian interests involved (see PART IV  {B) below).
As regards the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company. Limited assessment by contemporaries as to 
the standards of behaviour of the Westerners when it became British/Belgian owned is still valid today. In 
the words of “Champion Market Rigger alias Colonial Englishman” in a letter to the Investors Review of 
January 31st, 1903 :-
“The story...is one for which we can see no excuse, and the sooner the English and Belgian gentlemen 
who have been acting so high-handedly became better mannered, the more chance they will have of taking 
a creditable part in the development of the mineral resources of China. I f  they go on as they have done in 
the past intelligent Chinamen will be slower than ever in the future to allow Europeans to have any share in 
the industrial development of their country.”
This episode created an atmosphere that tainted the Chinese attitude towards inward investment for many 
years and is still a century later the subject of academic authors in China (114).
Having, in the words o f the author of the above letter, “fleeced the pockets of the Chinese shareholders 
and lined the pockets of an Anglo-Belgian gang” the sense of being cheated intensified the already strong 
opposition of Chinese to foreign mining ventures. As evident from the internal documents of the Company 
this tendency to cut ethical comers persisted throughout the Company’s history (as did their arrogant 
attitude in dealing with the Chinese generally) as instanced by, for example
- The supply of labourers to the Rand.
- The in-fighting with the rival Luanzhou Company.
- The cooperation with the Japanese when the vast majority of the Chinese, of whatever political 
complexion, were engaged in armed resistance.
The rewards to those engaged in the financial manipulations which accompanied the 1901 takeover were, 
as noted, high but, at a lower magnitude, the rewards to modest investors in the UK and Belgium were also 
high. Many scenarios can be advanced depending on the size, date o f entry and duration of an individual 
holding but, for example, if someone subscribed £1,000 to the initial issue o f debentures in 1901 and sold 
his free shares in 1930 his return would have been sixfold. In a period of relatively low inflation they 
received an attractive return. It could be justified, if one accepts an enterprise economy, as a reward for risk 
taking. The key point, however, is that by the standards of the mining sector, the Kailan Mines were a risk 
free investment. There were no doubts as to the geological richness o f the field and the risk free nature of 
extraction. The rewards to the European investors were more a function o f financial sleight of hand than of 
backing a problematic venture.
The high profits obtained by the Company from the mines, particularly during the First World War and 
the 1920s were mainly remitted to Europe. The rate of re-investment was low. Retentions as a percentage 
of net income developed as follows
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Percent
Original UK company (1901-1912) 4.9
1912 company -  Years to end June
- 1913-1923 22.9
-1924-1934 10,8
-1935-1940 24.8
TOTAL -  both companies 15.8
This ratio was low for foreign industrial enterprises in China being well into the lower quartile of the 
retention ratios of foreign industrial enterprises in China over 1872-1936 as calculated by Chi-ming Hou in 
Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937 (page 102). (Although a modest 
portion of the dividends would have accrued to Chinese shareholders and the Company’s share of the 
retentions o f the KMA would also tip the balance moderately).
It could he advanced that despite the tawdry nature of the 1901 takeover there was a compensating 
benefit attaching to a Western controlled enterprise providing capital and new technology and management 
skills and hence advancing the enterprise. Admittedly after the takeover there was a sharp improvement in 
the performance of the concern and in the first decade capital expenditure was twice depreciation. 
However, a large portion of the improvement was due to the elimination of corruption and over manning. 
This was a function of honesty of management rather than nationality of management. In any case, to 
receive the necessary injection of capital it was not necessary for the Company to be majority owned by 
foreigners -  a 50/50 or foreign minority enterprise would have sufficed. In terms of technical expertise any 
deficiency could be catered for by hiring Western mining engineers and over time the supply of Chinese 
engineers grew.
The Western enterprise did make some useful investments in the mines but these tended to be in the areas 
of power facilities, coal washing, harbour facilities, etc. rather than in coal cutting / transport 
mechanisation. (A factor in this was the unsettled state of China which made companies reluctant to invest 
in expensive labour saving equipment). Thus, although the mines were on a par with the best in China the 
failure to install the more modem cutting equipment, underground transport facilities and safety features 
had a bad effect on labour relations and this was worsened by the retention of the labour contractor system 
(against the advice of local management). However, to be fair to the British company, it is probably correct 
to say that conditions and remuneration in the Kailan mines were above average for the period. Also there 
was a large rise in real wages at the KMA in the 1920s and early 1930s -  see PART V.
As a Western controlled enterprise the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited did enjoy 
certain advantages over its locally owned counterparts. In particular, these included
- greater financial strength (particularly evident in the price war against the Luanzhou concern).
- greater protection against civil or military disturbances.
However, it would appear that these advantages did not seriously inhibit the growth of a Chinese owned 
modern mining industry or destroy to a significant extent the number o f small “native” mines >
- transport difficulties obviously inhibited many areas from interface of Chinese mines with the Company.
- although the Company made efforts to restrict competition in the important markets of the Tianjin area 
and Shanghai in the mid 1930s this was a joint effort with the strongest of its Chinese competitors 
(Zhongxing).
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- the Company’s share of total Chinese coal output fell over time from, for example, around 17% in 1913 
to 10% in 1936 -  partly, albeit, against Japanese owned mines but mainly against Chinese mines.
On balance, the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited brought some benefits to the 
development of the Chinese economy but the circumstances of its founding meant that it was never really 
accepted by the host nation. Its unfortunate reputation was an embarrassment to other UK industrial 
enterprises in China with a more honourable foundation and record.
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PART III -  CHAPTER THREE -  TEXTIT ES
(A) COTTON TEXTILES.*
British interests were as prominent in taking advantage of the relaxation of the prohibition on foreign 
investment in 1895 as they were in the fight to achieve it. The entry of foreign capital into this industry was 
precipitate. Six foreign joint stock companies were floated in 1895. There were four that eventually 
constructed mills (all in Shanghai) -  two of which were British
Nationality Authorised Capital
Thous. Taels ('£ thous.)
The Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning
and Weaving Company, Limited British 800 (112)
The Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving
Company, Limited British 1,500 (210)
The Soy Chee Cotton Spinning
Company, Limited German 1,000 (140)
International Cotton Manufacturing
Company, Limited American 1,000 (140)
The high hopes, as evinced by the glowing prophecies of success adorning the prospectuses of the 
founders, were uniformly disappointed. The Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company paid a small 
dividend (3.5%) in 1897 but did not resume payments until 1903 while the Laou Kung Mow (Lao Gong 
Mou) Company paid a modest interim dividend (4%) for the first half o f 1898 which was “perhaps to be 
regretted” (1). Dividend payments were not resumed until 1905. The Ewo Cotton Spinning and "Weaving 
Company reflected the poor trading environment by halving its capital by 1903 (2). Share prices tumbled -  
against a par value of 100 taels per share the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company stood at 40 taels 
in August, 1901 and that of the Laou Kung Mow at 45 taels.
Under-capitalisation was an important factor in this situation. In the case of the Ewo Cotton Spinning and 
Weaving Company expenditure on fixed assets alone totalled 1,360 thous taels by end October, 1898 with 
another 140 thous. taels to come against an issued capital at that date of 1,134 thous. taels (3). In the case of 
the Laou Kung Mow the Chairman constantly referred to the under-capitalisation o f his company at the 
annual meetings :-
“Interest, as usual, has been a heavy charge owing partly to the fact that our undertaking has been under­
capitalised from the start” (4).
The Laou Kung Mow made an operating profit even at the worst of times (very early on -  in 1900 -  the 
Chairman claimed that As regards our total cost of production we have exchanged copies of our working 
account with some well-known Indian mills and find that our total expenses are very nearly the same...” 
(5)) However, in some years e.g. 1900 interest alone exceeded the operating profit.
Under-capitalisation, which also affected other foreign mills, would not have exerted such an adverse 
influence if the companies had attained large trading margins. They failed to do so for several reasons :-
(i) Labour problems.
This was a problem in the very early days but was a teething problem that was quickly overcome. In 
1898 the Chairman of the Laou Kung Mow Company complained that “ .. .the demand for trained labour 
*A detailed account of the fortunes of "British Cotton Mills in Pre-Second World War China” is given by 
the author in Textile History, Volume 32, Number 2, November, 2001 p.p. 175-216.
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has naturally been far in excess of the supply, resulting in an exasperating independence amongst the work­
people which has been a source o f endless trouble” (6) ( Hardly the comment of an enlightened employer). 
However, by 1904 it was reported that this problem “has been largely overcome by training... ” (7).
(ii) The supply, price and volatility of price of local raw cotton.
The plans of the first foreign mills relied upon their ability to obtain abundant supplies of local 
cotton (short staple and only suitable for coarse yarns) at reasonable prices. The price of indigenous cotton 
in 1895 was around 10 to 11 taels per picul (c.133 lbs) and had been at this level for years. The estimates 
made by the new enterprises were based on the belief that local cotton would never go beyond 11.5 taels 
per picul but "In 1903 and 1904 the price of Chinese cotton was 90 percent above the figure on which the 
original calculations were founded ” (8). Factors in this rise (which given the move to increase spindleage 
should surely been foreseen) were increased demand from Japan (for wadding as well as spinning 
purposes) and the need to clothe the sharp rise in local spindle capacity.
The underdeveloped nature of cotton marketing in China fostered speculation because the local cotton 
market was “practically in the hands of an unscrupulous net of cotton growers and dealers, who are able to 
manipulate it almost at will... .”(9). The Chairman of the Laou Kung Mow mill at the 1899 meeting stated 
that the gap between the highest and lowest quotations for his mill’s raw cotton during 14 months had been 
very nearly 40 percent and that this was entirely unwarranted by World movements. To curb the “cunning 
of the native speculators” he suggested that a Cotton Exchange be established (10). These difficulties of the 
local market necessitated a high level of working capital thus adding to the problems of under­
capitalisation,
(iii) Adulteration of locally grown raw cotton.
This was a running sore to the mills. The usual trick was to water the cotton although there were 
other forms of adulteration such as mixing 5 to 30 percent ungnmed seed cotton with the clean article.The 
loss in weight was bad enough but there was also difficulties in separation -  one mill, at least, made a 
separate machine for this (11). Another trick was short-weight deliveries. At the annual meeting of the 
Laou Kung Mow mill in 1902 (12) the Chairman bewailed the delivery of false-packed cotton and of 
"cotton watered to such an extent that it could be used as a sponge without any added moisture” and 
thundered that "now people who bring watered cotton into Shanghai...do so at considerable risk to their 
persons and their pockets”. (This last refers to the formation of the “Watered Cotton Association” in 1901 
by the mill-owners and others with a force of inspectors. It was not, however, particularly effective).
The situation improved with the formation in 1911, with official support, of the Cotton Anti-Adulteration 
Association. A Cotton Testing House was established worked jointly under the auspices of the Imperial 
Maritime Customs and the Association (13). Problems still, however, persisted. Thus, for example, in 1924 
the Ewo Cotton Mills complained about two fraudulent practices relating to mixing inferior cotton with 
better qualities and as much as 20 percent moisture frequently added i.e. some 12 percent fraudulently 
added (14).
(iv) “Dumping” of yams in the Chinese market.
Thus, for example, in the second half of 1898 the Laou Kung Mow mill was hit by yarn imports from India 
and Japan -  yam prices were cut by 10-15 percent and some varieties were “absolutely unsaleable” (15).
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The situation improved markedly after 1905 -  one factor being the improved supply of local cotton. The 
First World War brought boom conditions to the industry with the restriction of supplies from abroad. The 
post-War boom lasted longer in China than in other textile centres. Deliveries to China of textile machinery 
were delayed with the need to meet pent-up demand in machinery producing countries together with 
shipping shortages. In the case of the British companies the buoyant conditions were reflected in their high 
stock market prices -  in December, 1919 the market value of the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Company ordinary shares was nearly 14 times their par value.
Dividends (ordinary) were very high at the British mills :-
1918 1919 1920
The Jardine Mafheson Companies.
The Ewo Cotton Spinning And Weaving Co. 34% 130% 180%
The Kung Yik Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. 16% 50% 80%
Yangtszepoo Cotton Mill, Ltd. 16% 70% 100%
Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. 7% 50% 65%
Oriental Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. 8.3% 50% 106.7%
From 1922 onwards, when the industry capacity came in line with demand, the overall situation of the 
industry became unfavourable and these difficulties lasted with varying severity until the period 1938-1940 
(when abnormal conditions -  analysed in PART W  (C) -  due to the conflict with Japan brought prosperity 
to those mills such as the British mills that escaped destruction or occupation. These survivors also 
benefited from the reduction in competition from Europe after the outbreak of the Second World War). 
There were several factors in this situation. Overall factors include the World-wide depression of the 1930s 
and also in that decade the various Japanese provocations and incursions leading to all-out war in 1937. 
Civil wars, civil disturbances and lawlessness caused difficulties in transport of raw cotton to the mills and 
affected distribution of finished cotton goods.
The foreign mills were also particularly affected with labour problems and gangsterism. The cotton 
industry was amongst the most strike prone in China after the First World War. Although Chinese mills 
were by no means immune, the major impact was on British and Japanese mills. In the Shanghai cotton 
mills there were 85 strikes during 1919-26 in the Japanese mills and 20 in the British as against 34 in the 
Chinese mills although the Chinese mills outnumbered the others (16). Both Japanese and British mills 
were subject to gangsterism. This did not, however, uniformly work to the employer’s disadvantage as 
gang control could be useful in labour recruitment and discipline (17).
The Economic Position of UK Mills in the Chinese Cotton Textile Industry.
Altogether there were eight British connected enterprises (all in Shanghai) that had, at one time or 
another, a presence in the Chinese cotton industry before the Second World War. With one insignificant 
exception -  Anglo-Chinese Cotton Manufacturing Company -  all the units listed below combined weaving 
with spinning for at least part o f their lives. (The Anglo-Chinese Cotton Manufacturing Company was a 
small -  11,678 spindles -  spinning mill started up in 1908. As the name implied, it was a joint 
Chinese/British enterprise. This mill became wholly Chinese owned in 1909 (18)).
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Name Founded Initial Issued
Capital - £ thous.
(11 Earlv Entrants.
Ewo (Yi He ) Cotton Mills, Limited 1921 880
- Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. 1895 140
- Rung Yik Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. 1910 60
- Yangtszepoo (Yangshupu) Cotton Mill, Ltd. 1914 195
Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning and Weaving 1895 80 Mill bought by
Oriental Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. 1917
Japanese in 1925. 
120 Was German.
Anglo-Chinese Cotton Manufacturing Company 1906
Liquidated in 1928.
55
(2) Late Entrants.
New China Textile Company 1937 155
China Printing and Finishing Co*. 1924 900
*Originally a finishing plant. Spinning and weaving added in 1936. Capital given refers to this date.
The improved conditions in the industry after 1905 led to an expansion in British capacity by the time of 
the First World War. Part of this was due to expansion at the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving mill (in 
1910) and at the Laou Kung Mow mill but there were also two new ventures associated with Jardine 
Matheson :-
-The Kung Yik Cotton Mill was established by a former Jardine Matheson comprador -  Zhu Dachun -  in 
1907. Jardine Matheson were closely associated with this venture from the start -  for example, the British 
machinery was imported via their agency. This spinning mill (weaving capacity was not installed until 
1912) was “floated” under the auspices o f Jardine Matheson in 1910 (19). Jardine Matheson became 
general managers of this new company -  the Kung Yik Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company -  and 
nursed it through its early years (the firm had an overdraft with Jardine Matheson of 73 percent of its issued 
capital at end November, 1911 (20)). Although attractive, the profitability of the Kung Yik mill was low 
compared with the other two mills in the Jardine Matheson stable. The main reason lay in the fact that the 
main market for the yarn sales of Kung Yik was Sichuan (a centre of hand weaving) with the insecurity of 
transport in troubled times.
-The main constituent, both financially and in terms of machinery, of the 1914 floated Yangtszepoo Cotton 
Mill, Limited was an unsuccessful Jardine Matheson company in Hong Kong -  The Hong Kong Cotton 
Spinning, Weaving and Dyeing Company, Limited which began running in June, 1899 (21). Its raw cotton 
came principally from India while China was its chief market. At its peak the mill had 55,632 spindles (22). 
However, owing mainly to Japanese competition, the mill became increasingly uneconomic. The last 
dividend was paid for the year ending July, 1907 (23), 10,000 spindles which had been idle were sold 
reducing the complement to 45,696 spindles (24). The other constituent of the new company was the 
Jardine Matheson owned Yangtszepoo Cotton Mill established in 1913 with 9,936 spindles (25). By early 
1915 the new company had 20,000 spindles running with the remainder being shipped from Hong Kong 
(26). Also, in that year the decision was made to install looms. By early 1917 the full shipment of 416 
looms from the UK was installed and working (27). Apart from the spindles the new company received 
“virtually all the moveable equipment” of the Hong Kong mill (28). (Ironically this situation was
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completely reversed after the Second World War as many Chinese mill owners in Shanghai moved their 
businesses and diverted equipment to Hong Kong).
The separation of the three firms in the same industrial sector that became to be managed by Jardine 
Matheson was clearly untidy. As the Chairman o f the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company 
reported at an extraordinary general meeting of the Company in March, 1921 
“ .. .many new mills have been projected, and we must be prepared for keen competition in the near future, 
to meet which we cannot...adopt a sounder course than consolidate our interests with those of the Kung 
Yik and Yangtszepoo mills.” (29).
This consolidation was achieved in April, 1921 when the Ewo Cotton Mills, Limited was founded with 
Jardine Matheson continuing as general managers. The new company was conservatively financed -  a very 
wise move in view of the cyclical nature of the textile industry and of the civil, military and labour 
disorders that were to hit the Chinese cotton industry in the next two decades.
The environment in which Ewo Cotton Mills operated in the next two decades was one that was 
completely contrary to sustained, efficient operation of the mills and financial stability. There were long 
periods of serious political instability and civil war, lawlessness, Japanese aggression and labour troubles. 
A typical example o f this first as it affected the Company was the item in the accounts from 1922 to 1937, 
when it was written off (30), of “debts due by the Chinese Government” of $143,000. This related to 
supplies of blankets to the Beijing based Government, the authority of which the later Nationalist 
Government did not recognise.
As regards the attacks on Shanghai in the 1930s by the Japanese, the Company was in terms of physical 
damage fortunate. In 1932 although it lost the best part of two months’ output there was only a small 
amount of damage (to the Kung Yik mill) (31), In the fighting that began in August, 1937, its mills were 
only superficially damaged but owing to the general disruption it was not until February, 1938 that the 
Ewo and Yangtszepoo mills resumed operations and “then only in a very small way” (32).
In the field o f labour relations, the Company experienced 15 major strikes and lockouts between 1925 and 
1940 (33). These strikes were in general company specific but m 1925 the Company’s mills were 
“practically idle for four months” (34) due to an overall Anti-British movement as a consequence of the 
May Thirtieth Incident. It might be deduced from the strike record that the Ewo Cotton Mills were by 
contemporary standards in China bad employers. The reverse would seem to be true. Their mills were an 
obvious target for strikes as, in contrast to the majority of Chinese owned mills, their financial strength 
meant that a prolonged strike would not mean permanent closure. The Company was the leader in 
attempting to end the scandal of child labour. From September, 1923 it no longer hired boys under 10 or 
girls under 12 (35)). Throughout its existence the Company had a superannuation fund for Chinese staff 
(adopted by its constituent companies just before the merger).
The Ewo Cotton Mills showed remarkable powers of adaptation in an extremely challenging environmemt 
(Between 1921 and 1940 it never passed a dividend and only made a loss -  a small one -  in one year, 
1924). In its mainstream business of cotton spinning (and weaving) its strategy became that of occupying a 
position between that of the local Japanese and Chinese owned mills. Their average count (until fairly 
recently the method of expressing the fineness of cotton yams -  the higher the count, the finer the yam) in
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the early 1930s was 19.3 (although their mills spun up to 42’s) against 17 for Chinese mills and 26.5 for 
local Japanese mills (36). By 1940 the position was that the mills spun coarse yam (6’s) on condenser 
mules and 10’s to 40’s on ring frames. (37). Although no entirely new mills were built and much of the 
original Platt Brothers of Oldham spindles were still operating in the 1930s, the Company still persevered 
with additions and improvements. Expenditure on fixed assets from 1921 to 1929 was 132 percent of 
depreciation and in 1931 to 1936 207 percent, (for financial information on the Jardine Matheson mills see 
the STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLES NN to QQ).
The number of British cotton mills in China was swelled during the First World War. The Soy Chee (Rui 
Ji) Cotton Spinning Company was incorporated under German law in 1895. By 1915 it had 50,768 spindles 
(no weaving capacity had been installed) (38). There was significant British ownership in this company.
Dining 1916 the Company was informed by H.M. Consul General that its name with its enemy 
connotation must be changed (to Oriental Cotton Spinning Company) (39). In May, 1917 this renamed 
company was wound up and sold to a new company called the Oriental Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Company, Limited (40). The Company was now recognised as a British company -  all the Board members 
were British.
Thus, by 1918 British presence in the Chinese cotton industry reached its peak (See TABLE JJ in the 
STATISTICAL ANNEX):-
If the Jardine Matheson bid in 1918 for the American company of International Cotton Manufacturing 
Co., Ltd. with its 53,056 spindles and 500 looms had been accepted (it was transferred to Japanese 
ownership -  with Jardine Matheson being outbid by 1,300,000 taels against 1,200,000 taels (41)) the UK 
share of China’s spindleage would have been 26.4 percent.
The UK share was still slightly higher than that of Japan. However, the UK did not share in the virtual 
trebling of capacity in the post-War boom. Coupled with the demise of the Laou Kung Mow and Oriental 
mills (see below), the UK share of national spindleage fell to only 3.9 percent in 1930 compared with 38.7 
percent for Japanese mills. With two new entrants (see below) the UK share improved marginally to 4.5 
percent by 1937 but by then the Japanese share was 44.5 percent. This pattern was repeated in the case of 
power looms at the integrated mills. In this sector the Japanese share by 1937 (51.4 percent) even surpassed 
that of the Chinese. (See TABLE MM in the STATISTICAL ANNEX). The reasons for this diminution of 
the UK to a minor force in the Chinese cotton textile industry and the rise of the Japanese presence are 
analysed in PART IV  (C) below.
One of the reasons for the decline in UK presence was due to the fact that the Laou Kung Mow and 
Oriental concerns did not share the resilience and adaptability of the Jardine Matheson mills
Number of spindles
Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.
Kung Yik Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.
Yangtszepoo Cotton Mill, Limited
Sub-total Jardine Matheson Mills
Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.
Oriental Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co.
Total UK mills
- UK share o f national total
- Japanese share of national total
- Chinese share of national total
73,952
25,376
55,632
154.960
40,096
50.768
245.824
21.7%
21.2%
57.1%
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- The Laou Kung Mow mill shared in the industry’s boom conditions from 1917 to 1921 but not to the 
same extent as the Jardine Matheson mills - one factor being its delayed move into weaving. During Spring, 
1918 the concern received “repeated inquiries to view the mill”. Several intended Japanese buyers “went 
thoroughly over your property but no bona fide offer was received” (42). In view of the subsequent history 
of the Company this was very unfortunate for the shareholders. In 1922, 1923 and 1924 the Company made 
horrendous losses totalling 105 percent of issued capital. (See TABLE RR in the STATISTICAL ANNEX), 
By the end o f 1923 all reserves had been completely run down. In 1924 the mill was closed from 1st, July to 
17th, November due to trading conditions. Shareholders refused to put in more capital into the Company 
(43) and it was wound up in April, 1925 (44). In the next month the mill was bought by a local subsidiary 
of the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company -  one o f the largest cotton spinning companies in Japan. (Jardine 
Matheson had been interested in acquiring the concern in November, 1924 but decided against it (45)).
- The Oriental mill shared in the general prosperity of the industry in 1919 and a dividend of 50 percent 
was declared. Transfers to reserves were 40 percent higher than these dividend payments as the Company 
was “most anxious to take advantage of the present prosperity and to free it once and for all of the hardship 
of insufficient funds ...” (46). Unfortunately this policy was slackened in 1920 and 1921. Transfers to 
reserves in 1920 were only a quarter o f the record dividend of 107 percent and in 1921 there was no 
transfer to reserves or depreciation. (For financial information on this company see TABLE SS in the 
STATISTICAL ANNEX).
The improved conditions encouraged the company to integrate forward into weaving which it had been 
planning “for a number of years”. In June, 1919 an order was placed for 440 looms (47). To help pay for 
this the capital was increased in 1920 and 1923. A further diversification, which was modest, albeit useful, 
was a waste spinning plant together with an associated blanket weaving installation which was initiated in 
1923 at a cost of 49 thous. taels (£7 thous.) (48).
The success of this last venture was a drop in the ocean compared with the series of losses that hit this 
company from 1922 onwards. Losses in 1922-1927 amounted to 93 percent of the issued capital. The 
general weakness of the industry was compounded in the case of the Company by unfortunate raw cotton 
purchasing (49) and violent labour relations. Even by the standards of Shanghai in the 1920s labour 
relations at the Oriental mill were particularly vicious. In 1927, for example, two strikes closed their 
spinning mill for two and a half months. One of their foremen was assassinated, another shot and a Russian 
watchman murdered. The labour contractor at the mill had to go about all through 1927 under armed 
protection and pleaded to be relieved of his duties. (50). Also, the Company suffered from its relatively 
little downstream activities -  integrated mills tended to fare better during the periodic crises in the industry. 
The Chairman admitted at the April, 1928 annual general meeting that :-
"It would certainly have been better had we, during the good years of 1919 to 1921, paid smaller 
dividends and invested part of our profits in weaving and finishing machinery, etc. At that time, however, 
everybody was so optimistic in regard to the cotton spinning industry that there seemed no necessity for 
extending the activities of our mill in other directions” (51).
The Company went into liquidation in September, 1928 (52). In early 1929 its facilities were sold to a 
Chinese cotton concern -  the Shen Hsin (Shen Xin) Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company owned by the 
Rong Brothers (53).
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The loss of these two companies was replaced by the entry of two other British firms of which one was 
the local subsidiary o f a British based cotton textile concern -  the Calico Printers’ Association (CPA). 
Given the plight of the export oriented British cotton textile industry after the First World War with the 
growth of local cotton industries in previously large export markets and severe competition in these 
markets from Japan, it seems strange that there was only one British based cotton textile firm that installed 
a plant in what had been a very important export market in pre-War years. The reasons for this failure of 
Lancashire firms (apart from CPA) to invest in China are postulated in PART IV  (C) together with an 
account of the progress of the CPA venture. A feature of this CPA venture was, because of the relatively 
fine nature of its products, it was in direct competition with the local Japanese mills rather than the Chinese 
mills. Apart from the tobacco industry this was the main competitive interface between British and 
Japanese concerns in China in the 1930s.
The other British late entrant was of less importance in terms o f scale (and profitability) than the CPA 
subsidiary of the China Printing and Finishing Company, Limited. It was also of less significance in terms 
of British presence in the cotton industry in China. Unlike the CPA venture it was not an attempt by a 
British textile firm to emulate the Japanese success in China but more an attempt by an import merchant to 
establish a tied outlet for its wares. The China Engineers, Limited (54) was established as a private 
company in 1928. The major part of their business was in supplying textile machinery (virtually all British) 
and electrical machinery to Chinese mills on credit terms ranging from one to four years. Other interests 
included supplying other machinery and trading in raw cotton, wool tops, textiles and chemicals. The 
Company had considerable trouble in 1937 in trying to protect installations of its textile machinery, on 
which the clients still owed money, from Japanese takeover. These attempts (described in PART IV (C)) 
met with little success.
Of more success was the Company’s participation in the launching of the New China Textile Company, 
Limited as a private company in December, 1937 -  it was converted into a public company in November, 
1939. Issued capital grew from $2.5 million at end 1938 to $7.2 million at end October, 1940. Two issues 
were made at a premium in late 1940 which attracted considerable support from Chinese investors. This 
was due to the mill producing a basic need and being situated in the International Settlement in Shanghai. 
The registered office o f this new company was that of The China Engineers, Limited and its Chairman the 
managing director of China Engineers. However, three out of the seven strong Board were Chinese and 
this influence increased with successive share issues.
The building for the spinning machines (capable of “economic development” up to 100,000 spindles) was 
completed in November, 1938 and 5,000 spindles were started up in December. By March, 1939 27,000 
spindles were working and by June 200 looms were started (55). All this machinery was previously 
installed in a Chinese mill in Qingdao.
Even at its peak, this mill was smaller than that of the China Printing and Finishing Company, Limited :-
-1941 -
Number of spindles Number of looms
New China Textile Company 38,000 260
China Printing and Finishing Company 42,240 1,130
Although increasingly profitable, the Company was less profitable than the CPA subsidiary :-
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Net profits after Dividends
transfers to reserves Percent
- £ thous. *-
New China China Printing New China China Printing
Textile and Finishing Textile and Finishing
1938 2.6 130.0 - 22.5
1939 14.5 18.0 10
1940 27.8+ 104.0 10+ 20+
*Converted at average yearly rates. + First half.
Also, The China Printing and Finishing Company made much larger allocations to reserves than the New
China Textile Company.
ASSESSMENT.
British direct investment in the Chinese cotton industry obviously produced both favourable and 
unfavourable effects on the general economic development of China. On the whole, it seems likely that the 
former outweighed the latter. There are several facets to this.
A common criticism of foreign investment in the period covered is that it led to geographic distortion of 
industrial development by favouring the coastal strip. Thus, all the British mills were situated in Shanghai 
with the advantages accruing there to foreigners. However, even without these, Shanghai would still have 
developed as a centre of the cotton industry as against inland districts. All industries have to start 
somewhere and Shanghai was much better situated as regards access to cotton than, for example, the initial 
centre of the US cotton industry in New England. Moreover, Shanghai was favoured by locally owned 
cotton mills —in 1936, for example, 39 percent of Chinese-owned spindles were in Shanghai and 59 
percent in Jiangsu as a whole (56).
Another criticism is that industrial investment by foreigners carried adverse effects on local handicraft 
production. In the period covered the productivity of a power spinning operative would be around 80 times 
that of a hand spinner while that of a non-automatic power loom operative would show a lesser, albeit 
pronounced, advantage over the hand loom weaver. It was clear that the introduction of power spinning 
was a priority in any move to industrialisation. It might be thought that the development of spinning mills 
o f Chinese, British, etc. ownership in the 1890s was entirely at the expense of local hand spinners. In fact, 
it was also in substitution o f the very large imports of machine spun yam from India and Japan. 
Nevertheless, it did not take many years for handicraft spinning to be greatly reduced by competition from 
machine spun yarns. Precise figures for this relative and absolute decline are impossible to calculate -  one 
difficulty being that if one eliminates the consumption estimate for cotton used in machine spinning from 
total consumption it is still impossible to accurately assess the significant consumption in wadding as 
compared with hand spinning. However, the following figures from the work of Xu Xinwu are very 
informed estimates. His figures for the relative usage of machine spun and hand spun cotton yams in the 
weaving o f hand woven cloth run as follows (57)
Hand spun yarn used in hand woven cloth.
Thous. tons. As % of total 
Consumption 
1894 284 77
1913 65 28
1920 172 49
1936 54 24
(The revival in 1920 was short-lived and was due to a temporary capacity restraint in the mill sector (58))
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The resultant loss of employment was softened to some extent by relatively sustained employment in hand 
loom weaving.
Already, as happened in the early days of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, hand spinning could not 
satisfy the expanding needs of the hand loom weavers. The availability o f machine spun yarn removed this 
bottleneck and the increased strength of the machine spun yam enabled hand loom weavers to prepare 
longer warps. As described in PART /, the day of the power loom in China dawned much later than 
machine spinning. However, despite the resilience in hand loom weaving and a rise in other handicraft 
sectors such as lace, there is no doubt that the collapse of hand spinning did lead to hardship for many 
displaced spinners.
Another angle is the effect on China’s balance of international payments. All the machinery installed in 
British mills was, with minor exceptions, imported from the UK. Also, to a certain extent, British mills 
used imported raw cotton (but, as outlined above, this was mainly a result of deficiencies in local supply). 
To balance this, the British mills substituted imports of cotton manufactures and a small export trade also 
developed. (In 1939 and 1940 the Ewo Mills endeavoured to increase their export business with agencies 
being set up in the UK, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, East Africa, the Belgian Congo and Thailand (59)). 
Remittance of profits to UK investors would seem to suggest that, over time, there was a net out-payment 
but, as time went on, Chinese local shareholders wTere by far in the majority (except for the CPA venture). 
Also, retentions were fairly significant -  for instance, over the life of the various Jardine Matheson mills 
retentions amounted to 23 percent of dividends.
Given, also, an influx of scarce capital, the training of labour, the backward linkage into development of 
local mill supplies, etc the net effect of British cotton mills on the Chinese economy can be adjudged 
positive. In any case, by the late 1920s British presence in the local cotton industry was small (after a 
promising start) and thus the effect, either positive or negative, on Chinese economic development was 
slight,
(B) NON -  COTTON TEXTILES.
The early promising position of British firms in the silk textile industry was not sustained as was that of 
other Western entrants into the silk filature sector. By 1911 only the Ewo Filature was “still running under 
entirely foreign ownership and management” (60). The filatures were notorious for providing probably the 
worst industrial working conditions -  the nature of the process used meant literally “sweated labour”. In a 
socially responsible sense, the loss of British participation in this sector was to be welcomed.
However, this decline in British interest in non-cotton textiles was more than counterbalanced in the long 
run by a movement into other textile sectors under this head
- There was a move by the Ewo Cotton Mills into jute weaving in 1929 (61) and making gunny bags (62) in 
1935 - by 1936 the Company possessed 25 gunny bag looms (63). This move was not, however, made by 
other British textile companies in China as they did not possess downstream packing interests like Jardine 
Matheson.
- Of much more significance was the entry of three British enterprises into a new branch of the local textile 
industry - worsted spinning (for hand knitting, machine knitting or weaving) and weaving. In 1932 an 
experimental plant to produce worsted yams was installed in the Ewo Cotton Mills. In 1934 this plant was
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extended and an experimental weaving, dyeing and finishing plant was installed (64). By 1935 there were 
30 looms installed. In 1936 83 percent of the Company’s expenditure on new machinery was devoted to 
expanding the worsted plant at a cost of $170 thous. (£10 thous.) (65). The number of looms was increased 
to 50 and a further 1,800 spindles installed for weaving and knitting yams (66). By October, 1939 the 
capacity was as follows (67) :-
Spindles -Hosieryyam 1,440
- Weaving yam 2,700
- Mules 2.400
6,540
Looms 66
By 1941 there were 116 looms (68).
The British worsted spinning firm of Patons and Baldwins, Limited, with mills in the UK, Canada and 
Australia, had a significant business exporting worsted yams to China. With new import duties it faced 
exclusion from this market (UK exports of worsted yarn to China fell from 937 tons in 1933 to 14 tons in 
1936). Hence a decision to build a mill producing tops and worsted yams in Yangshupu which came on 
stream in 1934. The initial capital of this enterprise was £750 thous.
The enterprise prospered and by 1940 had a workforce of over one thousand and there were 20 British 
employees. After the Second World War the Foreign Office noted that “it was the only British factory still 
operating in China” (69). It was not until 1959 that the mill was transferred to Chinese ownership. It is 
fairly likely that the reason for survival was the relative inexperience o f the Chinese in worsted spinning as 
compared with the long lasting experience in the technology of cotton spinning (Even as late as 1958 there 
were two expatriate staff at the mill (70)).
Shanghai Worsted Mills, Limited, founded in 1935, was a local enterprise “under the aegis of Chinese 
Engineers, Ltd. with the collaboration of a group of Chinese merchants” (71). The Chinese presence was 
strong throughout -  4 out of 9 directors, for example, in December, 1940. There were two departments -  
one producing hand knitting yams and the other making other worsted yams, woven worsted fabrics, wool 
tapestries, etc. By 1941 there were 55 looms installed (72).
Six hundred spindles were imported from England and put into operation in August, 1935. The Company 
made useful profits in its first three years but lost heavily in the year to March, 1939 (73)
Issued Capital Net Profit Dividend
$ thous. $ thous. $ thous.
1935 (5 months) 150 13 -
1936 200 116 -
1.1.37-31.3.38 500 29 -
1.4.38-31.3.39 521 -349 -
1.4.39-31.3.40 521 395 42 (8%)
1.4.40-30.9.40 1,070 238 -
A recovery in the next financial year and the payment of a modest dividend encouraged the Company to 
float in a context o f a desperate desire of Chinese investors to seek security in shares in local British 
enterprises -  see PART 7F(C).
By the outbreak of the Pacific War British enterprises occupied a prominent position in this emerging 
industry (74)
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Number of worsted spindles Output of worsted yams
Tons per annum
Ewo Cotton Mills, Ltd. 10,260 1,665
Shanghai Worsted Mills, Ltd, 4,200 805
Patons and Baldwins (Far East), Ltd. 12.000 3.485
Total 26,460 5,955
The importance o f British firms in this important new industry can be illustrated by the fact that as regards
worsted yarns they accounted for 46 percent of national output in 1941 (75). In recent years China has
become a very significant producer of worsted items -  for example, it is currently by far the World’s largest
producer of worsted hand knitting yarns.
(C) M AN-M ADE FIBRES. (76)
In 1924 Jardine Matheson considered the possibility of a viscose filament plant in Shanghai. Courtaulds 
were approached as a partner. However, an interview with a Mr. Bell, the Managing Director of Courtaulds 
threw cold water on such a project
Low labour costs were not a crucial factor only accounting for 15% of the finished material.
The existing import duty into China was not heavy.
The manufacture of viscose filament required considerable expert staff of which there was a 
shortage.
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PART HI - CHAPTER FOUR - ENGINEERING 
There was no UK presence (in contrast to Japanese presence -  see PART IV  (C) below) in the manufacture 
of primary metals in China despite two promising projects which never materialised >
- in 1919 the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited seriously investigated the 
establishment of a iron and steel complex at Qinhuangdao (1). The project included
coke ovens.
iron works (1,000 tons pig iron per day), 
steel works (500 tons per day), 
coke ovens
a central power station, 
a sulphuric acid plant.
and was to cost around £2 million (2). The project seemed attractive. The Company shipped large 
quantities o f coal from its port at Qinhuangdao to Shanghai. On return they could load with Yangzi iron ore 
from that port.
- in 1936 (reflecting the increased authority of the Nanjing Government in the South) a preliminary 
agreement was signed between the Guangdong Provincial Government and a British Group for the 
establishment of a large integrated iron and steel plant (3). On the outbreak o f hostilities in 1937 the 
project, as yet not frilly defined, was abandoned.
There was, however, considerable UK presence in engineering, This was particularly concentrated in 
marine engineering
ship repairing 
shipbuilding
ship breaking at China Ship-Breakers, Limited (founded 1933) -  the major part of Metal 
Industries of China, Limited which was floated in 1937 by Wheelock and Company, Limited (4). 
The shares were heavily oversubscribed by six times (5) 
although there was also a relatively modest presence in general engineering.
The general engineering fleld included British ventures in nails, railway coaches and freight cars, water 
fittings, metal windows, foundry products, etc (see Appendix One). In this sector a modest proportion of 
the activity was ancillary to the main operations of an UK owned company. Thus the British owned 
tramway company o f the Shanghai Electric Construction Company, Limited had a machine shop making 
tyres from steel for tramcars and a moulding shop for brass castings (6). Another example is the oil drum 
factory installed in Shanghai in 1911 by the Asiatic Petroleum Company, Limited (Shell) (7). It is 
impossible to disentangle these activities so, to a minor extent, there is an underestimation of UK industrial 
investment in the engineering area. Where the company with these ancillary engineering activities was in 
an industrial sector e.g. the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited with its engineering 
workshops or the British American Tobacco Company, Limited with its engineering department and its 
Acme Foundry, Limited (see above) then obviously the total figure is not affected.
There was, clearly, some overlap between the these two engineering sectors with the British owned 
marine engineering firms also engaged to a limited degree in general engineering. These included 
supplying structural steelwork, heating installations, pumping plants, metal plating, engraving, erecting oil 
storage tanks, etc. Many o f these activities were linked to the foreign community in Shanghai. Thus the 
Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company, Limited supplied structural steelwork for the Shanghai
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Volunteer Drill Hall, the Holy Trinity Cathedral and the Race Club stand (8) while in 1927 its rival -  the
New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Limited repaired and modified the armoured cars of the British
5th Armoured Car Company sent to Shanghai from India to defend the International Settlement.
Apart from some repair facilities in Tianjin, Fuzhou and Qinhuangdao and the example, already noted, of
the enterprise in Xiamen that was sold in 1918, British presence in marine engineering was confined to
Shanghai -  the prime port of China which grew explosively :-
Vessels Entered and Cleared in Shanghai -  Tonnage. (9)
1856 320,458
1900 9,432,419
1936 18,826.779 (22,779)*
-Chinese ports 7,704,592 (6,528)*
- Foreign ports 8,360,928 (1,768)*
- Inland trade 2,761,259 (14,483)*
*Number of vessels
By 1929 Shanghai was in terms o f tonnage handled second only to Rotterdam and before Hamburg (No. 3) 
and London (No.4) (10). It must be borne in mind, however, that because of the deficient transport network 
in China the proportion of coastal shipping (41% of Shanghai tonnage in 1936) and vessels utilising inland 
waterways (15% of tonnage and 64% of vessels in 1936) was much higher than in European ports.
Despite the significant volume of inland trade, it was only in one (unsuccessful) enterprise that the UK 
marine engineering companies in Shanghai started a venture to service repairs for inland craft at an up-river 
location. This was an unique venture as regards foreign marine engineering concerns in China. In 1920 the 
New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Limited started to extend its operations by purchasing land at 
Yichang to carry out repairs on river craft (11). This subsidiary -  Upper Yangtze Engineering Works -  
never got off the ground despite the Company’s perseverance. By 1927 the Company had organised 
machinery and building materials and awaited a “hoped for improvement in conditions on the Upper 
Yangtze” (12). In 1928 the Company despatched engineers and commenced organising the plant but 
“within a few weeks of having the yard completely established” the Chinese Government “ordered 
complete cessation of work” (13), The Company decided towards the end of 1931 to abandon the scheme 
entirely as they were “not able to overcome many difficulties”. The expenditure to date on the venture -  
155 thous. taels (£8 thous.) was written off (14).
By 1900 a high proportion of the significant facilities for marine engineering in Shanghai were in the 
hands of two British companies
Boyd and Company, Limited.
S.C. Famham and Company, Limited, 
and this strong position was reinforced by the purchase in the same year of another (unsuccessful) British 
concern (The Shanghai Engineering, Shipbuilding and Dock Company -  see FART V below) by S.C. 
Famham. In a further move in 1900 S.C. Famham and Boyd and Company merged into S.C. Famham , 
Boyd and Company, Limited which “controls all the shipbuilding and docking business of the port”(15). 
Reorganised in 1906 as The Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company, Limited this was the principal UK 
marine engineering company although a major UK competitor arose with the foundation of the New
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Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Limited in 1900 which amalgamated its interests in 1912 with the 
1905 founded Vulcan Ironworks, Limited.
The Worldwide extreme depression in shipping in the early 1930s brought the two British companies 
together. The Chairman of The New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works lamented in 1935 the “continued 
cutthroat competition existing between us and the only other British dock company in Shanghai” (16). In 
June, 1936 the two companies amalgamated the majority o f their interests in the Shanghai Dockyards, 
Limited (17). By 1940 the process of amalgamation was complete. This enterprise plus Mollers’ 
Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Limited (specialising in smaller vessels) then constituted the British 
presence in shipbuilding and repairing in Shanghai, Although a significant force in shipbuilding and repair 
the UK presence in Shanghai did not approach the scale of the British yards in Hong Kong. Thus, for 
instance, in terms of ships built up to 1938 over a broadly similar period, the position was (18)
No. of vessels. Tons. Averaee oer vessel -tons.
Shanghai. 66 95.000 1.440
Shanghai Dock and Engineering and
predecessors. 38 73,000 1,920
New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works. 28 22,000 785
Hong Kong. 174 291.000 1.670
Taikoo Dock and Engineering Co., Ltd. 78 141,000 1,810
Hongkong and WampoaDock, Co. 96 150,000 1,560
As noted, British firms enjoyed a commanding position in the marine engineering industry in Shanghai at 
the turn of the Nineteenth Century. This position began to be eroded within five years. The major factor 
was competition from the Chinese State owned Kiangnan (Jiangnan) Dock and Engineering Works with a 
captive outlet in the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company. Originally these facilities worked 
exclusively for the Government but in 1905 the business was put on a commercial basis and competed with 
the other dockyards on the open market.
Originally the Chairman of S.C. Famham, Boyd and Company, Limited foolishly underestimated the 
threat. At the Company’s AGM held on the 23rd June, 1905 he stated (19)
“I do not think the Arsenal Dock will affect us. We have tried to stir up the officials about it. They have 
taken away some of our men by offering double the pay they were receiving from us *. They have not, 
however, made a very brilliant start. One ship they have docked has turned over.”
This was in response to a question from a shareholder (which also gives an insight into the attitude of 
British businessmen in China at that time) >
“We know that already the Arsenal has made arrangements to do outside work and while we don’t like it, 
we cannot help it, unless the directors are able through the British Minister, or other Minister, to prevent the 
Government competing with a mercantile business. Until we succeed in doing so, we have something 
staring us in the face that will in a few years’ time seriously compete with us and probably take something 
out of our dividends.” (20).
*The key worker who left the British company (Mr A.B. Mauchan) was the general manager of the 
Chinese company for twenty years (21), As late as 1920 the number of foreign engineers outnumbered the 
Chinese engineers by 14 to 9 ( 22)
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(a) Ship repairing
The Table below shows how the commanding position of British firms had slipped by the
1930s. There was severe competition from, in particular, the Jiangnan Dock and Engineering Works but
also from another Chinese firm and the Societe Franco-Chinoise de Constructions Metalliques et
Mecaniques (see FART IV  (B)). Apart from this competition from these big players (i.e. those with dry
docking facilities) there was also competition from other Chinese units -  about ten of significance in 1930,
The British share o f the area o f dry docks in Shanghai thus fell as follows
Percent.
1900 100
1910 82
1920 83
1930 63
1937 47
There was a further fall by 1940 due to rationalisation of facilities upon the unification of the two British 
companies involved which started in 1936.
DRY DOCKS IN SHANGHAI -  FEET.
1930 (231 1937(241
a b c a b c
BRITISH.
Shanghai Dock and Engineering. 1.282 197.5 1.282 185
Old Dock 399 53 16 399 53 16*
Tunkadoo Dock 355 67 16 355 67 16+
International Dock 528 77.5 23.5 528 65 23..S+
New Engineering and
Shipbuilding Works. 912 121 926 123
Yangtszepoo I 577 61 20 584 62 20+
Yangtszepoo II 335 60 14 342 61 16+
TOTAL BRITISH DOCKS. 2.194 318.5 — 2,208 308
OTHER.
Jiangnan Dock and Engineering 
Works. 1.047 130 1.687 203
I 545 70 20 545 62 20
n 502 60 23.5 502 61 23
m - - - 640 80 23.5
Kung Mow Engine and Shipbuilding
Works -  Pingan Docks. 250 30 15 268 38 13
Societe Franco-Chinoise de Constructions 
Metalliques et Mecaniques (Kiousin 
Dock). 250 35 12 242 35 12
Whangpoo Conservancy Board. 190 40 16 190 40 16
TOTAL OTHER. 1,737 235 - 2,387 316
TOTAL 3.931 553.5 4.595 624
(a) Length on blocks, (b) breadth at entrance, (c) Depth of high water at ordinary Spring tides. 
* Sold in 1938 to Messrs Mollers5 Ltd. “ another British company.
+ Transferred in 1936 to the joint venture company o f Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd.
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(b) Shipbuilding.
Shanghai was by far the largest centre for shipbuilding in Mainland China -  as regards both Chinese and 
foreign firms -  particularly the former. The shipbuilding industry in Shanghai reached its peak production 
during the First World War and the immediate post-War years. The pressure on Allied shipyards led, in the 
case o f the Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company, to an order of three identical ships (a larger order 
for these ships was given to a Hong Kong yard). In the eighteen months to September, 1919 launches from 
this company totalled 22,850 tons and vessels totalling 13,000 tons were under construction (25), In the 
twelve months ending September 30th, 1919 its smaller British counterpart -  the New Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Works -  launched 12 vessels aggregating 920 tons -  the largest being only 250 tons. 
Tonnage under construction amounted to 6,450 tons -  the largest being a ship o f 2,050 tons (26). In 1921, 
a relatively good year, the two British shipyards completed the following (27)
No. of vessels Tons Average per vessel -  tons
Shanghai Dock and Engineering Co. 6  11,243 1,875
New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works 15 5,203 345
As can be seen, the average size of vessel was by European and North American standards small. The 
largest vessel ever launched by the Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company was 6,000 tons and by the 
New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works was 3,400 tons. The successor company to these two -  Shanghai 
Dockyards -  also did not exceed the 6,000 ton level.
In terms o f the number o f ships launched and the size o f vessels die Jiangnan Dock and Engineering 
Works was the clear leader. By 1928 this concern had built over 600 ships. In 1919 their yards were 
engaged in constructing four 10,700 tons steamers for the United States Robert Dollar Company Line (28). 
These 430 feet long ships were completed in 1921 mid were the largest built in China before the Second 
World War.
In 1930 shipbuilding at the major Shanghai yards was as follows (29) :-
Number o f vessels. Tons launched.
Jiangnan Dock and Engineering Works. 32 4,737
Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company. II 4,917
New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works. 9 225
Kiousin Dock 6 2,960
Japanese yards developed the capacity to produce considerably larger ships than those made in China. A 
factor in this was the naval connection. Initially the Japanese navy relied principally on British yards for 
large warships. However, 4 armoured cruisers were launched in 1905-11. By 1907 the first battleship was 
launched followed by 5 other pre-Dreadnoughts by 1911 and 2 Dreadnoughts by 1912 (30). Thus, by the 
time o f the First World War local yards had developed foe techniques and facilities for producing large 
ships for naval or commercial use (31).
Other competition to British firms in local shipbuilding came from the Societe Franco-Chinoise de 
Constructions Metalliques et Mecaniques and some Chinese companies o f which the most important were 
the Kung Mow Engine and Shipbuilding Works and the Nicholas Tsu Engineering Works.
ASSESSMENT.
The extent o f UK investment in non-marine engineering was so modest that it did not exercise an 
appreciable influence -  beneficial or otherwise -  on indigenous economic development. In terms of
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of import replacement for items such as steel windows, water fittings, etc for the modem building boom in 
Shanghai and the introduction of new technology the effect was positive.
In the key sector of marine engineering it is clear that British investment did not lead to geographic 
distortion of the economy in Shanghai and the Shanghai region generally. Given the underdeveloped 
transport system and the key role of water transport, ports such as Shanghai with large water access to the 
interior grew explosively. Marine engineering facilities merely followed this growth. Given the World lead 
enjoyed by Britain in shipping and shipbuilding in the Nineteenth Century it was very likely that British 
firms would take a prime role in marine engineering in the leading port of Shanghai.
In the last five years of the Nineteenth Century the two main British firms involved made good but not 
spectacular profits. The rates of retentions were reasonable over this period -  30% of net income in the case 
of Boyd and Co. and 39% in the case of S.C. Famham and Co. (See STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLES 
VV and WW).
The merger of the three British firms at the turn of the Century and their monopoly of large scale ship 
repairing facilities (i.e. the possession of dry docks) in Shanghai did not lead, as might be expected, to 
significant exploitation of this position
- unlike customers of a public utility monopoly in a locality, customers could in many cases easily switch to 
yards in other Chinese ports (Xiamen, Tianjin, Daku, Fuzhou and Dalian -  this last Japanese owned), Hong 
Kong and Japan except, of course, in the case of salvage operations. Here, for example, the Shanghai Dock 
and Engineering Company worked in conjunction with another British concern -  The Shanghai Tug and 
Lighter Company, Limited (32).
- competition from 1905 onwards from new, non-British entrants. The first new Chinese entrant was the 
Jiangnan Dock and Engineering Works. Discounted at first by the original UK monopoly, this was to prove 
a strong competitor. With other new entrants the UK share of commercial dry docking capacity fell from 
100% in 1900 to 47% in 1937.
- the entry of the New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works in the first years of the new Century and its 
1909 opening of a dry dock plus acquisition of the Vulcan Ironworks led to a long period of fierce 
competition with the incumbent British firm of S.C.Famham, Boyd / Shanghai Dock and Engineering. 
Even without the entry of non-British firms this competition acted as a restraint on the previous monopoly 
position.
The profits of the 1900 merged British company were fairly modest even up to 1905 and in the years 
leading up to the First World War were fairly poor. (For data relating to this paragraph see TABLES YY, 
ZZ, AAA, BBB and CCC in the STATISTICAL ANNEX). The Company shared to a modest extent in the 
prosperity of all Allied shipyards in the War and in the immediate post-War period. Over the whole of the 
period its profits were poor compared with those of its British competitor -  the New Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Works whose dividend in one year (1920) was 100%, After this immediate post-War period 
the positions of the UK companies were reversed with the Shanghai Dock and Engineering Co. performing 
better -  sustaining dividends even in the depression years of the 1930s. This company drew in its horns and 
operated the business almost as a “cash cow”. Retentions over its existence were only 15.5% of earnings. In 
contrast, its British rival retained over twice (33%) this proportion. These two British companies began to
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merge as a defensive move in 1936. After a modest start the new company made substantial profits in 1939 
and 1940 (see PART IV  (C) below) due primarily to the lessened competition from local firms.
The impact of this UK investment on the Chinese economy was probably, on balance, positive. It brought 
technical and management skills which were sown widely -  many expatriates left the original 1900 
company to join (for much higher salaries) the Jiangnan company. This investment stimulated some local 
metal and timber working enterprises. It also brought in the form of China Ship-Breakers, Limited a new 
segment of the industry to Shanghai in the 1930s. The relatively easy transference of business meant that 
any exploitation of high local market share was tempered. Dividends may have seemed excessive during 
and immediately after the First World War but this was a Worldwide phenomenon in this industry. As time 
went on an increasing proportion of dividends paid by local British firms in this sector went to local 
Chinese investors -  certainly by the time of the Second World War over half. The effect of local facilities 
for shipbuilding and repair on the balance of payments was positive even allowing for the fact that a high 
proportion of the machinery and components involved was imported.
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PART III -  CHAPTER FIVE -  CHEMICALS.
(A) INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS.
(a) Bulk Chemicals for Industry and Agriculture.
British participation in this area was minor being virtually confined to a producer of industrial acids - 
Major Brothers, Limited. This situation could, however, have been considerably different if projects in two 
sectors -  synthetic soda ash (sodium carbonate) and ammonium sulphate -  by Imperial Chemical Industries 
(and one of its founder companies -  Brunner Mond and Company) -  had come to fruition (1). ICI / Brunner 
Mond were leading suppliers to China of soda ash (where competition from a local Chinese producer -  
Yung Lee Soda Company - commenced in 1924) and ammonium sulphate for fertiliser use.
Soda ash.
Discussion of local manufacture dated back to 1899 (2) and was revived after the First World War. 
In 1928 ICI rejected a proposal by the South Manchuria Railway Company to cooperate in a soda ash 
venture near Dalian (3). In 1929 the ICI Main Board approved an investigation into the prospects for local 
manufacture but nothing materialised (4).
Ammonium sulphate.
ICI were leaders together with I.G.Farbenindustrie in supplying this fertiliser to China. There was 
some resistance to the use of ammonium sulphate as a fertiliser in the context of Chinese agricultural 
conditions and in 1926 ICI set up a small plant in Shanghai making mixed fertilisers (i.e. combining 
nitrogen from ammonium sulphate, phosphate and potash). However, this plant was subsequently 
abandoned as unprofitable (5).
In 1931 the Chinese Ministry of Industries as part of a programme of import replacement initiated 
investigations into the establishment of a joint venture ammonium sulphate plant with foreign participation. 
ICI and I.G. Farbenindustrie agreed that they would jointly investigate the project and a joint mission 
visited China in early 1932 (6). A preliminary report was submitted to the Chinese Government in mid 
1932 followed by a detailed report in January, 1933 based on an investment of $15 million (7). An 
alternative proposal (8) for a smaller plant costing $11 million >
$3 million by the Ministry of Industries.
$3 million by Chinese investors.
$5 million by ICI /  I.G.Farbenindustrie. 
was also made. However negotiations broke down. Further ICI projects in 1936/7 for ammonium sulphate 
plants in Guangdong and Hunan also floundered (9).
(a) Industrial acids. (See also TABLE DDD in the STATISTICAL ANNEX).
As described in PART /, Major Brothers. Limited, a long established Shanghai enterprise, had from its 
original business in refining precious metal items and producing industrial acids (nitric and sulphuric) 
moved into widely diverse activities. By 1907, however, it had virtually given up these last and 
concentrated on its core activities.
After a loss in 1905, The Company accepted the fact in 1906 (10) that, despite spending 26 thous. taels (4 
thous.) on renovating the acid plant (1879) in 1900 and 1901 (11), it was antiquated and that they needed a
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newer plant.
In early 1907 the Company completed the purchase of 5 acres of land in Shanghai for a new plant (12). 
This plant finally cost 250 thous. taels (£35 thous.) when completed in 1908 and was based on modem - 
machinery imported under conditions of secrecy in operation from a company in Berlin (13). This new 
works employed 250 men.
Despite the new plant, losses were made in every year from 1909 to 1913. Factors in this were :- 
keen competition from imports of Japanese sulphuric acid.
a high interest burden due to high bank overdrafts, mainly connected with financing the 
new plant.
a factor affecting the Company’s performance and competitiveness in this and other periods was 
the Government’s archaic attitude to the import and transport of sulphur. This was regarded by the 
Government as an ingredient in explosives. The Company was thus faced with absurd and 
bureaucratic restrictions in accessing an essential raw material.
Although things improved by 1914 and succeeding years, the Company only shared very modestly in the 
post-War boom. In 1919 the Company stated that “your directors realise that the demand for acids in China 
is not sufficiently great to occupy the works fully” (14). The 1920s (apart from 1929 when a dividend of 20 
percent was paid ) were for the most part disappointing. By the early 1930s the acid plant was constantly 
breaking down and “no longer economic owing to amount we had to spend on repairs” (15). Thus, in the 
period from 1930 to 1934 a program of replacement took place and the old machinery was completely 
scrapped. Also by 1934 the refining operations had practically ceased owing to the establishment of the 
Central Mint and Government legislation (17)..
Thus, by the late 1930s the Company was a small, albeit better equipped, operation with only 23 
employees. Capacity for acids was 4 thous. tons per annum but production was usually well below 
capacity. Thus in 1936 output was as follows (18) :-
- Tons -
Sulphuric acid 2,721
Hydrochloric acid 151
Nitric acid 181
3,053
On a national scale the Company’s share of output of sulphuric acid was only around 2-3 percent and, 
even in the context o f Shanghai, the firm was only one o f ten local producers o f sulphuric acid.
(b) Adhesives.
The Yue Kang Glue Factory Company was established in Shanghai in January, 1901 but 
was liquidated as early as June, 1902. The reasons for its failure was essentially due to its uncritical 
assumption that British conditions could be transferred directly to China - this is analysed in PART V.
(c) Coatings, etc.
With the exception o f a very short lived venture in 1911 -  Demovel, Limited producing paint remover 
-  British involvement was confined to the Orient Paint. Colour and Varnish Company. Limited. Apart 
from a modest Chinese shareholding, this company was a joint venture of two British companies -  
John Swire & Sons, Limited and the paint company of Pinchin, Johnson and Company, Limited. With
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a minor exception, all the references below concerning the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, 
Limited are taken from the papers of John Swire & Sons, Limited held at SOAS (19). As with the case of 
Electric and Musical Industries (see Chapter Six below) these archives give the opportunity of examining 
the motives, behaviour, etc. of new British entrants to operations in China in the 1930s.
John Swire & Sons felt in the early 1930s that there were good prospects for a paint venture in 
Shanghai. This was partly actuated by a desire to provide paint to their shipping interests (China Navigation 
Company) and dockyard facilities (Taikoo Dockyard and Engineering Company in Hong Kong where there 
were already paint mixing operations). However, the Company also saw great possibilities in the open 
market for paint, particularly in Shanghai. On instruction from the Head Office in London, the Shanghai 
office prepared a concrete scheme. In a letter to London of December 23rd, 1932 (20) it proposed the 
erection of a plant in Shanghai with a capacity of 1,000 tons per annum. Only 22.5 percent of the turnover 
was to be to Swire’s captive outlets (21).
The project progressed but there was a glaring defect -  the scant knowledge within the Swire Group of 
paint, particularly modern paint, production. A joint venture with a paint specialist was an obvious move 
although there was a clear risk o f management problems in whether jobs could be filled "by a paint expert 
with no knowledge of China or a China expert with no knowledge of paint.” (22).
Pinchin Johnson’s paints were distributed in China by their subsidiary company of Wilkinson, Heywood 
and Clark whose manager had been pressing for some time for the establishment of a paint factory in 
China. Rumours in Shanghai and other factors led Pinchin Johnson to approach Swires and in the latter’s 
words proposed a 50/50 venture “combining with ourselves with the object of preventing two important 
British interests entering upon the business in competition with each other.” (23),
In July, 1934 the two companies signed a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” (24). They pledged themselves to 
take equal shares in the new paint company. The initial capital would be $1,500 thous. Of this, $900 thous. 
(£60 thous.) would be initially taken up by the two companies. It was agreed that “if one or two suitable 
Chinese can be found, they will be allotted up to $80,000 between them to be taken equally from the shares 
allotted ... to the British shareholders ... It is the intention that the remaining $600,000 unissued capital be 
taken up, if and as required, largely by Chinese, ... but in so far as it is not taken up by Chinese, the British 
shareholders agree that they will do so in equal shares.” The British shareholders agreed to advance up to 
£10 thous. each, as required, to the new company on loan as working capital. The initial Board would 
comprise two directors in Shanghai and one in London from each company and “if suitable Chinese 
shareholders are forthcoming, one Chinese director”. The two companies “will advise the directors 
nominated by them respectively that they should not court the favour of the “Irish Party” in the person of 
the Chinese directors. The impression of a secret cabal working behind the Chinese directors’ back must, 
however, at all costs be avoided.” i
The new company was registered on the lines indicated above on August 21st, 1934 (25). Even before the 
new company was formally registered the well connected T.V.Soong (Song Ziwen), having seen the 
articles of association, wrote a letter to Mr Brown of Butterfield & Swire, Shanghai on 8,h, August, 1934 
saying that he was interested in the company “from the beginning in a substantial manner” (25). (Earlier in 
a letter dated 31.7.34 the London Office had stated that “We hope that T.V.Soong will accept a seat on the 
Board, and that his influence and advice will be helpful to the Company” (26)). Soong was the brother-in-
-125-
law of Chlang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and a member of the ‘Tour Great Families” . A former Minister of 
Finance, he became leader of the Bank of China and created the China Development Corporation. The two 
partners in the new company thus indicated that they were prepared, as previously agreed between them, to 
accept Chinese investment participation up to $80 thous. maximum.
Initially 30 $1,000 shares were issued to the Chinese and a Mr Tse Tsok Kai -  “one of T.V.Soong’s 
henchmen” (27) was appointed to the Board of the new company in December, 1934. He died in January, 
1937 (28) and was replaced by other Chinese directors in the course o f time. However, these were all 
creatures of T.V.Soong and in a list of shareholders in March, 1946 Soong was shown as the only Chinese 
shareholder (29).
A further 30 shares were issued to Chinese interests in June, 1935 and the development from then, when a 
further 110 shares were issued to the British partners, was as follows >
- No of issued $1,000 shares - 
June. 1935 mid-193 8
No. % No. %
John Swire & Sons 560 47.5 860 47.75
Pinchin, Johnson 560 47.5 860 47.75
Chinese 60 5.0 80 4.50
Total 1,180 100.0 1,800 100.0
The increase in 1938 which brought the authorised capital to $2,600,000 and the issued capital to 
$1,800,000 (which was not further increased) was connected with the acquisition of Wilkinson, Heywood 
and Clark (see below) and the need to establish the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company “on a sound 
financial basis” -  by November, 1937 its overdrafts had reached $277 thous. Proceeds of the share issue 
were used to eliminate overdrafts and leave a margin in working capital -  by May, 1938 there was a cash 
balance of around $50 thous. Also, the two British shareholders cancelled the loan given to the Company, 
of which £19,200 had been taken up (30).
The paint factory was not finally completed until September, 1935 but limited production began in mid 
July (31). Half yearly output rose as follows (32)
- Gallons -
Six months ending 31.3.1936 2,462
Six months ending 30.9.1936 6,672
Six months ending 31.3.1937 7,666
Six months ending 30.9.1937 9,141
By July, 1936 production for sale at 109 tons exceeded 100 tons for the first time (33),
As evident above from the financing of the new enterprise, it had “a troubled childhood”. Part of this was 
due to production difficulties and marketing problems but an important factor was the confused and 
duplicated selling units in China of the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company and Pinchin Johnson. 
The main trouble was the relationship between the former and the local Pinchin Johnson subsidiary of 
Wilkinson, Heywood and Clark. “That the two organisations must clash was inevitable as the O.P. 
Company set out to manufacture and sell the equivalent of imported articles which W.H.and C. had 
marketed for many years,” (34). This “need to eliminate competition and expenses of two selling 
organisations” was not resolved until April, 1938 when it was agreed that Wilkinson, Heywood and Clark 
was to be sold to the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company (35).
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The aim of the Company was to replace imported high and medium grade paints and they “expected to 
undersell imported paints o f equal quality with a fair to large margin of profit” (36). This aim was to a 
large extent increasingly realised by product diversification. Thus, the Company developed special lines of 
paint and by early 1938 the number of lines regularly manufactured was 110 (eventually it was 128) (37) :-
- Percent of sales -
Number Bv weight Bv value
Category A - Original standard lines 24 45 37
Category B - Special lines 86 55 63
However the Company’s performance was weakened by other factors >
(i) In tenns of domestic sales the Company admitted that it was handicapped by being a foreign concern 
when quoting for Government, Railway business, etc (38). This was, of course, counterbalanced to an 
extent by a generally favourable reception to the Company by British, etc concerns in China. (39)
(ii) Although the Company was happy to receive Chinese participation at the Board level -  particularly 
as, it was noted in June, 1941, that "the Chinese director has been quite inactive since 1937” ! (40) - its 
acceptance of Chinese management was gingerly. There was a split of opinion between the local 
management (or rather the Local Works Manager -  a Mr S.C.Radford) and Swire’s Head Office. In a letter 
to headquarters on September 19th, 1938 (41) he expressed the following opinion >
“Many of our coolies are now skilled labour, and will compare with any other nationality, providing 
they are under direct foreign control. The Staff are making good progress but easily collapse when the 
foreign staff is withdrawn ... From careful study of our Staff, we are forced to the conclusion that close 
foreign supervision is the only safe policy if the goods produced are not to be commercially rejected in 
quality.”
However, this opinion was (rightly) rejected by Head Office who claimed, in response to his request for 
additional staff, that this should “be carried out by a good Chinese”. This was particularly so after the 1937 
hostilities as with some Chinese competitors destroyed :-
“ ...really first-class Chinese technical experts may now be available to take the place of expensive 
foreigners and that we might be able to reduce the factory to say one good foreigner and an assistant with 
Chinese under them”. (42)
Nevertheless the predominance of expatriates in senior positions persisted and, as hinted in the above 
statement (also see below), this was a competitive disadvantage given their high costs. The local staff 
estimated the distribution of 1938 factory expenses in January, 1938 (43) as follows
Percent
Foreign salaries including home leave expenses 28.6
Sundry foreign staff expenses 1 7
30.3
Chinese employees 15.9
- Watchmen 0.8
- “Keymen” 4.5
- Office 2.0
- “Coolie labour” 8.-6
Expert adviser’s fees 15.5
Depreciation 14.6
Rates, insurance, etc. 6.7
Other works expenses 17.0
Total 100.0
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Particularly noticeable in the above is the cost of expatriate employees and also the income accruing to 
Pinchin Johnson for their technical assistance, (for this Pinchin Johnson received $30,000 per annum plus 5 
percent commission on net profits (44)).
(iii) Apart from high and medium grade paints the Company aimed to compete with Chinese plants at 
lower grades in the local market. There would be small margins in this last business but it would serve to 
spread factory overheads. It was in the category of paste paints that the main interface took place between 
the Company and local producers.
By October, 1936 when the “works were operating at such full pressure” (45) the maximum output of the 
plant was approximately as follows :-
- Tons per month -
Paste paints 51 (25%)
Dry colours 5 (2%)
Ready mixed paint 102 (51%)
Varnish 15 (7%)
Boiled oils 31 (15%)
Total 204 (100%)
By 1939 the proportion of paste paints in total sales was still significant despite the Company having 
developed a re-sale business which helped to reduce the impact of overhead charges
Sales -  January to July. 1939 (46).
Percent bv Percent bv Average price
weight value per ton -$
Paste paints 26.2 16.2 587
Ready mixed paints 20.2 28.5 1,361
Enamels 0.4 1.4 3,158
Dry colours 9.9 6.8 665
Varnishes 2.6 5.1 1,863
Oils and sundries 17.0 16.5 964
Re-sale items 23.7 25.5 1,041
Total 100.0 100.0 970
(Re-sale items included linseed cake, coal tar, lead piping, powdered calcium carbonate, etc.)
It was in the category o f paste paints that the Company found difficulty in competing with Chinese 
competitors. The first modem paint plant in China started up in 1915 in Shanghai and although there were 
other centres e.g. Tianjin, Shanghai remained the main centre. Leading firms were (47) :-
Capital Operatives
Thous. $
Kailum Paint and Varnish Manufacturing Co., Ltd (1915) 250 260
Chen Hua Paint Manufacturing Co. (1918) 200 125
Yung Koo Paint and Varnish Manufacturing Co. (1926) 120 85
Durvar Varnish Works (1929) 40 20
Dah Kwan Loh Paint Co. n.a. 15
Wan Li 20 15
Valet Varnish Works, Ltd. n.a. 20
There were at least 4 others. As usual the capitalisation of the Chinese companies was much less size for 
size when compared with Western companies.
The Company's sales of their low priced paints were in three categories 
“C5” “Monkey” (stone powder) -  white paste paint.
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“C13” “Monkey” (barytes) -  coloured paste paint.
“C l27” -  blended thinners.
The Company's policy on competing with Chinese rivals in the bulk market for paints and the difficulties 
they experienced are clearly shown by the internal correspondence given below
“Monkey brand being your lowest grade paint must be reserved for paints made from the cheapest 
materials, and eventually used to compete with the cheapest possible trash which the Chinese produce.” 
“You must have bulk, you cannot have bulk until you can make trash.”(4&). The Company’s efforts to 
penetrate the cheaper paint market with these products were inhibited at first by production problems -  trial 
batches produced “almost unmarketable paints”. (49). However, the main problem was the Company’s 
repeated failure to  produce these paints at reasonable cost >
“There is little doubt that the making of Paste Paints to compete with the Chinese article has not been a 
success and this can in part be ascribed to our heavier overheads for our foreign staff plus technical 
adviser’s fees and management fees.” (50).
“The local Chinese Paint companies fought amongst themselves for the cheap paint trade (at prices below 
the cost o f our raws and containers).. .(51).
The hostilities in Shanghai in late 1937, o f  course, lessened the competition from Chinese paint plants. (The 
effect on the Company o f these hostilities is given in some detail in Annex A to Part IV(C) below).This 
obviously created an opportunity for the Company, Detailed reports were made by them on the first five 
Chinese companies (52) :-
- Kailum -“Badly damaged by shells and fire.” (53)
- Chen Hu a - “Bombed and gutted by fire. (53)
- Yung Koo - “Main factory severely damaged. Other factory carrying on,” (53)
- Durvar -  “Undamaged but closed down”. (53)
- Dah Kwan Loh
- Valet Varnish Works, Ltd -  “Buildings undamaged, machinery dismantled and removed to 
Settlement.” (53)
Doubtless this was due to  the prospect o f  out-sourcing cheap paints >
“It is a fact that our Chinese competitors have suffered a great deal from the war and.. .we are rather taken
with the idea of coming to some arrangement with a Chinese factory which might assist us in solving our
cheap paste problems.” (54). However, these studies could also have been done to investigate acquisition
prospects (immediately after the Pacific War the Company expressed interest in acquiring Kailum and also
the Manchukuo Paint Co. in Dalian (55)).
Despite the reduced competition these cheap paints were still the weak area of the Company’s business :-
Sales margin - $ per ton
C5. C13. C127 Other Products
July, 1939 92 1,508(56)
August, 1939 94 1,533 (57)
September, 1939 172 1,220 (57)
October, 1939 205 860(57)
The Company relied to a certain, and increasing extent, on locally sourced materials. It started off by 
importing its raw materials from Europe but this very quickly tapered o f f :-
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Percent of raw material purchases (58)
“U.K. and Continent.” “Eastern.”
1935 88 12
1936 23 77
1937 16 84
1938 28 72
1939 10 90
In the financial year ending 30th September, 1937 purchases of raw materials totalled $578 thous. Of this, 
purchases of Chinese products totalled $191 thous. (33%) and of imported products $387 thous. - $90 
thous. from the UK, $165 thous. from Japan and Manchukuo and $132 thous. from other countries. (59). 
The proportion imported from Europe dropped off sharply as war approached. Doubtless local purchases 
increased but also imports of items such as perilla oil, barytes, red lead, whiting, etc. from Japan rose 
sharply.
This shift in the geographic profile of the source of raw materials also occurred in the case of the 
Company’s sales. The distribution o f sales by territory changed as follows
SALES BY VALUE -  PERCENT.
Financial vear Financial vear November June
to 30..9.38 fal to 30.9.39 fbl 1940 fcl 1941 fd>
Shanghai 74.5 67.9 51.2 53.4
Rest of Mainland China 8.5 6,3 10.1 1..9
Hong Kong 17,0 25,7 14,6 13,9
“Southern Markets” 0.1 24.1 30.8
-Singapore 0.1 17.2 14.2
- Penang - - 4.8
- Kuala Lumpor - 2,7 0.8
- Rangoon - 4.2 -
- Bangkok - - 11.0
(a) Letter from Shanghai to Swire Head Office November 10th, 1939. Box 2053.
(b) Letter from Shanghai to Swire Head Office February 23rd, 1940. Box 2053.
(c) Sales Report for November, 1940. Box 2058.
(d) Letter to Head Office on July 18th, 1940 from Shanghai. Box 2058.
(e) See also TABLE EEE in the STATISTICAL ANNEX.
For the financial year ending September 30th, 1941 the split of “sales ex production” was (60)
Tons Percent
Total 1.904.1 100.0
Shanghai 1,148.3 60.3
Rest of Mainland China 109.7 5.8
Hong Kong 341.3 17.9
“Southern Markets” 304,8 16,0
Shanghai was clearly by far the most important sales outlet for the firm throughout its existence. Again, 
Hong Kong was a constant large market (with large captive sales). However, an important change took 
place after 1937 in the distribution of sales to other markets. Sales to Free China were over time very small 
as routes were increasingly blocked while sales in the occupied territories had problems with currency 
exchange (61). The firm alleviated these problems by building up sales in “Southern Markets”. In February, 
1939 the Company began looking at outlets in Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya and the Philippines and
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market surveys were undertaken (62). In October, 1939 small sales of $2 thous. were made (to Singapore 
and Malaya) (63) and by the end of 1939 “these trades” were “building up nicely and as demand in China 
continues to fall off it is essential that we keep in.” (64). By November, 1940 sales had reached $73 thous. 
($52 thous. to Singapore, $13 thous. to Burma and $8 thous. to Malaya) (65). By June, 1941 sales to 
“Southern Markets” at 92 tons were a record (66) and at $198 thous. accounted for nearly 31 percent of 
total sales in value terms. (67). The need to develop these export markets was one reason why the firm 
persisted with its “Monkey” paints (the other was to spread factory overheads) despite suggestions from 
Head Office in London that they could be dropped. Shanghai argued that these low margin products were 
the key to export markets which would then “become interested in our high grades”. (68)
Apart from the usual teething troubles of a new enterprise and no supply of experienced labour (this 
problem was, as noted above, overcome by late 1938) the Company was, as outlined above, suffering from 
a highly competitive market and had a cost disadvantage against local competition. Losses were made in 
the first three financial years ending September, 1935, 1936 and 1937 respectively. Cumulative losses in 
this period totalled $267 thous. (£16 thous.) (69) :-
- Financial Years ending 30th, September -  Profit /  loss -.
$ thous. £ thous.*
1935 -57.9 -3.5
1936 -157.6 -9.6
1937 -51.9 -3.2
1938 -24.9 -1.3
- First half -368.7 -19.2
-Second half 343.8 17.9
1939 539.1 15,5
1940 1,279,2 21,7
1941 1,976.0 27.8
* Converted at exchange rates for the period concerned.
(See also TABLE FFF in the STATISTICAL ANNEX).
Matters gradually improved and by July, 1937 the operation was showing a profit. (70). Unfortunately, 
the outbreak of hostilities in the next month affected production, sales and profits. After the period of 
closure of the factory (it reopened for active working in February, 1938 (71)), recovery was helped by the 
retention of workers at half pay during the crisis. (72). By April, 1938 the Company was breaking even 
and by the following month making a profit (73). The second half of the financial year thus saw a profit, 
which, as shown above, nearly overtook the losses of the first half.
The next three years saw an upsurge in the Company’s sales even when, more meaningfully, 
converted into Sterling terms at the exchange rate for the period concerned :- 
Total Sales (t.e. including re-sale items! f74>.
$ thous. £ thous.
1937 662.0 41.2
1938 1,214.7 52.7
1939 2,773.7 69.5
1940 4,638.0 73.7
May to October, 1940 2,377.1 36.2
May to October, 1941 4,787.4 63.1
Financial vears
1,10.37-30.9.38 884.6 44.3
1.10.38-30.9.39 2,166.7 62.6
1.10.39-30.9,40 4,536,7 77.1
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The financial year to end September, 1939 saw a dividend (5%) paid for the first time. (75). Sales in 
1938/9 were 145 percent up on 1937/8 in dollar terms but, more meaningfully, 41 percent up in terms of 
Sterling. In the following financial year sales rose in Sterling terms by 23 percent. Increased export sales 
counterbalanced the continued closure of a large section of the China market. Profits rose in Sterling terms 
by 40 percent despite a problem with labour that was not of the Company’s creation >
“Much against their will our men have been forced to join an organisation controlled by the “Puppets” 
and known as the China Labourers Association”. (76).
A dividend of 10 percent was declared. (77). Sales in 1940/1, even in Sterling terms, were at a high level 
with a particularly high level reached in July, 1941 and the works ran at full capacity. However, margins 
were increasingly affected by rising material costs. Profits rose in Sterling terms by 28 percent.
Only a relatively small part of the profits reaped in the above three financial years were paid out in 
dividends
Financial years to end September 
1938/39 1939/40 1940/41
- $ thous. -
Profits 537.1 1,279.2 1,976.0
+ Amount brought forward 76.4 523.5 622.7
-Dividends 90.0 180.0
- Transfers to reserves - 1,000.0
Amount carried forward 523.5 622.7 2,598.7
The outbreak of War came before a decision was made about the relative proportions of distribution or 
retention of 1940/41 earnings. Dividends had been paid to the two British partners in Sterling but they will 
have failed to receive any such payment for 1940/41. However, although the Company was “trying not to 
accumulate local dollars” but was faced with the fact that in “Shanghai customers who can pay in foreign 
currencies are few”, what earnings there were in foreign currencies e.g. from exports had been sent to a 
London bank. (78).
ASSESSMENT.
Major Brothers had in the Nineteenth Century a period of creative introduction of technology into China 
including commercial production of acids (previously only produced by Government arsenals). However 
these ventures tended to fade out and their impact was slight on the Chinese economy. Even in acids its 
early predominance was lost and it then had a very modest presence in the Chinese market. British presence 
in bulk chemicals would, of course, been radically different if ICI’s prospective ventures had come to 
fruition.
The situation was completely different in the case of paints. Here, in contrast to the situation in, for 
example, industrial acids, the two British companies entered a market where already -  in Shanghai in 
particular -  there was a well established industry. The experience of their venture is noteworthy in certain 
respects (and the availability of the Swire archives is invaluable in pinpointing these) >
the competitive disadvantage that British firms had to face with the high cost of expatriate 
staff. The cost structure of the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company brings this out very clearly.
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- partly because of this, this company found it very hard to compete in bulk paints with local firms. 
In no sense could it be described as having a weakening effect on the local industry. It was not until 
hostilities that weakened local competition that the Company could seriously compete in bulk paint 
markets.
- with the much worse effect o f the War on indigenous suppliers, less affected British firms enjoyed 
an Indian summer in this and other sectors.
- in speciality paints the Company had a beneficial effect, on balance, on the Chinese economy. 
Their output in this sector mainly replaced previously imported paints. Also, the Company, by necessity, 
built up a substantial export trade. Against this is the fact that the Company had to remit to one of its UK 
owners substantial fees for technical assistance and that all the machinery and, in the early days, the 
majority o f its raw materials had to be imported.
- the Company, reflecting the improved relations between the UK and China in the mid 1930s, had 
presence on its Board of the then political elite.
(B) CONSUMER CHEMICALS.
British interests here were confined to soap and allied products and candles. There was considerable 
overlap between British manufacturers in these two sectors and also much interplay between the various 
British contenders in these markets.
At first Chinese demand for these products was met by imports. The first significant foreign soap 
factories in China were Japanese followed by French and Russian firms. British presence was initially 
small -  a venture by Major Brothers, Limited (see PART I  above) and the Pao Tai Soap Factory 
(Burtenshaw and Co.) in Hankou. The first Chinese Factory -  The Tientsin Soap Manufacturing Company 
-  started in 1905 and, given the ease of entry, was followed by many other Chinese enterprises. It was not 
until the 1920s that significant UK presence in soap manufacturing occurred.
Candles were a large import item for China with the British concern of Price’s Patent Candle Company, 
Limited (who also had small interests in soap making) having originally virtual control of this trade. The 
Company lost ground to European competitors and in 1910 purchased land in Shanghai to erect a large 
candle factory and defeat this European competition by exploiting, at what seemed to be, cheap labour 
costs (79). Also, for some time the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Shell) had been selling candles to the 
Chinese market (candle making was an obvious downstream integration from production of paraffin wax).
British producers o f soap built up a substantial export business to China in the early years of the last 
Century. By 1910 imports from the UK totalled 8,913 tons and by 1912 were well over 10,000 tons. (80). 
Thirty percent of this business was in the hands of Lever Brothers (later on New Years Day 1930 to be one 
of the partners in the Anglo-Dutch combine of Unilever). The balance was in the hands of Gossage and 
Sons and Joseph Crosfield and Sons. These two companies were acquired in 1911 by Brunner Mond and 
Company (later in 1926 one of the four companies to comprise Imperial Chemical Industries) during a 
period of confrontation with Lever Brothers. (81).
Despite the state of relations between the two companies and the entry of Price’s into soap production in 
Shanghai, discussions took place between Lever Brothers and Brunner Mond in 1913 with regard to a 
50/50 venture (to be called the China Manufacturing Company) to make soap in China (82). Land for the
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construction of a soap factory was bought on the Yangtszepoo Road in Shanghai for £80 thous. Nothing, 
however, materialised. The bad blood between the two companies increased, there were legal delays and 
the World War broke out. Subsequently Lever Brothers transferred their half share of the land to their 
trading company o f Lever Brothers (China), Limited while Brunner Mond transferred their share to the 
China Soap and Candle Company, Limited. (83). This company was registered in the UK in January, 1917 
(84) to carry on the combined interests in China of Crosfields and Gossages and Price’s. Price’s owned 30 
percent of this private company and the two soap companies the balance. The issued capital shortly reached 
£510 thous.
The situation changed completely in October, 1919 (85) when :-
- Lever Brothers acquired the two soap companies from Brunner Mond.
- Lever Brothers acquired Price’s Patent Candle Company, Limited.
Thus Lever Brothers acquired complete control of the China Soap and Candle Company, Limited. Prices’s 
modest soap making facilities in China were lent to the China Soap and Candle Company, Limited for two 
years until a new factory was erected.
In 1922 Lever Brothers agreed with the Shell Group to form a joint company (Candles, Limited) to 
which all their illuminants business including Price’s was to be sold. In 1923 Shell Company of China, 
Limited became general managing agents for all Price’s (China), Limited’s activities including the supply 
of raw materials and sales of candles. This enterprise had over 250 employees. In 1936 Unilever sold its 
holding in Candles, Limited to its partner in the venture.
In 1923 the China Soap Company was incorporated in China by Lever Brothers and acquired :-
- the trading company of Lever Brothers (China), Limited.
- the China Soap and Candle Company, Limited which was wound up in November, 1925.
The China Soap Company, Limited had an authorised and issued capital of $8,000 (£900 thous.). Its 
factory in Shanghai (Yangtszepoo Road) came on stream in early 1925. Throughout its life it employed 
around 400 workers. Apart from a variety of soap products the factory produced boracic and cold cream 
and glycerine for industrial and pharmaceutical purposes. Sales of soap in China by the company developed 
as follows (86) >
- Tons - 
1929 17,000
1931 15,000
1934 15,000
1937 19,000
1939 24,000
Apart from 1935 this company was profitable -  in some years highly so (see PART V),
Although the largest soap producer in China -  the next largest was the International Soap Company with, 
in 1940, 320 workers against 410 at the China Soap Company and the rest nowhere (87) -  the entry of 
Lever Brothers did not hinder the development of the Chinese owned soap industry. In the 1930s the share 
of the China Soap Company of the Chinese soap market was around a fifth. (88). The amount of capital 
needed to enter the industry was small and the same situation applied to candle making. By 1926 there were 
about 100 Chinese owned soap and candle factories listed in The China Year Book. By 1932 there were 
about 210 soap factories in China with the main centres being Shanghai (over 50) and Tianjin (40). (89). 
Even after Wartime disruptions, there were in 1939 no less than 32 candle factories in Shanghai alone (90).
-134-
PART I I I -  CHAPTER SIX -  SOUND REPRODUCTION.
Apart from an article - “Shanghai Industrial Enterprises -  XXII -  Electric and Musical Industries 
(China), Ltd.”, in: Finance and Commerce, August 8th, 1934, all quotations and data below are taken 
from the archives of the EMI Group held at Hayes, Middlesex. When the writer consulted these 
archives they were not referenced and were contained in ten box files in rough date order.
There was one British factory in China in this modern industry owned by Electric and Musical 
Industries, Limited (EMI). EMI was registered in London in April, 1931 to combine the following 
companies
The Gramophone Company, Limited.
The Columbia Graphophone, Limited.
Their presence in China in terms of local output was virtually confined to the 1930s and their 
experience in this period typifies the external difficulties experienced by British firms, the means 
adopted either to adapt to or overcome these difficulties, and, in some instances, the partial success 
they enjoyed.
The growing Chinese market for records and gramophones and the level of import duties led to a 
decision in January, 1929 by one of the constituent companies of EMI -  Columbia Graphophone - to 
erect a record factory in China which would also supply their sales to Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. In the 
event the route taken was acquisition rather than erecting a new plant. In October, 1928 Columbia 
Graphophone acquired 98 percent of the shares of Pathe Freres of France which brought with it 
control of Compagnie Pathe Orient. In 1908 this last company first introduced gramophones and 
records to China on a significant scale. The business grew so rapidly that a factory was built in the 
Route de Zikawai in the French Concession in Shanghai. The business of Compagnie Pathe Orient 
was principally in Northern China but with some sales to Hong Kong and Indochina. In 1928 63 
percent of sales were to Shanghai, 22 percent to Tianjin, 9 percent to Saigon and 6 percent to Hong 
Kong. The Company was very profitable in the mid 1920s but 1928 saw a severe decline 
Issued Capital. Profit.
- Thous. francs -
1924 2,667 2,068
1925 2,667 3,486
1926 2,667 4,534
1927 2,667 3,382
1928 2,667 414 (£36 thous.)
Source: annual reports (in French) of the company.
Record sales fell from a peak of 800,000 in 1926 to 620,000 in 1928.
After its takeover Compagnie Pathe Orient was liquidated and the assets passed to two new concems:- 
Pathe Orient, Limited -  commercial functions.
China Record Company -  a production company.
The takeover of Compagnie Pathe Orient was a diminution of EMI’s ambitions in China. In a letter to 
Columbia Phonograph Co., Inc (part of RCA which until November, 1935 had a financial interest in 
EMI) in June, 1931 a Mr Louis Sterling stated : “It had been our original intention to put down a very big 
factory in China to take care of all requirements but this is in abeyance at present and all we are doing is 
extending the facilities o f the Pathe Orient factory” (24 new presses were ordered for this factory).
-135-
Not only were the ambitions for China trimmed but their expectations were disappointed. In a similar
letter dated, May, 19th, 1931, Mr Sterling stated :-
“We expect the next few years will show no profit for us in the Chinese m arket; owing to the price of
silver and the general economic situation business has dropped very much in that territory.”
The difficulties were not only external. In a letter dated December 25th, 1931 to Mr Sterling in London a
Mr L. H. White of the Japanese subsidiary stated that :-
“Pathe is sick, can be cured but will require a considerable period for convalescence.” (A not too subtle
hint at management problems).
The financial performance was very disappointing :-
Net Profits.
Pathe Orient. China Record.
- $ thous. -
1931 7.0 -16,7
1932 -291.7 46.2
1933 -64.4 22.1
1934 Jan.-June -387.3 14.5
Output of records at 420,000 in 1932 and 525,000 in 1933 were markedly below the levels previously 
enjoyed. In April, 1934, while capacity was for 300,000 records per month, output was currently averaging 
40,000 per month.
In mid-1934 both Pathe Orient and China Record were absorbed into Electric and Musical Industries 
(China), Limited. With this new company the improvement was dramatic. A net profit of $39.9 thous. was 
made in the first three months and in the first fiscal year (to end June, 1935) a net profit of $145.9 thous. 
(£11.5 thous.) was made. In the following year there was a rise to $244.2 thous. (£12.8 thous.) while the 
year to June, 1937 saw a rise to $529.6 thous. -  in sterling terms (£27.7 thous.), an all time record. Factors 
in this improvement were (See TABLES HHH, HI and JJJ in the STATISTICAL ANNEX for the financial 
record of this concern) :-
better control of working capital, 
closure of poorly performing branches.
elimination of unprofitable departments such as film hire, cinema equipment, etc. 
a large advertising campaign in the Chinese press.
Sales rose sharply
Records. Gramophones.
1935 (calendar) 372,000 4,800
1936 (calendar) 884,000 11,040
April, 1937 (annual rate) 1,334,000 14,400
Apart from sales under its own labels of “Pathe” and “Columbia” the Company also produced records for 
resale by its German associated company of Carl Linstrom AG -  also with operations in China (in July, 
1935 these accounted for 9. 6 percent of the Company’s output of records).
Although the Company did produce records in European languages, the majority of its output was of 
Chinese records. In the financial year to end June 1936, Chinese records represented 91 percent of their 
sales by volume of “Pathe” and “Columbia” records.
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The Company was quick to realise the increasing influence of the cinema in China and signed up cinema 
stars such as Miss Butterfly Wu (in the Company’s words “the Joan Crawford of China”) on exclusive 
contracts. (See article in Finance and Commerce of 8.8,1934). Despite this catering to the Chinese 
consumer, the management of the Company was exclusively European -  in particular British, French and 
exiled Russians. Thus, Chinese employees had little access to details of modern sound reproduction 
technology.
Although the Company had the most up-to-date record plant in China, drawing upon the international 
technical resources of the Group, it did not have a monopoly of the Chinese market. The Company 
estimated its share of the Chinese record market to be as follows in January/February, 1935
Sales of records. Percent.
EMI China 60,000 39
Victor* 35,000 23
Carl Linstrom 29,000 19
Great Wall 10,000 6
Great China 15,000 9
Kon Lun 6,000 4
Total 155,000 100
*From local output and imports from their Western and Japanese plants.
In the years leading up to the Pacific War the Company’s profitability was very creditable considering the 
environment in which it had to operate. Eliminating the distorting effect of the slump in the external value 
of the Chinese dollar gives the following >
Years to end June. Net Profit as Percentage of Sales.
1936 33.3
1937 n.a.
1938 6.4
1939 17.1
1940 18.2
-First half. 22.3
-Second half 16,1
1941 18.4
By the financial year 1940/1941 the Company had “practically no trade with unoccupied China.” but this
was more than counterbalanced by :-
- a boom in sales to Shanghai. Converting into Sterling at the average rate for the year concerned, the 
value of sales to Shanghai rose by 64 percent from 1937/38 to 1940/1941.
- a rise in exports to Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Hong Kong. Admittedly, an increasing 
proportion of these exports were re-sales of Group products but exports from the Shanghai plant also 
increased as a proportion of sales from this plant -  from 43 percent in 1938/1939 to 50 percent in 
1940/1941.
The Company tended in this period before the Pacific War to not retain its earnings -  remitting large 
dividends to the UK parent company (see PART V below). Apart from investing £10 thous. for facilities to 
produce portable gramophones, investment was pared. The parent company arranged that export earnings 
were retained in foreign currencies due to the fall in the Chinese dollar. “Surplus funds beyond immediate 
requirements have been regularly submitted to Hayes”. The Head Office became increasingly anxious to 
repatriate funds and in a cable dated 19th May, 1941 stated :- “Please examine local situation with view 
declaring and remitting interim dividend maximum possible before 30th June next”.
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Given a more politically and economically stable environment in China the EMI Group would, no doubt, 
have, as was its original aim, operated a larger enterprise with a longer term financial history in China 
rather than living from hand to mouth.
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PART III -  CHAPTER SEVEN - DRINK. FOOD. PACKING. ETC. OF AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS.
Much of British investment in these sectors was either
introduced initially to cater for Westerners or those Chinese with Western tastes (and thus did 
not compete with established local industries). This was also the case with the piano firm of S. 
Moutrie and Company, Limited -  see Chapter Eight below.
in the cases of packaging, drying or freezing of local food products or rendering other agricultural 
products more acceptable to export purchasers and machine pressing them to reduce shipping costs, 
the introduction was with the prime aim of realising the export potential o f Chinese natural products. 
This potential was substantial and eventually represented a high proportion of Chinese exports to 
■Western nations.
(A) DRINK.
(a) Brewing.
There were two British breweries of note in this industry, separated by many years :- 
- The Anglo-German Brewery Company. Limited.
Founded in early 1904 by a syndicate of various nationalities but with British and German 
interests dominating (see PART IV  (B) below) this company had, in terms of product acceptance, a great 
success from the start. The Company received a gold medal and diploma at the Munich Brewery Exhibition 
of 1906 (1). The introduction of new technology at the Qingdao brewery (on stream in October, 1904 (2)). 
and the emphasis on quality has served the enterprise well and even a century later it is still China’s leading 
exporter of beer. However, in the early years these market advantages were not fully reflected in 
profitability -  the Company underestimated the expenses in installing the brewery by 88 percent and also 
had to write off the cost of a small brewery in Shanghai (the Victoria Brewery) that was acquired in 1905 
but proved to be too small and uneconomic (3). Despite this the Company paid modest dividends (5-8 
percent) in the first decade of its existence, missing only one year, (See STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE 
KKK). The First World War put an impossible strain on the Company due to its German connection and it 
was sold to Dai Nippon Brewery in 1916 (see PART IV  (B) below).
The Ewo Brewery (later the Ewo Brewery. Limited).
In 1934 Jardine Matheson began buying land in Shanghai for a brewery at a cost of around $350 
thous. (c.£24 thous.) plus an order for piles costing $100 thous. (c.£7 thous.). (4). The plant and machinery 
came from Germany -  the Germania Works at Chemnitz. (5). This was a barter deal with the Germans 
receiving tea, apricot kernels, goat hair, camel hair, etc. (6), The total cost of the brewery and a bottling 
and pasteurising plant was estimated in March, 1935 at £215 thous. (7). The share of Jardine Matheson in 
the original private company was a third with the balance held by two partners of the Shanghai 
stockbroking firm of Messrs Benjamin and Potts.
Jardine Matheson were confident that they could withstand competition from the incumbent producer in 
Shanghai -  the Norwegian owned Union Brewery Company (see PART IV  (B)). In 1936 this brewer had an
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annual capacity o f300,000 cases of beer as against sales in the previous year of 160,000 cases. (8). The 
annual capacity of the Jardine Matheson venture was smaller (9) :-
-Cases-
1938 1939
Beer 80,000 135,000
“Maltonic” 36,000 36,000
Nevertheless, Jardine Matheson were confident that their “very efficient and low-capitalised brewery”
could compete successfully with the Union Brewery. (10). An “interesting and encouraging fact is that our
buildings are to cost $450,000 against the Union Breweries $2,4000,000 approx.” (11).
The Ewo Brewery in Shanghai came on stream in September, 1936. (12). Sales developed as follows
Cases $ thous.
1936 n.a. 133(b)
1937 First Half 18,828 (a) n.a.
Second Half 24,599 (a) n.a.
Year 43,427 (a) 685(b)
1938 First Half 40,422 (a) n.a
Second Half 35,119 (a) n.a.
Year 75,541 (a) 1,473 (b)
1939 Year 80,500 (b) 2,201 (b)
(a) Jardine Matheson Archives (J37). Outward Shanghai to London 1939. Letter of 21.7.39 from Mr W.J.
Keswick to Mr B. D.F. Beith. No. 2103.
(b) Jardine Matheson Archives (J37). Shanghai to London 1940. Letter of 2,4.40 from Mr W.J. Keswick to
Mr B.D.F. Beith. No. 2370.
The venture was initially not successful and losses were made in 1937 -  1939. Losses at the trading level 
as a percentage of sales were (13) :-
1937 58.1%
1938 15.9%
1939 8.7%
The position improved in 1940 (see PART IV  (C)) partly because the brewery developed an export trade to 
the British forces in Egypt. For example, in August, 1941 the Company sold 9,000 cases, valued at £15 
thous., to The N.A. A.F.I. in Egypt (14).
Jardine Matheson saw the opportunity in 1940, consequent upon the move into profitability, to realise at 
least a part of their investment. In March, 1940 there was an approach by the Dai Nippon Brewery seeking 
the sale o f the brewery to them. (15). Terms were discussed but at this stage Jardine Matheson and its 
partners were already drawing up the letter for sale to the public of a large part of the enterprise (16) - 
which took place in October, 1940. (See PART IV  (C)).
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks.
The mam item was aerated water although the British companies involved also made other 
soft drinks such as tonic water, ginger ale and beer, lemonade, etc. One o f the largest British companies in 
this sector -  Crystal, Limited - was an authorised bottler of Coca Cola. Altogether there were about ten 
British enterprises in the period 1895-1940 in this small and, because o f the transport difficulties, mainly 
localised industry. The four leaders were >
- J. Llewellyn and Company, Limited.
- A. S. Watson and Company, Limited.
- The Aquarius Company, Limited (established by Caldbeck, MacGregor and Company -  a 
large wine and spirit merchant with branches in the UK, Singapore, Hong Kong and China.)
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- Crystal, Limited.
The first two companies were mainly retail chemists, retailers of toiletries, perfumes, etc and the drinks 
business was only a small part of their operations.
(B) FOOD.
(a) Flour mills.
British interest in this sector was virtually confined to a mill founded in 1896 in Shanghai -  the 
China Flour Mill Company. Limited. The financial fortunes of this company illustrate the problems of 
enterprises relying on the input of indigenous agricultural materials during the period under review -  with 
the danger of interruption to supplies due to natural disasters or civil or military disruptions accompanied 
by violent price fluctuations. In its twenty years life the company only paid dividends in six years -  1901- 
1905 and 1909 -  albeit that in two years (1902 and 1905) the dividend was of the order of 20 percent. 
(STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE LLL). In 1906 the price of wheat soared, the mill worked only 100 days 
and the dividend was passed. (17). 1907 and 1908 saw the dividend passed and although there was a 
modest revival in 1909 the succeeding years saw losses in every year except 1913. The Company was hit 
by poor wheat crops, imports of American flour and quality problems. Reserves were run down and 
increased borrowings led to a heavy interest burden. At end 1914 Mitsui Bussan Kaisha debentures totalled 
341 thous. taels compared with 138 thous. taels at end 1913 - “.... were it not for the financial assistance of 
our General Manager we could not continue working.” (18). By the end of 1915 the situation was hopeless 
-  the Company’s properties were heavily mortgaged. Debts (mostly to Mitsui Bussan Kaisha) and 
accumulated losses totalled 552 thous. taels against an issued capital of 500 thous. taels (19). In 1916 after 
further losses Mitsui Bussan Kaisha “in exchange for all our properties took over all our liabilities and paid 
all expenses in connection with the liquidation and winding up of the Company” (20). The shareholders got 
nothing.
(b) Oils and fats.
(i) Sova bean products.
Although British interests were pioneers in the introduction of modem steam powered 
technology into the process of extracting soya oil and making bean cakes (see PART I  above), subsequent 
British progress was, however slight. Apart from a short-lived venture by Butterfield and Swire in 1896 in 
Niuzhuang (which was very shortly “worked by Chinese only and is practically Chinese owned” (21)) and 
a Shanghai venture in the 1930s producing soya flour -  Nutro Products, Limited (22) with “Soyogen” flour, 
British interest in this important Chinese industry was confined to British financial interest in two ventures 
in the main processing area for soya beans of Manchuria.
(ii) Other oils.
Apart from tung oil refineries, particularly in Hankou, by Jardine Matheson, Amhold and 
Company, Limited and Liddell Brothers and Company and a small cotton seed oil and cake mill belonging 
to Major Brothers, Limited (see PART 7 ) British involvement was twofold :-
Scharff s Oil and Bone Mills. Limited.
Founded in 1906, the mill, which came on stream in 1907, was intended for treatment of all kinds o f oil 
seeds. The Company was dogged by troubles almost from the start. The machinery was so unreliable that
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duplicate machinery had to be installed in 1909 and there were heavy leakages in oil export shipments (23). 
The Company incurred heavy losses, especially in 1910 when it was hit by the high price of rape seed and 
problems with the supply of cotton seed. In July, 1911 the Company went into liquidation (24).
The Lih Teh Oil and Bean Mill Company. Limited.
Founded in 1909, the major product of this Shanghai mill was cotton seed oil and the co-products of 
cake (cattle feed) and the hulks (for fertilisers, etc). By 1918 the mill could use 6,075 tons of cotton seed 
per annum providing 1,215 tons o f oil (25). (There were at that time five Chinese mills o f comparable size 
in Shanghai).
The mill depended to a large extent on the good supply of cotton seeds in a satisfactory condition. In 
1911, for example, the seed supply was generally poor and hit by worms and the Company made a loss 
after a small profit in its first full year (26). (STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE MMM). In January, 1915, 
after a good period for the Company, it was hit by a fire which destroyed its crushing plant (27) -  until this 
was replaced the Company survived by refining crude oil from Chinese producers. In the year ending May, 
1918 a dividend of 15 percent was paid -  the first since the first full year o f working. This dividend was 
repeated in the next two financial years when the firm benefited from strong demand and good quality seed 
supply. However, in the year to May, 1921 the enterprise was hit by declining oil prices and the mill only 
operated for 66 days - net losses in the year were nearly 40 percent o f issued capital (28). The next year’s 
results were adversely affected by a shortage of seeds. (29). There was a partial revival in 1922/3 when the 
mill operated for 189 days. (30). 1923/4, however, saw a sharp reversal with losses of over 30 percent of 
issued capital (31). After years of poor performance, the par value of the shares was slashed from 50 taels 
to 5 taels in 1928 (32). The Company was wound up in 1930 (33).
The history o f both the above firms illustrates further the hazard o f relying on a consistent supply of 
local raw materials.
(iii) Margarine.
Edible Products, Limited was incorporated in China in 1933 under the name of the United 
Margarine Company, Limited -  the name being changed two years later. The plant was constructed at the 
Unilever complex at 2210 Yangtszepoo Road, Shanghai. The paid-up capital was modest - $300 thous. 
(£20 thous.).
(c) Other foods.
The principal item in which was an export oriented business was eggs in desiccated or
frozen (whole or liquid) form although other items included :-
frozen game, 
frozen poultry, 
frozen pigs, 
frozen meat, 
lard.
intestines.
As is apparent from PART 11 and Appendix Two this business dwarfed the other food sectors.
Egg factories were scarcely heard of in China until the turn of the Nineteenth Century -  fresh eggs being 
sold as such. It was the entry of foreign enterprises and the development of preservation techniques that 
enabled a considerable export potential to be realised.
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The first development of an export business was in albumen -  particularly by German enterprises 
although one of these concerns fell into British hands. This last closed in 1904 (34) -  a fate shared by most 
other producers as the trade declined for a variety of reasons -  competition in Western markets from 
synthetic substitutes, quality problems, difficulties in acquiring good standard salt, etc.
The egg business, in particular, received an enormous boost with the entry of Western firms (necessarily 
large in view of the technology required) who built refrigerating plants and had access to correspondingly 
equipped ships and appropriate facilities in the main importing markets in Europe and the USA. The main 
usage was by the large makers of cakes and pastries.
The development o f this business introduced a significant new item in China’s exports. From 1,677 
thous. Haiguan taels in 1903 egg exports had reached 7,220 thous taels in 1914 (35). The development 
since then was as follows (36)
Thous. Haiguan taels. Percentage of Total Chinese exports.
1914 7,220 2.0
1919 20,932 3.9
1924 31,523 4.0
1929 (peak) 51,720 5.1
1934 21,870 5,7
In 1929 Eggs and Egg Products ranked third in Chinese exports after Beans and Products (22.6%) and 
Raw Silk and Cocoons (15.9%) (37). By 1934, however, despite the elimination of most of the soya bean 
trade with the loss of Manchuria, the egg trade sank to fourth position (38). In terms of Chinese exports to 
the UK the egg trade became the leading item. For instance, in 1934 this item accounted for 38 percent of 
Chinese exports to the UK (39).
The leader in the egg business, was a UK company - International Export Company. Limited. This 
concern erected in 1908 an extensive plant at Hankou to “freeze eggs, pigs, fowls and game” (40). The first 
shipment of frozen products to the UK was in May, 1909 in a company ship (41). Apart from pigs, this first 
consignment contained poultry, game, hares, geese, ducks, eggs, deer and beef (42).
The export o f frozen pigs and poultry had an encouraging start which even attracted Parliamentary 
attention. In reply to a question in July, 1909 Mr Bums (President of tlie Board of Trade) replied (43)
“When members fire the usual volley 
Of questions on the day’s concern 
There’s one man thinks the game is folly 
And that man is Mr Bums 
For when approached re Chinese bacon 
And how it ranks as breakfast fare 
He made reply, his nerves unshaken 
I neither know nor do I care”
However, after this favourable start this pork trade was a relative failure (despite trying to improve the 
breed of local hogs by providing new British stock) and the egg business became the main activity of the 
Company. The International Export Company, Limited was 100 percent owned by the Union Cold 
Storage, Limited -  owning cold-storage premises and plants for refrigeration in the UK and abroad. After
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relying on other companies for specially equipped ships it began to own its own refrigeration steamers 
sailing under the flag of the Blue Star Line. The Company was part of the Vestey family empire.
The plant at Hankou was added to by operations in Tianjin and Nanjing. The Nanjing plant (1914) was 
one of the largest cold storage plants in the World. The value of the buildings and plant in this last 
operation amounted to £1,500 thous. in 1924 (44).
This company, in contrast to its competitors, bought direct from local suppliers. To this end it employed
over 150 purchasing agents (45). In peak periods the Company purchased 2,000 barrels (880-850 eggs) per 
day>
Total 2.000
- Nanjing 1,200
- Hankou 580
- Tianjin 220
Two other British companies also entered the field 
S.Behr and Mathew. Limited.
Starting in a modest way in 1911 as an exporter of eggs in shell, the firm further developed a 
business in frozen eggs. The firm had three cold storage facilities in Shanghai, Hankou and Qingdao. It had 
cold storage plants in London and Hamburg. (46). The firm’s capital in China was 700 thous. taels and it 
handled in peak years 4,000 tons of eggs. (47).
Ewo Cold Storage Company.
This Jardine Matheson owned company was established in 1920 in Shanghai. The capital of the 
firm was 790 thous. taels and the quantity of the eggs handled in peak years was 6,000 tons. (48). In 1936 it 
was estimated by Jardine Matheson (49) that output in the twelve months ending March, 1937 would be 
split as follows :-
Tons %
Frozen eggs 2,100 64.4
Shell eggs 930 28.5
Dried eggs 230 7.1
Total 3,260 100.0
Profits of the Ewo Cold Storage Company were as follows in the immediate pre-war period
$ thous. £ thous.
Year ending 31.3.39 683 23
Year ending 31.3.40 146 4
(Jardine Matheson Archives (J37). Letter Shanghai to London o f20.12.38.
(Jardine Matheson Archives (J37). Letter Shanghai to London of 6.9.40.
There were many Chinese competitors in the egg products business but, in general, they were fairly 
small -  an important exception being The China Egg Produce Company. The most important foreign 
competitors were American (see PART I V (B)). In 1933 foreign owned factories accounted for 56.8 percent
of total output of egg products (50). UK firms occupied the first position in the foreign owned sector
accounting for around 40 percent of total output.
Based on the experience of the International Export Company, this industry was very profitable in the 
period 1912-1919but, beginning after 1931 in particular, the industry experienced difficulties due to :-
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increasing tariffs in export markets, 
growth in poultry farming in these markets, 
strong prejudice created against Chinese eggs in the USA. 
increasing difficulties in transportation in China, 
health scares,
no standardisation of egg sizes.
Exports of Eggs and Egg Products fell as follows (51) :-
Thousand Haikwan Taels.
1930 51,161
1932 29,100
1933* 26,414
1934* 21,870
1935* 23,223
1936* 31,244
* Converted from dollars.
(C) PACKING. ETC. OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
This primarily export oriented industry -  although some of the sales were made to the interior or to other 
Chinese ports -  was a field in which British firms played a preponderate part. British firms were leaders in 
establishing this industry which was early established (see PART I). By the 1920s there were eight British 
companies engaged in hydraulic press packing and allied activities such as cleaning. There was a particular 
concentration in Tianjin but also Shanghai and Hankou were important centres. Three British firms were 
the leaders in this business
- Ewo Press Packing Company, with facilities in Shanghai and Tianjin. This company under the name of 
Ewo Yuen Press Packing Company was established in 1907. It was then owned jointly by Jardine 
Matheson and a Chinese partner. This partner decided to retire and in 1919 Jardine Matheson became sole 
proprietors under the above name. At peak, the Company could process up to 100,000 bales per annum at 
its Shanghai plant (52). For Jardine Matheson this unit was "a very good investmemt”. (53).
- Liddell Brothers and Company. Limited, were a substantial import/export firm. Their packing interests 
were in Shanghai (Pudong), Tianjin (1888) and Hankou. These were supplemented by a plywood factory 
in Harbin.
- Mackenzie and Company. Limited. Another substantial import/export firm. Their packing interests were 
in Shanghai (Pudong), Tianjin (1888) and Hankou.
ASSESSMENT.
Although a piebald area it would seem that, on balance, British investment in the above fields was 
beneficial to the Chinese economy. In the drinks sector, both alcoholic and non-alcoholic, the early 
investments were principally to cater for Westerners and those with Western tastes and did not compete 
with local industries. A modest export trade developed to South East Asia. In contrast to the cigarette sector 
these industries did not develop consumers to any extent outside major centres of Western influence -  
mainly in the coastal strip. Although providing useful employment to the Chinese, the drinks sector did not 
impact to any large extent on the Chinese as consumers. In the case of the Qingdao brewery, in particular, 
new technology was introduced. The case of the Ewo Brewery at the end of the period was, perhaps, an 
exception to this benign picture in that the partners in the venture, including Jardine Matheson, could be
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accused of taking advantage of the frantic desire of Chinese investors to seek security in shareholdings in a 
foreign company. This situation is analysed in PART IV  (C).
Although British interests were pioneers in the introduction of modem technology for sugar refining and 
soya bean processing, subsequent British presence was zero or minimal respectively in these important 
industries. In other oils (cotton seed oil, etc.), British involvement in this sector (which, as with soya 
processing, grew at the expense of traditional pressing methods) was slight compared with Chinese mills. 
In this sector as with flour milling, British mills were plagued by violent fluctuations in the availability and 
price of their locally sourced materials (due to natural disasters, transport difficulties and disorders in the 
interior which were compounded by Chinese speculators).
Of much more significance than the above food and drink sectors in terms of building up Chinese exports 
was the British entry into packaging, drying and freezing of eggs and other products. Particularly in the 
case of frozen products this involved for foreign companies large amounts of capital not only in China but 
in specialised ships providing refrigeration and appropriate facilities in the customer locations. This 
business was, thus, in terms of exports capital intensive. Thus, although there were many Chinese 
competitors, accounting for nearly half of the business they were with one exception small. The three 
British companies principally involved, accounting for around two fifths of output, on the positive side 
were the largest contributors to an export trade in eggs. On the negative side, their overwhelming 
purchasing power was probably abused.
Another export sector in which British concerns played a prominent part was press packing and allied 
operations. By improving quality and by modem press packing machinery reducing shipping costs, these 
firms facilitated Chinese commodity exports.
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PART III -  CHAPTER EIGHT - MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES.
Many of the sectors of British investment in this sector were short-lived and small > 
fa) Glass.
The Tsing Hwa Glass Company. Limited was established in 1932 with a capital o f $500 thous.(£30 
thous,). Its Shanghai factory had 200 workers and specialised in bottles, especially bottles for beer and soft 
drinks for local firms (1). Its major customers became the Union Brewery Company (Norwegian) and the 
Ewo Brewery (see above).
In addition, there was a minority British interest (balance Chinese and Japanese) in the Yao Hua 
Mechanical Glass Company, Limited which produced window glass in Qinhuangdao. The British interest 
was via the joint venture Kailan Mining Administration (see above) who were the general managers of this 
company.
(b) Office furniture.
The Office Appliances Company. Limited was established in 1930 with a capital of $510 thous. (£ 
29 thous.). Its main activity was in selling imported office machinery and repairing office machinery but it 
did have a factory for steel office furniture which started in 1932. It was, however, an unsuccessful 
venture which was closed in 1935.
(c) Tanning.
A second attempt was made by British interests to enter this industry in 1904 (the first having 
failed in 1883 -see PART I). A group of British merchants established the Shanghai Tanning Factory. 
Although initially fairly successful the Company was hit fry a  serious fire in May, 1910 when the “tannery 
was showing profit and great future promise” (2). Gross profit on sales of leather was prior to the fire 
running at 26 percent of turnover (3). After this the Company ran into serious commercial as well as 
production difficulties. By 1913 with a  turnover o f only 400-500 hides per month the Company needed a  
20 percent margin to cover fixed expenses. This was impossible to achieve given the serious competition 
from imported leather (4). The Company was as a consequence liquidated.
British presence in this industry was very small compared with the involvement of USA firms (see 
PART IV  (B)). Two large UK based companies were engaged to a minor extent in this industry in China
- The General Electric Company o f  China was a subsidiary o f the General Electric Company, 
Limited. It had a works in Shanghai but this was mainly engaged in installing, etc. of imported Group 
machinery. Actual local production of electrical articles was small.
- Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company. Limited was a  subsidiary o f  Cable mid Wireless, 
Limited -  a UK registered company. The former company was involved with the Chinese 
Government in The Chinese National Wireless Telegraph Company, Limited -  dealing in and 
installing o f wireless, telegraph aid  telephone apparatus. There was a small (50 employees) factory in 
Shanghai mainly engaged in assembling and testing imported radio and wireless materials but also 
making radios and wireless equipment (completely burned out in 1937).
More substantial and longer lasting British enterprises were engaged in :-
(a) Building materials.
Apart from brick production (for internal use as well as for sale) by the Chinese Engineering and Mining
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Company, Limited and a cement and tile works operated by the same company until sold in 1907 to 
Chinese interests and brick production by the Pekin Syndicate (see above), British interest was confined to
A.Butler Cement Tile Works. Limited in the early period and The China Aerocrete Company. Limited in 
the 1930s. The first company named was registered in July, 1904 (5) with an issued capital of 60 thous, 
taels (£8 thous.) and the Shanghai factory producing roof and floor tiles, ventilation bricks, etc. came on 
stream at the end of 1905. The company was never particularly profitable -  the peak being in the years to 
March, 1916 and 1917 when dividends of 12 percent were paid. (See TABLE NNN in the STATISTICAL 
ANNEX). The business was then hit by increased costs of labour and materials and no dividends were paid 
in the next three financial years. In early 1920 the Company received an offer from Chinese interests for its 
land, buildings and machinery which was well above book value. In March, 1920 the shareholders 
unanimously accepted this offer (6) -  since its inception the Company had, on average, paid only 3..5 
percent per annum. The shareholders received 116 percent of the par value of their shares (7). China 
Aerocrete was established in Shanghai in 1929 to produce light artificial stone. The issued capital was very 
shortly increased to the authorised limit of 200 thous. taels (£24 thous.). A 10 percent dividend was 
declared for 1930 but no dividends were paid in the next six years. The company was dissolved in 1937.
(b) Wood processing.
At the turn of the Nineteenth Century sawmills and timber yards were virtually all in the hands of 
Chinese concerns. The role o f foreign firms was essentially that of import merchants. The main exceptions 
were two foreign owned sawmills in Fuzhou -  one British. These utilised indigenous timber which was 
becoming scarce, of smaller size and with transportation over increasing distances due to previous lack of 
afforestation (8). The British company failed in 1904 (9).
The situation changed in 1900. A leading Chinese timber firm (Tzeang Tah Lumber Co.) went bankrupt 
and was taken over by a German timber importer -  Herr H. Snethlage. In 1902 the acquired concern was 
incorporated under the Hong Kong ordinances as the Chinese Import and Export Lumber Company. 
Limited (10). Although there was strong German (and some American) influence in the new company there 
was considerable British presence from the start. By 1908 there was a British majority on the Board. The 
German influence quickly waned -  Herr Snethlage died in 1905 (11) -  and in 1910 the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank paid off the high liabilities (12) (at end February, 1908 in excess of issued capital (13)) due 
to the Deutsche - Asiatische Bank. The Company thus very quickly could be regarded (and was regarded) 
as a British company.
The Company always asserted that because they took over a Chinese company “no distinctions in 
advancement have ever been made between the Chinese and foreigners in the Company’s service. In the 
numerous offices and stations which the Company maintains, the Chinese are the principals, while the 
foreigners serve largely in a consulting or auditing capacity.” The Company maintained a school for a five 
year apprenticeship and by the 1930s the great majority of the “indoor Chinese employees” were graduates 
of this school. (14).
The Company took immediate steps to expand and modernise its business. New machinery for a sawmill 
arrived in Shanghai in 1903 (15). This was the first plant in Shanghai driven by electric transmission. By 
1907 this mill had a daily capacity o f around 70,000 feet of worked lumber (16).
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The firm developed native sources of wood -  in Fujian with a sawmill at Fuzhou. Initially, this 
“developing native woods trade” was successful and accounted for a large part o f the firm’s income. In 
the early 1920s the Company had “about 300 thous. taels invested in forests, forest-godowns and rafting 
operations up country. This is advanced to Chinese agents and constitutes a lien on the forests, etc. 
though, of course, land cannot by owned by foreigners in the interior of China”. (17) In 1919 the 
Company reported that -  “Our sawmills at Foochow are operating successfully and prospects at this 
branch of our business are bright” (18). However, mainly due to the disorder in the interior of Fujian, this 
business rapidly deteriorated. In 1925 the staffing of the forestry operations in Fujian was reduced to a 
skeleton basis. (19). In 1926 the sawmill in Fuzhou was dismantled and part o f the machinery was 
installed in a new mill started up by the company in Qingdao (20).
At its fullest extent in the inter-War period the company operated a large sawmill, a box factory and 
extensive dry kilns in Shanghai with smaller sawmills in Nanjing, Hankou, Qingdao and Tianjin. In 
addition it had a plywood plant for the production of veneers and made a speciality o f interior woodwork 
finishes, flooring and high grade hardwood panelling -  the contracts for which were handled through its 
Shanghai subsidiary -  the China Woodworking and Dry Kiln Company, Limited. (21). The company had 
timber yards in all important cities in Central and Northern China. It had its own tugboats and lighters 
and several river steamers. However, although the company’s sawmill interests were extensive they were 
not by any means in a monopoly situation. In the mid 1920s there were over 20 sizeable Chinese 
sawmills and about 15 Japanese or Sino-Japanese sawmills (mainly in Manchuria).
The Company made steady progress in the years up to the First World War (except for 1908 when a 
small loss was made) with dividends in the 5-10 percent range (SEE TABLE OOO in the STATISTICAL 
ANNEX). Also the balance sheet was substantially improved despite the company having made large 
deliveries of lumber to “various Government railways.” These were not able or willing to pay and at end 
February, 1912 owed the company 292 thous. taels (38 thous.) (22). In the early years of the First World 
War performance was fairly sluggish but the financial year to end February, 1917 saw a significant 
improvement with a dividend of 20 percent. The next three financial years saw the shareholders receive 
as dividends virtually the face value of their shares. The next financial year ending February, 1921 saw 
the Company make a serious loss -  slightly over 80 percent of paid up capital and the Company’s large 
reserves (increased by a revaluation in 1918/19) were run down from 2,200 thous. taels to 1,900 thous. 
taels. The next financial year saw a good profit despite “the failure of Chinese Government Railways to 
meet obligations for materials supplied” (23). (These debts were still not paid off a decade later). 
Dividends were resumed in the next four financial years but during this period the Company experienced 
considerable difficulties. Their operations in the interior were affected by military interference, illegal 
taxation, banditry, attempts to seize staff for ransom and civil war. However, the end of the decade saw a 
marked improvement. Dividends in the years to end February, 1930 and 1931 were 24 percent. The 
Company survived the uncertain conditions of the 1930s well. With the absence of serious competition 
from Chinese firms in the years preceding the outbreak of the Pacific War the Company, in common with 
other UK companies, enjoyed good trading conditions -  see PART IV  (C).
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In addition to primary wood processing in the form of sawmills there was some British presence in 
making wood furniture and interior architectural woodwork.. This was essentially linked to Western 
property development organisations in the Treaty Ports, especially Shanghai. There was no meaningful 
competition with Chinese furniture makers. Some of the British presence in furniture making was part of 
primarily retail organisations e.g. Hall and Holtz, A.H.Jaques and Company (in Tianjin), Sims and 
Company (also in Tianjin) and Weeks and Company, Limited. There were, however, more specialised 
producers -  in particular, Arts and Crafts, Limited and Woodcraft Works, Limited. The former was by 
far the leading firm. Arts and Crafts Furnishing Company was founded as a furniture business in 1904. In 
1908 it was transformed into a limited company with a capital of 98 thous taels (£13 thous.) and this 
enabled the company to build their own furniture factory in Shanghai (24). By the 1930s the factory 
occupied an area o f 11 moti -  nearly 2 acres (25). Apart from furniture and interior woodwork the factory 
engaged in electro-plating, glass bevelling and polishing, plasterwork, etc.
(c) Musical instruments.
S.Moutrie and Company. Limited, was founded in 1889 with its original business being dealers in 
music. The company were import agents for European pianos and American organs. (There was a firm 
customer base in Western missionaries). In 1895 a factory was established in Shanghai to produce upright 
pianos (grand pianos were not made by the enterprise until 1919 (26)). A new industry was thus introduced 
into China. This factory had produced 250 pianos by the First of July, 1899 (27). On that date the company 
became a public company. A new factory was on stream by October, 1904 -  by that date the original 
factory had produced 570 pianos (28). (These pianos were especially adapted to Asian conditions). This 
second factory was in turn replaced in 1925 by another Shanghai factory which cost 160 thous. taels (£24 
thous.) (29). In total, the preceding factory had produced 4,000 pianos over its working life (30).
The earlier years of the Company were moderately prosperous and apart from the year to end 
March, 1907 modest dividends were paid (SEE TABLE PPP in the STATISTICAL ANNEX). However, 
dividends were passed in the three financial years ending March, 1910, 1911 and 1912. In one year -  to 
March, 1910 -  a loss was made. Recovery took place in the year to March, 1913 and this revival was 
continued. The 1920s were a period of considerable prosperity for the concern. In the financial years from 
1922 to 1931 shareholders received dividends averaging 19 percent per annum together with capital bonus 
distributions. Even in the turbulent year of 1925 when 125 Chinese employees were on strike for four 
months output was kept up to some extent by foreign employees and the Company was able to pay a 
dividend of 15 percent (31).
The Company experienced very poor trading conditions in the first half of the 1930s. Losses were 
made, dividends were passed and there was considerable talk of liquidation but this was rejected by the 
directors
- the Company’s fixed assets would be realised at distressed values. Attempts to sell the 
factory at a reasonable price failed.
- the firm’s investments in municipal and public utility debentures would have to be sold at a 
loss.
- there was considerable scope for rationalisation. Thus, sales offices were closed, 
commitments were reduced and a standardised model of piano was developed for the home
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market. This retailed at $395 (£24) -  by far the lowest price on record (32).
- the Board saw the possibility of developing a greatly increased export trade given the low 
rate o f exchange coupled with cheap labour. The Company could “produce a first class 
piano at a price which defies competition in any market” (33).
The export plans of the Company came to fruition. Exports were made to Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Dutch East Indies, India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Africa, etc. In the last market it was claimed 
that “owing to favourable exchange conditions the Moutrie piano can be landed 50% cheaper than pianos 
from any other source” (34). The effect on China’s balance of trade was not as beneficial as might be 
expected “as ... .practically everything that goes to make up a piano has to be imported” (35).
The position improved in the year to March, 1937 when dividends were resumed. In the next financial 
year the factory only worked for seven months due to the hostilities but profits were only 15 percent 
down on the previous period. In these seven months output o f pianos totalled 353 against 466 in the full 
twelve months of the preceding year. Dividends were, however, passed due to the need for liquid funds 
to finance “the increase in our turnover which has taken place in the past few years” (36). In the 
following year output of pianos were the highest since 1923 (37). Profits rose by a half and dividends 
were resumed. Profits were higher again in the year to March, 1940 even after taking consideration of the 
depreciation of the dollar.
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PART IV  -  INTERFACE WITH OTHER FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS IN MAINLAND 
CHINA.
(A) OVERVIEW.
The Table below gives the writers estimates o f the value o f  industrial investment by the various non- 
Chinese nationalities in Mainland China. The information available from the main sources used (1) as 
a basis for these estimates for pinpointing non-UK investment is unfortunately only available for the 
three snapshot years shown.
1914 1930 1936
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
UK 14.4 48 24.8 28 26.4 25
Other Western Countries 1 1 25 10.3 12 M 8
- Russia 2.9 10 3.1 4 0.9 1
- Germany 2.0 6 0.8 I 0.7 I
- France 0.6 2 0.8 1 0.8 1
- Belgium 0.4 1 0.3 - 0.3 -
-USA 1.1 4 4.4 5 4.3 4
- Other 0.5 2 0,9 1 1.4 1
Japan M 27 53.6 60 72.0 67
Total 29.9 100 88.7 100 106.8 100
* Converted at average exchange rates for the year concerned.
There seems to have been no detrioration in the share of the UK in total foreign industrial investment 
in Mainland China between 1895 and 1914 judging from relating the UK figure to the total figure 
given by a Chinese source for foreign industrial investment at the beginning o f this period (2). By the 
1930s the UK share had almost halved due to the upsurge in Japanese investment although the UK 
share advanced in terms of the ratio to that of other Western countries.
(B) INTERFACE WITH OTHER WESTERN INTERESTS.
Other Western countries obviously were desirous of exploiting the investment possibilities offered by the 
Treaty o f Shimonoseki. Table Seven gives further estimates made by the author o f the value of industrial 
investments bv sectors made by Western competitors and the comparison with the UK position for the three 
years pinpointed above. Table Eight gives for many industrial sectors the number of these Western 
enterprises engaged at certain points of time.
In terms of the total value of investment (but not necessarily in terms of the greatest competitive interface 
with UK interests) the leading countries by 1914 were Russia and Germany (see the table above). The First 
World War had severe consequences for the level of German investment with the loss o f the concession in 
Shandong being the major factor and by 1936 there was a similar decline in Russian investment. The USA 
became by far the Western leader apart from the UK in the level of investment by the 1930s. There were a 
variety o f reasons that included
- the decline in the level o f German and Russian investment.
- the large rise in the value o f investment by B.A.T.
- that this rise in the level of investment by the USA did not lead to a fall in the ratio of UK investment to 
that of other Western countries. In fact the reverse was true
TABLE SEVEN-
ESTIMATED INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT BY WESTERN ENTERPRISES (OTHER 
THAN UK CONCERNS) IN MAINLAND CHINA - £ MTT LION*
Russia
1914
Germany France Belgium USA Other Total (UK)
Total 2 3 2 3 0 6 M LI 05 73 (14,4)
Mining
Engineering/
0.4 0.9 0.2 “ *“ 1.5 (3.3)
metals 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0,5 (1.0)
Chemicals 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.5 (0.4)
Cotton textiles - 0.2 - - 0.2 - 0.4 (0.4)
Other textiles - 0.1 0.1 - - - 0.2 (0.1)
Food/drink 2.0 0.4 02 01 0 5 01 3.3 (1.8)
Tobacco 0.1 - - - - 0.2 0.3 (6.2)
Electrical ind. - - - - - - - ( - )
Press packing,etc - 0.1 - - - 0.1 ( 1.0)
Other
1930
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 (0-2)
Total 33 M 0 8 03 fL4 09 10.3 (24.8)
Mining
Engineering/
0.5 0.1 ” “ - 0,6 (4.0)
metals 0.2 0.2 0 2 - 0.5 - 1.1 (0.8)
Chemicals 0.2 0.2 0.2 - 0.5 0.1 1.2 (0.8)
Cotton textiles - - - - - - (1.2)
Other textiles neg. - - - 0.6 - 0.6 (0.1)
Food/drink 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.3 3.7 (1-6)
Tobacco 0,1 - - - - 0.4 0.5 (15.0)
Electrical ind. - - - - 1.4 - 1.4 ( - )
Press packing, etc - - - - 0.1 0.1 (0.8)
Other
1936
0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.1 (0.5)
Total 0 9 0 7 M 03 43 1 4 SA (2M )
Mining
Engineering/
0.2 0.1 - “ 0,3 (4.1)
metals - 0.2 0.2 - 0.4 0.6 1.4 (0.8)
Chemicals - 0.1 0.2 - 0.5 0.1 0.9 (0.8)
Cotton textiles - - - - - - - ( 1.8)
Other textiles - - - - 0.5 - 0.5 (1.0)
Food/drink 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.4 2.6 (2.5)
Tobacco neg. - - - - 0.2 0.2 (13.7)
Electrical ind. - - - - 1.4 - 1.4 ( “)
Press packing, etc - - - - 0.1 - 0.1 (1.0)
Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0,1 1.0 (0-7)
^Converted at average exchange rates for years concerned.
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TABLE EIGHT.
NUMBER OF WESTERN ENTERPRISES fOTHER THAN UK CONCERNS! IN MAINLAND CHINA
1914 1926 1939
Sawmills.
German 2 1 -
Russian 8 7 1
American - 1
Egg products.
French 1 1
Belgian 1 1  i
German 5 2 -
Ameriean 4 5 3
Cement and Brick Works,
Russian 2 1
Belgian 1 1  i
French - 2 1
German 2 3
Italian 1 -
Distilleries.
Russian 15 10 2
Austrian 1 _
French l
Breweries.
Russian 7 3 I
Austrian 1
German 3
Norwegian - l i
Soft Drinks.
German l
Greek - 1 1
American - I I
Russian 3 2 -
Marine Engineering/Other Engineering.
French 3 2 2
Russian - 1 _
German l
American - l i
Swiss 1
Italian 1
Flour mills.
Russian 11 7
French 1
Glass.
Russian 1
American [
Tanning.
French I
Russian l
Oil mills / bean cake.
Russian 13 1
Italian - 1
Marble works.
Italian l
Soan and Candles.
Russian 8 1 -
American 2 2 -
German 1
Smelting works.
Russian 1
German 2
-154-
1914 1926 1939
Tobacco industry
Greek 4 3 1
Russian 3 4 I
Brick tea.
Russian 6 4 2
Carpets/rugs.
American - 9 6
German I
Cork making.
Belgian 1 1
Italian 1 1 1
Sources The China Year Book, trade directories, etc.
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Value o f industrial investment by the UK as percentage of thaf o f other Western countries.
%
1914 192
1930 241
1936 314
The varying positions of the leading Western investing countries in relation to their competitive interface 
with the industrial interests of the UK in China is assessed below. The geographic pattern of investment by 
the various countries was strongly, albeit varyingly, influenced by their acquisition of various spheres of 
influence. A brief description of these has been given in PART I  and the section on each country given 
below refers further to these and changes as the situation developed.
(1) RUSSIAN INVESTMENT.
As early as the 1860s Russian tea merchants established brick tea factories (using tea dust and low 
quality tea leaves) in the interior with the purpose of exporting to Russia. By 1868 there were 3 Russian 
brick tea factories in Hankou -  by 1878 6 (3 with steam-powered machines) (3). In 1872 the first Russian 
brick tea factory was erected in Fujian -  by the 1880s there were 7 such factories in Fujian (4). Another 
centre that developed was Jiujiang. In 1891 the Russians closed some factories in Fujian in favour of the 
other locations (4). By 1894 there were 7 Russian firms that were engaged in this business in China with
7,000 employees (c. 5,000 in Hankou, c. 1,000 each in Fujian and Jiujiang) and with total assets o f $5,600 
thous. (£560 thous.),(5).
Investment in brick tea factories was the total of Russian investment up to the end of the 1890s -  tea 
processing was not a field which British companies entered on any scale.The Chinese started using superior 
technology for the firing and processing o f tea (other than brick tea) and, in any case, foreigners could not 
develop plantations on the pattern of India and Ceylon whose teas provided increasing competition to 
Chinese tea in the UK market (6).
The situation as regards Russian investment then changed markedly with the Russian incursion into 
Manchuria in the late 1890s. Although access to the raw material bounty of Manchuria was attractive the 
main incentive was imperialistic ambition. The ice free harbours of Port Arthur (Lushun) and Dalian on the 
Liaodong Peninsula and the building of strategic railways was the prime motive. In 1896 the Russians 
gained a concession for building the Chinese Eastern Railway running across North Manchuria to 
Vladivostok. In March, 1898 Russia gained a lease for 25 years on the Liaodong Peninsula and the right to 
construct a railway linking Harbin on the Chinese Eastern Railway with the two ports.
Although not the primary motive the establishment of this Russian presence in Manchuria stimulated 
Russian industrial investment in that territory. The development o f the railway zones stimulated the 
development o f ancillary activities and supplies, particularly coal for the railways. Apart from the 
stationing of Russian troops and seamen there was an influx of Russian civilians. During the Russo- 
Japanese War the amount of Russian civilians in Manchuria reached the 100,000 mark (7). After the War 
the number decreased but by 1911 there were still around 58,000 (7), This substantial community provided 
a useful outlet for any local Russian enterprises.
Before the outbreak o f the Russo -  Japanese War the Chinese Eastern Railway and others had started, for 
instance, developing coal mining operations in all three provinces of Manchuria. Thus, in 1902 the
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Zhalainuoer lignite mine in Heilongjiang was opened. In 1903 output was 17 thous. tons and by 1905 it 
had reached 469 thous. tons (8). After 1906 (448 thous. tons) it fell off sharply and in 1914 it amounted to 
172 thous. tons (8). The next largest output was achieved in 1921 -  306 thous. tons (9). The principal outlet 
for the mine’s output was for use on the Chinese Eastern Railway -  in some years virtually the only outlet 
(for example, in 1921 railway use accounted for 96.7 percent of sales as against 87.2 percent in 1913 (10)). 
By 1914 investment in the mine amounted to £0.4 million (11), The low calorific value of the output o f the 
mine meant that it was no competitive threat to either British or Japanese mines in North China. In Jilin two 
mines were started near Changchun while in Liaoning the Russians stated developing mines at Fushun 
(1903) and Yentai (1899) -  the former in a minority venture (37.5%) with a Chinese interest. Their total 
investment amounted to £130 thous. The most progress was made with the development of the Fushun 
mine with initial output in the region of 130 thous. tons per annum (12).
(There was also some Russian investment in mining in Outer Mongolia -  the 1898 gold mining concern o f 
The Mongolor Company (an abbreviated name) with an issued capital of £190 thous. The maximum output 
(1911) was 59,600 ounces of gold (13). However, 1912 saw this area become independent of China.)
After the Russo -  Japanese War the concessions in Jilin and Liaoning fell into Japanese control. The Jilin 
field was allowed to lapse because of its inferior coal (14) by the Japanese but Fushun became the largest 
mining complex in China. Also, the Yentai mine began to be operated on a commercial basis in 1910.
In 1924 the Muleng Coal Mining Company was formed as a 50%/50% venture of the Jilin provincial 
government and local Russian merchants in Harbin. The merchants put in $3 million as capital - the 
provincial government contributed the mining rights (15). Output reached 106 thous, tons in 1926 and the 
peak production of 338 thous. tons was in 1931 (16) - even at this level it was modest. The output was of 
fairly inferior bituminous coal.
In March, 1935 the Chinese Eastern Railway was sold by the Russian Government to Japan and thus the 
Zhalainuoer mine was transferred to the joint Japanese /  Manchukuo company of the Manchuria Coal 
Mining Company. In that year output was only 53 thous. tons (17)
In addition to investment in mining, the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the influx of 
Russian civilians into Manchuria and the stationing of Russian troops in that area meant an upsurge o f 
Russian investment in industry -  predominantly light industry.
The first Russian flour mill was established in Harbin in 1900 -  by 1902 there were 3 Russian owned 
mills (18) and by 1904 13 mills were in operation, virtually all in Harbin (19). Flour milling was the most 
important Russian investment in the food sector but there was also significant investment in >
- Beet sugar. In 1908 a sugar mill was established by two Russian Poles in the vicinity of Harbin. It was 
capitalised at £105 thous (20). By 1915 deliveries had reached 2,065 tons (21). In 1925 the plant was closed 
on bankruptcy but it was reopened in 1934 as a Polish / Japanese enterprise -  the North Manchuria Sugar 
Manufacturing Company -  which accounted for 35 percent of Manchurian sugar output in 1938 (22).
- Soya bean processing.
In 1900 the first Russian owned distillery in Manchuria was founded. By 1914 there were about 14 -  half 
for vodka. Similar progress was made in the development o f a brewing industry (see Table Eight). There 
was also minor progress in soft drinks -  including an installation of the Chinese Eastern Railway (1924).
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Cigarette production (Russian type with a mouthpiece) began in 1898 when A. Lopato and Sons set up a 
factory in Harbin (23). Another important enterprise was the factory of the Tschurin Tobacco Company 
which came on stream in 1914 and was extended in 1923 (24). I.I. Tschurin and Company, Limited was a 
large firm primarily engaged in wholesale and retail business and as an importer. Apart from its cigarette 
manufacturing it also had factories making paints, sausages and vodka.
The tobacco industry was the only industrial sector where at first sight there could have been a 
competitive interface with British interests i.e. B.A.T who had had a manufacturing presence in Manchuria 
since 1908. However, in 1913 B.A.T. gained a financial interest in the Lopato company’s factory and their 
relationship was reinforced in 1918 by the creation of a joint venture (Alliance Tobacco Company) with the 
majority owned by B.A.T. (25), Competition for B.A.T. from Tschurin was slight -  in 1936 compared with
B.A.T.’s 55 cigarette machines in Manchuria the Tschurin Tobacco Company had only a (reduced) 3 (26). 
The Tschurin cigarette factory temporarily stopped production in December, 1937.
Other industries that were developed by the Russians before the First World War included consumer 
chemicals (soap, candles, etc) and wood processing. By 1916 the distribution of Russian investment in their 
stronghold in Northern Manchuria was as follows (27) :-
Number of factories. Number of labourers.
Flour mills 12 591
Oil mills 13 720
Distilleries 15 432
Cigarettes 3 190
Metal processing 1 100
Sugar 1 400
Glass 1 25
Mineral water 2 31
Soap 2 II
Wool washing 5 ?
Tamtine 2 ?
Total 57 ?
The situation in Northern Manchuria changed markedly after the War and the Russian Revolution and the 
civil war that ensued. The local Russian population increased to over 140,000 in 1920 from 60,000 in 1918 
(28) with an influx of White Russians, particularly in 1920, and these brought with them some former 
entrepreneurs. This stimulated the development of some new industrial sectors such as canning, garments, 
footwear, etc. There was also some expansion of established industrial sectors. However, things became 
difficult for the Russian population -  with a particular concentration in Harbin -  as they became 
increasingly isolated. There were confrontations in factories between White Russians and Soviet trade 
unions. Relations with the Chinese authorities at Harbin also deteriorated. Many Russian manufacturing 
enterprises were sold or became joint ventures with Japanese and other interests.
Outside Manchuria, the brick tea trade fell sharply after the War (the quantity of exports of tea to Russia 
in 1923 was only 1.1 percent of the 1909 level (29)) and coupled with the sale of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway with its several investments locally in industrial activities and the decline in Manchuria of 
industries owned by people of Russian origin this meant that by 1939 Russian investment was very much 
reduced. There was by 1939 only a few surviving Russian enterprises (Table Eight).
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(2) GERMAN INVESTMENT.
Apart from the special case of brick tea firms, the pattern of Russian investment in Mainland China 
could almost be regarded as resultant from their imperialist moves into Manchuria. The situation was 
different in the case of Germany. The Germans were very keen to expand their trade with China as evinced 
by the creation in 1889 of the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank -  a joint venture of major German banks. German 
merchant firms were very active in the Treaty Ports. Thus, German companies went from merchant 
activities to become involved in industrial enterprises, particularly in Shanghai. Parallel to this was the 
desire o f the German Navy to acquire a coaling station in East Asia as already obtained by the other major 
powers. Admiral Tirpitz had already selected for acquisition Jiaozhou Wan harbour as an excellent naval 
base when the murder of two German missionaries in Shandong gave a pretext for occupying Jiaozhou. By 
the subsequent convention o f March, 1898 Germany secured a 99 year lease on a 30 mile enclave covering 
the city of Jiao Xian and the port of Qingdao. Qingdao was built up by the Germans to become the “Riviera 
of the Far East”. In addition, Germany acquired rights to invest in railways in Shandong and to develop 
mining property within ten miles on either side of the track. This plus the energetic development of 
Qingdao led to an upsurge in German industrial development in Shandong.
One of the first few cotton spinning companies of foreign ownership to be established in China was the 
Soy Chee (Rui Ji) Cotton Spinning Company which was incorporated in November, 1895. It was 
incorporated under German law with an authorised (and fully paid up) capital of one million taels (£140 
thous.). The instigators and general managers were the local German merchant firm of Amhold Karberg. 
On stream in April, 1897 (30), the initial intended complement of 40,000 spindles was quickly reached 
(31). By 1915 there were 50,768 spindles installed but no weaving capacity was installed. By that date the 
Jardine Matheson mills in Shanghai had, in contrast, three times this spindleage and also had weaving 
capacity. This relatively minor competitor to British mills (in which anyway there was British financial 
involvement and Board representation) became as already noted, after reconstruction, in May, 1917 a 
British company under the name of The Oriental Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited.
In 1894 the Jui-lan Silk Filature was established with 1,100 workers, 480 basins and a capital of 480 
thous. taels (67 thous.) (32). In 1902 another German filature was established in Qingdao -  the Deutsche 
Chinesische Seiden - Industrie Gesellschaft with a capital of 1,800,000 Marks (£90 thous.) (33). Starting 
production in 1904 with 1,500 employees, it suspended operations in 1909. In 1910 it was sold to a Chinese 
firm (33).
Other light industry sectors founded by German investors before the First World War, many o f which 
were related to German development of Qingdao, included (see Table Eight) >
- albumen. In the early part of the last century German factories were set up in Hankou, Wuhu, etc but 
the trade soon declined for a variety of reasons -  competition in Western markets from synthetic 
substitutes, quality problems, difficulty in acquiring good salt, etc.
" food.
- soap and candles.
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- pharmaceuticals, at Voelkel and Schroeder A.G. Founded in 1905 with a paid-up capital of $150,000 (£ 
13 thous.) it was taken over in March, 1919 by the American Drug Company. (34).
- feather cleaning. The Shanghai Feather Cleaning Company was established in 1897 with a capital of
60,000 taels (£5 thous.). (35). By 1898 with the works on stream the capital amounted to 150,000 taels (£14 
thous.). (36).
- drinks (both alcoholic and non-alcoholich On the margin o f German investment was The Anglo- 
German Brewery Company, Limited founded in 1904 by a syndicate of various nationalities but with 
British and German interests dominating. Although this company had throughout a British Chairman, had 
at least an equality o f British directors (sometimes more) and was registered as a British company in Hong 
Kong and is here (see PART III -  Chapter Seven) regarded as a British company, it had German managers 
and brewers at the brewery in Qingdao, German sales agents and the Deutsche -  Asiatische Bank as their 
bankers. (37). During the First World War the tensions were unbearable. In August, 1916 it was announced 
that it was “impossible to carry on the company and procure the services o f a British Board of Directors 
who would devote the time and energy to a concern, the success of which would prove of indirect benefit to 
German shareholders”. (38). The brewery was thus sold to Dai Nippon Brewery -  brewers of Asahi beer - 
for $500 thous. (£52 thous.) in December, 1916. (39). There were, however, some other brewery companies 
that were undisputably German -  in particular the Union Brewery (with a capital in 1913 of $400,000 - £35 
thous.) in Shanghai.
- press packing.
Apart from modest investment before the First World War in sawmills, building materials and antimony 
smelting works (in 1905 Carlowitz and Company began operating a large antimony smelter in Wuchang 
(40)), the main investment in heavy industry was in mining although there was some commercial activity at 
the Tsingtau Werft which was opened in 1905. This shipyard could both build and repair vessels (by 1914 
it had built 22 vessels and it also possessed a large floating dock (410 feet by 128 feet) with a capacity of 
handling 16,000 tons. It was removed by the Japanese after the First World War). (41). This yard was 
engaged in commercial work as well as catering for the needs of the German navy which accounted for 60 
percent of its business. (41). As the British shipyards were concentrated in Shanghai this posed no 
significant threat to them.
In October, 1899 the Schantung Bergbau Gesellschaft was established with a capital of 12 million Marks 
(£600 thous.). (42). (It was subsequently (1912) taken over by the Shantung Railway Company). Two coal 
mines were started :-
- Fangzi, 102 miles from Qingdao. On stream in 1902.
- Zichuan, 168 miles from Qingdao. On stream in 1906.
By 1912 the firm employed 60 Germans and 7,000 Chinese. It was obliged to sell the requirements o f the 
Imperial Navy* at 5 percent below the market price in Qingdao. Also, because of transport costs from the 
interior to Qingdao and elsewhere the mines could not compete with the products of the Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Company. In the year to end March, 1913 with sales o f 613 thous. tons, 170 thous 
tons were shipped outside Shandong but this included sales to ship’s bunkers i.e. exports were small.(43).
*The German East Asiatic Squadron under Vice Admiral Graf von Spee was based here on the outbreak 
of war in 1914.
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Output from Fangzi peaked in 1911/12 and the bulk of the firm’s output was then from Zichuan with its 
superior quality o f coal (44)
- Thousand tons -
Years to end March Fangzi Zichuan Total
1903 9 - 9
1904 51 - 51
1905 101 - 101
1906 137 - 137
1907 164 15 179
1908 149 41 190
1909 250 72 322
1910 273 183 456
1911 195 237 432
1912 289 170 459
1913 199 414 613
1914 (calendar) 132 372 504
The Japanese took control of these mines plus an iron ore mine with an annual output of 350 thous. tons 
early in the First World War. (The iron ore mine which was operated by the Shantung Railway Company 
was situated at Jinlingzhen about 180 miles from Qingdao). In 1923 the mines began to be worked by a 
50/50 Sino-Japanese concern -  the Luda Mining Company (see below) following the Washington 
Conference where the Japanese agreed in February 1922, to return the former German leased territory to 
China and transfer the former German mining rights to this Sino-Japanese company.
More long-lived was the German participation in the Jingxing Mining Administration which operated a 
bituminous coal mine in Hebei. Contact between this mine, founded by the Chinese in 1880, and German 
interests, headed by General von Hanneken, began in 1898 with the aim o f using German investment to 
modernise the operations. It was not until 1903, however, that an accommodation was arrived at with the 
authorities and a joint venture with a capital, equally divided, of 500 thous. tads (£60 thous.) commenced 
operations. (45).
At the beginning o f hostilities between China and Germany in 1917 the mine was taken over by the 
authorities. In 1922 cooperation was resumed but the German share o f the capital of $4,500 thous. was 
limited to 25 percent. (45). Production rose sharply reaching a peak of 882 thous. tons in 1936 compared 
with 257 thous. tons in 1914.
After the First World War, with the loss of the German position in Shandong being an important 
influence, the level o f German investment was reduced from its pre-War level not just in mining but in 
other industrial sectors (see Table Eight). By the 1930s the main German presence in the Chinese market 
was via imports from Germany - a very important category being chemicals especially dyestuffs and 
fertilisers. In the latter case there was a possibility of local production by I.G.Farben Industrie and ICI of 
the UK. This did not materialise - -see PART III, Chapter Five above.
(3) FRENCH INVESTMENT.
As mentioned in PART /, France enjoyed a sphere of influence in the far Southern provinces plus 
rights to the construction of a 289 mile railway from Indochina to Yunnan. Investment in Yunnan, etc was, 
however, limited due partly to local resistance (see below). Also, in terms o f French investment in the Far 
East, Indochina exerted a much greater pull and in the period before the First World War French
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investment overseas was earmarked to a significant extent by the enormous loans that were made by the 
French to Tsarist Russia.
In the rest of China investment was fairly small -  mainly in engineering in Shanghai (with a long lasting 
French concession), chemicals (industrial gases at the Far East Oxygen and Acetylene Company, Limited 
belonging To Air Liquide), etc, building products and food. Only in marine engineering -  in the form of 
Societe Franco-Chinoise de Constructions Mdtalliques et Mecanique (belomging to to Messageries 
Maritimes, Schneider and Chinese interests) -  was there any interface of significance with British firms. 
However, their Kiousin works in Shanghai was fairly small in both shipbuilding and ship repairing against 
British interests in Shanghai. Thus, for example, their dry docking capacity in the 1930s was only slightly 
more than a tenth of the British capacity in Shanghai.
(4) BELGIAN INVESTMENT.
The threshold o f the Twentieth Century was the high noon of Belgian economic imperialism with the 
patronage and support of an avaricious monarch (Leopold H). Flushed with the success of the economic 
(and human) exploitation o f the Congo, eyes were turned to China. In 1899 and the first quarter o f 1900 
alone about seven “colonial companies” were formed in Belgium specifically aimed at the Far East, 
especially China. (46). On March 28th, 1900 the Compagnie Internationale d’Orient was formed to be a 
coordinating and facilitating agency for Belgian initiatives in China -  thus meeting the desire of Leopold II 
for such an organisation. (47). Many of the individuals involved in the exploitation of the Congo were also 
involved in Belgian initiatives connected with China - in particular Colonel Albert Thys, an army engineer 
who supervised the construction o f the Congo Railway. It is thus no coincidence that Belgian projects in 
China (either direct or via UK interests -  see below) had a leaning towards mining and railways.
Orchestrating Belgian initiatives in China was the King:- 
“It is in the national interest that Belgians should take full advantage o f the business opportunities 
available in China and it is my job to further the national interest.” (48)
However, beyond this role as prime mover, the King backed this up by personal financial involvement. It is 
calculated that the King invested about 12 million Belgian francs (£470,000) into various commercial and 
financial enterprises in China. O f this 3 million francs (£120 thous.) was spent on the Chinese Engineering 
and Mining Company, Limited. (49).
The initial impact was principally in coal mining. In 1897 the Lincheng mine in Hebei accepted a loan 
from Belgian interests. In 1905 the arrangement was formalised with the formation o f the Lincheng Mining 
Administration -  a joint venture of the Lincheng Colliery and the Belgian company of Societe des Mines de 
Luhan (a subsidiary of the Societe d’etude des chemins de fer en Chine). The capital of the Societe des 
Mines du Luhan was 2.5 million Belgian francs (£100 thous.) -  74 percent Belgian and 25 percent French. 
(50). King Leopold with 50 thous. shares held 2 percent. (51). By 1914 the output of the jointly worked 
mine had reached 290 thous. tons. However, in 1920 the mine reverted to 100 percent Chinese control with 
repayment of the Belgian financial interest. The Societe des Mines de Luhan also had, starting in 1914, a 
financial interest in the Liuhegou mining company in Henan (mine started in 1903). However, on 
repayment of the loans in 1919 the mine became once more 100 percent Chinese owned.
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Belgian investment in other sectors was small -  in food (the Societe Anonyme Pour 1’Industrie des 
Oeufs -  SAPIO -  with factories in Tianjin and Hankou), building materials, ceramics and cork 
manufacture.
However, the figures given in Table Seven for French and Belgian participation in the mining sector 
underestimate their real involvement as they exclude the involvement o f investors from these countries in 
companies registered in the UK with the aim of engaging in mining in China (in some cases these 
companies did not get beyond the company formation or concession stages). Participation in this manner by 
other European countries was small -  the leading country being Germany.
At the turn of the Nineteenth Century, London was the World centre for the formation and financing of 
mining ventures and also a centre of mining expertise in the form of firms specialising as mining engineers, 
mine managers and financiers. The involvement of Belgian and French interests took two forms :-
(a) Formal joint ventures registered as such on the London Stock Exchange. This only occurred in the case 
of UK/French ventures. The London Stock Exchange was efficient in raising capital and a joint venture 
saved the large capital needed for a mining venture and reduced risk.
(b) Belgian and French investors taking (substantial) shareholdings in UK registered companies dedicated 
to mining in Mainland China.
In the case of companies registered elsewhere, both these forms of participation were not confined to the 
mining sector :-
- in the case of the former, the example of the Chinese Aluminium Rolling Mills, Limited which was a 
joint Swiss, British and Canadian venture albeit in practical terms Swiss managed (see below).
- in the case of the latter, the example, again mentioned below, of the Yah-Loong Cotton Spinning 
Company, Limited -  American managed (Fearon, Daniel and Company) but with a substantial presence of 
British capital.
However, in terms of the scale of capital involved it was most significant in the mining sector,
(a) Joint Mining Ventures Registered in the UK.
Svndicat du Yunnan. Limited.
In May, 1899 a group of influential French financiers instituted in Paris the Syndicat Minier du 
Yunnan (52). It was decided to seek British involvement
the proximity o f the potential mining areas to British areas o f influence in Burma and the 
Yangzi.
the Salisbury -  Courcel Agreement of 1896 (Clause 4) whereby any privileges secured by 
either country in Yunnan or Sichuan would be shared by both countries.
In October, 1899 the Anglo - French Syndicate was registered in London. With the introduction of a 
further Franco -  British consortium, the company was reconstructed and renamed in April, 1900. The 
authorised capital o f £35 thous. o f the Syndicat du Yunnan, Limited (all issued by 1906) was to be split 
equally between French and British interests as was the eight strong Board. The new company’s Agent- 
General in China was the French Consul-General Emile Rocher (connected with Yunnan since 1872) - 
placed at the Syndicat’s disposal by the French foreign minister. In 1902 Rocher’s efforts secured for the
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Syndicat a concession conferring mining and other rights over seven departments in the province of 
Yunnan. “This happy result would not have been reached had we not been supported by the two 
Governments o f France and England.. . ( 5 3 ) .
From 1903 to 1906 operations were limited pending railway completion (the New Hanoi Yunnan -fu 
Railway) and local unrest but a business in the purchase and export of tin produced by mines worked by the 
Chinese was developed. The Syndicat then decided to make a beginning o f independent working of tin. It 
transferred its rights in one o f the departments to a French company -  the Societe d’ Exploitation de Ling- 
Ngan -  in which it took a 42.6 percent share (22.5 percent was held by the Yangtse Valley Company -  see 
below).
A hornet’s nest was stirred up. Local opposition became furious both from the gentry and those involved 
with the local mines (54). The golden years for obtaining mining concessions were over and both centrally 
and in the provinces a policy was adopted o f refusing concessions and recovering those already granted 
(“TheRights Recovery Movement”). The directors stated that “...efforts have been made to energetically 
develop the concession held by the Syndicat du Yunnan but unfortunately these efforts have, to a large 
exrent, been frustrated by the opposition o f the local Chinese authorities” (55) Anti-foreign societies such 
as the Society for Determined Struggle of the Yunnanese were formed. (56). A local official involved in 
stymieing the company’s plans was rewarded with a substantial promotion after the French Legation’s 
formal protest at his actions. (57).
Given the situation, negotiations were entered into in 1911 with the Chinese Government. The 
Government offered 1,500,000 taels for the rights and property of the Syndicat including those of the 
Societe d’Exploitation de Ling-Ngan. This offer was reckoned by the Syndicat to be worth £190,650 of 
which the Syndicat’s share was about £93,000 (the Yangtse Valley Company being the main other 
recipient). The offer -  to be paid in instalments -  was accepted. After the final instalment the Syndicat was 
wound up voluntarily in 1922.
Anglo-French Quicksilver and Mining Concession (Kwei-Chau Province') of China. Limited.
This company was registered in the UK in March, 1899. Three of the eight strong Board were French 
residents. The authorised capital -  all issued by 1903 -  was £310 thous. Entry into iron mining and 
smelting proved to be a failure and the company concentrated on mercury. (58). A quicksilver furnace was 
in operation by 1902 despite the severe logistic difficulties of operating in China in the absence of railways 
and developed river transportation -  30 men had to be employed for six weeks to convey a boiler over 17 
miles. (59). By 1903 two furnaces were in operation - three by 1908. Output from the mines reached 55 
thous. tons per annum of cinnabar (sulphite of mercury). (60).
Progress was, however, disappointing and in March, 1906 the company was reconstructed into a new UK 
company of the same name. Indicating the change in ownership the three man Board was all British. The 
business was still, however, absorbing cash. From January, 1906 to November, 1911 sales of mercury, 
cinnabar, etc amounted to £34.2 thous. whereas expenditure on fixed assets totalled £54.5 thous. and 
administrative expenses £6.8 thous. (61). By 1912 the mines were closed permanently. The Company 
blamed local unrest during the 1911 Revolution (62) but this seems to be only a partial explanation -  poor 
mining performance being another. (63). The company was wound up in 1917.
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(b) Belgian and French Investment Participation in UK Registered Mining Companies.
Belgian financial interests were closely involved in the takeover from Chinese control of the Kaiping 
mines in 1901 by a process that could, even very charitably, be regarded as financial sleight of hand (as 
described in PART III, Chapter Two). Belgian shareholders took 37.7 percent of the first issue o f shares by 
the vehicle used in the takeover of the Chinese concern -  the Oriental Syndicate, Limited (German interests 
took 12.2 percent). (STATISTICAL ANNEX -  TABLE X). Members of the Belgian financial 
establishment also had a share of the finance granted to the Chinese concern. On the formation o f the 
Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited which took over the assets of the Chinese concern, 
investors in Belgium were the largest group of shareholders (STATISTICAL ANNEX -  TABLE Z)
Percentage of initial allotment of shares by location.
Original shareholders of the Chinese company 37.5* (Chinese/Foreign)
New shareholders in China 5.0
Oriental Syndicate 15.0
UK 13.3
France 2.5
Germany 0.8
China (American/Europeans) 2.0
Belgium 23.6
Other (European) 0.3
100.0
*Some of these were believed to have been snapped up by the Belgian company of Compagnie 
Internationale d’ Orient using “insider” information o f the impending takeover.
In addition, Belgian investors accounted for 62.0 percent of the debenture issue to finance the new 
company (STATISTICAL ANNEX -  TABLE Z). With the winding up of the Oriental Syndicate in 1902, 
shareholders in Belgium held 27 percent o f the capital of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, 
Limited plus an unknown amount acquired in China. Many UK shareholders subsequently parted with their 
shares to Belgians. By 1915 Belgian shareholders held about 40 percent of the total capital. (64). The first 
Chairman of the Company was Belgian plus strong Belgian participation on the Board and in management 
of the mines. Until the Second World War the Company had a separate main office in Brussels as well as in 
London.
One o f the purchasers of additional shares in the Company was King Leopold II. He acquired 9,100 of the 
original issue of shares (65) and further purchases brought his holding up to 120,230 (12 percent of the 
total) by the end of 1903 (66) -  at his death (1909) his holding had been halved -  62,803 shares. (67). He 
also had a holding in the Eastern Pioneer Company (68) -  see below- and in 1898/9 had attempted (without 
success) to ease the way for Belgian investment in the Pekin Syndicate. (69).
Belgian finance was also involved to a significant extent in the following UK mining companies :-
- Eastern Pioneer Company. Limited. Although registered as a UK company in October, 1899 half o f the 
capital (£300 thous. was eventually issued) was Belgian. The King had £18 thous. worth of the shares. (70). 
Attempts to exploit a mining concession in Sichuan secured in April, 1899 by the founder of the concern -  
a Mr William Pritchard-Morgan -  were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons and the company was wound 
up in 1921. The concession was transferred to a successor company - the Yang-tse Corporation, Limited 
(founded in 1898). There was a similar lack of success.
- Yangtse Valiev Company. Limited. Founded in 1900, this company with a peak issued capital o f £96 
thous., had, judging by the composition of the initial Board of Directors, a one third Belgian interest. Apart
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from its minority venture with the Syndicat du Yunnan (see above) no progress was made as regards 
mining in China and the Company’s only activity was shareholdings in railways, public utilities, etc in 
China, etc. The company went into voluntary liquidation in 1940.
- China Exploration Company, Limited. Although registered in the UK in February, 1899 the 
shareholders were mainly Belgian. Out of the capital (authorised £80 thous. -  issued £18 thous.) 91 percent 
was Belgian and the balance British. (71). A mining engineer was engaged to prospect in China but nothing 
ensued. Again, in May 1899 discussions with Mr Pritchard-Morgan (see above) to finance the Sichuan 
venture proved abortive. The company went into voluntary liquidation in 1904.
French participation via shareholdings in British registered mining companies was most significant in the 
cases of the Pekin Syndicate. Limited of March, 1897. By 1905 the issued capital o f this company 
amounted to £1243 thous. and it was the next largest UK mining enterprise in China after the Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Company, Limited. Continental shareholders gradually increased in importance 
and a sharp rise in the Syndicate’s share price in 1909/10 induced many British shareholders to sell out. In 
February, 1910 the British Chairman and his associates were ousted from the Board. French (and Belgian) 
shareholdings further increased -  by 1911 the French alone had a controlling interest. (72). The two joint 
managing directors were French.
The period of French control lasted until 1923. French interests closely connected with the Syndicate 
promoted the Banque Industrielle de Chine (1913) in which the Chinese Government (30%) and the 
Syndicate (9%) also took shares. (73). After a promising start the Bank ran into great difficulties. The 
situation facing the Syndicate was very serious. Apart from its shareholdings in the Bank it had a large 
proportion of its very substantial cash resources on deposit at the Bank. The Syndicate weathered the storm 
but an affect o f the affair was to restore effective control of the Syndicate to British interests. At the 
ordinary general meeting o f the Syndicate in February, 1923 it was decided that while there was to be an 
equal number of French and British directors, the Chairman was to be British with a casting vote (74).
(5) AMERICAN INVESTMENT.
Unlike the major European powers the USA did not participate in the "scramble for concessions” but 
adopted and formally advocated to other powers the “Open Door” policy in 1899/1900. (This policy 
reflected the American preoccupation with competing interests to China at the turn of the century -  the war 
with Spain and the subsequent acquisition o f the Phillippines, Ruerto Rico and Guam. The period also saw 
the annexation of Hawaii, Wake Island and American Samoa.) Thus, apart from its long standing sharing of 
the International Settlement in Shanghai with the UK, there was no geo-strategic imperative attached to 
USA industrial investment in Mainland China. The economic aspirations o f the USA in China were 
different from the more “predatory” ambitions of the major European countries.
The USA was by the 1930s, next to the UK, the largest Western investor in industry in China. However, 
its influence in several sectors in which UK investment was predominant either failed to develop or after a 
good start relapsed. An example of the latter is cotton textiles. The International Cotton Manufacturing 
Company, Limited was formed in 1895 (75) as one of the four Western pioneers in this sector -  one 
American, in this case, one German (see above), and two British. Its original capital was one million taels 
(£140 thous.) but given the recession in this sector this was reduced by 25 percent in 1901. (76). By 1914
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the total o f issued capital and reserves totalled 1,254 thous. taels (£163 thous.). (77). As noted in PART III, 
Chapter Three above, in 1918 this mill was sold to Japanese interests. The other American venture in cotton 
textiles was short lived. The Yah-Loong Cotton Spinning Company was formed in 1897 with majority 
American ownership but with British and Chinese participation. It had 20,392 spindles by 1901 and also 
416 basins in a silk filature. (78). However, at the end of 1901 this business was bankrupted. The Russo- 
Chinese Bank, Limited had declared that unless the Company repaid its overdraft by November 24th, 1901 
it would foreclose. At a meeting on November 19th, 1901 the Company had no alternative but to accept. 
(78). A similar fate was shared by early American ventures in silk filatures.
There was no American involvement of any significance in mining in China (The Sino-American Yunnan 
Ming Hsing Mining Company was a joint venture of the Orient Mining Company of New York and the 
provincial government to work silver and lead mines but nothing developed). Also the 1920s saw the 
repulse by B.A.T. of moves by American based tobacco firms to challenge their supremacy in the Chinese 
market by B.A.T. eventually purchasing their Chinese interests (79) -  as described in PART III, Chapter 
One.
A sphere of investment in textiles in which the USA had a virtual monopoly of Western investment in 
China was carpets and rugs. The First World War gave a great impetus to this business. Exports of rugs and 
carpets from Turkey were virtually at a standstill while shipments of Persian and Turkistan rugs and carpets 
were restricted. (After the War European customers returned to these sources which were in terms of 
transport much more convenient for them than China). The American manufacturing facilities that were 
erected were principally in Tianjin but also in Beijing. Some of these enterprises also had associated 
spinning and dyeing facilities.
The major constituent of American investment in the food and drink sector was the egg processing 
business -  in particular, the two firms of Amos Bird Company (taken over in 1929 by the Borden 
Company), the largest, and Henningsen Produce Company whose factory was badly damaged in 1937. 
(80). These were substantial firms and provided a significant competitive element to the industry leaders -  
the three UK firms. However, in terms of scale, the UK producers held the advantage -  see PART III, 
Chapter Seven. Another source of competition for UK enterprises was in sound reproduction. The RCA 
Victor factory, employing 200 (81), provided competition for EMI (see PART III, Chapter Six above).
In chemicals the main investments were in matches, dyestuffs, soap and candles. The American Far 
Eastern Match Company employed about 600 workers in the late 1930s. (82).There was also some 
American investment in sectors such as wood products, paper making, leather belting, products for 
packaging, glass, etc. There was also the Bolton Bristle Company. Starting in 1918, it initially dressed 
bristles only. It then entered the field of bleaching white bristle. According to market conditions and season 
it employed 600-1,000. Its main market was in supplying toothbrush and hairbrush makers in the USA. 
(83).
However, the largest single item of American investment in the 1930s was in the sphere of engineering, 
machinery and electrical equipment -  especially the latter. Before the First World War American 
investment in these areas was minor but the situation was considerably altered by the 1920s and 1930s. In 
1917 the (American) General Electric started to make electric lamps on a limited scale in Shanghai at its 
subsidiary of China General Edison Company. (84). In 1918 the China Electric Company was formed as a
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50/50 venture of the Ministry of Communications and Western Electric. In 1925 Western Electric sold its 
interest in this joint venture, which included a telephone, telegraph and electric equipment plant in 
Shanghai, to International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.
In the 1920s General Electric expanded its Shanghai plant. By 1934 it had a labour force of 500-1,000 
with an output of 500,000 large lamps and 600,000 flash lights per month. (85). It also took a financial 
interest in Anderson Meyer and Company (originally Danish). (86). By the 1930s General Electric had 
acquired a controlling interest in Anderson Meyer. (87). From its Shanghai plant, which included a 
foundry, Anderson Meyer made window sashes, lathes, planers and other machine tools, etc plus standard 
electric apparatus. By the 1930s, in its original operation plus Anderson Meyer, General Electric employed 
2,400 -  2,500 employees in China. (87). In addition, General Electric via Anderson Meyer held a one third 
stake (balance one third Chinese and one third Sir Victor Sassoon) in the China Car and Foundry Company. 
At its peak this company employed 1,000 workers making railway passenger coaches and freight cars. 
Another American company in the electrical sector was National Carbon Company with a factory in 
Shanghai producing batteries and carbon products. In the electrical sector American interests dwarfed the 
small British involvement in this area.
(6) INVESTMENT BY OTHER COUNTRIES.
Investment in 1914 was modest -  the largest single item being investment in the tobacco industry by 
Greek concerns. Other sectors included drinks and building materials. The drinks sector became more 
important after the First World War with the transfer of the ownership of the previously German owned 
Union Brewery Company to Norwegian interests. In 1935 it constructed a new brewery which together 
with the old brewery had an annual capacity of 50 million bottles. (88). 1928 saw a greater involvement in 
the chemical industry when the Swedish Match Company gained control of two Japanese factories which 
had operated under the name of the Sui Sung Match Company. (89). Also 1933 saw the coming on stream 
of the Shanghai aluminium foil plant (for cigarette packaging, etc) of the Chinese Aluminium Rolling 
Mills, Limited. Based on imported material its capacity by 1940 was 5,000 tons per annum, it employed 
400 and represented an investment of £250 thous. (90). It was in practical terms a Swiss company (see 
above). The main Italian interests were in engineering -  in particular the Italian-Chinese Engineering 
Works, the marine engineering subsidiary of the shipping firm of China-Italian Navigation Company. (91).
As analysed above, the anatomy of the business sectors established by Western competitors would seem 
to suggest that the competition experienced by British firms from this source was less than inspection of 
Table Seven would first suggest. The segmentation noted above of the broad categories presented in Table 
Seven, both geographically and by product type, is revealing.
(i) Geographic segmentation.
The long distances involved and the inadequate transport system to a significant extent inhibited 
competition - particularly in the case of heavy industry. Thus the pre-First World War German mines in
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Shandong, due to their distance from the coast afforded little competition to the leading British controlled 
mine. The same applied to the Russian mines in North Manchuria. (There were also structural factors in 
both cases further inhibiting competition -  the commitment of the Shandong mines to supply the naval 
squadron at Qingdao and the prime need of the Russian Zhalainuoer mine to meet the requirements of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway). Thus the apparent competitive threat of the Russian and German mines to UK 
interests as might be inferred from the figures in Table Seven is not justified. The same situation applied as 
regards the German marine engineering interests.
Again, much of the Russian investment in light industry in Manchuria had little impact on British firms 
operating in Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, etc. The desire o f countries such as Russia and Germany to 
develop the industrial base of their recently acquired zones of influence was to a large extent of little 
significance to British firms. Outside these zones there was no significant competition from Russian 
enterprises but, particularly before the First World War, there was some competition to British firms from 
German interests.
(ii) Product segmentation.
Again, in the coal sector, much of the Russian coal output in North Manchuria was of lignite and not 
in the same market segment as the output of the British mines. In food the large Russian investment in the 
early years was mainly in brick tea, flour mills, soya bean products and sugar refining and was not matched 
by British presence -  none in sugar refining and brick tea and only minor presence in flour milling (none by 
1916) and soya bean products. The key area for British investment was egg products where the main 
competition came from American concerns. In drink there were no British distilleries but in soft drinks the 
British firms were by far the market leaders. In non-cotton textiles the British interests by the mid 1930s 
were concentrated in the worsted industry whereas the American investment was entirely in a non­
competitive sector Le carpets and rugs.
In the more homogeneous categories in Table Seven i.e cotton textiles, the tobacco industry and the 
electrical industry the position was as follows. By 1918 there was no local competition in cotton textiles 
from other Western countries to British firms. In the tobacco industry B.A.T. had virtual dominance over 
Western competitors. In contrast there was no effective competition to the American position in the 
electrical sector from the UK or other Western concerns. Also, in a specialised sector -  the press packing, 
etc of agricultural products -  the UK firms occupied a prominent position.
The effect of competition from other local Western concerns on British industrial enterprises was 
therefore relatively small. Beyond this, in the mining sector in particular, the nationals of Continental 
European countries -  especially Belgium and France -  were willing to enter into joint ventures with UK 
interests or, alternatively, take shareholdings in British enterprises. Again, the freemasonry often existing 
between British merchant firms and other Western firms in China encouraged them to take financial 
interests in ventures headed by other Western countries.
The competitive situation experienced by British firms in regard to competition from Japan proved to be a 
much more serious threat as time went by than that described above.
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(C) INTERFACE WITH JAPANESE INTERESTS.
As outlined above, the interface between UK enterprises and their European and USA counterparts was 
relatively minor. Indeed, especially in the mining sector, what was interesting was the way UK and 
Continental financial interests (especially Belgian and French) were prepared to work together without 
seemingly advancing their individual countries’ interests in China against other European powers.
The situation was markedly different in the case of the interface of local UK industrial enterprises with 
their Japanese counterparts. Here, the effect of normal commercial competition was much more 
pronounced albeit mainly concentrated in certain sectors. Moreover, beyond this there was an additional 
factor -  the effect o f diplomatic and territorial moves by Japan in relation to China, Japanese provocations 
against Western interests in China and Japanese military action leading to all out war with China in 1937.
The Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 marked the first stage of Japan’s expansion moves with the 
acquisition of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (although the Japanese takeover of the Liaodong 
Peninsula was quickly frustrated by the combined opposition of Russia, Germany and France). The Treaty 
of Portsmouth ending the Russo-Japanese War gave Japan the Russian lease on the Liaodong Peninsula and 
Japanese control of the former Russian railway linking the Peninsula to Changchun. The Japanese valued 
China as a source o f raw materials and a market for finished products but Manchuria with its agricultural, 
forestry and mining resources was particularly valued. In 1906 the South Manchuria Railway Company -  
half owned by the Japanese Government -  was formed to be an instrument of economic penetration in this 
Japanese sphere of influence in South Manchuria. Economic ambitions were thus mixed in with territorial 
and military ambitions.
The First World War provided an excellent opportunity for Japan to fulfil further expansionist 
ambitions. Very quickly the Japanese occupied the German concession in Shandong and also seized the 
entire length o f the German run railway from Qingdao to Jinan and the German controlled mines. In 
January, 1915 the Japanese presented to the Chinese Government the infamous Twenty One Demands. 
Here the nature of the demands were mainly economic in nature as Japan moved to protect their existing 
privileges and expand them. Of the Five Groups of demands only Group Five was not accepted by China 
and the rest were incorporated in the agreement signed on May 25th, 1915 :-
I. Japan should be permitted to dispose of the German leases in Shandong as it saw fit. 
n.The duration of the previously Russian lease of the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchuria 
Railway should be extended to 99 years and the Chinese right to repurchase the railway after 36 years 
cancelled. The Japanese to be given the right to hold land in Manchuria and to carry out mining 
operations.
III. One of the clauses gave Japan joint control of the Hanyeping Iron and Coal Company. A supplier of 
iron ore and pig iron to Japan and with Japanese loan finance this concern was threatened with 
nationalisation by the Chinese. In 1914 its output had been 135 thous tons of pig iron and 99 thous. tons 
o f steel. (92).
IV. China should not cede any territory along her entire coatline to any other power.
V. China should engage Japanese political, financial and military advisors. There should be in certain 
areas Japanese participation in policing and that there should be Japanese participation in supplying
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armaments. Rights should be given to Japan for building certain railways in South China and that Japan 
should be given first option on capital projects for railways, mines and dockyards in Fujian province.
In April, 1919 at Versailles the German rights in Shandong were transferred to Japan. However, in 1922 
at the Washington Conference Japan gave up these rights in Shandong but kept most of its economic 
gains there.
Political and military factors were predominant in the Japanese attack in Manchuria in 1931 and the 
creation o f Manchukuo as a puppet state in March, 1932.1932 also saw the Japanese diversionary attack 
on Shanghai. 1933 saw the addition of Jehol to the area of Japanese occupation. July, 1937 saw the 
outbreak of full scale war between Japan and China.
Apart from the direct effect of warfare on British industrial interests -  particularly those outside the 
Treaty ports -  with the risk of damage and disruptions to operations in terms o f cutting off of supplies and 
the labour force, transport difficulties, etc. there was also deliberate Japanese provocations (as well as a 
general uncooperative attitude). Typical o f these was the crisis over the British concession at Tianjin. 
From within the concession Nationalist Chinese patriots carried out raids on the Japanese and their 
collaborators. Also the concession contained deposited Nationalist silver reserves. Again, in the 
concession the Nationalist bank notes circulated and seeped out into Japanese occupied Tianjin and 
depressed the value of the occupation currency. In the middle of June, 1939 a blockade was imposed by 
the Japanese in an aggressive and insulting manner on the concession and was not removed until August 
..aften.diplomatic.. efforts were., successfulJn. resolvinga. crisis that.possibly..co.uld.have. led.to war.hetween 
the UK and Japan.
(1) Development of Japanese Industrial Investment in China.
Investment before 18.95 was negligible -  the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha managed Shanghai Cotton Cleaning 
and Working Company. Established in 1888, this employed 150 workers. (93). However, ownership was 
shared with British, American and German interests. Exploitation of the possibilities afforded by the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki was in turn slow to develop. Of the 38 Japanese industrial enterprises established in China 
1895 -  1913, albeit an impressive record, only 4 were initiated before 1905. (94). Japan suffered from a 
shortage of capital and the fact that in the early years after 1895 industrial firms in Japan could not yet 
compete freely with those in Western countries >
Distibution bv Industry of Initial Capital of Japanese Industrial Firms That Were Established
1895 to 1913 in China.
Number of firms. Capital.
$ thous. £mn.*
Mining/Smelting 5 3,048** 0..3
Engineering/Shipyards 4 1,539** 0.1
Spinning/Weaving 6 4,433 0.4
Foodstuffs 14 8,072 0.7
Other 9 3,617 03
Total 38 20,709 1.8
(Compare UK) (34) (49,-681) (4.4)
♦Converted at average rate for 1913.
** Excluding the mines and workshops of the South Manchuria Railway Company.
Source: Wang Jingyu: Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao 1895-1924 man. Beijing: Kexue 
chubanshe, 1957. Volume 2, Part 1. Pages 7-11.
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The exclusion of investment by the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR) in the above table, 
particularly as regards its prime position in heavy industry, could be regarded as Hamlet without the Prince 
of Denmark but
Initially, the acquisition o f the SMR could be regarded as booty of War rather than the 
fulfilment of a considered investment opportunity.
Despite the exclusion the table is informative as its primarily relates to non-Goverament 
investment and also the rise in Japanese economic confidence following their victory in the war 
with Russia.
The SMR, as noted, was the instrument o f the Japanese Government to foster Japanese economic 
penetration of Manchuria and all subsequent tables in this study incorporate it.
It is interesting to note, in view of the future dominance of Japanese companies in the foreign-owned 
cotton industry in China/that out of the six foreign joint stock spinning and weaving companies (one 
American, one German, two British and two Japanese) floated in 1895, the only two not to come to fruition 
were Japanese. These were the Towka Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company (liquidated in 1897) and 
the Shanghai Cotton Spinning Company. In the case of the last, a site was purchased, foundations begun 
and boilers brought to the premises. Textile machinery was ordered from England. The Company then 
decided it was more economical to manufacture in Japan, The machinery was then diverted in transit from 
Shanghai to Kobe where a mill was erected by 1898. (95). To illustrate the original lukewarm attitude of 
the Japanese, Mr Masada Tokashi of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha stated in the Japan Mail of 24th, October, 1896 
that “it would be extremely doubtful business for the comparatively poor capitalists of Japan to enter into 
competition with the far wealthier capitalists of Europe and America ...”. It was not until 1902 that the first 
Japanese cotton mill was established in China when Mitsui Bussan Kaisha took over the facilities of the 
bankrupt Yah Loong Cotton Spinning Company (see above). (96).
The situation changed markedly after the Russo-Japanese War with a large upsurge in Japanese industrial 
investment particularly marked in Manchuria with the SMR playing the leading role. By 1914 84 per cent 
of Japanese industrial investment was in Manchuria
Estimated Industrial Investment by Japan in Mainland China in 1914 - £ million.
Manchuria Other Total (Compare UK investment)
Mining 6.00 0.30 6.30 (3.34)
Oil pressing mills 0.08 0.20 0.28 (0.03)
Flour mills 0.24 0.30 0.54 (0.01)
Matches 0.05 0.02 0.07 ( -  )
Tobacco industry 0.33 - 0.33 (6.20)
Cotton textiles - 0.35 0.35 (0.43)
Other 0.07 0.08 0.15 (4.41)
Total 6,77 1.25 8.02 (14.42)
Source for Japanese figures - C.F.Remer: Foreign Investments in China. Pages 429-431.
The leading sector was mining with the facilities acquired from Russia being an important factor. The 
output of the principal coal mine of the SMR at Fushun had increased to 2,204 thous. tons by 1914. (97). 
Apart from the mining sector, progress was made in other sectors such as pressing of soya beans, etc, flour 
milling, matches, cotton textiles and tobacco (see table above ). By 1913 there were three Japanese cotton 
mills (two owned by trading companies, only one by a Japanese spinning company) with a total of 112 
thous. spindles and 886 power looms. (98). In 1906 the Toa Tobako Kabushiki Kaisha (also known as the
-172-
East Asia Tobacco Company) commenced cigarette manufacture in Niuzhuang on a site within the 
jurisdiction of the SMR. (99).
Despite this progress total Japanese investment by 1914 was at a lower level than that of the UK - by 44 
per cent in total. By 1930, however, the position had been reversed -  see Table Nine. Total Japanese 
industrial investment was over twice the UK level and in non-mining activities one and three quarters the 
UK level. Development of mining and metals continued. By 1930 output of the Fushun operation had 
increased to 7,500 thous. tons (100) (having surpassed the Kailan Mining Administration in terms of output 
in 1922 thus becoming Number One in China) and this growth was supplemented by development of other 
sites in Manchuria and acquisition of former German operations in Shandong (see above). As regards the 
latter, the Japanese worked the former German mines from the early days of World War One until 1922. 
After the Shandong Settlement reached at the Washington Conference the three German mines in 
Shandong were transferred in 1923 to a 50 percent Japanese / 50 percent Chinese venture called the Luda 
Company. (101). Production o f coal in the last year of full Japanese control was as follows :-
- Thous. tons - 
Zichuan 675 (102)
Fangzi 180(102)
The new company leased out the rights to the Fangzi field and concentrated on the major field of 
Zichuan. Output of iron ore at Jinlingzhen had fallen from 124 thous. tons in 1920 to 67 thous tons in 1922 
due to flooding. (103). This mine was abandoned in 1924.
In terms of ownership the Hanyeping Iron and Coal Company (1900) was Chinese but it was effectively 
under Japanese control in terms of loan finance and its commitment to supply iron ore to the Japanese, (see 
above). After the abandonment o f steel output in 1922 and the closure o f the ironworks in 1926, the sole 
activity was the supply of iron ore to the Japanese.
The dire plight of the Hanyeping Iron and Coal Company, surviving only by the Japanese desire to 
redeem some of the money advanced by them in loans, was not quite matched by two Japanese ventures in 
ferrous metallurgy in Manchuria. In 1915 the Zhenxing Company was formed as a 50/50 Chinese/Japanese 
venture to mine iron ore. The output was to be completely dedicated to the SMR subsidiary o f Anshan Iron 
Works (later Showa Steel Works, Inc.). Development of an iron and steel complex started in 1917. By 1919 
output of pig iron started. Output in this year was 50 thous. tons. (104). By 1926 output of pig iron reached 
163 thous. tons while the production o f the iron ore mine reached 473 thous tons. (105). The concern only 
survived because of financial help from the SMR -  in the period 1919-1933 losses were made in 12 out of 
15 years. (106). Despite this the SMR persevered and the 1930s saw a great expansion of the complex in 
accordance with the Japanese development of industry in Manchuria (see below). At its peak the complex 
had facilities for pig iron, steel and steel products such as rolled steel. Capacity for pig iron increased from 
the original 150 thous. tons per annum to 700 thous. tons in 1937 and 1,700 thous. tons in 1938 (107). In 
the year to end March, 1938 output was as follows (108) >
-Thous. tons - 
Pig iron 677
Steel billets 515
Steel sheets 456
Steel materials 215
TABLE NINE.
Estimated Industrial Investment in Mainland China in 1930 - £ million.
UK Japan Notes on Japanese Investment
£ nm. % £mn.* %
Mining/metals 4.06 16.4 17.50 32.7 Including iron ore, pig iron and steel,
-Manchuria - - 16.53 30-9 gold mining,, etc as well as coal mining-
-Other 4.06 16.4 0.97 1.8
Cotton textiles 1.23 5.0 19.56 36.5
-Manchuria - - 1.23 2.3
-Shanghai 1.23 5.0 14.40 26.9
-Other - - 3.93 7.3
Other textiles 0.06 0 2 2.23 A2 Apart from silk textiles including linen
(silk) and wool textiles.
Musical instruments 0.05 0.2 - -
Sound reoroduction 0.11 0.4 - -
Ensineering 0.79 1 2 2.00 3.7 Excluding the engineering facilities of 
the South Manchuria Railway Company.
Wood processing 0.30 L2 2.00 3/7 Mainly in Manchuria.
Ceramics, glass, tiles. Mainly in Manchuria, especially Dalian.
bricks, etc 0.02 o i 0.80 L5 Also in Shanghai.
Paper manufacture - - 0.60 UL In Manchuria.
Alcoholic drinks - - 0-20 0 4 Mainly Dai Nippon Brewery in Qingdao.
Other food drinks 1.63 6.6 2.80 5.2
-Sugar refining - - 0.60 1.1 In Shanghai and Manchuria.
-Oils and fats - - 2.00 3.7 From soya beans, cotton seed, etc.
-Frozen products 1.55 6.3 0.20 0.4
-Other 0.08 0.3 - -
Industrial oils.fats - 0.40 0,7 In Manchuria.
Matches 0.40 0.7
Tobacco industrv 15.00 60.4 1.00 L9
Dves. paints
Packing, etc of agricultural
2.00 1 2
products 0.75 3.1 - -
Other 0.79 3.2 2.09 4.0
TOTAL 24.79 100.0 53.58 100,0
- Manchuria 1.90 7.7 26.33 49.1
- Other 22.89 92.3 27.25 50.9
^Converted from Yen at average rate for 1930.
The source for the Japanese data is as follows. At a conference in Kyoto o f the Institute o f Pacific Relations 
five papers were presented by various national speakers on foreign investment in China. By far the most 
complete and authoritive was that prepared by a committee of Japanese economists headed by a Mr 
Masunosuke Odagiri o f the Yokohama Specie Bank. He was the director of the bank in charge of its China 
branches and business. The paper was reproduced in the Far Eastern Review o f January, 1930 (Pages 15- 
18).
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By 1943 capacity was as follows (109)
- Thous. tons per annum- 
Pig iron 1,950
Steel ingots 1,330
Steel material 940
The other venture was the Benxihu Coal and Iron Mining Company. This was formed as a 50/50 Sino- 
Japanese venture in 1910. In 1911 an iron ore mine was added and the company began to produce pig iron 
in 1915. In contrast to the coal operation where output of coal reached 410 thous. tons in 1920 (110), the 
iron ore and pig iron operations lagged -  output o f the former being suspended in 1921 and the latter in 
1922. Although output was resumed the level was modest -  that of iron ore being 93 thous. tons and of pig 
iron 51 thous. tons in 1926. (111). By 1936 coal output had reached 739 thous. tons (112) with that o f pig 
iron 160 thous tons (113).
Substantial although this growth was in heavy industry it was surpassed in the period up to 1930 by the 
explosive growth in the cotton textile sector -  by 1930 Japanese mills in China possessed a total of 1,587 
thous. spindles. (114). Cotton textiles (discussed below) became by 1930 the largest single sector of 
Japanese investment. Apart from these two main sectors useful progress was made in the sectors of paint, 
etc (started 1918), paper, wood processing, non-cotton textiles, etc.
Partly because of the effects of nationalist boycotts, progress of locally made Japanese cigarettes was 
relatively slow although Toa had extended its operations from Manchuria to Shanghai and Tianjin in 
1917/18. (115).
A minor part o f this growth in Japanese investment to 1930 was due to acquisition o f former British 
companies (noted in PART 111 above)
- In 1916 the former Anglo-German Brewery Company, Limited in Qingdao was sold to 
Dai Nippon Brewery.
- Again, in 1916, the Shanghai based China Flour Mill Company, Limited was acquired by 
Mitsui Bussan Kaisha.
- In 1925 the mill o f the Laou Kung Mow (Lao Gong Mou) Cotton Spinning and 
Weaving Company, Limited with 45,516 spindles and 515 looms was acquired by a 
local subsidiary oftheKanegfuchi Spinning Company.
In the next decade leading up to the outbreak of the Pacific War Japanese investment grew apace. The 
emphasis was on expansion of heavy industry although there was also significant expansion of light 
industry -  in particular of investment in the cotton and tobacco industries >
(a) Cotton industry.
The number of Japanese owned spindles grew as follows (thousands) >
1930 (116) 1937(117) 1941(118)
Total 1.587 2.261 n.a.
-Manchuria 102 246 481
-Other 1,485 2,015 n.a.
This expansion was not only by means o f newly founded mills. The financial strength of Japanese cotton
firms enabled them to take over financially weakened Chinese mills. Again, many Chinese mills were 
induced to borrow from Japanese financial institutions with their property as security. On default their 
property was seized and handed over to Japanese cotton textile firms for operation. In 1936, for example, 
Japanese interests took over six Chinese mills with a total of 181 thous. spindles. (119).
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(bJ Tobacco industry.
Japanese cigarette manufacture in Manchuria was supplemented by the entry of another producer -  the 
Manchu Tobacco Company -  in 1934. Apart from expansion in Manchuria a number of Japanese firms 
acquired or expropriated Chinese producers as their armies advanced. The most significant of these firms 
was the Toyo Tobacco Company. By 1941 B.A.T.’s management calculated that Japanese firms held 40 
per cent of the total cigarette production capacity in China including Manchukuo (120).
The expansion in heavy industry was a consequence of Japan’s 1931 occupation of Manchuria. There was 
a philosophy (increasingly adopted with the increase in influence o f the Japanese military) that the 
Manchurian economy should be developed via central control and in the interests of Japan. The emphasis 
was on investment in mining, iron, steel, industrial chemicals, etc. The Manchukuo economy should 
dovetail with that of Japan -  indeed part of Manchuria’s industrialisation was to be facilitated by 
transference of idle factories from Japan. Joint ventures by Japanese organisations in conjunction with 
Manchukuo residents or Japanese encouragement of wholly owned ventures by Manchukuo interests were 
also part of the process. As W.Cr. Beasley points out (121) this build-up of an industrial complex in 
Manchuria departed significantly “from the imperialist doctrine that the role o f dependencies is to provide 
the homeland with food for its work-force and raw materials for its manufacturing industries.”
Apart from the organic expansion of Japanese coal mines, Chinese interests in mines in Manchuria were 
taken over -  the process was complete by 1939. (122). In 1934 the Manchuria Coal Mining Company was 
formed and was the vehicle consolidating these acquisitions. With its explotation of other mines, output of 
this enterprise rose from 1.5 million tons in 1934 to around 8 million tons in 1939. (123). Coal output in 
Manchuria rose to 12,166 thous. tons in 1935 and to 21,200 thous. tons in 1940. As regards ferrous metals, 
the expansion of the Showa Steel Works has already been noted.
Output of oil from oil shale began at Fushun in 1930. Output rose from 29 thous. tons in that year to 66 
thous tons in 1935 (124) and 120 thous tons in 1936, (125). By 1939 capacity had risen to 350 thous tons 
per annum. (125). In February, 1939 a plant for oil from lignite liquidation was completed at Fushun. (126), 
This hydogenation facility had been delayed in construction. (127). Two other enterprises entered this field 
in Manchuria and capacity in 1940 was estimated at 60 thous. tons per annum. (128).
Japanese firms installed plants for the production of industrial chemicals -  in particular chlor-alkali, soda 
ash and fertilisers. Four Japanese firms entered the field of dissolving wood pulp to supply the burgeoning 
Japanese rayon industry. Cement production increased three fold between 1935 and 1941.
In addition to the products mentioned above there were many products which the Japanese developed in 
Manchuria or were in the process of developing before 1942 including (129) > 
synthetic rubber, 
at least 6 munitions complexes,
vehicle assembly (which started in 1937 (130)) / air frame assembly. The companies that were 
involved in the former were the Dawa Automobile Company and the Manchuria Automobile 
Company and in the latter the Manchuria Aircraft Manufacturing Company, 
aluminium smelting. At the Manchuria Light Metals Company whose plant was complete in 
June, 1937.
magnesium. The Manchuria Magnesium Company started output in June, 1939.
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railway rolling stock and rails, etc. 
machine tools.
(2) Commercial Competition between UK and Japanese concerns.
The large Japanese industrial investment in Manchuria had with only one exception relatively little effect 
on the fortunes of British industrial enterprises in China. A high proportion of this investment was in 
industries in which there was no British participation in China. Only in the case o f the tobacco industry was 
there any significant British operation in Manchuria. Sales by British companies to Manchuria from other 
Chinese sites were relatively insignificant and consequently the Japanese inhibition after the creation of 
Manchukuo of imports from non-Japanese sources had little effect.
Over much o f the business sectors in which British enterprises were engaged there was nil or only slight 
competition from Japanese enterprises located in China. There was no local competition in the sound 
reproduction, musical instruments, worsted spinning and weaving and press packing sectors. In the egg 
products business the most important competitors to  the British enterprises were American firms. In 
engineering all the British effort in the main sector of marine engineering was in essence confined to 
Shanghai where there was no Japanese presence. In wood processing the Japanese effort was essentially 
confined to Manchuria. In coal mining there was some limited competition with Japanese mines in China 
but for some considerable time there was collusion between the leading British interest of The Kailan 
Mining Administration and their Japanese rivals. In 1933 the Chairman of the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company, Limited referred to the abandonment o f “arrangements which have existed for a number 
of years between ourselves and our Japanese competitors....” (131). These arrangements regulating sales to 
Chinese coastal markets dated back to 1915 and originally applied to coal exported from Japan but in 1918 
the SMR joined the scheme. (Also the Kailan Mining Administration had in the 1930s similar agreements 
with various local coal mining companies including the Jingxing Mining Administration which was 
minority German owned (132)). It was only in the sectors of the tobacco industry and the cotton textile 
industry that there was a marked competitive dimension.
(a) Tobacco industry.
Manchuria was initially the main battleground and this situation lasted until the Japanese incursion into 
China in 1937. Before then Japanese involvement outside Manchuria was minor. In 1935 output of 
cigarettes by aft non- British foreigners in Mainland China excluding Manchuria was only 0.8 per cent of 
the total as against 50.5 per cent for B. A.T. and 48.7 per cent for Chinese producers.
The competitive situation in Manchuria was long lasting with B. AT, competing, as stated above, with 
one offshoot of the Japanese tobacco monopoly (Toa Tabako K.K.) in the early years of the last century. In 
1906 it was reported that “a war of rival cigarette manufacturers is now being carried on in Manchuria” 
with both contenders “adopting extraordinary methods to push their various brands” (133). To contain this 
Japanese incursion B.A.T., as described in PART HI, Chapter One, opened a cigarette factory in Shenyang. 
This presence was supplemented by acquisition. In 1898 the Russian firm of A. Lopato & Sons started 
making cigarettes in Harbin. In 1913 B. AT. acquired a  financial interest in this concern. In 1919 the two 
companies formed a majority B.A.T. owned joint venture - the Alliance Tobacco Company -  to distibute 
their products.
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Competition with Japanese interests in Manchuria was, however, fairly subdued until the establishment of 
Manchukuo in 1932. By 1936 the capacity of Japanese cigarette factories in Manchukuo was with 59 
machines (134) 69 per cent o f the local B.A.T. machine park of 86 machines. (135). (The B.A.T. capacity 
did, however, increase to 101 machines by 1939 with a new factory at Yingkou o f 20 machines replacing a 
small factory o f 6 machines established in 1933 inLiaoyang (136)).
Manchuria was an important market for B.A.T. in China. In 1931 it accounted for 15 per cent of the 
quantity of B.A.T. cigarette sales in China -  by 1937 this proportion had increased to 20 per cent (figures 
derived from Tables Four and Five above). This importance was recognised by the formation of the Chi 
Tung (Qidong) Tobacco Company, Limited in 1930 which took over the B.A.T. business in Manchuria in 
January, 1931 (see APPENDIX ONE).
Apart from increased Japanese competition in Manchuria, after 1931 B. A.T. also faced a serious threat in 
that a tobacco monopoly -  similar to the Manchukuo Oil Monopoly - promulgated as Imperial Ordinance 
No. 149 in December, 1934 and effective from April, 1935 (137) -  could be imposed. (There was a 
precedent for this in that in 1904 the tobacco industry in Japan, including a B.A.T. subsidiary, was 
nationalised). It would seem, given the size o f their interests, that B.A.T. had no option to avoid this threat 
but that of registering the Chi Tung Tobacco Company and A, Lopato & Sons under the commercial law of 
Manchukuo ~ which was done in July, 1936 (see APPENDIX ONE). (Except for Japan only El Salvador 
recognised the puppet state !).
After a setback in 1932, B.A.T.’s sales in Manchuria increased up to 1937 and there was only a modest 
decline in market share (see Table Five). The total market for cigarettes increased sharply with the greater 
internal stability in the region
Comparison of B.A.T. Cigarette Sales in Manchuria with those of Other Companies - Million Cigarettes.
B.A.T.
Years ending 30 . 
- Percent Other
September. 
- Percent Total
1931 5,985 77.8 1,710 22.2 7,695
1932 4,386 72.3 1,683 27.7 6,069
1933 6,518 74.0 2,295 26.0 8,813
1934 7,618 71.0 3,110 29.0 10,728
1935 8,738 71.9 3,418 28.1 12,156
1936 8,912 69,1 3,990 30,9 12,902
1937 10,998 74.1 3,849 25.9 14,847
1938 10,878 67.2 5,305 32.8 16,183
1939 9,034 53.2 7,933 46.8 16,967
1940 9,033 49.9 9,077 51.1 18,110
1941 8,296 45.6 9,910 54.4 18,206
Source > YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  page 734.
A flaw, however, was that the profitability o f the Chi Tung Tobacco Company was consistently below the
rest of B.A.T. in China albeit improving in the late 1930s. (Also, the Chi Tung Tobacco Company
increasingly had to resort to loan finance (138))
Chi Tung (OidoneJ Tobacco Co. -  Profits as Percent of Capital -  Years ending 30th. September.
1931 0,3 1937 3.4
1932 0.4 1938 8.3
1933 0.7 1939 15.0
1934 6.3 1940 13.5
1935 2.7 1941 7.5
1936 9.3
Source YingM ei Yan Gottgsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 1,474, 1,477, 1529 and 1,583.
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After 1937, however, B.A.T.’s share of the Manchurian cigarette market fell sharply (see the first table on 
the preceding page) and their sales decreased in absolute terms. The Manchukuo authorities began to exert 
control over leaf supplies and a Government sponsored company was given control in 1938 over the 
purchase and distribution o f both domestic and imported tobacco leaf to the detriment of the position of
B.A.T. (139).
In spite of the Japanese incursion into China from 1937 B.A.T. managed to hold its own fairly well, Its 
market share of the cigarette market excluding Manchuria developed as follows
Years to September 30th.
1937 65.7%
1938 75,0%
1939 67.7%
1940 61.2%
1941 64.3%
( These percentage figures are derived from taking the figures o f sales to Manchuria by B.A.T. and 
others as shown above from the equivalent figures for all China given in Table Six)
The main decreases in market share were in Hubei, Jiangxi and the “Border Region” (See Table Five).
(b) Cotton textile industry.
Experience here was sharply in contrast to that of the tobacco industry where B. A.T. was fairly 
successful in fending off Japanese competition. In cotton textiles (See PART ///, Chapter Three), after a 
promising start, the British mills became minor players in this industry. In contrast, by 1937 Japanese mills 
possessed only slightly less spindles than those of Chinese owned mills and in the case o f looms at the 
integrated mills their share surpassed that o f the Chinese mills. (In terms of the impact on the traditional 
Chinese handicraft sectors of hand spinning and handloom weaving, the Japanese mills in China were 
therefore very much more responsible than Western mills for any decline).
The British share of the national spindleage surpassed that of other Western mills (American and 
German) by 1907, By 1918 the UK share reached its peak at over a fifth (22 per cent). The UK share was 
still slightly higher than that of Japan. However the UK did not share in the frenzied post-War expansion of 
capacity and, coupled with the demise o f two UK companies, the UK share fell to only 4 per cent by 1930. 
With two new British entrants, the share improved marginally to 4.5 per cent by 1937 but by then the 
Japanese share was 44.5 per cent (see STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE RRR).
There are two facets to this reduction o f the UK to a relatively small force in the Chinese cotton textile 
industry
(i) The incentive and capability o f Japanese firms to expand bv new facilities or acquisition in this
industry in China.
00 The lack of incentive or inability o f British firms to invest on a large scale in this industry in
China.
0) Incentives for Japanese investment increased markedly during and after the First World War
- The wage gap between the two countries widened. Thus earnings for female spinning
operatives in Japan in 1920 were 3.75 times those of 1914 compared with a doubling in the case of
Chinese operatives.
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- The March, 1923 law prohibiting the midnight shift in Japan (although not actually enforced 
until July, 1929) increased the attractiveness of mills in China where no such law existed,
- The Shanghai Tariff Conference of 1918 led to higher duties on imports of those varieties of 
yarns and piecegoods that the Japanese mills had been exporting in large quantities to China. Thus, for 
example, the rate per bale (400 lbs) of 20’s yarn increased from 2.85 taels to 4.14 taels.
- The post-War boom in Japan in cotton textiles terminated before that in China. Some 
Japanese firms which had ordered machinery diverted it to China.
- The emergent Japanese textile machinery industry found an important market in China for its 
successful products (the Toyoda automatic loom was a World beater).
The prosperity o f the Japanese textile industry in the War and the immediate post-War years provided 
the capability for investing in mills in China. Dividends paid by the members of the Japan Cotton Spinners5 
Association were as follows (see STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE RRR)
- % -
1914 13.5
1915 15.5
1916 23.5
1917 41.1
1918 49.7
1919 51,0
The capital composition of these firms improved during the First World War and “gearing” was still low 
even during the early years of the 1930s (140)
Paid-up capital. Reserves. Loans.
- % -
1914 57.0 24.8 18.2
1919 52.7 39.0 8.3
1920 58.8 33.8 7.4
1932 51,4 32,0 16,6
(//) A particularly stubborn set of facts confronted the UK cotton industry after the First World War :-
- the growth of mills in customer countries aided by the erection of tariff walls (after tariff revisions 
Chinese imports o f cotton piece goods, for example, fell by 94% in value terms from 1929 to 1937). Some 
of these former importing countries in turn began to export yams and fabrics e.g. China.
- severe competition in third markets -  in particular from Japan. Spindleage in Japan increased from 
2,577 thous. in 1914 to 11,428 thous. in 1939. (141).
Given this situation it thus seems strange that only one UK based firm -  the Calico Printers’ Association 
(CPA) - decided to install a spinning and weaving plant in what had been a very important market. China 
had been the third largest importer of UK piecegoods and exports to this market fell from an average of 
587 million square yards in the five pre-War years to 173 million square yards in 1925 and 20 million 
square yards in 1934.
The CPA was primarily a textile finishing company but with significant upstream interests in spinning 
(its UK spindleage amounted to 174 thous. in 1936) and weaving, supplying base cloth for finishing. Under 
the influence of its visionary Chairman -  Mr Lennox B. Lee -  the CPA began to establish mills inside the 
tariff walls o f countries such as China and Egypt. This policy was pursued despite the poor financial results 
of the company. In the financial year to June 30th, 1929 the company paid a dividend o f 5 per cent. No
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further dividends were paid for over eight years -  in one year (1935-6) during this period the company, in 
fact, made a loss. (142). (The company was, in common with others, hit by the Great Depression but more 
important was the fact that the Lancashire cotton industry was well into its terminal decline).
The policy followed was a logical one and would doubtless be that recommended as a result of a modem 
business school study. The main reasons for its failure were bad luck and understandable inability to 
forecast political risks more than bad judgment o f business opportunities. An illustration of this was their 
venture with two other partners in Java -  of which their share was £100 thous. CPA organised the shipping 
of machinery for this spinning and weaving mill which began to come on stream only months before the 
outbreak of War in 1941.
In two moves the CPA established a presence in China in 1924. In March, the Board approved the buying 
of 17 acres of land in Shanghai, judged to be the most suitable for future operations, for £58,000 (143). 
Later in the year the Company received a cable from Ilbert & Co. offering a small French owned textile 
printing works in Shanghai (the works originally belonged to French missionaries). The price agreed with 
Ilbert & Co. in November was 180 thous. taels - £29 thous. (143).
From this modest start the CPA greatly expanded its finishing business (bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, 
printing, schreinering and finishing) in China under the name adopted in 1926 o f The China Printing and 
Finishing Company, Limited. The first major expansion was to expand the number of printing machines 
from three to ten. This was agreed by the CPA Board at the end of 1926 (144). This raised capacity from c. 
10 million yards per annum to 37.5 million yards -  4 per cent of CPA’s UK capacity. It was on the 
occasion of this rise that the possibility o f in-house output of cloth was examined. A director suggested a 
plant of 20,000 spindles and 600 looms be considered (144). Nothing came of this but further expansion of 
the finishing facilities took place. Cumulative spending on this venture rose from £111,400 at November, 
1926 to £340,000 by March, 1930. (145). In early 1931 production ran in a peak week at 71 million yards 
per annum -  19 percent o f the level at CPA’s UK plants. An expenditure on the works that amounted to 
£30,000 was authorised in 1934 and brought capacity up to 80 million yards per annum (146).
A report submitted to the CPA Board by the firm’s China based manager in December, 1932 (147) 
advocated the installation o f a spinning and weaving mill in Shanghai. The eight man Board finally 
approved the project at a meeting in October, 1933 but with two directors having previously argued against 
it. (148). These two advocated, in fact, a completely contrary policy -  selling the existing finishing unit to 
the Japanese - owned Shanghai Cotton Manufacturing.
For the spinning and weaving plant (in Pudong) it was envisaged by the Board in December, 1932 that 
this “would involve a total expenditure including land already purchased” (see above) of £454,000 (149). 
This implied a total spending on buildings and machinery o f £396,000 but by the end o f June, 1935 
£442,000 had been expended (150). Together with the expanded finishing plant (i.e. the £30,000 additional 
expenditure authorised in 1934) the CPA’s sterling investment in The China Printing and Finishing 
Company totalled £763,000 at the end o f 1936 (151) and by the end o f 1937 “over one million sterling” 
was “sunk in this enterprise by the parent company” (152). Shipments o f machinery began in June, 1934 
and by 1936 the mill was in full operation with 42,240 spindles and 1,130 looms. (153).
The main purpose o f the mill was to supply grey cloth to the finishing plant -  which was some distance 
away. The cotton mill’s output was, by local standards, of a high degree of fineness -  the average yam
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count being 31.5 in early 1941 (154). The great majority o f the combined output of the mill and the 
printworks was for the local market -  less than 5 per cent was exported (155).
The CPA venture was reasonably profitable and this suggests that the ascendancy o f Japanese cotton 
spinning and weaving mills in China was not inevitable and could have been challenged by British 
enterprises. The CPA venture was a direct challenge to local Japanese mills >
- Previous to the development of in-house weaving in China their printing base cloth requirements were 
met by local Japanese mills. This was a source o f irritation for the local CPA management as through no 
fault of their own they were hit by Chinese boycotts against the Japanese. Thus, in October, 1928 the 
Company suffered seizure of some of its goods by an Anti-Japanese boycott. (156). In 1931 a director (Mr 
Bolden) urged the advantage o f local spinning and weaving (157) >
free the Company from the effect of boycotts of Japanese goods.
secure supplies.
avoid having to buy in advance.
- In terms of the market for the finished cloth produced by the China Printing and Finishing Company, it 
was in direct competition with local Japanese mills rather than Chinese mills in the market i.e. China 
where the bulk of its output went. This is clearly brought by the high average count o f the mill (see above).
There was a possibility that the CPA could have dramatically expanded its presence in the Chinese cotton 
industry. At a Board meeting in October, 1934 it was reported that the CPA’s local management had been 
approached by the managing directors o f two Chinese banks to find ways o f helping the Sung Sing Group 
of mills which were in severe trouble and mortgaged to the banks (158). The Sung Sing Group, comprising 
nine mills with a total capacity of 530,000 spindles and 4,860 looms, was the largest Chinese owned group 
in the cotton industry. Nothing, however, transpired.
Other UK firms did think on occasion of following the example of CPA but nothing of any import 
materialised. (The other British firm to enter the field in the 1930s was essentially a merchant firm 
operating in China -The China Engineers, Limited and not a UK based cotton firm). In 1930 a 
representative o f the Bleachers' Association visited Shanghai with a view to starting a works and the CPA 
Board favoured collaboration with the company (159) but nothing came of this. Also, in 1936 the three 
leading British textile finishing companies o f CPA, the Bleachers’ Association mid the Bradford Dyers’ 
Association formed Overseas Industries, Limited to sponsor spinning, weaving or finishing overseas with 
special reference to countries in which local industrialisation was tending to exclude imports from the UK - 
China being an obvious example. Nothing transpired. Again, at a Board meeting in August, 1933 the 
Chairman revealed that he had received a letter from his counterpart at the thread producer J. & P. Coats 
asking for information as they were “considering putting up a small plant in China” (160). Once again, 
nothing came of this.
The main reasons for this failure of UK based cotton textile firms (apart from the CPA) to invest in China 
appear to be threefold. Firstly, the lack of vision of many directors of Lancashire firms which was 
accentuated by the mainly horizontal structure o f the industry. The numerous manufacturers had no 
experience of overseas marketing while the merchants had no substantial knowledge of production 
processes or factory management. Contrast the vertical structure of the Japanese cotton industry and the
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close links with the merchant firms. Secondly, the poor financial state of the UK cotton industry after the 
post-War boom. In 1920 the average dividends of spinning companies was 40.21 per cent but dividends 
from 1922 onwards were very poor -  reaching a low point of 1.46 per cent in 1931 (see STATISTICAL 
ANNEX, TABLE RRR). In the years 1927-1934 there was, on average, losses by UK spinning companies. 
It was the spinners of lower count yarns, in the form of the “American” sector of the spinning industry, that 
suffered the most whereas the “Egyptian” sector producing fine count yarns from long staple cotton was in 
a much better state. It was, of course, the “American” sector which would be most probably interested in 
utilising Chinese short staple cotton. This financial weakness of the Lancashire cotton industry was more 
than could be justified by the poor trading it faced. The post-War boom in the industry led to a “speculative 
financial reconstruction” o f around 46 per cent of the spinning industry on the basis o f spindleage. This 
process which was performed via refloatation or recapitalisation was accompanied by a large increase in 
loan finance. This large increase in “gearing” meant that the companies affected were weak sellers and in a 
poor position to diversify geographically. Again the “American" sector was much more affected by this 
financial weakening than the “Egyptian” sector (161).
Moreover, political uncertainties and civil and military disorders in China made British firms chary of 
Chinese projects. This was certainly the case in the 1920s and early 1930s (with also the example of the 
demise o f two British mills) but these factors were less relevant in the high noon of the Nationalist 
Government in the mid-1930s when there was also a period of greatly improved Sino-British relations.
With the advantage of hindsight, o f course, the reluctance of UK cotton firms to invest in Chinese 
projects, apparently against the current evidence, was justified in retrospect by the outbreak of War 
followed by civil war and the subsequent sequestration of foreign enterprises by the People’s Republic of 
China.
(3) The Effect of Japanese Military and Other Provocative Moves on UK Enterprises.
As the 1930s developed, UK industrial firms were increasingly affected by the aggressive moves of 
Japan against China. The principal events affecting British firms were, to repeat,
- the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 followed by the proclamation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 
March, 1932.
- the conflict in Shanghai starting at the end of January, 1932 and ending in May on the arrangement 
of a truce.
- the start of all out conflict at the end of July, 1937. Fighting in Shanghai, the area most relevant to 
UK interests started on August 13th, 1937 and stopped in early November.
- the blockade of the Tianjin concession starting in mid-June, 1939, partially eased in August and 
finally lifted in Spring, 1940.
The effect of the creation of Manchukuo was really only of significance to one British concern - B.A.T. -  
and has already been discussed. On the whole, British firms survived fairly well the hostilities in Shanghai 
in 1932. Typical of their experience was that of the Ewo Cotton Mills, Limited as related above. The 
Company lost the best part o f two months’ output. There was only a small amount o f damage but the mills 
had to be closed for over a month due to the fighting. The Tianjin crisis o f 1939 had, as regards British
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concems, the main impact on those companies in the press packing sector. It was the fighting starting in 
1937 -  particularly the struggle for Shanghai ~ that had the most serious effect on the operations of British 
companies. This affected the operations of the majority of British industrial firms. Annex A to this PART 
gives an account o f the fortunes of many of the British firms in this regard.
Apart from the direct effects of military action, British companies were also subject to harassment from 
the Japanese occupation authorities in terms, firstly, of arbitrary seizure of British property and, secondly, 
instigating labour disputes at British firms.
An example of the former is the experience of The China Engineers, Limited (see PART III -  Chapter 
Three). This company supplied as part of its activities textile machinery to Chinese mills on credit terms. 
The machinery supplied by China Engineers remained their property until it was fully paid for. On the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1937, the Company, in the case of two contracts on its books, “took special 
precautions to protect our interests” (162). These were
the Chun Tah Cotton Mill - an integrated mill in Shanghai with 25,000 spindles and 640 looms. 
(163). There were 1,495 employees.
China Dyeing Works, Shanghai.
The land on which these mills stood was British owned. However, “owing to the policy of the Chinese 
National Government to give special privileges and encouragement to purely national enterprises, the 
British interests were not advertised” (164). With these interests in jeopardy two companies were formed 
on the outbreak of hostilities
China Spinners, Limited which purchased all the property belonging to the Chun Tah Cotton 
Mill.
The China Textile Manufacturing Company, Limited.
However, the Japanese forces seized these installations in December, 1937 and despite the fact that the 
deeds of sale had been signed in September, 1937 regarded them as Japanese companies. The Chun Tah 
mill was handed over to the Toyada Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company. (165). The same situation 
applied to the finishing milL (165). Despite British, diplomatic protests these mills were retained in 
Japanese hands.
One example of the latter is the situation facing the China Printing and Finishing Company in 1939. On 
May 20th a strike commenced which in the words of the Company was “fermented by Japanese paid 
agitators” (166). These were organised in the Chinese Republic Workers League. A combination of 
gangsters, collaborating labour organisers and a puppet local authority fermented disputes in foreign 
factories >
“...as a result of certain anti-British agitation a number of strikes have recently occurred at British owned 
factories in the neighbourhood of Shanghai but outside the International Settlement The agitation appears 
to be directed by the Japanese sponsored administration in Pootung and there is reason to believe that 
certain Japanese elements are actively concerned with it ” (167).
A relief allowance was paid to the strikers by the local authority. The local authority demanded $500 
thous. from the Company for these strike expenses with the threat that damage would be done to its 
property. Nevertheless, the Company did not submit to this blackmail. The expenses of the Company were 
£6,000-7,000 per month and it reckoned it could finance itself for a year (168). The situation became very
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serious from an international relations aspect when on June 5th a Mr R.M. Tinkler (169) was fatally shot and 
bayoneted by Japanese marines after an altercation with the strikers. Another UK employee of the firm died 
from shock.
The strike ended on November 27th, 1939 (170) principally due to a reduction in Japanese support for the 
strikers. This was not an end to the Company’s troubles. Much less serious strikes occurred in 1940 due to 
another Japanese creature -  the Chinese Workers’ Welfare Association. (171). Apart from The China 
Printing and Finishing Company, The Ewo Cotton Mills, Limited, The Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish 
Company, Limited, The China Import and Export Lumber Company, The Ewo Brewery, Patons and 
Baldwins, The China Soap Company and Shanghai Dockyards were other British concerns that reported 
trouble from this source. (171).
Attitude and behaviour of British firms in relation to the Japanese penetration into China in the 1930s.
The attitude of British companies to the Japanese incursion varied widely. At one extreme you had the 
example o f the Pekin Syndicate which did not cooperate in any form with the Japanese and continued its 
cooperation with the Guomindang. (see PART III - Chapter Two above). Another example o f distaste for 
accommodating the Japanese was that of the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company (47.75% owned 
by John Swire & Sons and 47.75% by Pinchin, Johnson and Company, Limited -  a UK paint 
manufacturer). In a letter of February 26th, 1939 to Swires in London the Company reported that a visit had 
been received from the managing director of the Kwangsai Paint Company (No. 2 paint producer in Japan 
with also a paint factory in Shenyang). In a return letter of the 17th, March (172) Swire’s replied 
“As you surmise, we are not prepared to consider either the outright sale of O.P.Co, or the admission of 
Kwangsai Paint Co, into a 50% share. We should dislike the second alternative more than the first.” (172).
The position o f B. A.T., as described above, was intermediate between that o f those companies above and 
that described below of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited with its extreme 
willingness to accommodate the Japanese invaders. It is difficult to see what other action B.A.T. could have 
taken with its interests in Manchuria.
The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company had an equal share with Chinese interests in the Kailan 
Mining Administration (KMA). The output of these mines was of particular interest to the Japanese. The 
agglutinating properties of this coal was counted very highly by the Japanese steel industry (because of this 
US planes bombed the mines as early as October, 1942.), There was thus some Japanese purchase o f the 
shares of the Company -  2 per cent of the equity by 1939 (173). There were rumours, particularly strong in 
1935, that the Japanese were putting pressure on the Company to sell out (although no mention o f this is 
contained in the Company’s archives).
In March, 1938 a strike broke out at the Zhaogezhuang mine which spread to the other mines. The KMA 
lost a whole month o f output. (174). It was alleged at the time (175) that these labour disturbances were 
secretly encouraged by the Japanese to influence the KMA to come to a working agreement with them. 
Support for this view is given by the cablegram received by the Board o f the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company on April 6th, 1938 from the acting head of mines 
“ ...have complained to the British Consul General of large numbers of Japanese and Korean agitators 
who are now inciting and endeavouring to organise strikers in opposition to KMA.” (176).
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While the strike was in progress Mr E.J.Nathan, the General Manager of the KMA, reached an agreement 
in Japan to increase shipments o f (coking) coal to Japan. To handle the larger shipments a new local sales 
company was formed to replace the Kaiping Coal Sales Company. Japanese companies would have the 
majority o f the shares -  in particular, the Japan Iron Manufacturing Co. but also other large consumers. 
Supplies to Japan were to be increased to 2,500 thous. tons per annum from 1,700 thous. tons. (177). The 
strike action at the mines was settled fairly shortly after the agreement was concluded with the intercession 
o f the Japanese army.
This accommodation with the Japanese was undoubtedly of considerable commercial advantage to the 
KMA. The Japanese press (Japan Times, Tokyo) called the agreement “an actual result of British 
diplomacy based on reality” (178). The action o f the Chinese partners in the KMA would, of course, count 
as collaboration with the enemy to the great majority of Chinese of any political viewpoint. The action of 
the British partners would, again, offend all but a relatively small section o f the Chinese. There were, of 
course, Quisling governments -  initially in Inner Mongolia, Beijing and Nanjing -  succeeded in March, 
1940 by the most extensive puppet regime under Wang Ching-wei (Wang Jingwei). At the industrial level 
there was a varying amount of collaboration by industrialists. This has been closely analysed by Parks M. 
Coble in a recent work. (179).
The benefits of the close relationship with the Japanese for the Chinese Engineering and Mining 
Company is apparent from the figures below :-
Kailan Mining Administration (KMA1 / Chinese Engineering and Mining Company fCEMC) -  Twelve 
Months To End June-
Gross Profits Net Profits 
KMA* Accruing to
Output of 
Coal bv KMA* 
Thous.metric tons $ thous. £ thous. CEMC - £ thous.
Net Income CEMC 
Before Tax After Tax 
£ thous. £ thous.
1937 4,664 10,557 633 128 180 168
1938 4,458 13,603 762 208 215 185
1939 5,967 27,721 776 314 330 224
1940 6,629 36,469 766 199 219 54
1941 6,546 42,073 1,136 272 392 257
* Figures from -  Jiu Zhongguo Kailuan meikuang de gongsi zhidu he haogong zhidu.Tianjin: Tianjin 
renmin chubanshe, 1983. Page 145.
Output of coal soared and the benefits o f full capacity utilisation were attained. In May,1940 Mr 
E.J.Nathan reported that “all mines working overload to produce maximum output which you are aware is 
politically essential.” (180). The gross profits of the KMA nearly doubled in sterling terms between 1936-7 
to 1940-1. The profits in sterling accruing to the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company from its 
holding in the KMA rose from nothing in 1934-5 and 1935-6 to levels not exceeded since the late 1920s. 
Even in the tense five months before Pearl Harbour profits from this source were running at a rate (£185 
thous. per annum) in excess o f that o f the financial year 1936-7. (SEE STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE 
CC). The shareholders o f the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company did not fully share in this as with 
the rise of military expenditure in the UK tax was inevitably increased. However, dividends of the Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Company revived -  from nil in 1933-4 and 1934-5 and 2.5% in 1935-6 to 7.5% in 
1938-9 and 3.75% in 1939-40.
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The level of cooperation with the Japanese grew to a level which later was a source of embarrassment 
for the UK company. The cooperation reached a high pitch in late 1941. In a letter from Mr Nathan to the 
Chairman dated October 15th, 1941 he stated that he had discussions with a Lt. Col. Yamashita -  Chief o f 
the Tianjin Special Mission. In this meeting Yamashita suggested that in the event of war between the UK 
and Japan then there should be a hand over period in which the British staff ran the mines until the 
Japanese were in a position to operate the mines efficiently. In his reply to Yamashita’s summary o f the 
talks Nathan stated (October 11th, 1941) that as regards KMA’s contact with the Japanese authorities >
“I have always believed that this liason was as satisfactory to the Japanese as it is to the KMA and I trust 
that no attempt will be made to substitute any other arrangement for one that has functioned and is 
functioning so successfully.” (181).
It was not until December 10th, 1941 that the Board of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company 
decided to impart what seems a significant piece o f intelligence to the UK authorities :-
“It was resolved that a copy of enclosures Nos. A1 and A3 relating to the handing over of the whole 
management of the KMA to the Japanese Military in the event of War be sent to the Foreign Office for 
their information.” (181).
The eventual reply from the Foreign Office in June, 1942 (182) was scathing >
.the Kailan mines have produced a large proportion of the coking coal essential to the Japanese steel 
industry and are of first class military importance. Nevertheless... Mr Nathan gave an undertaking to the 
Japanese authorities to be responsible for the continued working of the mines after the outbreak of war and 
until the Japanese were in a position to take them over... Mr Eden is not impressed by the Statement of 
your directors that this was the only means to enable the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company to 
resume possession of the property after the war and that the Japanese would eventually have been able to 
replace the British staff with their own nationals.
These and the other arguments advanced...do not, in Mr Eden’s opinion, excuse a voluntary undertaking 
by a British subject to carry on a vital war industry for the enemy against his own country, and he can only 
express astonishment and regret that such conduct should be openly approved by the directors of your 
Company.”
( A full account of this extraordinary affair is given in Annex B to this PART).
Furthermore, the Board of Trade in a letter of July 9th, 1942 exercised powers conferred on them by the 
Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939 and the Defence (Trading with the Enemy) Regulations, 1940 and put a 
Government Controller into the Company. This severely restrained the business of the Company. This 
action was justified as the Company’s “Kailan Mining Administration Account” dated June 12th, 1942 
showed (183)
- “June 12th, 1942 -  Cash Staff Payments 1st, December, 1941 to 31st, May, 1942 - £2,775.”
It was not until July 8th, 1946 that the Board of Trade Controllership on the UK company was lifted.
(4) The Indian Summer of British Industrial Enterprises in China.
Abnormal conditions after the 1937 invasion of China by the Japanese brought prosperity to the great 
majority of British firms after the initial impact of any fighting and disruption in their vicinity and in spite 
of the results of the various Japanese harassments.
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The following figures estimated in this study from the various accounts with differing year ends of the 
companies concerned (Seethe STATISTICAL ANNEX) illustrate this :-
Profits as Percentage of Paid-up Capital- 
Total UK Industrial O f which Total excluding - O f which -
Companies in China B.A.T. China B.A.T. China Cotton Marine Mining Chemicals
Textiles Eng.
1935 8.6 11.8 -0.3 0.9
00o'i 0.6 -7,3
1936 14,7 18.6 6.5 7,2 1,1 6,0 6.6
1937 20.2 26.3 7.8 14.9 4.8 6.5 7.0
1938 21.4 25.2 15.1 37.1 10.5 9.0 12.7
1939 48.8 77.1 15.0 39.7 14.1 2.9 73,9
1940 n.a. 83.8 n.a. n.a. 62.6 11.1 49.0.
Although in many cases the opportunity was taken to build up reserves, rewards to shareholders in terms 
of dividends grew markedly in many cases (although because of the depreciating Chinese currency not, in 
some cases, in real terms)
Dividends (ordinary and preference) as Percentage of Paid-up Capital.
Total UK Industrial O f which Total excluding Of which -
Companies in China B.A.T. China B.A.T. China Cotton Marine Mining
Textiles Engineering
1935 3.3 3.8 1.8 4.3 1.6
1936 5,3 6,2 3,4 3,0 3,6
1937 7.2 8.0 5.3 7.2 3.6 5.1
1938 9.8 8.6 11.8 28.9 8.0 6.3
1939 12.7 15.3 9.4 24.9 28.9 3.2
1940 n.a. 32.2 n.a. n.a. 41.0 1.2
Table Ten shows the development of ordinary dividends for many o f the British firms. Particularly large 
increases were recorded by British American Tobacco Company (China), Limited, Electric and Musical 
Industries (China), Limited (which retained only 0.6 per cent of its earnings from June, 1934 to June, 
1941), the shipbreaking, etc firm of Metal Industries of China, Limited, the Shanghai Exploration and 
Development Company, Limited, China Import and Export Lumber Company, Limited and Ewo Cotton 
Mills, Limited. By 1939 the net profits of the last were 3% in excess of the total paid-up capital bringing 
Jardine Matheson £29 thous. as general managers. (In 1940 net profits were as much as 52% in excess of 
capital). The rise in the dividend rates was a major factor in the beneficial rise for shareholders in the share 
prices o f local British companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Thus, the share price of Ewo Cotton 
Mills, Limited peaked in May, 1940 at $82 against, for example, $17.5 in July, 1937.
Despite the severe depreciation of the Chinese currency between the outbreak o f War and 1941 profits on 
translation into Sterling did in most cases rise. The following figures are taken from individual company 
records (See the STATISTICAL ANNEX) utilising their translation into Sterling :-
Net Income - £ thous.
B A T. fChinal China Printing and Orient Paint. Colour EMI ('China!
Year to Calendar Finishing and Varnish Year to
Sept Year Calendar Year Year to Sept. June
1937 1,711 1,775 64 -3.2 27.7
1938 2,416 2,408 130 -1.3 4.5
1939 1,809 1,733 18 15.5 11.6
1940 1,883 2,021 104 21.7 15.5
1941 2,501 27.8 21.3
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TABLE TEN.
Dividends on Ordinary Capital (including bonus share Issues) - Per cent.
Financial Year 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
B.A.T. (China), Ltd.
Ending :- 
Sept. 1 5 8 9 20 48 76
Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Co., Ltd. June 2.5 5 7.5 7.5 3.75
Pekin Syndicate Dec. - 2 - - - - -
Shanghai Exploration and 
Development Co., Ltd. Dec. 4 _ 6.25 49 34.25 88.5
Ewo Cotton Mills, Ltd. Dec. 3.6 8.6 20.0 50.0 71.5 71.5*'
China Printing and 
Finishing Co. Dec. 22.5 20
New China Textile Co., Ltd. Dec. - 10 25
Shanghai Worsted Mills, Ltd. March - - - - - 8 _ *
EMI (China), Ltd. June 14 35 44 43 44.5 105.5 197
Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd. Sept. - 4 9 25 30
Metal Industries of China, Ltd.,** Dec. - - 60 140*
Orient Paint, Colour and 
Varnish Co., Ltd, Sept. . . . 5 10
Ewo Breweries, Ltd. Dec. i# ,, B< 5*
China Import and Export 
Lumber, Co., Ltd. Feb. 8 6 6 20 46.5 46.5
S. Moutrie and Co., Ltd. March - - 6 - 8 16
The figures above are taken from the relevant tables in the STATISTICAL ANNEX or the relevant tables 
in the main text except for
* Obtained from the Far Eastern Economic Review, Volume No. 8, 1946, Page 6 which gives dividends 
for 1940 for all those companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
** Figures for Metal Industries o f China, Ltd display an excellent example of the boom conditions 
experienced by British companies after the cessation o f hostilities in Shanghai :-
Issued Capital. Net Income. Dividend.
- $ thousand - - % -
1937 16.3 to 31.12. 1,250 -46.2 - {Finance and Commerce 15.6.38)
1938 1,250 -212.1 - (Finance and Commerce 22.5.40)
1939 1,250 1,317.2 60 (Finatice and Commerce 5.6.40)
1940 1,250 ma 140
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As regards B.A.T. (China), profits in March, 1940 at £319 thous. -  a rate of £3,828 thous. per annum -  
were a record. In the case o f the China Printing and Finishing Company profits in 1940 to the 13th, April 
ran at a rate of £380 thous. per annum. For Electric and Musical Industries (China), Limited profits in the 
four months to end October, 1941 ran at £59 thous. per annum.
The main reason for this relative (and rather artificial) prosperity of British firms was the differential 
impact of hostilities on their Chinese rivals. Thus, in Shanghai, out of the largest 18 cigarette 
manufacturing concerns out of the 45 Chinese factories operating, 8 were completely destroyed. (184). 
Sales of cigarettes from their Mainland Chinese facilities of B.A.T.’s main Chinese competitor -  Nanyang 
Brothers -  fell from 3,543 million in 1937 to 1,301 million in 1940. (See STATISTICAL ANNEX, TABLE
I). Again, the operations of the three largest competitors of the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company 
were virtually terminated. British firms prospered from this inability of many Chinese firms to supply (as 
did some Chinese firms in the interior who could obtain essential raw materials). There was, however, a 
negative aspect for British firms as, given the War conditions, the external value of the Chinese dollar 
plunged thus reducing earnings in terms of Sterling.
Another factor in the situation was the reduction of import competition from Europe after the outbreak of 
the Second World War. On the other side o f the coin, British firms were able, in many cases, to develop 
export business to compensate for the increasing difficulty in supplying Free China. (The boom conditions 
for British firms tapered off somewhat in 1941 as the Japanese blockade o f trade with Free China increased 
in efficiency).
Thus, the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company faced “the continued closure o f a large section of 
the China market” but, as described in PART III -  Chapter Five, redressed this by developing sales to 
markets in South East Asia. This situation was also experienced by Electric and Musical Industries (China) 
who boosted exports from its Shanghai plant -  see PART I I I -  Chapter Six.
The dire state of locally owned industry, increasing inflation and political uncertainties led Chinese 
investors to seek sanctuaiy in local British industrial (and other) enterprises. Chinese investors desperately 
sought shares in local foreign enterprises in basic industries which were (mistakenly in the light of 
subsequent events) thought to have a high degree of security. Thus on the occasion of the public issue of 
shares in Ewo Breweries (see below) it was commented that :-
“There is an unrelenting search for sound investments which will provide a safeguard against depreciation 
of the national currency. Large amounts of national currency are available and the Chinese do not know 
what to do with it for the best.” (185).
This situation enabled British enterprises such as Ewo Cotton Mills, Limited and the New China Textile 
Company (see PART I I I -  Chapter Three) to make share issues at a considerable premium. In the case, for 
example, of Ewo Cotton Mills when new shares were issued in December, 1938 the premium was 100 per 
cent.
This situation also helped British concerns on converting into public companies and in the associated 
“floating The Shanghai Worsted Mills, Limited was founded in 1935 under the aegis of China Engineers, 
Limited (see above). In 1940 it was converted into a public company. An issue of 786 thousand shares at a 
premium was undertaken in December, 1940. 362 thousand of these were applied for by directors and their 
friends. O f the balance o f424 thousand shares offered to the public, principally Chinese investors,
-190-
applicants received as nearly as possible 2.8 shares for every 100 asked for (186). The lists were only 
opened for half an hour. (187). This was in the context of a company that had only paid one dividend in its 
history and was highly “geared” -  at 30.9.1940 creditors were nearly five times capital and reserves with 
Sterling denominated debts accounting for 89 per cent o f these debts. (188).
A similar process took place in the case of Ewo Breweries -  originally a private venture by Jardine 
Matheson (a third share) and two partners of Messrs Benjamin and Potts (Shanghai stockbrokers). (See 
PART III, Chapter 7 (A)). Its initial financial performance was poor. Losses were made in 1937, 1938 and 
1939 although a good profit was made in the first half of 1940 (189)
- $ thous. -
1937 398 loss (before interest o f240)
1938 254 loss (before interest o f288)
1939 194 loss (before interest of 301)
January- June 1940 618 profit
July -  December 1940 253 profit
1940 871
(The interest figures quoted above are derived from the Jardine Matheson Archives (J37). 1937/8 from 
Letters Shanghai to  London 1939, No. 2103 and 1939 from Letters Shanghai to London 1940, No. 2370.) 
The second half, however, showed a partial relapse. (190).
However, these profit/loss figures, quoted in the prospectus offering shares in the Company are rather 
misleading as they do not take account o f the considerable interest burden in 1937-1939.
In October, 1940 the concern was incorporated as a public company as Ewo Breweries, Limited with 
Jardine Matheson as general managers. Benjamin and Potts offered for sale 800,000 of the 1,400,000 shares 
held by Jardine Matheson and their partners. Some o f the share issue was taken up by British interests but 
the vast majority was taken by Chinese investors. (191). There are some grounds for thus believing that, 
here again, the vendors took advantage of the desperate desire of Chinese investors for security. Jardine 
Matheson raised money which could be used to buttress their own local operations or, by various means, 
repatriated while still maintaining effective control of the company.
This case was quoted by the Historical Academic Research Committee in the PRC as an example of 
British imperialist exploitation (192). However, on the other side o f the coin, the figures quoted here do not 
tally with the information given in the offer document. Also, to be fair to the promoters it seems that the 
assets for sale were not over-valued. The valuation of the fixed assets was well below replacement value.
After the Second World War British companies did not experience any competition in China from local 
Japanese enterprises. All o f  those remaining, in common with other Axis ventures, were nationalised. For 
example, in cotton textiles they became part of China Textile Industries. This Government concern 
controlled 83 cotton mills with 1,763 thous. spindles and 38,400 looms -  in 1947 it accounted for 35.8 per 
cent o f the national output o f cotton yarn. These nationalised organisations could not offer anywhere near 
the keen competition that the previous Japanese managed firms could. Thus, on this count British firms 
could expect a bright future. However, the civil war followed by the formation of the PRC rendered this 
factor irrelevant.
A
CONSEQUENCES FOR BRITISH FIRMS OF THE HOSTILITIES IN 1937/1938
British American Tobacco. Factory at Pudong damaged and out of action for two months. The Thorbum 
Road factory in Shanghai escaped with only minor damage, (a).
Chinese Engineering and Mining Company. The mines escaped physical damage and sales of coal kept up 
better than expected. The port o f Shanghai was closed from August to December, 1937 but this was 
“compensated to some extent by increased sales elsewhere” . Sales of coal from the Kailan mines in the 23 
weeks from 1st July, 1937 at 1,567 thous. tons were only 8% down on the 1,702 thous. tons for the same 
period of the previous year (b).
Shanghai Exploration and Development Company. Limited. In August, 1937 operations at the mine (16 
miles from Beijing) were suspended due to hostilities in the vicinity. The labour force was forced to 
disperse. Production was not resumed until April, 1938. (c).
Pekin Syndicate. Production was curtailed towards the end of August and in October it was decided to 
close down the mines. In February, 1938 the mines were occupied by the Japanese military, (d).
China Printing and Finishing Company. The cotton mill at Pudong Point received twelve shells either on 
the building or in the compound. The skeleton staff at this mill and the printworks (also in Shanghai) had to 
make daily reports to the Head Office in the relatively unaffected International Settlement. In December, 
1937 the local manager sent to the Chairman of the parent company (the Calico Printers’ Association) a 
compilation of these reports which covered the period August 23rd to December 6th, 1937. After apologising 
for the bulkiness it was noted that “even the bulkiness is no measure of the anxiety through which we 
passed during the four months they cover”(e).
Ewo Cotton Mills. Limited. On the nights of September 18th and 21s1 incendiary bombs landed on the Ewo 
mills but damage was relatively slight. Six carding machines and eight mule spinning machines were badlly 
damaged, (f). The Company’s war damage claim for this and other damage was fairly small - $45,000 
(£2,700). (g).
Patons and Baldwins (Far East). Limited. The factory suffered damage but not to the main building, (h). 
Shanghai Dockyards. Limited. The International Dock was badly damaged and the Tungkadoo Dock was 
burnt, (i)
Metal Industries o f China. Limited. Direct damage due to hostilities was unimportant but it was not until 
May, 1938 that the Company obtained control of their properties. Thefts amounted to around $50 thous. (£3 
thous.). The outbreak of hostilties meant the cessation of activities after a period of “very substantial 
profits”, (j).
Hope Crittal fChinal Company. Limited. The factory escaped serious damage - a few holes in the wall 
caused by shrapnel. Work ceased in the factory on August 14th, 1937 but the Company rented a portion of a 
factory in the Settlement to complete some rush orders. By January, 1938 the factory was operating, (k).
The China Brass and Iron Works. Limited. There was no material loss from shrapnel or bombs. During the 
period that the factory was closed the Company removed any stocks of value, (1).
Major Brothers. Limited. The plant was undamaged in the hostilities and reopened in November although 
“many factoriesjising our product have been either destroyed or so seriously damaged as to prohibit their
-192-
working.” (m). (Being a supplier of acids the Company was more vulnerable in terms of its customer base 
than suppliers of consumer goods).
Orient Paint. Colour and Varnish Company. Limited. The works were evacuated on August 14th, 1937. 
Watchmen remained on duty until the IS* when told by Japanese troops to get out. The depot was “stocked 
to capacity” so was “in a favourable position when business reopens.” (n). However, although the 
Company obtained a permit to remove ten truckloads of manufactured goods it was “impossible owing to 
Japanese restrictions”, (o). On October 15th a shell landed but fortunately did not explode. Repairs only cost 
around $900 (£55). On October 19th a shell burst in a paint storage depot but damage was “fairly slight”, 
(p). The minutes for the local meeting of the “Advisory Committee” of the Company on December 2nd, 
1937 noted that “we have been particularly fortunate in avoiding serious damage” (q). The factory was 
reopened on February 7th, 1938. (r). (The company was lucky in that the two shells had landed just after the 
expiry of their war risk insurance (s)). Sales fell from $103 thous. in June, 1937 and $80 thous. in July to (t)
August $30 thous.
September $26 thous 
October $23 thous.
The China Soap Company. Limited. One of the warehouses at the factory at Yangtszepoo Road was hit by 
an incendiary bomb on September 1st, 1937 but by June, 1938 the factory was in full production, (u).
Electric and Musical Industries fChina! Limited. From August 14th the factory was virtually closed -  only 
a few workers being employed on export orders. By October 31st the Chinese employees were laid off - to 
be fully re-employed in March, 1938. Direct losses due to hostilities amounted to $39,000 (£2,300). Home 
sales fell from a monthly average of $177.7 thous. in July/August to $22.7 thous. in September to 
December, 1937. (v).
The Ewo Brewery. The brewery was “in the centre of hostilities, however the staff kept to their posts and 
the products from time to time found their way through the Japanese lines.” (w).
S. Behr and Mathew. Limited. Their egg factory was severely damaged by an incendiary bomb. (x).
The China Import and Export Lumber Company. Limited. The Shanghai factory of their subsidiary of 
China Woodworking and Dry Kiln Company, Limited was hit by an incendiary bomb causing damage of 
$132,000 (£8,000) while damage at other sites, mainly Nanjing, cost $88,000 (£5,300). Two of the 
Company’s Shanghai yards also suffered damage, (y). An incendiary bomb (from a Chinese plane!) set fire 
to their Yangtszepoo Road premises (z).
Woodcraft Works Limited. Shelling induced a fire which helped by the combustable raw materials mainly 
gutted the plant which had to be entirely reconstructed, (aa).
S. Moutrie and Company, Limited. The factory in Shanghai, employing 200 Chinese, was closed for five 
months albeit only slightly damaged, (bb).
Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company. Limited. The small (50 employees) factory in Shanghai, mainly 
engaged in assembly and testing of imported equipment but also making radios and wireless equipment, 
was completely burnt out during the hostilities, (cc).
(a) Finance and Commerce, November 24* 1937.
(b) The Times, December 18*, 19381Finance and Commerce, January 5* 1938.
(c) Finance and Commerce, August 3rd, 1938.
November $21 thous. 
December $34 thous.
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(d) The Chairman of the Pekin Syndicate at the Ordinary General Meeting on July 6th, 1938. Finance and 
Commerce, August 10th, 1938.
(e) The archives o f the Calico Printers’ Association. Box 1254 marked “Shanghai”.
(f) Finance and Commerce, October 6th, 1937.
(g) North China Herald, May 11th,1938,
(h) Finance and Commerce, December 1st, 1937.
(i) Finance and Commerce, December 1st, 1937.
(j) Finance and Commerce, June 15th, 1938.
(k) Finance and Commerce, January 5th, 1938.
(1) Finance and Commerce, January 12* 1938.
(m) North China Herald, March 16 ,1938.
(n) Swire Archives (see PART HI, Chapter Five). Letter to UK Office from Shanghai, August 24th, 1937. 
Box 174.
(o) Telegram to Swire Head Office from Shanghai on September 24th, 1937. Box 174.
(p) Telegram to Swire Head Office from Shanghai on October 19th, 1937. Box 174.
(q) Swire Archives. Box 174.
(r) Letter to Swire Head Office from Shanghai on February 11th, 1938. Box 175.
(s) Letter from Shanghai on November 22nd, 1947 to Butterfield & Swire, Hong Kong, Box 364B.
(t) Attachments to letter from Shanghai to Swire Head Office of February 18th, 1938.
(u) Finance and Commerce, June 15th, 1938.
(v) Archives o f the EMI Group.
(w) Far Eastern Economic Review, April 7th, 1940.
(x) Finance and Commerce, October 6th, 1937.
(y) Finance and Commerce, May 17th, 1939.
(z) Finance and Commerce, October 10th, 1937.
(aa) Finance and Commerce, December 22nd, 1937.
(bb)Finance and Commerce, July 20th, 1938.
(cc) Finance and Commerce, January 12th, 1938.
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Annex B.
This extraordinary affair, which can be closely followed from the archives o f the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company, must have been beyond the comprehension of the gentlemanly and intensely patriotic 
(judging by his record in the First World War) Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. The archives are not 
systematically classified and indexed but, in this case, are given in date order o f the various minutes of the 
Board meetings. The volumes concerned are 
MS 28378/16 - Minute Book No 14.
MS 28378/17 - Minute Book No. 15.
MS 28378/16.
As noted in the main text above, the Minutes of the 54th Meeting o f the Committee of the Board of 
Directors on December 10* 1941 noted that copies of the key documents “relating to the handing over of 
the whole management of the organisation of the Kailan Mining Administration to the Japanese Military in 
the event of War be sent to the Foreign Office for their information.” These documents which were typed 
were attached to the minutes as enclosures A1 and A3.
Enclosure A3.
This document was headed “Resume of Talks Between Mr Nathan and Lt. Col. Yamashita, Chief of the 
Tientsin Special Mission, on October 2nd, 1941. There were five points
1. “It is desired the KMA will confirm that, in the event o f a war unfortunately breaking out between Japan 
and Britain, the KMA will hand over peacefully the whole equipment of the organisation to the Japanese 
Military.”
2. “ .. .it is desired Mr Nathan and the rest of the KMA Staff pledge that they will remain at their respective 
posts.. .until such date when the Japanese side will have completed all necessary arrangements to take over 
and operate in frill the whole machinery o f the KMA. The period of time required for such preparatory 
arrangements is tentatively fixed at about 6 months.
3. There was a guarantee “that the Japanese Military will give protection to the life and property of Mr 
Nathan and the rest of the KMA Staffs”.
4. A Japanese advisor and his assistants to be appointed as honorary members o f the KMA.
5. If  a vacancy occurred in the technical staff a Japanese technician should be considered.
Enclosure A I.
Nathan’s reply included
- “I accept the responsibility for the continued functioning of the Mines until such time as the Japanese 
were able to assume this responsibility if, after war had broken out, they decided to do so.”
- “I can give the pledge requested regarding the KMA Staff remaining at their posts after War has broken 
out...”
A letter was sent in reply by the Foreign Office to the Company on February 26*, 1942. This was noted 
as received in the minutes of the 60th Committee Meeting of the Board o f Directors on March 4th, 1942 but 
no copy was attached.
MS 28378/17 -  Minute Book No. 15.
The Minutes of the 66* Meeting of the Committee of the Board of Directors on May 21st, 1942 noted the 
receipt of a letter dated May 13* 1942 from the Foreign Office. This stated that “I am directed by Mr
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Secretary Eden to inform you that the following telegram was recently received from the Swiss Charge 
d5 Affairs at Shanghai through his Majesty’s Minister at Berne.” After noting this it went on to say that 
“In reply His Majesty’s Minister has been instructed to request the Swiss Government to inform the 
Managers of the Kailan Mining Administration o f the general attitude o f His Majesty’s Government in the 
matter, namely that His Majesty’s Government do not regard as unpatriotic the participation o f British 
subjects in such maintenance o f essential services as is for the benefit o f the civil population o f the 
occupied territory, but that they do expect patriotic British subjects to refrain from assisting the enemy war 
effort, and that as the production of coal is clearly essential to the Japanese war effort His Majesty’s 
Government cannot but regard assistance given voluntarily by British subjects to this end as unpatriotic and 
reprehensible.”
The Minutes of the 70th Meeting of the Committee of the Board of Directors on June 10th, 1942 noted that 
a letter defending their conduct had been sent to the Foreign Office on June 1st, 1942.
The Minutes of the 71st Meeting of the Committee of the Board of Directors on June 24th, 1942 contained 
a copy of the withering reply from the Foreign Office
1. “I am directed by Mr Secretary Eden to acknowledge the receipt o f your letter of June 1st enclosing a 
memorandum on the subject o f the arrangement made by the manager o f the Kailan Mining Administration 
with the Japanese authorities at Tientsin.”
2. “The views expressed by your Board of Directors have been carefully considered, but they do not lead 
this Department to modify the opinion already conveyed to you in the letters of February 26th and May 
13th".
3. “The fact remains that the Kailan Mines have produced a large proportion of the coking coal essential to 
the Japanese steel industry and are of first class military importance. Nevertheless, in the circumstances 
already described, Mr Nathan gave an undertaking to the Japanese authorities to be responsible for the 
continued working o f the mines after the outbreak of war and until the Japanese were in a position to take 
them over. This undertaking specifically related to a state of war between Great Britain and Japan.”
4. “Mr Eden is not impressed by the argument o f your directors that this was the only means to enable the 
Chinese Engineering and Mining Company to resume possession of the property after the war, and that the 
Japanese would eventually have been able to replace the British staff with their own nationals.”
5. “These and other arguments advanced in your memorandum do not in Mr Eden’s opinion excuse the 
voluntary undertaking by a British subject to carry on a vital war industry for the enemy in a war against 
his own country and he can only express astonishment and regret that such conduct should be openly 
approved by the directors o f your Company.”
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PART V -  FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (The relevant Figures (4 -14J are given on Pages 214-224Y
(A) INTRODUCTION
The large assembly of financial data on British industrial enterprises in China, presented here (mainly) in 
the STATISTICAL ANNEX, is not only useful for assessing the scale of British investment, as shown in 
PART II, but also in assessing the level of profitability of these enterprises and the distribution of their 
profits -  how much was paid out in dividends as against retained with the likelihood of being ploughed 
back to further develop the business.
There are currently, given the volume of financial data revealed by modern companies, a selection of 
financial ratios that can be calculated bearing on differing aspects of, for example, the profitability of 
enterprises. This situation did not exist in the period covered here. Thus, in assessing profitability, it is 
impossible from the data available to  calculate such familiar ratios as profits as percentage of average total 
assets (or net assets) employed (very little balance sheet information available), operating profits as 
percentage o f sales or earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and goodwill amortisation. All that is 
comprehensively available from both Chinese and UK sources is the ratio of profits to issued capital and 
the ratio of profits less dividends to total profits.
Nevertheless, despite all its limitations this analysis is still worth performing with the main aim of 
analysing the cogency of what Chi-ming Hou describes as the “Drain Effect” (1) in this instance >
“ ... foreign trade and investment are alleged to have drained the economy o f its wealth because o f the 
secularly unfavourable balance of trade and the large amount of income that was made or remitted to their 
home countries by Western enterprises”(2). This opinion was propounded by Chinese politicians of such 
diversity as Mao Zedong, Jiang Jieshi and Sun Yat-sen. (3). It was also echoed by Western writers such as
C.K. Hobson :-
“Capital has been employed in numerous instances to drain countries of their resources, to weaken them 
economically, and to degrade them morally.” (4).
The charge has been encapsulated by Lloyd E. Eastman in listing the various arguments as (5) :- 
“The imperialists... drained off China’s wealth by repatriating the large profits made in China...” 
Another facet of the argument concerning the impact of foreign investment in China that is examined 
in this PART is the assertion that a major portion of this investment did not originate in the transfer of 
scarce capital to China but was the result of recycling monies received from previous commercial 
operations in China predominantly of an exploitive nature, in particular the opium trade. In the words of 
Wui Zichu (referring to total British investment in China) (6)
“Although England has a large amount of capital in China, yet the actual amount brought in is very 
limited and the graeter part of the capital came from China and not from England... From a study ... 
probably the total capital brought in by English firms cannot be more than £50,000,000. Yet each year they 
received from China a remittance of profits in good times more than £10.000.000.”
The principal sources of funds for this locally generated capital was alleged by Wei Zichu to be the 
“huge profits” of the opium era and profits on land speculation i.e. alleged commercial exploitation aided 
by the "Unequal Treaties” and the Concessions. (7).
This analysis below only covers one sector of British investment in China and is not necessarily 
representative even of British investment as a whole and even more so of total foreign investment.
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Nevertheless it is hoped that this analysis might throw some light on, to recapitulate, assertions that
Investment by foreigners in China was highly profitable both absolutely and relatively against 
the background of relevant conditions in the investing countries.
These (allegedly) high profits were preponderated repatriated to the investing countries.
A substantial, indeed major share, of investment by foreigners was not financed by capital 
exports to China but by utilizing funds secured by previous commercial operations, often of an 
exploitative nature, within China.
The data on the performance of British companies given here has been assembled by the author from the 
accounts of these companies. Key sources include
(a) The financial statements of the various companies (locally or Hong Kong registered) as given 
principally in the North China Herald, The Celestial Empire or Finance and Commerce (the 
Reuters publication in Shanghai).
(b) A useful compilation of similar financial information is contained on pages 850-877 in Chen 
Zhen and others: Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (Source material for history of modern 
industry of China). Volume Two; Beijing, 1958.
(c) In the case o f British registered companies dedicated exclusively to operations in China -  a 
small proportion of the total and virtually confined to the mining sector -  data has been 
sourced from the reports of the firms concerned (mainly from The Economist, the Times, the 
Stock Exchange Yearbook, the Colliery Guardian, etc) or in one case their archives (the 
Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Ltd.).
(d) In the case of British registered companies with their presence in China being by private 
subsidiaries recourse has been made to the archives of companies such as British -American 
Tobacco (in this case analysed by Chinese researchers from local documents of the 
Company), Electric and Musical Industries, Limited, etc.
There is not 100 percent coverage of the financial series that ideally could be available but the omissions 
do not affect the analysis. The coverage incorporating those organisations with the necessary financial 
details was, for example, in 1921 as follows: -
Percent of total British industrial Percent covered by 
investment in China. financial details.
Sector.
Tobacco industry. 63 100
Mining. 10 95
Cotton textiles. 6 100
Marine engineering. 5 100
Other sectors. 16 12
TOTAL 100 85
Obviously, there is no attempt made at giving financial ratios for the under represented “Other sectors” 
but it can be confirmed that in terms of the figures for the total situation, this is very unlikely to distort any 
conclusions. The proportion of “Other sectors” increased somewhat in the 1930s but this was 
counterbalanced by increased financial information on this area.
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Comparison is made with the profitability and distribution of profits of British industry in the period 
under review. Two series are principally used in this comparison. Neither of these are completely 
satisfactory for the purpose
- the first series below is not strictly comparable as the figures include non- industrial activities.
- the second series is more comparable in terms of coverage but restricted in length.
The Economist Series.
Starting in 1908, The Economist series, concerning companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
covers the period up to the Second World War. A useful compilation of these figures is included in “British 
Industrial Profits, A Survey o f Three Decades” by Hargreaves Parkinson in The Economist of December 
17th, 1938 -  pages 597-603., However, only around 60 percent of the coverage relates to industry with the 
figures including public utilities, transport, etc. Also, a relatively small proportion (around 10%) includes 
British companies in oil, nitrates, rubber and tea with their operations mainly overseas.
The Hart Series
This series gives a more relevant categorisation but only starts in 1920. It is given in “Studies in Profit, 
Saving and Investment in the UK 1920-1938, Volumes 1 and 2” by P.E.Hart. (pages 21, 32 and 118).
In addition to the above limitations there are other difficulties in comparisons of profitability, etc over 
time. There could be changes over time of accounting practices and also in the obligations concerning 
disclosure of information. There could be varying treatments of depreciation. Also, in periods of high 
inflation as occurred in China in the 1930s depreciation would presumably be calculated on original asset 
cost but income would be in terms of current cost. Taxation is another problem. Thus in the later years of 
the First World War and immediately afterwards British companies’ profits were understated because of 
Excess Profits Duty whereas in 1921 Excess Profits Duty repayments tended to raise profits. Nevertheless 
despite these and other difficulties it is felt that the comparisons made below are reasonably sound.
(B) AN OVERALL COMPARISON.
(1) PROFITABILITY.
Part (A) of Table Eleven gives an overall comparison of British experience in China with The Economist 
series for the UK while Table Twelve and Figure 4 show the development over time with a split showing 
the (differing) position o f B.AT. China compared with other British industrial sectors in China. Table 
Fourteen and Figure 6 show the development over time of the major British industrial sectors other than 
B.A.T. China. Table Thirteen and Figure 5 gives the comparison between UK experience in China with the 
P.E.Hart series for the UK.
Section (A) of Table Eleven gives the profit rate of UK companies in China with UK companies as taken 
from The Economist series. The overall comparison shows that British companies in China enjoyed an 
advantage of seven percentage points over the UK companies. However, if we do not include B. AT. China 
in the comparison the difference is only about one and a half percentage points.The cigarette industry from 
the start of the First World War and throughout the twenties and thirties was enjoying a period of sustained 
growth despite the Great Depression. B A T . accounted by 1937 for about 55 percent of total British 
industrial investment in China -  completely disproportionate to the tobacco industry’s relative importance 
in UK industry.
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TABLE ELEVEN.
AVERAGE 1909 -  1959.
(A) PROFITS AS PERCENTAGE OF PAID UP CAPITAL - %.
UK Companies (The Economist Series). 9J)
UK Industrial Companies in China. 16.5
- B. A,T, China, 18,8
- Other. 10.9
- Cotton Textiles. 26.8
- Marine Engineering. 13.0
- Mining. 6.5
- Chemicals. 8.7
- Other 8.1
(B) DIVIDENDS ON PAID UP CAPITAL (Ordinary plus Preference) - %.
UK Companies (The Economist Series). 7.4
UK Industrial Companies in China. 7.6
- B.A.T. China. 74
- Other. 8,7
- Cotton Textiles. 22.0
- Marine Engineering. 10.8
- Mining. 5.2
(C) THE RETENTION RATIO (Profits less dividends as percentage of profits) - %. 
UK Companies (The Economist Series). 22.8
UK Industrial Companies in China. 46.2
- B.A.T. China. 61.8
- Other. 20.1
- Cotton Textiles. 18.0
- Marine Engineering 16.8
- Mining 19.6
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TABLE TWELVE.
PROFITS AS PERCENTAGE OF PAID UP CAPITAL - %
The Economist Feinstein UK Industrial companies in China
Series for the UK Series Total B.A.T. China Other
1895 n.a. ) 22.2) - 22.2
1896 n,a. ) 12,4) - 12,4
1897 n.a. )15.2 9.6) 9.5 - 9.6
1898 n.a. ) 7.7) - 7.7
1899 n.a. ) 6.6) - 6.6
1900 n.a. ) 6.9) - 6.9
J90I n.a. ) 9.3) - 9.3
1902 n.a. ) 12.7 6.3) 7.3 85.7 5.9
1903 n.a. ) 5.9) 144.0 5.1
1904 n.a. ) 8.2) 151.7 6.1
1905 n.a ) 7.3) 37.3 6.3
1906 n.a. ) 9.2) 22.7 7.3
1907 n.a. ) 11.9 9.0) 8.6 22.0 7.2
1908 11.6 ) 8.1) 5.1 7.2
1909 7.5 ) 9.4) 20.4 8.1
1910 8.5 6.3 13.4 5.5
1911 9.2 7.5 12.6 6.9
1912 9.7 7.6 17.8 5.3
1913 11.5 9.9 16.5 8.4
1914 10,9 9,2 19,6 6,7
1915 10.1 n.a. n.a. 7.5
1916 13.6 n.a. n.a. 8.5
1917 I2.S 18.9 23.4 17.5
1918 12.2 24.8 42.9 18.6
1919 14.6 12.2 7.1 40.6
1920 13.2 19.6 16.3 37.4
1921 6,8 10,2 8,3 17,2
1922 9.1 13.8 15.0 9.0
1923 9.9 18.7 20.5 12.3
1924 10.7 18.4 22.0 5.9
1925 11.4 18.6 22.3 5.1
1926 10.8 19.7 23.6 7.5
1927 10.8 15.1 17.2 8.8
1928 10,7 16,4 19.1 7,7
1929 10.6 16.0 17.8 10.7
1930 8.7 12.6 16.3 4.6
1931 5.7 15.6 19.5 8.0
1932 5.7 12.9 16.2 5.1
1933 6.7 16.4 21.8 2.8
1934 8.0 16.3 21.3 3.0
1935 9,1 8,6 11,8 -0,3
1936 10.6 14.7 18.6 6.5
1937 12.1 20.2 26.3 7.8
1938 11.2 21.4 25.2 15.1
1939 8.6 48.8 77.1 15.0
1940 n.a. n.a. 83.8 n.a.
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(Some guide as to the relative position before 1909 is given in Table Twelve with the figures for the UK 
being taken from C.H.Feinstein’s 'Home and Foreign Investment Some Aspects o f Capital Formation and 
Finance in the UK 1870-1913.’ (Ph.D. thesis, University o f Cambridge, 1960). Unfortunately his figures 
for industrial profitability, based on tax data, include, besides industry, transport, building, etc. However, 
even allowing for lower profitability in the industrial sector in the UK, there seems little evidence of 
profitability o f British industrial operations in China being in excess of that in the UK in the period covered 
from 1895 to 1909).
As noted above, the gap between the relative profitability of British companies in China and those in the 
UK was relatively small over the period 1909 to 1939 but still in the former's favour. However, as best 
seen from Figures 4 and 6 there were two periods when the profits of British industrial firms in China were 
boosted by special and short-lived factors >
- the period of the later years of the First World War and its immediate aftermath. The War brought boom 
conditions to local suppliers with the reduction of supplies from abroad and this lingered after the War.
(As noted above, the boom in profitability o f firms in Britain was restrained by Wartime taxation). The 
boom was particularly marked in the case of the cotton textile industry (see Table Fourteen and Figure 6). 
Here the post-War boom lasted longer than in other textile centres. Deliveries to China of textile machinery 
were delayed with the need to meet pent-up demand in the machinery producing countries together with 
shipping shortages.
- the abnormal conditions after the 1937 Japanese invasion of China brought prosperity to the great 
majority o f British industrial firms in China. Also the outbreak of the Second World War meant a reduction 
in import competition from Europe. (This period from 1937 until late 1941 has been fully discussed in 
PART IV  (C) above on the interface with Japanese interests).
Thus, if we compare the relevant data for UK industrial companies in China excluding the years 1918- 
20 and 1938-9 then the balance of profitability becomes marginally in favour o f UK companies as per The 
Economist series.
Table Thirteen and Figure 5 present the comparison over a shorter period than the above but with a more 
comparable series in that the UK figures relate to industry alone. Over the whole o f the period 1920 to 1938 
overall profitability of British industrial enterprises in China was about four and a half percentage points 
higher than that in the UK -  i.e. 35 percent higher. However, if the comparison is made with the tobacco 
industry being excluded in the case of UK companies in China then the comparison is reversed with, over 
the whole period, the British companies in China recording a level of profitability only slightly over half 
the level o f their UK counterparts, (The comparison would be slightly better for the UK firms in China in 
that the figures exclude textiles where the UK cotton textile industry was throughout most o f the period 
under review faced with very poor trading conditions -  see below). The UK figures include the tobacco 
industry but this should not affect the comparison more than slightly particularly as the British-American 
Tobacco Company, Limited is excluded.
(2) DIVIDENDS / RETENTIONS.
Parts (B) and (C) of Table Eleven, Table Fifteen and Table Sixteen and Figures 7,8 and 9 give the 
positions for the related ratios o f (a) dividends as a percentage of issued capital and (b) the retention ratio 
i.e. profits less dividends as percentage of profits.
TABLE THIRTEEN.
PROFITS BEFORE DEBENTURE INTEREST AS PERCENTAGE OF ISSUED 
CAPITAL FOR INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES EXCLUDING TEXTILES.
UK Industrial Firms. UK Industrial Firms in China. (Excluding
(P.E Hart series) B.A.T.)
1920 7.6 16,1 (14,7)
1921 6.8 8.5 (9.4)
1922 10.2 13.8 (7.7)
1923 11.0 19.5 (14.8)
1924 11.4 19.8 (10.0)
1925 11.6 19.4 (6.4)
1926 11.4 20.1 (7.3)
1927 12.5 15.6 (9.8)
1928 12.7 16.4 (6.6)
1929 13.2 15.0 (6.0)
1930 13,0 12.3 (2.6)
1931 12.1 13.3 (5.2)
1932 10.3 12.6 (3.0)
1933 11.6 17.3 (2.6)
1934 13.7 16.7 (3.0)
1935 15.4 8.8 (-0.3)
1936 16.4 15.3 (6.4)
1937 16.2 20.7 (5.6)
1938 15,1 20,1 (9,0)
Average 1920-38 12.0 16.3 (6.8)
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TABLE FOURTEEN.
PROFITS AS PERCENTAGE OF PAID UP CAPITAL FOR UK INDUSTRIAL
COMPANIES IN CHINA - EXCLUDING B.A.T. CHINA.
Total Cotton textiles Marine engineering Mining Chemicals
1895 22,2 - 26,4 - - 1,7
1896 12.4 - 13.7 - 2.6
1897 9.6 3.7 15.8 - 4.4
1898 7.7 1.6 16.2 - 2.0
1899 6.6 0.7 20.8 - 10.1
1900 6.9 -8.1 26.6 -2.6 7.0
1901 9.3 5.5 30.6 3.4 0.3
1902 5,9 2,4 16,5 2,9 6,8
1903 5.1 3.2 13.0 3.0 4.9
1904 6.1 -0.3 14.6 4.1 8.0
1905 6.3 22.7 7.4 4.7 -2.1
1906 7.3 28.8 3.7 6.9 2.1
1907 7.2 -0.8 5.5 8.6 - 1.0
1908 7.2 8.8 4.7 8.6 6.6
1909 8,1 22,3 5,6 8,3 -3,5
1910 5.5 4.3 1.2 7.1 -3.2
1911 6.9 12.5 -5.0 10.1 -5.2
1912 5.3 21.3 3.6 4.0 -5.2
1913 8.4 26.2 6.2 6.5 -3.8
1914 6.7 14.5 3.3 6.5 36.3
1915 7.5 14.7 2.8 7.8 3.6
1916 8,5 -1,2 15,5 8,2 12,5
1917 17.5 37.7 21.9 8.6 21.5
1918 18.6 22.6 23.1 13.5 -10.5
1919 40.6 87.6 36.1 17.3 -0.4
1920 37.4 112.5 34.8 7.8 0.5
1921 17.2 48.9 14.7 5.3 1,2
1922 9.0 13.7 10.5 5.2 -1.8
1923 12,3 3,1 9,4 16,8 -0,1
1924 5.9 -10.7 14.5 9.4 0.1
1925 5.1 -0.8 5.5 6.4 1.3
1926 7.5 8.9 8.1 8.5 1.1
1927 8.8 3.3 8.6 11.2 5.3
1928 7.7 15.6 11.7 5.3 5.1
1929 10.7 48.5 21.2 2.5 7.5
1930 4,6 23,8 7,9 0,8 8,7
1931 8.0 39.1 3.4 4.2 17.4
1932 5.1 23.7 11.8 0.5 15.0
1933 2.8 4.9 2.7 1.3 15.1
1934 3.0 3.1 -0.3 2.1 12.6
1935 -0.3 0.9 -0.8 0.6 -7.3
1936 6.5 7.2 1.1 6.0 6.6
1937 7,8 14,9 4,8 6,5 7,0
1938 15.1 37.1 10.5 9.0 12.7
1939 15.0 39.7 14.1 2.9 73.9
1940 n.a. n.a. 62.6 11.1 49.0
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(a) Dividends.
As Part (B) of Table Eleven shows there was little overall difference over the period 1909 -  1939 in the 
level of dividends between UK companies and their counterparts in China. However, the level of dividends 
of UK companies in China excluding B.A.T. was about one and a half percentage points higher. This was 
principally due to the cotton sector (and to a lesser extent marine engineering) with a very high level of 
rewards to shareholders in the post- First World War boom and in the years immediately before the Pacific 
War (See Table Fifteen and Figures 7 and 8). This more than counterbalanced periods of relatively low 
dividends in the years leading up to the First World War and the mid 1930s (see Table Fifteen and Figure
7).
(b) Retentions. (Tables Eleven and Sixteen and Figure 9)
As Part (C) of Table Eleven shows, the overall retention ratio of UK industrial companies tn China was 
over twice that registered by UK companies. However, this was entirely due to the very high ratio recorded 
by B.A.T. China. The majority o f the great expansion recorded by the Company in China was financed 
front local internal sources. (B. AT. adopted a very conservative approach in its financial treatment of its 
many large international subsidiaries. Dividends from these subsidiaries to the parent company were 
restrained allowing them to build up reserves.(8)).
Excluding B.A.T., the reverse result is apparent from Part (C) o f Table Eleven. British industrial 
companies in China had a retention ratio three percentage points lower than UK companies. As Table 
Sixteen and Figure 9 display the ratio of the former was particularly low in the mid 1920s to the mid 1930s. 
This is confirmed by a comparison with the P.E. Hart series covering 1920 -  1938 :-
Retention ratio.
UK -  P.E. Hart series. 34.8%
UK industrial companies in China excluding B.A.T. 10.5%
Thus, it could be asserted that British industrial companies in China (with the exception of B. A.T.) in the 
light of the difficult and uncertain operating conditions in China in the 1920s and 1930s decided not to 
reinvest to any degree but remitted the bulk of their profits to their shareholders abroad -  particularly in the 
UK. However, this assertion must be tempered by the fact that many UK controlled companies in China 
had significant numbers of Chinese shareholders. Also, the proportion o f Chinese shareholders to the total 
increased markedly towards the Pacific War as Chinese investors sought security. The extent of Chinese 
shareholding obviously varied from sector to sector with the largest proportion obviously being in those 
companies quoted on the Shanghai Stock Exchange *
Textiles.
Both the two British pioneer cotton textile companies in China had from the very start significant 
Chinese shareholder presence and in 1925 Jardine Matheson stated that Chinese investors owned about 75 
percent of the capital o f British mills in China (9). Of the two new entrants after then -  the New China 
Textile Company, Limited and the China Printing and Finishing Company, Limited the former attracted 
considerable support from Chinese investors but the latter had no Chinese interest.
The Jardine Matheson Ewo Filature had substantial Chinese shareholding from its start in the 1880s while 
* This was a sizeable institution with nearly 70 shares quoted -  Reuters claim that before the Second World 
War it was the second largest market for their financial reporting service.
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TABLE FIFTEEN.
DIVIDENDS ON PAID UP CAPITAL (ordinary plus preference! -  PERCENT.
The Economist series UK Industrial Companies in China
for the UK Total B.A.T. China Other -Cotton
Textiles
-Marine -Mining 
Engineering
1895 n.a. 13.5 - 13.5 - 15.9 -
1896 n.a. 7.8 - 7.8 - 8.9
1897 n.a. 6.2 - 6.2 2.2 10.6
1898 n.a. 5.2 - 5.2 1.3 10.5 _
1899 n.a. 4.6 - 4.6 - 15.3 _
1900 n.a. 8.7 - 8.7 25.6 _
1901 n.a.. 5,9 - 5,9 - 17,0 3,2
1902 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.7 - 15.0 2.1
1903 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.7 4.1 12.0 2.8
1904 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.4 - 13.0 3.7
1905 n.a. 4.9 10.0 4.7 12.1 8.0 3.3
1906 n.a. 5.6 8.2 5.3 14.1 3.4 5.3
1907 n.a. 5.9 12.0 5.1 4.5 4.9 5.3
1908 n.a. 5,1 4,5 5,2 6,9 5,2 5,4
1909 6.0 6.1 9.8 5.7 13.7 5.9 5.3
1910 6.4 4.1 11.2 3.3 4.1 2.5 3.5
1911 6.7 4.5 16.0 3.3 9.5 3.3 2.7
1912 8.1 5.2 10.3 4.0 14.6 3.4 2.9
1913 8.2 6.1 6.6 6.0 17.1 5.6 4.9
1914 8.1 4.1 2.9 4.4 11.0 3.4 3.9
1915 7,2 n,a. n,a, 5,6 10,0 8,1 4,2
1916 8.8 n.a n.a. 6.1 5.5 9.8 4.8
1917 8.1 12.1 15.5 11.1 19.5 15.8 5.7
1918 7.9 12.9 16.0 11.9 14.7 15.3 8.0
1919 9.5 7.1 3.6 26.5 58.6 24.2 11.7
1920 9.4 11.2 7.2 32.0 91.7 26.0 7.4
1921 7.3 6.2 3.8 15.1 46.3 10.6 6.2
1922 i n 7,7 6,9 10,8 20,7 10,1 7,4
1923 7.9 9.3 9.4 9.0 7.4 10.0 9.3
1924 8.3 9.2 10.1 5.8 3.9 12.8 4.3
1925 9.0 8.5 9.4 5.2 4.3 8.6 4.3
1926 8.9 9.0 9.4 7.4 9.6 8.1 6.5
1927 8.6 7.1 6.4 9.9 6.3 9.2 11.0
1928 8.5 8.0 7.7 9.4 11,3 9.2 8.8
1929 8,6 8,4 7,7 10,6 41,3 11,5 4,8
1930 7.3 5.3 6.0 3.7 13.9 9.1 1.4
1931 5.4 6.5 6.3 6.9 31.7 8.1 4.1
1932 5.2 5.0 5.3 4.5 21.6 8.4 1.4
1933 5.5 5.7 7.1 1.8 6.1 5.9 0.3
1934 6.4 5.5 6.9 1.2 4.9 1.4 0,2
1935 6.9 3.3 3.8 1.8 4.3 _ 1.6
1936 7,7 5,3 6,2 3,4 3,0 _ 3,6
1937 8.4 7.2 8.0 5.3 7.2 3.6 5.1
1938 7.9 9.8 8.6 11.8 28.9 8.0 6.3
1939 6.3 12.7 15.3 9.4 24.9 28.9 3.2
1940 n.a. n.a. 32.2 n.a. n.a. 41.0 1.2
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TABLE SIXTEEN.
THE RETENTION RATIO (Profits less Dividends as percentage of profits> 
The Economist series
for the UK Total B,A,T. China Other -Cotton. -Marine 
Textiles Ensineerine
■Mining
1895 n.a. 39.2 - 39.2 - 39.9 -
1896 n.a. 36.9 - 36.9 - 35.3 -
1897 n.a. 35.9 - 35.9 39.5 32.9 -
1898 n.a. 32.1 - 32.1 IS.4 34.9 -
1899 n.a. 30.1 - 30.1 100.0 26.7 -
1900 n.a. -32.2 - -32.2 -100.0 3.9 -100.0
1901 n.a. 37.3 - 37.3 100.0 44.5 5.2
1902 n,a. n,a, n,a. 20,1, 100,0 9,1 27,7
1903 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.0 -28.6 7.7 8.4
1904 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.7 -100.0 10.8 9.6
1905 n.a. 33.1 73.2 25.7 46.9 -7.5 31.5
1906 n.a. 38.8 64.0 28.3 51.0 8.9 23.3
1907 n.a. 33.7 45.4 29.1 -670.6 10.1 38.2
1908 n.a. 27.4 11.1 28.4 22.0 . -11.5 36.6
1909 20,1 35,0 51,9 30,0 38,2 -5,2 36,5
1910 24.4 34.5 16.4 39.6 4.5 -96.9 50.6
1911 27.4 38.6 -27.9 52.4 23.5 -165.4 73.3
1912 16.4 32.2 42.2 24.2 31.7 4.9 28.7
1913 28.4 38.9 60.2 29.1 34.7 10,1 25.6
1914 26.3 55.5 85.0 34.0 23.8 -2.8 39.3
1915 28.3 n.a. n.a. 26.0 31.9 -193.6 45.6
1916 35,2 n,a n,a, 27,6 -561,3 37,1 40,7
1917 36.7 35.8 33.8 36.7 48.3 27.6 33.7
1918 35.1 47.9 62.7 36.3 35.1 33.7 40.6
1919 35.2 42.0 49.6 34.7 33.1 32.9 32.4
1920 28.8 43.0 55.5 14.2 18.4 25.2 5.0
1921 -7.9 38.7 54.0 12.2 5.5 27.7 -18.1
1922 15.2 44.0 53.9 -20.5 -51.7 3.9 -42.3
1923 20,2 50,5 53,9 27,0 -135,7 -6.0 44,6
1924 22.3 50.2 54.0 -4.4 -136.4 11.7 54.5
1925 21.1 54.4 58.0 -3.2 67.8 -57.2 32.9
1926 17.9 55.8 60.0 13.8 -7.6 -0.3 23.2
1927 20.7 53.7 62.9 -6.4 -93.1 -6.8 2.2
1928 20.1 52.2 59.3 -15.1 27.2 21.0 -67.4
1929 18.6 48.5 57.0 4.6 14.7 45.6 -86.7
1930 15,7 57,9 63,3 11,0 41,5 -16,3 -72,5
1931 5.5 58.2 67.6 2.8 18.9 -137.4 1.5
1932 8.9 60.6 67.6 -15.9 9.1 28.4 -204.3
1933 17.2 65.5 67.5 -11.4 -24.1 -116.2 77.2
1934 20.9 66.6 67.4 40.4 -55.5 -657.1 88.6
1935 24.6 65.6 68.1 -257.9 -358.9 -100.0 -143.0
1936 27.5 64.1 66.8 46.3 58.0 -100.0 40.1
1937 30,7 65,4 69,6 36,1 51,6 25,4 21,8
1938 29.4 54.6 65.9 20.8 22.1 23.6 29.9
1939 26.9 73.4 80.2 14.3 37.4 -105.6 -10.4
1940 n.a. n.a. 51.6 n.a. n.a. 34.5 89.3
-207-
the Shanghai Worsted Mills, Limited, established in 1935, had strong Chinese presence from its 
foundation.
Mining.
Of the three British companies that engaged in sustained mining operations in China only the smallest 
company -  the Shanghai Exploration and Mining Company, Limited had a great number of Chinese 
shareholders -  probably up to 50 percent. Of the other two companies (both UK registered) the Pekin 
Syndicate, Limited had no Chinese shareholders but in its early days the Chinese Engineering and Mining 
Company, Limited had a significant proportion of Chinese shareholders stemming from its 1901 takeover 
of the original Chinese company but the proportion of such shareholders declined over time.
However, it is worth noting, as described in PART III -  Chapter Two, that from 1912 and 1914, 
respectively, the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited and the Pekin Syndicate, Limited 
combined most of their activities into joint ventures with Chinese companies. In both cases the 1930s saw a 
strengthening of the interests of the Chinese partners in these respective joint ventures.
Marine Engineering.
After a long period of amalgamations the main British interests in this activity were consolidated in 
1936 into Shanghai Dockyards, Limited. The Chinese interest in this company eventually reached 80 
percent of the issued capital.
Chemicals.
Of the two leading British companies in the 1930s — The China Soap Company, Limited (Unilever) and 
the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, Limited -  only the latter had a Chinese share (4.5% from 
mid-193 8) of its equity.
Other Industries excluding tobacco.
Chinese investors did not figure strongly overall in these industries. An exception was the Ewo Brewery 
when it was changed from a private concern to a public company in 1940 -  this increased the Chinese share 
of the company to around 60 percent (see PART IV  (C)).
British -American Tobacco.
The share of Chinese investors in the B. AT. subsidiaries in China has been pinpointed above in PART 
III -  Chapter One. The share of Chinese investors in British-American Tobacco Company (China), Limited 
never exceeded 5.1%. This proportion is low compared with, say, the textile and marine engineering 
sectors. Thus, the B.A.T. companies in China had a high retention ratio but a low proportion of Chinese 
investors. In contrast, those sectors with a relatively low retention ratio such as cotton textiles and marine 
engineering had a high proportion of Chinese investors,
(C) A COMPARISON BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR.
(a) British-American Tobacco.
Figure 10 (Based on Table QQQ in THE STATISTICAL ANNEX) shows the respective dividend records 
of the B. A.T. China flagship companies with those of two UK tobacco companies and the leading Chinese 
competitor -  Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company. Although lagging behind the dividend record of the 
Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company in the early 1920s the B.A.T. company in China was ahead as 
regards dividends from 1924 onwards. However,in relation to dividends by UK tobacco companies those of 
the B. AT. subsidiaries in China tended to be modest apart from during the First World War and just before
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the Pacific War. (The profits of Imperial Tobacco would include dividends from the B.A.T. parent 
company but over the period these were at a rate below the dividends of Imperial Tobacco). These high 
dividends by leading UK tobacco firms further illustrate the fact that the First World War and the next two 
decades were periods of prosperity lor the cigarette industry Worldwide and that the .high level of 
prosperity of B. A.T. in China was not exceptional.
(b) Cotton Textiles.
Figure 11 (Based on Table .RRR in the STATISTICAL ANNEX) gives the dividend progress of UK cotton 
firms in China as compared with their counterparts in the UK and Japan. The pioneer UK cotton companies 
in China had a poor start (see PART III, Chapter Three (A)) but the situation improved markedly from 
1905. There followed a period of reasonable dividends until the massive boom conditions o f 1917-1922- It 
should be noted, however, that this boom also applied, albeit at a lower level, to the industry in Japan and 
the UK. From 1923 onwards, apart from 1929, the dividend level was unspectacular albeit much higher 
than that of the UK industry which was starting its terminal decline- This situation lasted until 1.938 
onwards with the UK mills in China enjoying boom conditions again.
(c) Marine Engineering.
Figure 12 (Based on Table SSS in the STATISTICAL ANNEX) shows the relative position as regards 
dividends of UK companies in Shanghai compared with leading companies in the UK. In the late 1890s and 
until 1904 the level o f dividends was in excess of the UK level. However, due to the entry of further British 
firms and the growing competition from the Chinese concern of Kiangnan (Jiangnan) Dock and 
Engineering Works dividends were mediocre until the First World War led to a high level of dividends, 
particularly in 1919 and 1920. Dividends in the balance of the 1920s were unspectacular, albeit better than 
that of UK counterparts, and matters deteriorated in the mid 1930s -  in contrast to the UK experience. The 
special conditions applying from 1937 onwards plus the savings following on the merger of the two leading 
British companies in Shanghai led to a period of (short lived) prosperity.
(d) Mining.
Of the three important British coal mining companies in China the Pekin Syndicate was by far the worst 
performing. From the start in 1908 of its mines in Henan until June, 1922 accumulated profits only 
amounted to £70 thous. compared with the cost of the concession and capital expenditure totalling £811 
thous. (10). There was a brief period of relative prosperity in the early 1920s but after then the profits of the 
mines went downhill (See Table V in the STATISTICAL ANNEX) >
Years to end June. £thous. Years to end June. £thous.
1923 100.6 1931 -12.6
1924 114.0 1932 -24.6
1925 56.3 18 months to end 1933 -26.1
1926 -31.3 1934 -  calendar -20.0
1927 -50,7 1935 18,5
1928 -75.0 1936 n.a.
1929 -45.5 1937 11.8
1930 -23.6 1938-1940 „ -
Only in one year -1936- did the Pekin Syndicate pay a dividend (3.3%) on a reduced capital. From its 
entry into production to the end of 1.937 the total profit of the Henan mining operation was only c. £70
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thous. against fixed capital expenditure on these mines which totalled £865 thous. up to the end of June, 
1928.(11).
The relatively small Shanghai Exploration and Mining Company had a chequered career and it was 
unfortunate for the Company that its best years were close to the Pacific War. It only made a small net 
profit in 3 out of the years 1920 to 1931. However, the 1930s saw a pronounced revival with a high 
dividend record towards the end of the period (See Table S in the STATISTICAL APPENDIX):-
1933 8%
1934 6%
1935 4%
1936 -
1937 6.25%
1938 29% +one bonus share for every 5
1939 34,25?/*
1940 68.5% + one bonus share for every 5
The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company was until 1937 capitalised at slightly less than the Pekin 
Syndicate and this tended to affect the position as regards profits and dividends in total of these three 
significant UK mining ventures in China. Only in two years -  1934 and 1935 -  did the Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Company fail to pay a dividend before the outbreak of the Pacific War and only in 
the former year did it make a (small) loss -  overall the Company was satisfactorily profitable in contrast to 
Pekin Syndicate -  see PART III -  Chapter Two.
Figures 13 (Based on Table TTT in the STATISTICAL ANNEX) and 14 (Based on Table UUU in the 
STATISTICAL ANNEX) show the comparison between the operations of the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company / Kailan Mining Administration and the UK coal industry. Profits per ton of coal raised 
were consistently higher than the depressed UK industry with the exception of 1936 (Apart from poor 
trading conditions the UK coal industry also suffered from the fact that in terms of mechanisation a 
substantial proportion of its pits were not much further advanced than the Kailan mines). In terms of labour 
costs the Kailan Mining Administration clearly enjoyed an advantage but the margin narrowed by the 
1930s. Real wages rose at the Kailan Mining Administration -  by 1931 they were about twice the level of 
1920 and this rise continued until 1935 -  after which there was some relapse. (12).
External factors in the 1920s and 1930s meant that the Kailan Mining Administration could not enjoy the 
full advantage of its low labour costs. One reason is that coal at the pithead is, apart from use in internal 
power generation, useless unless there is secure transport to the consumer markets. The difficulties that the 
Company experienced in this regard were legion. A regular feature of the annual reports of the Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Company was statements on the following lines >
“... our sales were in every market limited by the amount of coal we were able to transport.” (13).
There were endless troubles with the Peking-Mukden Railway Company which came to a head in 1931 
when the railway concern attempted to blackmail the mining concern. (14 ). Add to this civil and military 
disdurbances and labour troubles then the profitability of the mines was below what one might expect from 
its low labour costs. Also a factor hitting the English partner in the Kailan Mining Adminisration was that, 
as the external value of the Chinese currency fell, the profits in terms o f Sterling fell.
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(e) Chemicals.
Until the mid-1920s the profitability of the British sector in this industry in the form of Major Brothers 
Limited, a producer of industrial acids, was mediocre. No dividends were paid by this firm between 1904 
and 1929. The position changed with the formation of The China Soap Company, Limited and the coming 
on stream of the factory in Shanghai of this Lever Brothers company in 1925. Apart from 1935 this 
company proved to be consistently profitable (15) :-
Profits as percentage of capital.
1926 1.1 1934 12.6
1927 5.5 1935 -7.6
1928 5,1 1936 9,5
1929 7.5 1937 1.5
1930 8.8 1938 15.9
1931 17.5 1939 83.8
1932 14.9 1940 44.0
1933 15.1
The other late UK entrant in this field was the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, Limited and 
here the record was not initially as favourable as the Unilever company. Losses were made in the first four 
financial years (to end September) but 1938/9 saw a move to profitability -  29.8 percent of capital. In 
1939/40 profits were 71.1 percent of capital and in 1940/41 109.8 percent. Dividends were, however, 
restrained - 5 percent in 1938/9, 10 percent in 1939/40 and nil in 1940/41 -  see PART III -  Chapter Five,
(f) Other industrial sectors.
Profits in the food and drink area were modest except in the case of the freezing, mainly for export, of 
eggs, game, poultry, etc which was particularly profitable in the period 1912-1919. In wood processing, the 
leading British company of The China Import and Export Lumber Company, Limited made steady progress 
(except for 1908) in the years up to the First World War. In the ensuing boom towards the end of the War 
the Company delivered dividends o f 33 percent in 1917,1918 and 1919. Dividends were passed in the next 
two years but with the exception of 1926 dividends were paid in the rest of the decade with 1929 (and 
1930) being good years with dividends of 24 percent After modest payments in the first years of the next 
decade the Company paid high dividends in 1938 (20 percent) and 1939 and 1940 (46.5 percent in each 
year). (See Table OOO in the STATISTICAL ANNEX).
The musical instruments company o f S.Moutrie and Company, Limited (pianos and organs) made modest 
profits up to the year ending March, 1910 when the dividend was passed as it was in the next two financial 
years. However, dividends were resumed in the following financial year and this revival was continued. 
The 1920s saw a period of considerable prosperity with dividends averaging 19 percent per annum. The 
first half of the 1930s brought a period o f great difficulty. Losses were made, dividends were passed and 
there was talk of liquidation. With the development of exports of pianos, the crisis was overcome and 
dividends were resumed in the year to March, 1937. (See Table PPP in the STATISTICAL ANNEX). 
Another specialist company was Electric and Musical Industries (China), Limited which was formed in 
1934 to take over the previous interests o f the Group in China -  Pathe Orient and China Record which had 
in recent years been making losses. The revival in the Company’s fortunes was remarkable and dividends 
to the parent company (Electric and Musical Industries, Limited) rose sharply (see Table HHH in the 
STATISTICAL ANNEX
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Years to end June -  Percent. *
(Compare EMI, Ltd. **) Compare EMI, Ltd5"*)
1935 14 (12.5) 1939 44.5 (-)
1936 35 <10) 1940 105.5 <-)
1937 44 (10) 1941 197 (6)
1938 43 (5)
* See Table HHH in the STATISTICAL ANNEX.
** Source : The Stock Exchange Yearbook.
The parent company in England did use the Chinese subsidiary as a “cash cow” -  in the period from
June, 3.934 to June, 1943 retentions by the company in China were only 0-6 percent of earnings (see 
TABLE HHH in the STATISTICAL ANNEX). (As can be seen above, the performance of the EMI Group 
as a whole was mediocre).
(D) CONCLUSIONS- 
(1) PROFITABILITY.
The charge that British industrial companies in China enjoyed a bonanza and were in an 
environment where profitability was well above that of their home equivalents is not proven. Discounting 
the special conditions towards the end of the First World War and in the immediate years before the Pacific 
War (where in both cases this prosperity was shared by other foreign firms and in the first case by Chinese 
firms and in the second case those Chinese firms that escaped Japanese aggression) the financial 
information suggests that there was no markedly higher profitability for British concerns over their 
counterparts in the home country.
Another approach confirming the above does not relate principally to financial data but looks at 
the failure rate of British industrial enterprises in China. This was quite considerable over the period under 
review and probably in excess o f the situation in the UK.
Examples include >
(i) Cotton Textiles.
In the 1920s two out of the three British cotton spinners and weavers went out of existence after 
enormous losses leaving, until two new entrants in the next decade, Ewo Cotton Mills, Limited (Jardine 
Matheson) as the sole survivor - see PART I I I -  Chapter Three (A),
(ii) Marine Engineering.
The Shanghai Engineering, Shipbuilding and Dock Company, Limited was founded with ambitious 
plans in 1892 but had a short and unsuccessful life. After expensive delays, due to wet weather, labour 
troubles, repeated flooding of the coffer dam and landslip (16), its dry dock in Shanghai was opened in 
May, 1899.. (17). Repotting on its results to end April, 1900 the Company admitted it was “getting further 
into debt” — at end April 1900 ‘sundry creditors’ were 82 percent of issued capital. (18). The Company was 
rescued by another British company (S.C.Famham and Company, Limited) in order to “get rid of reckless 
competition”. (19)- After the takeover, S.C.Farnham found that the financial situation was even worse than 
claimed. Claimed stocks in the accounts “could not be found” and there was a previously undisclosed bank 
loan plus “outstanding bills whose name is legion”. (20).
The Vulcan Ironworks, Limited was founded in 1905.. The firm started off fairly well but matters 
deteriorated after the first three financial years (to end August) and losses were made in the financial years 
1909 and 1910. The Company was hit by heavy interest charges and despite a small profit, the Chairman 
stated at the annual meeting in 1911 that “with the very heavy sum to be paid for interest, the chance of the
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shareholders ever having a dividend are remote". (21). Heavy losses were made in the period September, 
1911 to February, 1912 and at a meeting in April, 1912 the shareholders voted for a merger with another 
British firm -  the New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Limited. (22).
(iii) Mining.
Seventeen British mining ventures were established from 1896 to 1920 but only seven actually started 
mining operations in China. Of these only the three companies discussed above engaged in sustained 
operations. The other four companies
The Anglo-French Quicksilver and Mining Concession (Rwei-Chau Province) of 
China, Limited. Established 1899 -  wound up 1920,
Tung Tsing Coalmining Company -1910-1917.
Kiangpei Ting Coal and Iron Mining Company -  1906-1909.
The Weihaiwei Gold Mining Company, Limited -  1903 -  wound up in early 1907, 
all did not survive.
(iv) Chemicals.
The ephemeral career of the Yue Kang Glue Factory Company is an example of the pitfalls facing 
British investors in China. The Company was established in January, 1900 with a capital of $125,000 (£11 
thous.) and by April, 1900 the plant in Shanghai was ready. (23). It suffered many problems (24)
a loss o f 10,399 taels (£1,350) was made in the period January 29<h,1900 to December 31st, 
1900.
shortage of working capital, 
difficulties with the comprador.
sourcing problems. The bones supplied were of inferior quality compared with the UK.. Only 14 
percent was realised as glue. Also the price of bones rose as soon as buying commenced, 
production problems. The hot and damp weather of a Shanghai summer reduced the yield of 
glue from bones to only 10 percent and spoilt the glue.
In the case of the last two problems the Company admitted that they had not taken full account of how 
“different conditions were from home”. After losses the shareholders voted for liquidation in April, 1902. 
(25).
Another disastrous and very short lived venture occurred in 1911 with Demovel, Limited with a 800 
gallons per day plant in Shanghai for making paint remover. (26).
(v) Other Industrial Sectors.
As illustrated in PART ///-C h ap te r 7 the following two food companies illustrate the problems of British 
enterprises during this period relying on the input of indigenous agricultural materials -  with the danger of 
interruptions to supplies due to natural disasters or civil or military disruptions accompanied with violent 
price fluctuations >
The China Flour Mill Company, Limited.
- ScharfFs Oil and Bone Mills, Limited.
Other British companies which were relatively short lived and went into liquidation included 
General Forge Products (1929), Limited, producing nails, bolts, etc., went into 
liquidation in 1934.
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A. Butler Cement Tile Works, Limited -  see PART III -  Chapter Eight.
China Aerocrete -  see PART III -  Chapter Eight.
The Shanghai Tanning Factory - see PART I I I -  Chapter Eight.
(2) RETENTION POLICY.
Here the evidence is less clear-cut. The financial evidence is that, excluding B.A.T. from the 
equation, British industrial companies in China had a retention ratio in the period 1909-1939 3 percentage 
points lower than companies in Britain. The great discrepancy, as is apparent from the P.E.Hart data for the 
UK, was in the 1920s and 1930s. Here, it could be argued, British firms “called back the legions" i.e. 
repatriated as much as possible of what profits there were to the UK. (Given political turmoil, lawlessness, 
etc in the country o f overseas investment, it is clear that many companies will restrict investment locally 
and try as much as possible to repatriate earnings). However, this charge is negated to a considerable 
degree by the fact that the British industrial sectors amongst those with the highest degree of Chinese 
shareholding were also those with low percentages of retention i.e. cotton textiles and marine engineering. 
(Where there was a high retention ratio i.e. B.A.T. there was a very modest Chinese shareholding). 
Admittedly, as high Chinese inflation and War conditions existed in the late 1930s British firms tended to 
repatriate whatever profits they could lay their hands on but this was an extreme case in extenuating 
circumstances. Over the whole piece British industrial companies in China were only slightly guilty as 
charged.
A final point. The third charge, noted above, is that the early profits of British commercial activities in 
China e.g. the opium trade plus profits on land purchases i.e. alleged commercial exploitation aided by the 
“Unequal Treaties” and the Concessions, funded British industrial investment in China and thus there was 
little capital inflow. According to Wei Zichu this recycling was predominantly in the hands of trading 
companies such as Jardine Matheson and such recycling of profits by British banks and insurance 
companies in China to British industrial enterprises in China was virtually nil. (27).
This seems to contradict to some extent the second charge. However, it could be argued that the profits 
from drug dealing, in particular, were so enormous that organisations could do both -  repatriate very large 
sums as well as invest heavily locally.
This charge could be seen as having some validity in the early days of British industrial investment in 
China. However, as time went on, the proportion of British industrial investment in the hands o f long 
established trading companies such as Jardine Matheson shrank considerably. The author estimates that by 
1937 under 15 percent of British industrial investment in China was in the hands of these “Old China 
Hands”.
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PART VI -  A SUMMARY OF. AND CONCLUSIONS FROM. THE EVIDENCE ADVANCED IN
PARTS 777 AND V CONCERNING THE IMPACT. FAVOURABLE OR OTHERWISE. ON CHINA OF 
BRITISH INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT.
The purpose o f this concluding part o f the study is to answer a salient question that was raised in the 
Literature Review -  Was the net result of British industrial investment in Mainland China in the period 
under review to the advantage or otherwise of the Chinese economy?. (Couched in terms of total foreign 
investment in China this has been a much discussed topic and, also what might be said, a highly polemical 
and politicised topic. Here an attempt is made to confine the analysis to strictly economic terms.). The 
analysis below is, to a large extent, based on the studies of the various branches of British industrial 
investment given in PART 777 and the overall analysis of the financial aspect given in PART V. Clearly 
there was likely to be a differential impact of the various industrial sectors on the Chinese economy and 
this has been brought out in the concluding parts of the sector studies in each Chapter of PART III.
Historically there was a clear answer to the above question by a widespread school of thought epitomised 
in the writings of Mao Zedong (and Marxists generally). Industrial investment by foreigners in both light 
and heavy industry in China served “to obstruct the development of her productive force” (1). Not only 
that, foreign direct investments, as with most significant investments, being capitalist in character were 
historically ephemeral in that they would experience an inexorable transition to state ownership :-
“ The socialist system will eventually replace the capitalist system : this is an objective law independent 
of man’s will “ (2).
Economic penetration by foreigners into China in all sectors, not just industrial investment, was, it was 
alleged, particularly inhibiting on Chinese development due to “Imperialist Oppression”. An essence of 
imperialism in the economic sphere is that the foreign Government secures for its citizens in the host 
country advantages not justified by a level playing field. Among the factors which, it was thought, 
conferred economic advantages on the British and other foreigners in China were those arising from the 
“unequal treaties” -  in particular
Lack of tariff autonomy.
From the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 until the beginning of the 1930s China did not enjoy the right to 
fix unilaterally her customs duties. During this period import tariff rates were fixed at around 5 percent ad 
valorem. On regaining tariff autonomy in 1929 there was a sharp rise in import duties.
Thus, the level of protection available to protect Chinese industries, particularly infant industries, was 
fairly negligible. However, this lack of effective tariff protection also affected British industrial concerns in 
China, particularly in their early years -  an example being the difficulties experienced by the Laou Kung 
Mow cotton mill in 1898 consequent on “dumping” of yarns by Indian and Japanese spinners (see FART 
77/, Chapter Three). A low tariff did, however, aid British industrial enterprises in developing the market 
for their products when their local output was small - B.A.T. being the main case in point.
The rise in tariffs on resumption of Chinese tariff autonomy did lead to a small increase in UK 
industrial investment as companies such as the wool textile firm of Patons and Baldwins aimed to recoup 
what they lost by the imposition of high duties (see PART 777, Chapter Three). The increased level of 
import tariffs did, however, lead to high cost increases for those British enterprises in China that relied to a 
large extent on imported components (almost 100 percent reliance in the case of the piano manufacturer of
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S. Moutrie and Company -  see PART III, Chapter Eight). Thus, in 1934 the Shanghai Dock and 
Engineering Company, Limited had to cope with the following price increases on imported components 
and materials (3) :-
Steel plates and angles -  plus 22%. Teak -  plus 50%. 
which were mainly attributable to increased tariffs.
Although the period of lack of tariff autonomy was in the interests of British industrial exporters to 
China and exercised a restraint on indigenous industrial development this cannot be said of British 
industrial firms in China except in the case noted of B.A.T.
Extraterritoriality and its concomitant privileges.
These rights embodied in various treaties exempted foreigners from Chinese legislative actions and 
the full extent of internal taxes and levies. These advantages were most pronounced in the Treaty Ports 
which amounted to self governing foreign enclaves in China. Thus the administration of the International 
Settlement in Shanghai was dominated by representatives of foreign business interests -  particularly British 
interests. However, these enclaves included some Chinese industrial enterprises (which benefitted in terms 
of the greater law and order) and also many o f the British factories in China were outside these centres. The 
B.A.T. factories in Pudong, etc were a case in point as were British mining ventures (with one insignificant 
exception). In the marine engineering sector a significant proportion of British docks in the Shanghai area 
were in Pudong. Although the extraterritoriality rights applied throughout China, the further from the areas 
of Western influence they were the less likely they could be enforced in the context of lawlessness and 
separatism that existed for much of the period in China.
The main situation in which extraterritoriality could be regarded as giving an unfair advantage to British 
industrial firms is the issue of taxes.
Internal Transit Taxes -  The Likin (Li-jin) (4)
Introduced in 1853 (abolished in 1930) the Likin was a tax on goods in transit from one province to 
another or from one district to another within the same province. The rates varied but normally within each 
province would not exceed 10 percent but goods going through more than one province could face a total 
burden of 15-20 percent. In contrast, by the Treaty of Tianjin (1858) goods produced abroad would be 
exempt by paying half the import duty i.e. around 2,5 percent and later this concession was extended to 
goods produced in foreign factories in China. At first sight this seems to have extended to foreigners an 
important advantage. However, beginning in the 1880s, finished products from Chinese factories were 
exempted. Raw materials and non-factory produced products were not so exempted. Therefore, in so far as 
British industrial firms in China used a higher proportion of imported raw materials than Chinese factories 
then this gave them an advantage. Examples where British companies tended to be more reliant on 
imported raw materials than their Chinese rivals included the marine engineering sector and cotton 
spinning but over the whole range of industries this advantage was of no great magnitude ( B.A.T., for 
example , adopted a programme of import replacement for its tobacco requirements that came to partial 
fruition by the 1920s).
Other Domestic Taxes.
Tobacco industry.
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In this case (5) B.A.T. had as early as 1904 concluded an agreement with the Chinese Government 
which allowed its locally made cigarettes to be taxed equally with Chinese goods. The Company, however, 
suffered increasingly from local taxation including Likin. Negotiations between B.A.T. supported by the 
Foreign Office and the Beijing Government to relieve the burden of arbitrary taxes by the provincial 
authorities and replace them by a central Government tax dragged on until 1921 when an agreement was 
reached for a central Government tax in place of local taxes. However, with the growing disintegration of 
China, many provinces began to impose consumer taxes on cigarettes. After a confrontation with the 
emerging Guomindang Government, with this government introducing a blatantly favourable tax schedule 
for local producers, the issues were resolved in early 1928. The new tax regime, as described in PART III, 
Chapter One, while starting off fairly neutral, increasingly favoured B.A.T. As the cigarette tax was the 
third largest source of Government revenue and B.A.T. was the largest single taxpayer this situation was 
not due to the extraterritoriality factor but to the Company’s size and ability to organise a very welcome 
flow of cash to the Government’s coffers.
Mining.
Here the various Chinese mining regulations were paramount over extraterritorial rights and were 
enshrined in the concession granted. On the whole British mining interests in China did not enjoy any 
taxation advantages over Cliinese mines. In any case the two main enterprises -  the Pekin Syndicate and 
the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company -  were for most of their working life engaged in joint 
ventures with Chinese companies.
Cotton textiles.
Here it has been alleged that the excise duties on cotton yarns, imposed in the 1930s to replace the 
end of the Likin, discriminated against Chinese mills in that the tax rates on coarse yarns (i.e low count 
yarns), which tended to be the field in which Chinese mills operated, were higher than on fine yarns. This 
last was the province of the local Japanese mills with an average count of 24.5 in the early 1930s. However, 
the leading group of British mills -  the Ewo Cotton Mills -  had an average count in the early 1930s of 19.5 
which was not much higher than the 17 count average of the Chinese mills. (6). The other main British mill 
-  the China Printing and Finishing Company - however, had an average count much higher (31.5 in early 
1941). (7). However, even here the tax differential was fairly marginal.
Thus, from the evidence we have for these three main sectors of British industrial investment it would 
appear that, as far as formal taxation in areas where the Central Government’s writ was strong, the charge 
that UK firms enjoyed an unfair advantage in taxation is weakened although still of some force. (In another 
main sector of UK investment -  marine engineering -  the charge is weak in that the key competitor to the 
British firms concerned was a State owned company (The Jiangnan Dock and Engineering Works) which 
would be unlikely to been put under any competitive disadvantage in this respect).
There is, however, another aspect. It is alleged by, for example, Joseph Esherick (8) that foreign 
companies during periods of weak control by the Central Government escaped the arbitrary and random 
nature of taxes and levies collected by local governments or warlords. He argues that much Chinese capital 
in a search for security was invested in foreign controlled enterprises in China and thus “by channeling 
elsewhere the development capital needed by Chinese...enterprises” gave a “considerable advantage” to 
foreign enterprises. However, this assertion should not be exaggerated. Firstly, many Chinese industrial
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enterprises were in, or near, Treaty Ports where the influence of such independent local governments and 
warlords was not a factor. Secondly, some of the capital injected into foreign controlled industrial 
enterprises was a recycling of monies earned by compradores from foreign investment. This occurred, for 
instance, with some of the enterprises in the Jardine Matheson stable -  for example the Kung Yik Cotton 
Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited. Again, the large Chinese firms were often either owned or 
backed by influential Chinese officials. It is difficult to believe that they were subjected to severe official 
abuse or exactions.lt might also be added that foreigners were not primarily to blame for the situation in 
which taxes and levies by warlords and unregulated regional governments arose.
A rather similar charge concerns the period before the Pacific War when the Chinese State was menaced 
by Japanese aggression. Here, in at least two cases, British concerns took advantage of the desperate desire 
of Chinese investors to seek security (which proved to be illusory) by “floating” British local industrial 
concerns. This has been discussed above in PART JV(C).
Apart from the “unequal treaties” there must also be considered the situations where Imperial Powers 
used their power directly to ensure particular advantages for their national industrial companies in China. 
This process was clearly most likely during periods of weakness of the Chinese State. It was particularly 
prominent in the mining sector in the cases of the granting of concessions or subsequent defence of a 
concession already granted (see below). One area in which the exploitation of diplomatic or even military 
power failed to make even a marginal impact on China was the agricultural sector. There was no suggestion 
of any parallel to the “plantation” development as occurred in many other countries. There were strictly 
enforced laws banning foreigners holding agricultural or forest land. Thus, British industrial firms could 
not integrate backwards into raw materials and were subject to the vagaries of Chinese suppliers. (This, as 
described in PART III, often created difficulties for UK enterprises in the cotton industry and in the food 
industry and led in the cotton sector on occasion to large imports of foreign cotton). Even B.A.T. could 
only manage to have some very minor success in the form of “front” companies or before the First World 
War in securing land for tobacco collecting from the German administration in Shandong (see PART III, 
Chapter One).
To revert to the case of mining, diplomatic pressure by the British Foreign Office was clearly a factor in 
the securing of concessions by British firms. Examples include the case of the Syndicat du Yunnan, 
Limited (see PART IV  (B)) and the Pekin Syndicate, Limited. The Chairman of the latter company stated at 
an extraordinary general meeting of the Syndicate on July 19th, 1898 after concessions in Shanxi and Henan 
had been granted that (9)
“..the present happy position  could not have been reached without the support of the British
Government acting through its representative in Peking, Sir Claude Macdonald, with the friendly 
cooperation of the Marquis Salvago, the Italian Minister, also acting under instructions from his 
Government. Her Majesty’s Government recognised the necessity of granting this assistance in view of the 
fact that other Governments were vigorously supporting applications made by their subjects for 
concessions.”
The golden age for foreign concessions hunters was at the turn o f the Nineteenth Century but with a 
recovery of Chinese national pride from 1903 onwards there was at both central and local level a drive for 
recovering alienated mining rights. There would seem to be, as described in PART III, Chapter Two above,
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several cases where British holders of mining rights were victimised by local officials and vested interests 
exploiting the nationalist tide. However, in the case of the London and China Syndicate, the opposite 
seemingly occurred with the payment on redemption being well in excess o f the cost of the preparatory 
work on the site. This success was attributed by the local journalist G.E Morrison to great diplomatic 
pressure exerted on behalf of King Edward VII on account of a mistress (Mrs George Keppel) having 
shares in the venture :-
“ it is however believed that our most gracious sovereign. ..is interested in it for nothing else can explain 
the pertinacity with which the claims of the Syndicate are brought before the Commons and the wire 
pulling which has even caused instructions to be sent to both the German, Russian and American legations 
to support its pretensions,” (10).
It is impossible to confirm or deny this assertion as so far the writer has been unable to trace the 
shareholders’ register of the Syndicate.
Another general charge is that, influenced by the Western and Japanese presence in the Treaty Ports and 
the Leased Areas (for example, the German teased area in Shandong), foreign investment, according to 
Esherick (11), led to an unbalanced and stifled pattern of China’s economic development.
Western investment in the infrastructure of these areas attracted Chinese industrial investment. Thus, the 
charge is that Western industrial development led to a lopsided geographic distribution with an emphasis 
on the coastal strip. In the case of British industrial investment, for example, in 1937 (PART II) 86 percent 
was in the coastal strip and Manchuria and of the balance 10 percent was in Hubei (Wuhan) with relatively 
good river transport. No less than 44 percent was in Shanghai alone.
However, there is a strong argument to suggest that this situation was considerably more due to natural 
factors than Western influence. The transport system in China, even by 1937, was seriously 
underdeveloped and inland and coastal water transport played a key role. Add to this the perils for factories 
operating in many areas of the hinterland were great. Thus, it was natural that the main centre of the cotton 
industry in China was in Jiangsu and Shanghai with good access to raw cotton from the interior. It is also 
worth noting that even in 2003 the coastal strip plus Manchuria extending Northwards from Guangdong to 
Heilongjiang accounted for the following percentages of all “State-owned and non State-owned above 
designated size industrial enterprises” (32):-
-Percent-
Value added 70
Value of total capital 65
Value of total assets 64
Number of employees 64
This was despite the “Third Front” programme (13) in the 1960s and 1970s which, on military grounds,
built up factories, with the emphasis on heavy industry, in the interior. The proportion of investment in
capital construction that went into “Third Front” projects was high (14):-
-Percent- 
1963-65 38.2
1966-70 52.7
1971-75 41.1
and the proportion of industrial output outside the “coastal provinces” rose by 5 percentage points from 
1957 to 1978.(15).
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So far the discussion has been concerned with the various elements of the “Oppression Argument” :-
Foreign industrial concerns enjoyed various advantages that gave them a lead over Chinese 
industrial concerns.
These advantages were not just due to any financial, managerial or technical strength i.e “natural 
economic advantages” but to privileges associated with Imperialism.
Given this, the growth of modem Chinese industrial enterprises was stunted.
Also, foreign influence imparted a lopsided geographic development of industry.
Another hypothesis is the “Destruction Argument”. Imports of manufactures and local production of 
these by Western and Japanese enterprises destroyed a very damaging proportion of the traditional 
handicraft industries with unfortunate effects on the rural economy of China. To assess how, and to what 
extent, this applies to British industrial investment it is necessary to consider how far the various industrial 
branches interfaced with Chinese handicrafts :-
Percent of total 
UK Investment in 1937
(A) Tobacco Industry. 55.4
There was no sizeable handicraft production of cigarettes in China before B.A.T. 
entered the field -  pipe smoking being much more common. In fact the burgeoning 
development of cigarette consumption for which B. A.T. was to a large extent responsible 
and the desire to evade tax led to a growth of a new handicraft sector in the form of 
small-scale makers of hand-rolled cigarettes. B.A.T. was successful in obtaining 
Government action sharply reducing competition from this source (which also 
helped Chinese producers of machine rolled cigarettes).
(B) Mining. 11.5
Apart from the case of the Shanghai Exploration and Development Company whose 
treatment of the 100 or so small Chinese mines in its vicinity was hardly friendly 
(see PART III, Chapter Two) the effect o f the three major British coal mining 
companies on small Chinese mines was fairly limited. Transport difficulties were a 
factor in this by delimiting the area of practical competition.
(C) Cotton Textiles. 7.3
This was the key area of interface with the handicraft sector and is further analysed 
below.
(Df Non-cotton Textiles. 3.6
Although British firms were prominent in introducing powered silk reeling to China 
they had no presence by 1937. In the worsted sector, the coarseness of Chinese wool 
meant that there was no worsted textile production in China until this new branch of 
the textile industry was established in the 1930s. 
fEJ Engineering. 3.4
There was little competitive interface with handicrafts. Indeed in the marine 
engineering business there was a limited purchase of ships’ fittings from the handicraft 
sector.
(F) Industrial Chemicals 0.3
No interface with handicraft industry.
(G) Consumer Chemicals. 2.8
Some interface but the ease of entry in the soap sector still enabled small producers 
to survive. This, as with matches, created new handicraft sectors.
('HI Sound Reproduction. 0,2
No interface.
(I) Drink. Food. Packing, etc. of Agicultural Items. 13.4
(a) Brewing -  no interface. 1.5
(b) Non-alcoholic Drinks -  no interface. 0.3
(c) Flour mills -  an area of interface but British representation in this trade, which was 
modest, ended in 1916.
(d) Oils and fats. There was pioneering British presence in introducing modem 0,1 
technology in extracting soya oil, etc. which competed with traditional methods
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but this soon petered out. Again, British presence in modern processing of other 
oils was relatively short-lived.
(e) Eggs, etc. No interface with handicraft activities. The industry relied on modem, 7.7 
capital intensive, refrigeration facilities.
(f) Packing and cleaning, etc, of agricultural products. An export oriented industry 3,8 
with no competitive interface with handicraft activities.
(J) Miscellaneous Industries. 2.1
(a) Wood processing. Some limited interface in lumber and furniture. 1.7
(b) Musical instruments. No interface. 0.2
(c) Glass and electrical industries. No interface. 0.2
(d) Tanning. Some interface but British presence ended in 1915.
Thus, only around 10 percent, on the basis of above, of British industrial investment represented a serious 
threat to handicraft industries with the impact being most pronounced in cotton textiles. As outlined above, 
the development of power spinning in China greatly reduced in a relatively short time hand spinning. (See 
PART III, Chapter Three (A)). The great majority of this loss o f employment was not attributable to British 
firms -  only 4.5 percent of spindles in 1937 - but to local Chinese spinners (51 percent), the first to install 
spinning mills in China, and Japanese spinners plus heavy imports of yam in the closing years of the 
Nineteenth Century, Also the growth in machine-spun yarn (apart from supplying stronger and more 
regular warp yams to hand loom weavers) removed a bottleneck in the supply of cotton yarn to hand loom 
weavers who survived much longer due, partly, to the basic economics of hand loom weaving against 
power looms being more favourable to the traditional process than in the case of hand spinning. Also, as 
described in PART I , the hand woven cloth was in a different market segment than the machine woven 
variety. Again, there were technical improvements in hand looms, not only in the traditional wooden loom 
but also in the introduction of the “iron-gear” loom which mimicked the simpler power looms. (16). 
Another technological slant is that in China the hand loom was competing against second division 
technology in that the automatic loom was, with the exception of some presence in Japanese owned 
weaving sheds, virtually non-existent. (17). (This loom with its automatic weft changing mechanism 
markedly increased the number of looms a weaver could tend.). In contrast to the situation in weaving, the 
productivity o f a machine spinning operative was so enormous compared with hand spinning that it was a 
clear priority in any move to industrialisation. This process, however unpleasant in a social context, was 
only matching what had already occurred in the earlier process of industrialisation in, for example, Europe.
A final charge on the theme that Western development in China distorted and weakened traditional 
sectors of the Chinese economy. It is alleged that Westerners by linking China’s agricultural economy to 
the World market created export trades that were vulnerable to the vicissitudes of overseas demand. The 
British industries that processed Chinese agricultural products, primarily for export, accounted for 11.5 
percent of total UK industrial investment in China in 1937. The smaller category (3.8%) was the press 
packing, etc. business which did not create this export business but rendered the already existing export of 
agricultural products more competitive by improving quality and reducing transport costs. The larger 
category (7.7%) -  the freezing, etc. o f eggs, meats, etc. was developed by Westerners (particularly the UK) 
and created a new outlet for the Chinese rural community. Initially the trade was very buoyant but 
experienced difficulties in the 1930s, so, to that extent, the charge above has some validity. However, it 
could be argued that periods of recession in the export market for Chinese agricultural products should be 
balanced against periods of buoyancy.
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So far, we have concentrated on the debit side of the balance sheet but it could be argued that British 
industrial investment brought with it :-
- The inflow of much needed capital. Admittedly, a proportion of British industrial investment, 
particularly in the early days, was financed by either the contribution of Chinese capital into British 
controlled ventures (see above) or from the reinvestment in China of monies gained by British trading 
groups in China from trading or land speculation in the Treaty Ports. However, this proportion steadily 
diminished over time as industrial companies registered in the UK started up industrial operations in China 
(seethe concluding section of PART V above).
- The introduction of new technology. British firms setting up factories in China were in many cases 
precursors of economic development by their introduction of new technology. Examples, quoted in PART 
III, include :-
silk reeling (although the technology was primarily French or Italian), 
sugar refining.
soya bean processing (as with the above, abortive ventures).
marine engineering.
non -  marine engineering.
industrial acids.
brewing.
margarine
press packing.
worsted textiles.
specialised paints.
sound reproduction.
piano manufacturing.
In British coal mines in China there was some useful innovations but there was no technical progress in 
the key areas of mechanised coal cutting and underground transport. In the cigarette industry B.A.T. 
introduced the latest techniques of cigarette manufacture but also the back-up engineering effort to sustain 
these techniques and modem packaging materials. Beyond this, B.A.T. introduced modem advertising and 
marketing techniques to China.
In many cases these introductions of modem technology inspired Chinese entrepreneurs to follow suit, 
albeit, in many cases, at the lower end of the price/quality spectrum. The factories started by British firms 
trained Chinese operatives and these formed a pool of trained labour available for Chinese enterprises. It is, 
however, important to recognise that this process was not a necessary condition for the transfer of 
technology to China. The same result could be achieved by Chinese enterprises hiring Western specialists 
and importing machinery for the purpose. Thus, the Chinese cotton industry preceded Western mills in 
China with hired Western mill managers providing the initial expertise (at the end of the Nineteenth 
Century there already was a Lancastrian Society in Shanghai). Again, the diversification move of the 
Jiangnan Dock and Engineering Works into the commercial marine engineering market in Shanghai was 
aided by poaching managers from the local British enterprise. (See PART III, Chapter Four).
- The backward linkage effect. The establishment of British industrial concerns in China stimulated the 
local supply of intermediates and components. Textile mills stimulated a modest local industry for mill 
supplies while the British shipyards in Shanghai (which like railways demanded a large volume of diverse 
supplies) were also significant contributors to developing local suppliers. However, this effect should not
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be overestimated. Many British firms (including shipyards) still, as mentioned, relied to a significant extent 
on imported supplies.
Alleged financial exploitation (see PART V).
The charge is, that along with other Western countries, UK industrial investment in China was highly 
profitable both absolutely and relatively against relevant conditions in the UK. These profits were, 
supposedly, repatriated preponderantly to the UK. A further charge, already replied to on the previous page, 
is that a very significant share of UK industrial investment in China was financed not by capital export to 
China but by previous British commercial operations in China often o f an exploitative nature such as opium 
trafficking.
From PART V  we can conclude that British industrial concerns in China did not enjoy a significantly 
higher profitability over home operations. In the case of “milking” profits earned in China by excessive 
repatriation the evidence is less clear-cut but the severity o f the charge is greatly reduced.
It is, of course, very difficult to balance all of the above but, on the evidence presented, the impact of the 
negative assertions must, if not as in some cases be even dismissed, is not nearly as serious as often 
charged. Also, the assertions o f the positive aspects of foreign industrial investment are given extra validity 
by the PRC Government’s approval since 1978 of foreign direct investment in industry. Why then was 
there such contemporary resistance to such investment by the UK and others and why has such investment 
been vilified by historians both in China and abroad ?,
The answer would not seem to lie as much in the economic benefits or penalties of such investment but 
the way, often very insensitive, in which it was carried out (However, even if British industrial investment 
in China had been carried out with the utmost sensitivity and in a diplomatic manner it still faced the 
historical baggage of Western (with the exception of the USA) and Japanese diplomatic and military 
humbling of China in the last half of the Nineteenth Century.)
The often arrogant attitude of certain British companies, in particular the Chinese Engineering and 
Mining Company, caused great offence to the host country. Almost throughout its history this company 
was imbued with a feeling of racial superiority. Examples of this have been given above for the early years 
of the Company but this attitude persisted into the 1930s. Thus, in negotiations with their Chinese partner 
in the Kailan Mining Administration in 1934, Mr E.J.Nathan sent a personal message to his Chairman 
stating that “ .. .Chinese commonly cease to observe agreements when these have ceased to operate in their 
favour” (18). The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company was, of course, an extreme case. 
Nevertheless some other firms acted in an arrogant manner. They behaved when dealing with Chinese 
competitors in a manner which was unacceptable in the United Kingdom at that time having been outlawed 
for a considerable time. Thus, for example, B.A.T. used coercive business practices in dealing with its local 
competitors.
A feature of many British industrial firms in China was the reluctance to have Chinese managers in 
senior positions (the Chinese Import and Export Lumber Company was an exception). Although there is 
little numerical information available, the writer is fairly convinced that the ratio of expatriates to total 
staffing was well above that usually applicable currently. This placed a significant cost burden on UK 
firms. This, is evident from the experience of the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, where there
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was a divided opinion between the local Works Manager and London as to the question of Chinese staff at 
senior levels (see PART 111, Chapter Five (A)).
Another aspect is that, in the case of British managing agencies, the British General Managers on 
occasion adopted a rather cavalier attitude to their Chinese shareholders and members o f the Consulting 
Committee. Significant decisions concerning finance, capital investment, etc. could be implemented with 
insufficient consultation. This was more or less admitted by Mr W.J.Keswick o f Jardine Matheson, China 
in September, 1937.(19). In the light of amendments to the Companies Act of India in 1937 intended to 
solve a similar abuse, he wrote that as regards their managing agencies in China they “intend to be on the 
safe side and take the Consulting Committee into our confidence more than formally.” Fuller details were 
to be revealed.
By the standards of the day, the record of British firms in dealing with the Chinese labour force in their 
mines and factories was reasonable (with the exception of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company 
although their workers did manage an improvement in their pay -  see PART III, Chapter Two). The British 
enquiry into labour conditions in China, instigated by the First Labour Government in 1924 (20), gave a 
reasonably clean bill of health to British factories in China. Part of the reason for any failure in labour 
relations was due not to ill will but language difficulties and the existence of the labour contractor system 
in many British enterprises. This last was a constant source of trouble. For example, despite the advice of 
its local Acting General Manager in a cablegram to the Board of the Chinese Engineering and Mining 
Company in October, 1920 (21) ;-
“have recently discovered contractors responsible for general strike in summer and have been conspiring 
to make more trouble. Last week Ma-Chia-Ko (Majiagou) colliery contractors made reduction in wages 
resulting in general strike here. Contractors defied us and resigned. Ma-Chia-Ko colliery now working 
without contractors in a system which Engineer-in-Chief and all concerned very certain will work very 
satisfactory indeed...”
Unfortunately, the Board rejected this advice replying :-
“ ...not in favour of abolishing contractors in principle and fear great difficulty first to get rid of 
contractors and secondly in dealing with coolies direct.” (22).
(By the early 1930s over 80 percent of the miners were still contracted workers (23)).
Labour relations tended to become easier in the late 1930s particularly as newer British enterprises 
rejecting using labour contractors. Also, respect for Chinese workers by British firms increased. Thus, the 
China Printing and Finishing Company (which employed all its 4,000 Chinese operatives directly) whose 
two mills were affected by the hostilities in Shanghai in 1937 made arrangements “to pay wages due to all 
operatives at Head Office” in the relatively unaffected International Settlement :-
“Our Chinese have stood by me like heroes and I am proud of them. Do anything you can to pay all who 
call. I consider this very important” (24).
The maturing of the relationship between UK firms and the Chinese was not only marked in labour 
relations in the late 1930s but extended to other matters. The period was also marked with easier 
relationships at the diplomatic level.
After the Pacific War even the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company belatedly noted that things 
had changed. On the 25th, September 1946 “recognising the new conditions in China” it was decided to
-235-
“intimate to the Board of Directors of the Lanchow Mining Co. that the Board of Directors of this company 
were in favour of the admission of the Chinese Government into partnership with the two companies in the 
K.M.A. at the opportune moment and in conditions mutually acceptable to the parties and the Chinese 
Government.” (25). Also, “the cheapness of labour on which they had relied so much up to 1941 was a 
thing of the past.” (26).
It is possible that the course o f British industrial investment in China might have reached a situation in 
which relations with the host country were considerably better with greater understanding on both sides 
and, in particular, greater sensitivity to local feelings on the British side. The victory of the PLA in 1949 
and the formation o f the PRC meant a postponement of such a situation happening for three decades.
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APPENDIXONE
ROLL CALL OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN PRE- SECOND WORLD WAR CHINA.
(A> THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY.
All British investment in this sector was in the hands of the British-American Tobacco
Company, Limited. -  B .A X  Altogether B,A,T, had 32 companies to its name in pre-Second World
War China. These are given below together with date of establishment.
22.7.1903. The American Cigarette Company. Ltd. Founded in 1890 it became a limited company in 
1896 -  capital 150,000 taels (£22,000). It started a cigarette factory in Pudong. It was 
purchased by W.D. and H.O. Wills for 190,000 taels (£23,000) on 7.8.1902. New 
company under same name incorporated in 1903.
19.11.1903. Mustard and Co.. Ltd. Founded in 1870 as merchants. In 1890 it started importing 
cigarettes from the American Tobacco Company. In 1891 it had a small cigarette factory in 
Shanghai under the control of a Mr Laurits Andersen, a Dane. This company became a detached, 
separate arm of B. A.T.’s involvement in China when purchased in 1903 (81,3 percent owned by 
B.A.T.). It operated from a separate office in Shanghai from the usual Group office at 175, 
Soochow Road. Together with a branch in Tianjin, it operated as an importer of machinery, 
drugs, toiletries, office machinery, etc.
29.6. 1904. Murai Brothers Co.. Ltd. The American Tobacco Company had a controlling interest in 
this company which was the largest cigarette producer by far in Japan. However, in 1904 
the Japanese Government nationalised the whole tobacco industry. B.A.T., however, 
retained the Shanghai importing arm which operated from the main office building above.
26.9.1905, British Cigarette Company. Ltd.(97.1% owned by B. A.T.) -  previously the American 
Cigarette Company, Limited.
24.7.1912. Enterprise Tobacco Company. Limited. 100% owned by B.A.T. and given control of 
certain brands.
14.11.1912.Union Tobacco Company. Majority owned by B.A.T. but with Chinese interest. Managed
by Chinese and allocated two brands by Enterprise Tobacco to sell throughout China. Chinese 
interest terminated in 1919 and in 1920 its brands handed over to Wing Tai Vo.
22.12.1913. Keystone Tobacco Co.. Ltd. Based at Dalian this company covered the Group’s business in the 
Kwantung Leased Territory.
29.4.1914 A. Lopato & Sons. Ltd. Founded in 1909 as a Russian company, having started production in 
Harbin in 1898, Majority interest acquired by B.A.T, On 1,8,36 it was reorganised as a 
Manchukuo company.
18.8.1914 Caravan Commercial Company. Limited.
27.2.1919 British-American Tobacco Company (Chinal.Limited. This was formed to acquire all of 
B.A.T.’s interests in China. 97.5% owned by B.A.T. parent company.
28.4.1919. Alliance Tobacco Company o f China. Limited. Joint venture o f B.A.T. and A. Lopato to 
distribute their products. B.A.T. majority.
10.5.1920. China Financial Company. Limited.
2.12.1920. Hung An Land Investment Co.. Ltd. Ostensibly a Chinese company, and registered as 
such, its apparent owners were, in fact, Chinese compradors of B.A.T. This “front” 
company with capital of $1,000,000 (£220,000) enabled B. A.T. to avoid a prohibition on 
foreigners buying land outside the Treaty Ports The land was needed for their tobacco leaf 
processing activities,.
1.10.21. Wing Tai Vo Tobacco Corporation. The President of this company, Cheng Po-chao
(Zheng Bozhao) was a merchant who initially became a distributor in Shanghai o f Wills1 
“Ruby Queen” cigarettes in the 1890s. This was under the auspices of Wills’ agent of Rex and 
Co. When this firm’s contract was terminated in 1904 Wing Tai Vo continued its connection 
with B.A.T. via Mustard and Co. B.A.T. acquired a controlling interest (51%) in a new joint 
venture with this concern in 1921 (capital $1,000,000 - £130,000),
By the 1930s this concern operated 169 warehouses throughout China. It had the sole 
distribution rights for certain B.A.T. brands.
17.1.1922 China Packers Supply Co.. Ltd. producing tin foil, tin cases, cardboard boxes, etc at 
Pudong for packing and transporting cigarettes. (Capital $10,000,000 - £1,222,000)
31.12.1923 Tobacco Products Corporation (China). An American owned competitor bought out 
by B.A.T. (Capital $4,256,000 - £480,000). It had a factory in Yulin Rd,, Shanghai.
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9.4.1926. Acme Foundry. Limited. This machine shop, based in Museum Road, Shanghai, made 
stoves, ranges, steel furniture etc.
11.5.1926. British-American (China! Tobacco Securities Co.. Ltd. Founded mainly to give Chinese 
investors an interest in the B.A.T. business in China. This company had for every one of 
its shares issued to acquire one share in British-American Tobacco Company (China),
Limited -a non quoted company.
10.2.1927. Provident Trustees. Limited.
24.2.1927. Liggett and Myers Tobacco (China) Company. Limited. Another USA competitor whose 
importing concern was bought out by B. A.T.
8.7.1927. Midland Investment Company. Limited.
14.11.1930. Chi Tung Tobacco Company. Limited. Based in Manchuria.
30.6.1931 Kung Hsin Tobacco Company. Limited.
20.8.1931 Pacific Investors. Limited.
14,1.1933 Hsuchang Leaf Tobacco Company, Limited, Another “front” company using a Wu Ting Seng 
assisted by an American to buy land in Henan. There was strong opposition from local 
tobacco brokers. After the murder of these two B.A.T. abandoned this venture.
22.9.1934. Both the following companies were formed to take over the business in China carried on 
by British-American Tobacco Co. (China) Ltd. except in Manchuria and Hong Kong (in 
Hong Kong the British Cigarette Co. continued to operate the factory). The British- 
American Tobacco Co. (China) Ltd thus became mainly a holding company.
Yee Tsoong Tobacco Company. Limited. A manufacturing company (capital of 
$180,000,000 - £12,000,000).
Yee Tsoong Tobacco Distributors Company. Limited. (A wholly owned subsidiary of the 
above). A selling company (capital o f $60,700,000 - £4,080,000). This company had by
1938 the following 24 sales offices :- 
Beihai* Qinhuangdao”
Beijing Shantou*
Changsha* Shashi*
Chengdu* Tianjin
Chongqing* Weihaiwei*
Fuzhou* Wuhu*
Guangzhou Xiamen
Jiangmen* Yichang*
Jiujiang Yunnanfu*
Kunming* Zhangiiakou*
Nanjing Zhenjiang*
Qingdao Zhifu*
*Headed by Chinese managers or agents.
27.9.1934 Chi Tung Manufacturing Company. Limited. Based in Manchuria.
29.4.1936. Pagoda Insurance Company. Limited.
29.7.1936. Chi Tung Tobacco Company. Limited. Registered as a Manchukuo company.
30.7.1937. Tobacco Development Company. Limited. Importers of tobacco leaves. Capital of 
$10,000,000 (£620,000).
31.7.1937. Capital Lithographers, Limited. (Capital $20,000,000 - £1,245,000). In 1937 this company 
operated 6 printing plants making wrapping and advertising material.
(B) EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES.
(I) OIL INDUSTRY.
The only industrial activity was by the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Shell) and was minor in 
nature- the titming locally of kerosene imported in bulk.
(II) MINERAL MINING.
Altogether there were 17 mining ventures that were associated with British interests. Not 
one of these were multinational companies -  none of them had any operations in the UK. Many o f these 
companies never got beyond the company formation or concession stage (mining operations were, with one 
insignificant exception (Weihaiwei) outside the Treaty Ports and thus needed official permission). Many of 
them had their mining concessions redeemed by the Chinese authorities in the “rights recovery” movement
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in the first decade of the last century. The only organisations to engage in sustained operations running 
from the early years of the Century until the outbreak of the Pacific War were three coal mining companies 
listed first in the snapshot of these 17 companies below :-
NAME
(1) MAJOR PLAYERS
(i)Pekin Syndicate, Limited
DATE UK
EST. REGISTERED
(ii)The Chinese Engineering and Mining 
Company, Limited
(iii)The Shanghai Exploration and
1897
1900
Yes
Yes
ENTERED
MINING
OPERATIONS
1908
1901
PRODUCT
Coal
(Anthracite)
Coal
(Bituminous)
Development Company, Limited 1919 No 1922 Coal
(Anthracite)
2) OTHER
(iv)Tung Hsing Coalmining Company 1896 No 1896 Coal
(Anthracite)
(v) China Concessions Syndicate, Limited 1898 Yes - -
(vi)Kiangpei Ting Coal and Iron Mining
Company 1898 No 1907 Coal
(Bituminous)
(vii)British and Chinese Corporation 1898 Yes - -
(viii)Eastem Pioneer Company, Limited 1899 Yes - -
(ix) Yang-tse Corporation, Limited 1898 Yes -
(x) China Exploration Company, Limited 1899 Yes - -
(xi) Anglo-French Quicksilver and Mining
Concession (Kwei-Cliau Province) of
China, Limited 1899 Yes 1902 Mercury
(xii)London and China Syndicate, Limited 1900 Yes - -
(xiii)Syndicat du Yunnan, Limited 1900 Yes - -
(xiv)Yangtse Valley Company, Limited 1900 Yes - -
(xv) Hui Kung Company 1903 No - -
(xvi)The Weihaiwei Gold Mining
Company, Limited 1903 No 1904 Gold
(xYii)The- Pingyuan Gold Mining Company 1909 No - -
(1) MAJOR PLAYERS
(i) Pekin Syndicate, Limited.
Founded March, 1897 with capital of £20,000. In 1898 it secured concessions in Shanxi and Henan and by 
1900 capital had increased to £495,000 and by 1905 £1,243,000, In 1902 construction began of a railway to 
link the projected mining areas. In 1908 the mining rights in Shanxi were redeemed for £356,000 -  the 
railway so far completed having been sold to the Government in 1905 for £800,000. Activities were then 
concentrated on the Henan mines which started producing coal in 1908. In 1914 the selling activities of the 
mines were placed into a joint venture (Fu Chung Corporation) with 3 local Chinese mines. In 1933 
production as well as selling activities were placed into a new joint venture- the Chung Fu Mining 
Company -  which was 49% owned by the Pekin Syndicate.
(ii) Chinese Engineering and Mining Company. Limited.
Founded in December, 1900 and registered in London with a capital which totalled 
£1,000,000 when frilly issued at end 1901. In that year it took control of the Chinese company of the same 
name. In 1912 it entered into a joint venture with the Lanchow Mining Company. Called the Kailan Mining 
Administration this administered the assets in China of the two companies and their sales. A new British 
company was formed in 1912 with the same name and capitalisation and took over the assets and liabilities 
of the old company.
(iii) The Shanghai Exploration and Development Company. Limited.
Incorporated in 1919, the main activity of the Company was a modem anthracite mine about 16 
miles from Beijing. By 1924 capital issued amounted to 2,986,000 taels (£480,000).
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(2) OTHER
(iv) Tung Hsing Coalmining Company.
This was the first foreign participation in mining when in 1896 an English merchant rented this 
colliery at Mentoukou near Beijing. By 1907 the mine after passing through several hands had fallen into 
the hands of a UK company in Tianjin and a  Chinese entrepreneur.. These transactions were done without 
official permission and in 1908 the mine was closed. In 1910 it was reorganised with official approval as a 
Sino-British venture with a capital of 1,000,000 taels (i.e, c.£60,000 each).By 1915 the output had risen to
80.000 tons of anthracite coal. However, the mine was closed in 1917 after being completely flooded.
(v) China Concessions Syndicate. Limited.
Registered in London in 1898 “to carry... on the business o f merchants, traders, miners, etc.17 Very 
little of the authorised capital of £20,000 was issued and in 1902 the company went into voluntary 
liquidation.
(vi) Kiangpei Ting Coal and Iron Mining Company.
In 1898 a  Mr Archibald John Little began to work this concession in Sichuan in conjunction 
with some Chinese. The output of bituminous coal was fairly modest albeit profitable. In 1906 the above 
company was formed -  half of the capital (500,000 taels - £65,000) was to have been Chinese but it proved 
impossible to raise this. In the eleven months to end January 1908 output of good quality coal amounted to
29.000 tons. However, troubles with the provincial authorities and the local population caused the cessation 
o f operations. In July, 1909 the company was “successfully jockeyed out o f  its holding” {The Times, 20th 
May, 1910) and the concern was handed over to a Chinese company.
(vii> British and Chinese Corporation.
The contract for the Beijing -  Shenyang railway in 1899 carried an ancillary agreement 
granting the above half share- in the- coal mines at Nanpiao in Jehol. In 1908 after two years of dispute- over 
the Corporation’s claim for £20,000 compensation (not successful) the mining agreement became void.
(viii) Eastern Pioneer Company. Limited. / fix) Yang-tse Corporation. Limited.
In 1898/9 a British MP of Australian origin -  Mr William Pritchard - Morgan -  secured mining 
concessions in Sichuan that were approved by the provincial authorities and the central government. As a 
result o f these efforts the Eastern Pioneer Company was formed in London in October, 1899. The 
authorised capital was £300,000 -  by end 1903 £250,000 had been issued. Half of the capital was held by 
Belgian interests. Delays in exploitation due to the Boxer Rebellion and local resistance gave the Chinese 
Government the excuse to cancel the Company’s concession in 1906. The Company spent many years 
trying to reverse this situation.. In 1921 the Company was acquired by the Yang-tse Corporation. Founded 
in 1898 with an authorised capital of £300,000 -  only £20,000 issued -  this was a “shell” company. With 
the acquisition of Eastern Pioneer its issued capital rose to £168,000 and in February, 1922 the Pekin 
Syndicate became their manager and agent in China with the aim of developing the concession formerly 
owned by the Eastern Pioneer Company. Despite this move no progress was made in China.
(x) China Exploration Company. Limited.
This company was registered in London in 1899. Despite its London registration the 
shareholders were mainly Belgian and, to a lesser extent, German. A mining engineer was engaged to 
prospect in China but nothing ensued. In 1904 the Company was wound up voluntarily.
(%i) Anglo-French Quicksilver and Mining Concession (Kwei-C-hau Province) of China. Ltd.
Registered in the UK in 1899 the authorised capital of £300,000 had all been issued by 1903. 3 
of the 8 directors were French residents. Entry into iron mining and smelting proved to be a failure and the 
Company concentrated on mercury. By 1903 two quicksilver furnaces were in operation -  later increased to 
three in 1908. Output from the mines reached 55,000 (metric) tons per annum of cinnabar. Progress, 
however, proved disappointing and in 1906 the Company was reconstructed into a new UK company o f the 
same name. The Board was now all British. Local unrest during the 1911 Revolution caused the complete 
cessation of operations. The Company was wound up in 1917.
(xii) London and China Syndicate. Limited.
This company was registered in London in 1900 with an authorised capital of £50,000 -  the 
maximum issued was £24,000 by 1904. In that year the Syndicate obtained from the local government of 
Anhui an agreement on mining rights (which obtained Imperial sanction) to an iron ore deposit it had 
discovered on the Yangzi, 55 miles North of Wuhu. The Syndicate ran into strong harassment from the 
provincial authorities and the local gentry. In 1909 the Chinese Government proposed to buy back the 
mines for £50,000. This compared with the £47,000 claimed by the Syndicate to have been spent on the 
project by end June, 1909. (At least two contemporary sources expressed great disbelief that anywhere near 
this figure had been spent). The Chinese Government increased this offer to £52,000 and through the 
intervention o f the British Foreign Office this offer was accepted by the Syndicate in 1910. The Company 
was wound up in 1912.
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(xiii) Svndicat du Yunnan. Limited.
In May, 1899 a group o f French financiers founded the Syndicat Minier du Yunnan. It was 
decided to seek British involvement. In October, 1899 the Anglo French Syndicate was registered as a UK 
company “to deal with mining properties” . With the introduction of a further Franco-British consortium, 
the company was reconstructed and renamed as above in April, 1900, The authorised capital o f this Anglo- 
French company (equal shareholding and Board representation and a Secretary and office in Paris as well 
as London) was £35,000 -  all issued by 1906. In 1902 the Syndicate obtained a concession covering mining 
and other rights over 40,000 square miles of the province of Yunnan. Up to 1906 operations were limited 
pending the completion of the Hanoi-Yunnan railway. In that year it was decided to begin working of tin. 
The Syndicate transferred its rights in one o f the departments o f Yunnan to the Societe dr Exploitation de 
Ling-Ngan in which it took a 43% interest (the other main shareholder with 23% was the Yangtse Valley 
Company -  see below).
A hornets’ nest was stirred up. Local opposition became furious both from the gentry and 
those involved with the local mines. Anti-foreign societies were organised. Given this situation the 
Company accepted in 1911 a Chinese Government offer for the rights and property of the Company of 
£190,000. The Syndicate was wound up voluntarily in 1922.
(xiv) Yangtse Valley Company. Limited.
This UK registered company came into being in December, 1900 in amalgamation of the 
Yangtse Valley Syndicate, Limited (registered May, 1899) and the Upper Yangtse Syndicate, Limited 
(June, 1899). The Company never engaged in any mining operations in China other than in taking 
shareholdings in other companies such as in the case of the Yunnan concession above. The Company went 
into voluntary liquidation in 1922.
(xvl Hui Kune Company.
In an agreement approved by the Chinese Government in February, 1903 this British 
company would invest in mines in four prefectures in Zhejiang in conjunction with a Chinese concern. The 
agreement stipulated that mining activities should commence before March 6th, 1904. The British 
concessionaires did not meet tliis requirement although some prospecting did take place. The concession 
became void in March, 1905
(xvD The Weihaiwei Gold Mining Company. Limited.
This company was floated in early 1903 on the Shanghai exchange by British investors. The 
capital (all paid up) was $600,000 (£50,000). The shares fell sharply in December, 1904 on news of 
disappointing results on the first ore crushing, A meeting of shareholders was held and despite the gloomy 
outlook resolved to put in more money into the Company via debentures with option to convert into 
ordinary shares. This proved to be throwing good money after bad and in 1907 the Company was wound up 
voluntarily.
(xvii) The Pingyuan Gold Mining Company.
This company was formed in 1909 to develop gold mining in Jehol, The capital o f  this 
Sino-British concern of 800,000 taels (£96,000) was equally divided. A development shaft was opened but 
the yield and seam thickness were disappointing. The operation was completely stopped in 1914.
(C) ENGINEERING.
(D MARINE ENGINEERING.
The table given overleaf shows details of British owned docks in the key port of Shanghai.
1853 Pootung Dock Co. In 1872 a new public company was formed to work the shipyard
which was leased to the existing tenants of S.C. Famham and Co.
(see below), Capital issued 94,000 taels (£28,000).
1858 Shanghai Dock Co. Established by British merchants. By the 1870s issued capital had
reached 220,000 taels. (£66,000).
1858 Amoy Dock Co. In Xiamen. The general managers were Tait and Co.- established in
1845 in Xiamen.
I860 E. Hawkins and Co.
1862 Boyd and Co. In 1891 converted into a limited company with an issued capital of
800.000 taels (£176,000).
1864 Bellamy and Co. Operated the Bellamy Dock of the Amoy Dock Company.
1865 S.C. Famham and Co, In 1892 converted into a limited company with an issued capital of
750.000 taels (£188,000).
1869 Foochow Dock Co.
1872 Shanghai and Pootung Foundry
and Engineering Co. Capital 100,000 taels (£30,000).
1888 The Hongkew Engine Co. Makers and repairers of ship engines.
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DIMENSIONS OF BRITISH DRY DOCKS IN SHANGHAI -  FEET.
a
Old Dock (1) 399
Tungkadoo Dock (2) 350
Cosmopolitan Dock (3) 532
International Dock (4) 528
New Dock (5) 450
Yangtszepoo /  (6)
Yangtszepoo II  (7)
TOTAL 2.259
a
Old Dock (1) 399
Tungkadoo Dock (2) 355
Cosmopolitan Dock (3) 
International Dock (4) 528
New Dock (5)
Yangtszepoo /  (6) 577
Yangtszepoo I I  (7) 335
TOTAL 2.194
1904
b c a
1910
b
53 16 399 53
67 16 350 67
77.-5 24 532 77,5
77.5 23.5 528 77.5
75.5 21.5 450 75.5
- - 452 61
- - - -
350.5
-
2,711 411.5
1930
b e a
1937
b
53 16 399 53
67 16 355 67
- - - -
77,5 23.5 528 65
- - - -
61 20 584 62
60 14 342 61
318.5 2,208 308
c a
1920
b c
16 399 53 16
16 355 67 16
24 532 77,5 24
23.5 528 77.5 23.5
21.5 450 75.5 21.5
20 570 61 20
_ - - -
2,834 411.5
-
e a
1940
b c.
16 _ _
16 355 67 16
- - - -
23.5 528 77.5 23.5
- - - -
20 577 61 20
16 335 60 14
1,795 265.5
a. Length on Blocks.
b. Breadth at Entrance.
c. Depth of high water at ordinary Spring tides on the Sill.
(1) 1904 S.C. Famham, Boyd and Co. -  previously belonged to S.C.Farnham. 1910,1920 and 1930 
Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company, Ltd. 1938 disused property sold to Messrs Moller’s Ltd. 
At Hongkou.
(2) 1904 S. C Famliam, Boyd and Co. -  previously belonged to S.C.Farnham. 1910,1920 and 1930 
Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company, Ltd. 1936 transferred to Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd. In 
Pudong. Original name Muirhead’s Dock.
(3) 1904 S.C. Famham, Boyd and Co. -  previously belonged to S.C. Famham. 1910 and 1920 Shanghai 
Dock and Engineering Company, Ltd. In Pudong adjoining International Dock. Disused site partly 
sold to Asiatic Petroleum in 1929. Remaining four fifths of land sold to Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd.
(4) 1904 S.C. Famham, Boyd and Co -  previously the Oriental Dock of the Shanghai Engineering, 
Shipbuilding and Dock Co. 1910, 1920 and 1930 Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company, Ltd. In 
1936 transferred to Shanghai Dockyards, Limited.
(5) 1904 S.C. Famham, Boyd and Co. -  previously belonged to Boyd and Co. 1910 and 1920 Shanghai 
Dock and Engineering Company, Ltd. In Pudong. 1921 sold to Nippon Yusen Kaisha for exclusive 
use as wharves and warehouses.
(6) Opened 1909 by New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Ltd. Expanded in 1916. 1936 transferred 
to Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd.
(7) Opened February, 1930 by New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Ltd. 1936 transferred to 
Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd.
1880s Acum's Boat-Building 
Yard
1892 The New Amoy Dock 
Company
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British ownership in doubt.
Floatation of company above (page 271) with issued capital of $67,000 
(£12,-000),
1892 Shanghai Engineering, Shipbuilding and Dock Company. Authorised capital 770,000 taels -
511,000 taels were originally issued. Taken over by S.C. Farnham in 
1900.
Capital $30,000 (£4,000).1893 Amoy Engineering Co. 
1900 S.C. Farnham, Boyd and 
Company, Limited
1906 The Shanghai Dock and 
Engineering Co., Ltd.
Capital 4,830,000 taels (£425,000). The merged company on its 
inception “controls all the shipbuilding and docking business of the 
port” (i.e Shanghai).
S.C. Famham, Boyd and Company, Limited was wound up and all 
assets and liabilities were transferred to this new company. All 
shares were transferred on a one to one basis.
1900 The New Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Works, Ltd.
1905 Vulcan Ironworks, Ltd.
Formed as a private company. In 1903 converted into a limited 
liability company with a capital of 102,000 taels (£12,000).
Capital 311,000 taels (£40,000). Merged with The New Engineering 
and Shipbuilding Works, Ltd in 1912.
1936 Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd. A joint venture private company to which the New Engineering
and Shipbuilding Works contributed virtually all its relevant assets 
and the Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company two thirds of its 
assets. By 1940 the balance of these assets (the Old Dock and the 
Cosmopolitan Dock -the last later sold to the joint venture) had 
been sold. Both the partners in Shanghai Dockyards went into 
voluntary liquidation in 1939 and 1940. At end 1940 Shanghai 
Dockyards, Limited became a public company. Its capital then 
amounted to $11,250,000 (£179,000).
1937 Metal Industries of 
China, Limited
1938 Mollers’ Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Works, Ltd.
Floated by Wheelock and Company (transport, warehousemen, 
removers, etc) the capital of this company was $1,250,000 -  
£78,000 of which Wheelock and Co. accounted for 32%. The new 
company comprised two previous subsidiaries of Wheelock and 
Company -  China Ship-Breakers, Limited (60% o f the assets o f 
Metal Industries of China, Ltd.) and China Rolling and Steel 
Works, Limited.
The British shipping concern of Messrs Mollers’, Limited acquired 
the Old Dock property from the Shanghai Dock and Engineering 
Co., Ltd for £70,000 in September, 1938.
(IT) GENERAL ENGINEERING.
1881-2 British firm in short - lived venture in Xiamen to make iron pans.
1882 G.A. Wood and Co. Capital 100,000 taeis (£24,000). 100 workers.
1908 Tientsin Ironworks,Ltd. A short-lived venture. Capital 70,000 taels (£8,400).
1922 Eastern Engineering Works,
Limited
1925 Acme Foundry, Ltd.
? The Ideal Foundry and 
Machine Works 
7 Linotype and Machinery, Ltd 
? McGregor Iron Works. 
General Forge Products 
Company of China.
Formed in 1922 as a private concern in Tianjin. Public company in 
1925 with capital o f240,000 taels (£36,-000),. hr 1923 it had taken 
over another LUC company -  Adair, Graham and Company.
Part of B.A.T. (see above).
Printing machinery.
Vitreous enamels.
Reorganised in 1929 as General Forge Products (1929), Limited 
and also took over China Amalgamated Nail Company. Capital of 
the Company thus became 500,000 taels (£40,000). However, the
? China Car and Foundry 
Company, Limited.
The China Brass and Iron 
Works, Limited,
? Hope Crittall (China) 
Company, Limited.
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Company went into voluntary liquidation in 1934.
Railway coaches and freight cars. One third American holding.
In 1926 the Shanghai Waterworks Company allotted to its 
shareholders shares in a new company -  Shanghai Waterworks 
Fittings Company, Limited -  formed from its Fittings Department. 
This company took a 50% interest in the China Brass and 
Iron Works, Limited -  increased to 75% in 1933 and 100% in
1939. Employing 200 it produced mechanical stokers, boilers and 
other items for the water fittings business.
The factory in Yangshupu produced metal windows and doors. It 
was owned by the two English companies o f Henry Hope and 
Sons, Limited and Crittall Manufacturing Company Limited.
(A minority interest of UK investment was the Chinese Aluminium Rolling Mills, Limited. On 
stream in 1933 the plant produced aluminium foil and sheet. A joint British, Canadian and Swiss 
venture, the management was virtually all Swiss. Based on imported material, its production 
capacity was 3,000 tons per annum.)
(D) SOUND REPRODUCTION. 
1928
1929
1931
1934
Columbia Graphophone took over Fathe Freres which brought 
with it the Compagnie Pathe Orient with a factory in the French 
Concession in Shanghai.
Columbia Graphophone liquidated Compagnie Pathe Orient and 
passed the assets to a commercial company (Pathe Orient, Ltd.) and a 
production company ( China Record Co.) The capital of the former 
was $490,000(£42,000) and the latter $1,470,000 (£125,000).
The Columbia Graphophone Company, Ltd, and The 
Gramophone Company, Ltd. merged forming Electric and Musical 
Industries, Limited.
Pathe Orient, Ltd. and China Record, Ltd. absorbed into a new 
company -  Electric and Musical Industries (China), Limited. The 
mainstream business of the Company was records and gramophones. 
The initial capital of this new company was $1,000,000 (£67,000).
ffi) COTTON TEXTILES. 
(1888) (Shanghai Cotton Cleaning 
and Working Conpany) (Capital o f75,000 taels (£15,000) owned by British (Boyd and Co), 
Japanese, American and German interests. With 32 ginning 
machines, it processed 5.4 metric tons of cotton per day. There 
were 150 workers. This Japanese managed venture (Mitsui Bussan 
Kaisha) closed in 1902.)
1895 Ewo Cotton Spinning and
Weaving Co., Ltd. Capital 1,000,000 taels (£140,000).
1895 Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning
and Weaving Co., Ltd.
1906 The Anglo-Chinese Cotton 
Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
1910 Kung Yik Cotton Spinning 
and Weaving Co., Ltd.
1914 Yangtszepoo Cotton 
Mill, Limited.
Capital 500,000 taels (£84,000). Mill bought by Japanese in 1925.
A small (11,678 spindles) spinning milt with a capital of 300,000 
taels (£30,000). This Anglo-Chinese joint venture became wholly 
Chinese owned in 1909.
Capital 537,000 taels (£64,000).
Formed by taking all moveable items from the Hong Kong Cotton 
Spinning, Weaving and Dyeing Company to combine with the 1913 
established, Jardine Matheson owned, Yangtszepoo Cotton Mill. 
Capital 1,500,000 taels (£195,000).
1917 Oriental Cotton Spinning and
Weaving Company, Ltd. Reformed as British company -  originally German (1895 -  The
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Soy Chee Cotton Spinning Company). Capital 600,000 taels 
(£120,000). Went into liquidation in 1928.
1921 Ewo Cotton Mills, Ltd. Formed to combine the above three units -  all in the Jardine
Matheson stable -  of Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving, Kung 
Yik and Yangtszepoo.. Capital 4,900,-000 taels (£882,000),
1924 China Printing and Finishing
Company, Limited.
1937 New China Textile 
Company, Limited
(FI NON-COTTON TEXTILES
(I) SILK,
1861 The Silk Reeling 
Establishment 
1882 Ewo Filature
Subsidiary of Calico Printers’ Association. Originally a finishing 
plant. Spinning and weaving added in 1936. Capital of $15,000,000 
(£900,000) at the latter date.
Capital $2,500,000 (£155,000).
Venture backed by Jardine Matheson. Closed in 1872. 
Originally called The Shanghai Silk Manufacturing Company. 
Capital 500,000 taels (£130,000).
Capital 200,000 taels (£52,000).
1888 Ewo Silk Spinning, Weaving
and Dyeing Company Capital 150,000 taels (£32,000). Spinning, etc of waste silk.
1891 Lun Chong Silk Filature Capital 200,000 taels (£44,000).
1882 Iveson and Company
(II) WORSTED SPINNING AND WEAVING.
1932 Ewo Cotton Mills, Ltd.
1933 Patons and Baldwins (Far 
East), Limited.
1935 Shanghai Worsted Mills, 
Limited
(III) JUTE TEXTILES. 
1929 Ewo Cotton Mills, Ltd
(G) CHEMICALS.
Early 1860s 
1875
1880 Sui Chong Match 
Factory
1889
1890 Major’s Soap Factory 
1900 Yue Kang Glue Factory
Company
1911 Demovel, Limited 
? Pao Tai Soap Factory
1912 Price’s (China) Limited.
1917 China Soap and Candle 
Company, Limited
1919
1922 Candles, Limited
See above.
Capital £750,000.
Converted into public company in 1940. Capital $5,000,000 
(£67,000).
See above. Hessian cloth and gunny bags.
Major’s Acid Works /  Kiangsu Chemical Works.
Major Brothers became a private limited company.
Major Bros. 400 workers. Sold in 1894.
Major Brothers, Limited formed with capital o f275,000 taels 
(£58,000).
Activity given up in 1896.
Capital 79,000 taels (£10,000). Went out of business in June, 1902. 
Short lived venture making paint remover.
Burtenshaw and Company. In Hankou.
A subsidiary of Price’s Patent Candle Company, Limited, A large 
candle factory, which also had a small production of soap, was 
erected in Shanghai.
Capital £510,000. A three way venture of Price’s Patent Candle 
Company, Limited and two UK soap companies which had been 
taken over by Brunner Mond and Company -  Crosfields and 
Gossages. Price’s transferred their Chinese interests to this new 
company.
Lever Brothers took over Crosfields and Gossages. By also taking 
over Price’s Patent Candle Company it took full control of the 
China Soap and Candle Company, Limited,
Lever Brothers and Shell agreed to transfer all their illuminents 
businesses to this company -  in 1936 Lever Brothers sold their
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share in this joint venture to their partner.
1923 Shell became general managing agents for all the activities of
Price’s (China), Limited. By then this enterprise had over 250 
employees.
1923 The China Soap Company,
Limited Incorporated in China by Lever Brothers. It took over their 1911
established trading company of Lever Brothers (China), Limited 
and the China Soap and Candle Company, Limited which was 
wound up in 1925. The China Soap Company, Limited had a 
capital o f $8,000,000 (£700,000). The factory in Shanghai came on 
stream in 1925. 400 workers produced, in addition to soap, cold 
cream, glycerine, etc.
1934 The Orient Paint, Colour and
Varnish Company, Ltd, A joint venture of John Swire & Sons,- Limited and the UK paint.
company of Pinchin, Johnson and Company, Limited. Issued 
capital $1,800,000 (£78,000) by mid-193 8.
(HI DRINK. FOOD AND CLEANING AND PACKAGING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
(I) DRINK.
(a) Brewing.
? The Empire Brewery and Aerated
Mineral Water Works Part of Evans and Co. Established in 1855, this company was
engaged in baking (the first Western bakery in China) and as 
shiphandlers. The brewing business was taken over by Hall and 
Holtz Co-operative Company in 1885 but it was sold in 1893.
1904 Anglo-German Brewing Co. Only at the margin can it be accounted as a British company
albeit registered as such and with a British Chairman and some 
other Board members. Very substantial German participation and 
ownership. Capital $400,000 (£39,000). Went into voluntary 
liquidation in 1916 with the brewery sold to Dai Nippon Brewery.
1935 Ewo Breweries, Ltd. Brewery completed in 1936 -  one third owned by Jardine
Matheson -  balance local British stockbrokers. In 1940 converted 
into public company with above name. Capital of $7,000,000 
(£105,000). Jardine Matheson retained one seventh of the capital 
and were general managers.
Public company in 1889 with capital o f $120,000 (£33,000) but 
even after installing a new aerated water plant in 1890 this business 
only accounted for 3% of total assets. Its main business was in 
selling medicines, toiletries, etc and dispensing.
InNiuzhuang.
In Fuzhou.
Founded in Hong Kong in the 1850s and incorporated in 1884. In 
1886 it extended its aerated water operations to Shanghai (50 
workers). This activity only a small part of its business which was 
mainly retailing. Apart from Shanghai the Company also erected 
soft drinks plants in Guangzhou, Tianjin and Xiamen,
Capital 100,000 taels (£25,000). Established by Caldbeck, 
MacGregor and Co. -  wine and spirits merchants (1864),
Capital 52,500 taels (£6,200). In Tianjin and Shanhaiguan. They 
were authorised bottlers of Coca Cola.
In Shantou. Bradley and Co.
Hankou. Capital $157,000 (£19,000). 
fiankou. Taken over by Chinese interests in 1925.
Tianjin.
Tianjin.
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks. 
1853 J Llewellyn and Co.
1890 Farr Brothers and Company
1891 H. Peel and Company.
? J. Wells
? Kyle and Company.
? Evans and Co. (see above).
1886 A.S. Watson and Co.
1892 The Aquarius Company
1901 Crystal, Limited
7 Swatow Aerated Water Co.
? Hankow Dispensary Co., Ltd. 
? Hankow Iceworks 
? A. Mackie and Co., Ltd.
? White Star Aerated Water 
Factory
7 Wilson and Company
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Hankou. Bought by Burtenshaw and Co. in 1918.
(II) FOOD.
(a) Sugar refining.
1869
1878 Swatow Sugar Refinery
(b) Flour mills.
1863 Shanghai Steam Flour Mill 
1896 China Flour Mill Co. Ltd.
Jardine Matheson short lived venture with Chinese merchants near 
Guangzhou.
Jardine Matheson venture in Shantou. Closed 1886.
First machine run flour mill in China.
Capital 150,000 taels (£22,500). In 1916 the Company was wound 
up and the mill was taken over by Mitsui Bussan Kaisha.
In Hankou. Capital 200,000 taels (£26,000).1905 Ho Feng Flour Mill
(c) Oils and fats.
(i) Soya bean products.
1866 Thomas Platt and Co. Founded in 1861 as a trading company in Niuzhuang. In 1866 it
ordered machinery for a steam powered mill to process soya beans 
The- venture was taken over by Jardine- Matheson and production 
commenced in 1868. Venture terminated in 1870.
1934 Nutro Products, Ltd. “Soyogen” flour,
( Also, in 1896 Butterfield and Swire were involved in the erection o f a steam powered mill, also in 
Niuzhuang, with a capacity of 11 tons of oil and 4,000 beancakes per day. However, according to Lord 
Charles Beresford (The Break-up o f China, 1899) the mill was “worked by Chinese only, and is practically 
Chinese owned.” There was also British financial interest in two ventures in Harbin. The Anglo-Chinese 
Eastern Trading Company, Limited was founded in 1914 and had a  utilisation capacity of 90 tons of soya 
beans per day. The second venture was Messrs. S. Soskin and Company’s Com Mills and Bean-Oil 
Works.)
(ii) Other oils.
1892 Shanghai Oil Company A small mill for cotton seed oil and cake. Part of Major Brothers, 
Limited. Sold in 1907.
Capital 107,000 taels (£14,000). Company went into liquidation in 
1907.
1904 ScharfF s Oil and Bone 
Mills, Limited
1909 Lih Teh Oil Mill
Company, Ltd. Capital 260,000 taels (£31,000). Wound up in September, 1930..
(also tung oil refineries, particularly in Hankou, owned by Jardine Matheson, Arnhold and Co., Ltd and 
Liddell Brothers and Company.)
1933 Edible Products, Limited Originally The United Margarine Company, Ltd. Name changed in
1935. Capital $300,000 (£19,000). Plant at the Unilever complex in 
Shanghai.
(d) Other foods.
This sector comprised three firms engaged in preserving eggs by freezing and other means and also 
freezing other foods.
1908 International Export Company,
Limited.
1911 S.Behr and Mathew, 
Limited
1920 Ewo Cold Storage, 
Company
100% owned by the Union Cold Storage, Limited -  part of the 
Vestey family empire. Original capital $351,000 (£30,000). The 
plant at Hankou was followed by others at Nanjing and Tianjin.
Plants in Shanghai, Hankou and Qingdao plus handling and 
freezing facilities in London and Hamburg. Capital in China of
700,000 taels (£84,000).
Plants in Shanghai and Qingdao. The capital of this Jardine 
Matheson company was 790,000 taels (£130,000).
(HI) CLEANING AND PACKAGING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 
1876 Hankow Press Packing Company, Ltd.
187? Collins and Co. In Tianjin. A firm of merchants.
1881 Birt’s Wharf Hide-curing and
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Wool-cIeaning,Co, Founded by W.Birt and Co.(I870) -  silk inspectors and merchants.
This Shanghai plant was sold in 1895 to Liddell Brothers and Co. 
1894 capital of this packaging/cleaning plant was 105,000 tads 
(£14,700).
1888 Mackenzie and Co..,. Ltd.. Founded in 1858,. this firm of merchants established a plant in
1888 in Tianjin. Other plants were added in Shanghai (Pudong) 
and Hankou.
1895 Liddell Brothers and 
Company, Limited
? Hatch Carter and Co.
? William Forbes and Co,
? Wilson and Company.
1907 Ewo Press Packing Co.
A substantial import/export company. Plants in Shanghai (see 
above), Hankou (1904) and Tianjin. These packing interests were 
supplemented by a plywood factory in Harbin.
An import/export company. Plant at Tianjin.
Merchants and commission agents. Plant at Tianjin,
Merchants. Plant at Tianjin.
Originally a joint venture of Jardine Matheson and a Chinese 
partner called Ewo Yuen Press Packing Company. In 1919 
Jardine Matheson became sole proprietors and the name was 
changed. Plants in Shanghai and Tianjin.
(I) MISCELLANEOUS.
fl> BUILDING-MATERIALS. 
1866 Shanghai Brick and Saw 
Mill Company 
1891 Shanghai Concrete Co.
1900 Chee Hsin Cement Co.
? Yang Tsun Brickworks.
1904 A, Butler Cement Tile 
Works, Limited 
1929 China Aerocrete Co, Ltd.
Capital 100,000 taels (£28,000). Closed 1870.
Probably British. 50 workers. Capital 30,000 taels (£6,600).
In Tangshan. Apart from cement, flooring tiles also made. 
Founded in 1890, it became a satellite enterprise of the Chinese 
Engineering and Mining Company, Limited in 1901 (see above). 
This cement plant was sold to Chinese interests in 1907. The 
Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Ltd. also produced 
bricks for internal use and outside sales.
Capital 60,000 taels (£8,000). Liquidated in 1921.
Producer of artificial stone. Capital 200,000 taels (£24,000). 
Company dissolved in 1937.
(JT) WOOD PROCESSING.
1885 Hall and Holtz Co-operative 
Company, Limited 
? A.H. Jaques and Co.
? Weeks and Co., Ltd.
? Sims and Company 
1901 The China Import and Export 
Lumber Co., Ltd.
? British sawmill in Fuzhou. 
1905 Ewo Timber Depot
1909 Arts and Crafts, Ltd.
? Woodcraft Works, Ltd.
? Liddell Brothers and Company 
Limited (see above)
Primarily a retail concern but also possessing a furniture factory. 
As above. In Tianjin.
As above, mainly a retail business.
In Tianjin,
Initial capital of 500,000 taels (£60,000). Majority British owned 
from 1908. Sawmills in Shanghai, Nanjing, Hankou, Qingdao, 
Tianjin and Fuzhou (this last closed in 1926). Also a plywood 
plant in Shanghai. The company supplied flooring, interior 
woodwork, etc via its subsidiary of China Woodworking and Dry 
Kiln Company, Limited.
Closed in 1904 with increased scarcity o f indigenous timber. 
Capital $150,000 ((£13,000). 200 workers. Jardine Matheson 
venture.
Capital 98,000 taels (£12,000). Founded in 1904 as a furnishing 
business. In 1909 it started producing furniture and interior 
woodwork.
Furniture producers.
A plywood factory in Harbin,
(E l) MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS.
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1895 S. Moutrie and Co., Ltd.
(IV) OTHER.
(a) Glass.
1882 Shanghai Glass Works,Co. 
1932 Tsing Hwa Glass Co., Ltd.
(Yao Hua Mechanical Glass 
Company, Limited)
(b) Office furniture. 
1932 The Office Appliance
Company, Limited
(c) Tanning.
1879
1881
1904 Shanghai Tanning Factory
fd) Electrical Industry.
? General Electric Company
of China The Shanghai factory was mainly engaged in installing and
contracting of electrical machinery. Actual production o f electrical 
articles was small.
? Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph A subsidiary of Cable and Wireless, Ltd. As a small part of their
Company, Limited business in China -  mainly dealing in and installing wireless,
telegraph and telephone equipment -  the Company had a small 
factory in Shanghai (50 employees), A part of its operations was 
making radios and wireless equipment. This factory was burnt out 
completely during the 1937 hostilities.
Notes :-
(1) The figures for capital in Sterling terms are converted at the average exchange rates for the applicable 
year.
(2) Unless otherwise stated in the above, the operations of the individual enterprises concerned were in 
Shanghai. O f the 180 enterprises listed, 59% confined their operations to Shanghai, 9% combined 
operations in Shanghai with other centres and 32% were centred in other locations. These last were 
particularly prominent in the sectors o f the mining and drink industries.
(3) These 180 enterprises were distributed by industrial sector as followa
Tobacco industry 32 All taken over or founded by B. A.T.
Extractive industries 18
Textiles 
Cotton textiles 9
Non-cotton textiles
- Silk 5
- Other 4 
Engineering
- Marine 21
- Other 11
Chemicals 13
Sound reproducton 4 All part of EMI or its constituent companies.
Drink 17
Food 14
Cleaning and packing of
agricultural products 9
Miscellaneous 23
Total 180
Founded in 1889 as dealers in music. In 1895 it established a 
factory in Shanghai to make pianos. In 1899 it became a public 
company with an initial issued capital o f $104,000 (£9,000). It 
also introduced organ production in China.
Capital 50,000 taels (£13,000). Closed 1893.
Specialised in glassware and bottles. Capital $500,000 (£32,000). 
200 workers.
(Window glass output at Qinhuangdao. The British interest was 
via the joint venture of the Kailan Mining Administration.)
Established in 1930 with its main business importing and 
repairing office furniture. It did, however, have a factory making 
steel office furniture from 1932 to 1935.
British merchant established a tannery in Shanghai (Pudong).
The above business acquired by The Shanghai Tannery Company. 
Wound up in 1883.
Capital $210,000 (£27,000). Liquidated 1913.
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(4) By date of foundation the split was as follows 
Before 1895 26%
1895-1914 40%
1915-1922 9%
1923-1929 11%
1930-1940 14%
Out of the 180 enterprises, 81 (45%) were extant in 1940 due to the consolidation of enterprises, liquidation 
of enterprises and transference of ownership from British hands.
(5) Distribution of British Industrial Enterprises bv fal Location of Operations (b) Date of Foundation.
(a) Location of Enterprises.
Industrial Sector. Shanghai. Shanghai/Other. Other Locations. Total
Tobacco industry 17 7 8 32
Extractive industries - I 17 18
Engineering
-Marine 15 1 5 21
-Other 8 - 3 11
Sound reproduction 4 - - 4
Cotton textiles 9 - - 9
Non-cotton textiles
-Silk 5 - - 5
-Other 4 - - 4
Chemicals 12 - 1 13
Drink 6 1 10 17
Food 7 2 5 14
Cleaning and packing of
agricultural products 1 3 5 9
Miscellaneous 18 1 4 23
Total 106 16 58 180
Date of Foundation.
Industrial Sector. Pre-1895 1895-1914 1915-22 1923-29 1930-40 Total*
Tobacco industry _ 9 6 7 10 32 (28)
Extractive industries - 17 I - - 18 (4)
Engineering
-Marine 14 4 - - 3 21 (3)
-Other 2 3 3 2 1 11 (4)
Sound reproduction - - 2 2 4 (1)
Cotton textiles - 5 2 1 1 9 (3)
Non-cotton textiles
-Silk 5 - - - - 5 (-)
-Other - - - 1 3 4 (4)
Chemicals 3 4 3 2 I 13 (3)
Drink 8 8 - - 1 17(10)
Food 5 6 1 - 2 14 (5)
Cleaning and packing of
agricultural products 4 5 - - - 9 (8)
Miscellaneous 6 12 4 1 23 (8)
Total 47 73 16 19 25 180 181+1
* The figures in brackets give those enterprises extant in 1940. 
+ O f which 58 in Shanghai or Shanghai/Other.
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AFPENDIX TWO
ESTIMATED ** UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1895 .1896 1897 1898 1899
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
TOTAL 0.81 100.0 0.93 100.0 1.08 100.0 1.25 100.0 1.65 100.0
(A1 TOBACCO INDUSTRY.
<B1 MINING. - - - - 0.02 1.9 0.09 7.2 0.40 24.2
( Cl COTTON TEXTILES. - - - - 0.21 19.4 0.24 19.2 0.30 18.2
<D1 NON-COTTON TEXTILES. 0.20 24.7 0.22 23.7 0.15 13.9 0.12 9j5 0.12 H
(a) Silk 0.20 24.7 0.22 23.7 0.15 13.9 0.12 9.6 0.12 7.3
(b) Worsted Spinning and 
Weaving _ _ .
(E) ENGINEERING. 0.41 50.6 0.47 50.4 0.43 39.7 0.47 37.6 0.50 30.4
(a) Marine 0.39 48.1 0.45 48.2 0.41 37.8 0.45 36.0 0.48 29.2
(b) Other 0.02 2.5 0.02 2.2 0.02 1.9 0.02 1.6 0.02 1.2
(FI INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS. 0.04 4 9 0.04 43 0.04 1 1 0.04 3.2 0.04 2.4
(a) Bulk Chemicals 0.04 4.9 0.04 4.3 0.04 3.7 0.04 3.2 0.04 2.4
(b) Adhesives - - - - - - - - - -
(c) Coatings, etc - - - - - - - - - -
<G1 CONSUMER CHEMICALS. - - - - - - - - - -
(a) Soap and allied items - - - - - - - - -
(b) Candles - - - - - - - - - -
(HI SOUND REPRODUCTION. - - - - _ - _ - .
HI DRINK. FOOD. PACKING.etc 
OF AGRICULTURAL ITEMS. 0.14 17.3 0.18 19.4 0.21 19.5 0.27 21.6 0.27 16.3
(a) Brewing - - - - - » - - - -
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.04 4.9 0.04 4.3 0.04 3.7 0.04 3.2 0.04 2.4
(c) Flour mills - - 0.02 2.2 0.02 1.9 0.03 2.4 0.03 1.8
(d) Oils, fats - - - - - - - - - -
(e) Eggs, etc. - - - - - - - - - -
(f) Packing, etc of agricultural
items 0.10 12.4 0.12 12.9 0.15 13.9 0.20 16.0 0.20 12.1
fJl MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES 0.02 0.02 12 0.02 L9 0.02 L6 0.02 L2
(a) Building materials - - - - - - - - - -
(b) Wood processing 0.01 1.3 0,01 I.I 0.01 1.0 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.6
(c) Musical instruments 0.01 1.2 0.01 1.1 0.01 0.9 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.6
(d) Glass - - - - - - _ - _
(e) Electrical industry - - - - - - - - - -
(f) Tanning - - - - - - - - - -
* Converted at average exchange rate for the year concerned.
*'*' The sources and in a few cases the limitations o f these figures that have been 
derived by the author are given in PART II  above.
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APPENDIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1900 1901 1902 1903 1904
TOTAL
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY.
(B) MINING.
(C) COTTON TEXTILES.
(D) NON-COTTON TEXTILES.
(a) Silk
(b) Worsted Spinning and
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
2.09 100.0 3.95 100.0 4.02 100.0 4.46 100.0 4.79 100.0
_ _ _ 0.02 0.5 0.03 0.7 0.10 2.1
0.86 41.1 2.42 61.3 2.42 60.3 2.79 62.7 2.82 58.9
0.27 12.9 0.28 7.1 0.27 6.7 0.18 4.0 0.19 4.0
0.12 5.7 0.12 3.0 0.10 2.5 0.10 2.2 0.09 1.9
0.12 5.7 0.12 3.0 0.10 2.5 0.10 2.2 0.09 1.9
Weaving - - - - - - - - - -
(El ENGINEERING. 0.45 21.6 0.68 17.0 0.72 17.9 0.82 18.3 0.90 18.8
(a) Marine 0.43 20.6 0.65 16.2 0.69 17.2 0.78 17.4 0.86 18.0
(b) Other 0.02 1.0 0.03 0.8 0.03 0.7 0.04 0.9 0.04 0.8
(FI INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS. 0.05 2.4 0.05 1.3 0.04 1.0 0.04 09 0.04 08
(a) Bulk Chemicals 0.04 1.9 0.04 1.0 0.04 1.0 0,04 0.9 0.04 0.8
(b) Adhesives 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.3 - - - - - -
(c) Coatings, etc - - - - - - - - - -
(G) CONSUMER CHEMICALS. - - - - - - _ - - -
(a) Soap and allied items - - - - - - - - - -
(b) Candles - - - - - - - - - -
(HI SOUND REPRODUCTION. - - - - - - - - - -
(11 DRINK. FOOD AND PACKING, etc
OF AGRICULTURAL ITEMS. 0.32 15.3 0.38 07 0.42 10.4 0.44 08 0.54 11.3
(a) Brewing - - - - - - - - 004 0.8
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.04 1.9 0.05 1.3 0.05 1.2 0.05 1.1 0.06 1.3
(c) Flour mills 0.03 1.4 0.03 0.8 0.02 0.5 0.04 0.9 004 0.8
(d) Oils, fats - - - - - - - - - -
(e) Eggs, etc - - - - - - - - - -
(f) Packing, etc of agricultural
items 0.25 12.0 0.30 7.6 0.35 8.7 0.35 7.8 0.40 8.4
(J1 MISCELLANEOUS
INDUSTRIES. 0.02 1 0 0.02 0 6 0.03 07 0.06 13 0.11 22
(a) Building materials - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.2
(b) Wood processing 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.3 0.02 0.5 0.04 0.9 0.05 1.0
(c) Musical instruments 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.3 0.01 0.2 002 0.4 0.02 0.4
(d) Glass _ - - - - - - - - -
(e) Electrical industry - - - - - - - - - -
(f) Tanning - - - - - - - - 0.03 0.6
♦Converted at average exchange rate for the year concerned.
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APPENDIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1905 1906 1907 1908 1909
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
TOTAL 5.40 100.0 5.88 100.0 6.40 100.0 7.83 100.0 8.32 100.0
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY. 0.18 03 0.58 09 0.61 9.5 2.00+ 25.5 2.20+ 26.4
(B) MINING. 3.27 60.6 3.12 53.0 3.28 51.3 3.35 43.0 3.60 43.2
(C) COTTON TEXTILES. 0.20 3 7 0.29 4.9 0.32 5J) 027 M  023 2.8
(D) NON-COTTON TEXTILES. 0.09 L7 0.09 L5 0.08 13 M S JLQ 0.08 1 0
(a) Silk 0.09 1.7 0.09 1.5 0.08 1.3 0.08 1.0 0.08 1.0
(b) Worsted Spinning and
Weaving - - - - - - - - -
(E) ENGINEERING. 0.95 17.6 1.04 17.7 1.04 16.2 0.96 12.2 0.96 11.5
(a) Marine 0.91 16.8 1.00 17.0 1.00 15.6 0.91 11.6 0.90 10.8
(b) Other 0.04 0.8 0.04 0.7 0.04 0.6 0.05 0.6 0.06 0.7
(F) INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 0.04 08 0.04 07 0.04 0 6  004 05 0.04 05
(a) Bulk chemicals 0.04 0.8 0.04 0.7 0.04 0.6 0.04 0.5 0.04 0.5
(b) Adhesives - - - - - - - - -
(c) Coatings, etc - - - - - - -
(G) CONSUMER CHEMICALS , - - - - - - - - -
(a) Soap and allied items - - - - - - - - -
(b) Candles - - - - - - - - -
(H) SOUND REPRODUCTION. - - - - - - - - -
(I) DRINK. FOOD. PACKING, etc of
AGRICULTURAL ITEMS. 0.55 10.1 0.58 09 0.88 13.7 0.99 12.6 1.05 12.6
(a) Brewing 0.04 0.7 0.04 0.7 0.04 0.6 0.04 05 0.04 0.5
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.07 1.3 0.07 1.2 0.07 1.1 0.07 0.9 0.07 0.8
(c) Flour mills 0.04 0.7 0.05 0.9 0.05 0 8  0.04 0.5 0.04 0.5
(d) Oils, fats - - 0.02 0.3 0.02 0.3 0.01 0.1 0.04 0.5
(e) Eggs, etc - - - - - - 0.03 0.4 0.06 0.7
(f) Packing, etc of agricultural
items 0.40 7.4 0.40 6.8 0.70 10.9 0.80 10.2! 0.80 9.6
CD MISCELLANEOUS
INDUSTRIES. 0.12 22 0.14 2A 0.15 2A  074 L8; 016 1 0
(a) Building materials 0.01 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.01 02  0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1
(b) Wood processing 0.06 1.1 0.07 1.2 0.08 1.2 0.07 0.9' 0.09 1.1
(c) Musical instruments 0.02 0.4 0.03 0.5 0.03 0.5 003 0.4 0.03 0.4
(d) Glass - - - - - - - - -
(e) Electrical industry - - - - - - - - -
(f) Tanning 0.03 0.5 0.03 0.5 0.03 0.5 0.03 0.4\ 0.03 0.4
* Converted at the average exchange rate for the year concerned.
+ Estimated -  see text in chapter on the tobacco industry.
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AlTENDIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1910 1911 1912 1913 1914
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % :£mn* %
TOTAL 9.03 100.0 9.32 100.0 12.35 100.0 13.07 100.0 14.47 100.0
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY. 2.50+ 27.6 2.50+ 26.8 5.50+ 44.4 6.00+ 45.8 6.20+ 42.7
(B) MINING, 3.55 39.5 3.59 38.4 3.27 26.6 3.33 25.6 3.34 23.2
(C) COTTON TEXTILES. 0.26 23 0.38 4d 0.42 1 4  045 1 4 0.48 1 1
(D) NON-COTTON TEXTILES. 0.08 09 0.07 08 0.07 0 6  008 0 6 0.08 06
(a) Silk 0.08 0.9 0.07 0.8 007 0.6 0.08 06 0.08 0.6
(b) Worsted Spinning and
Weaving - - - - - - - - -
(E) ENGINEERING. 0.96 10.7 0.96 10.4 1.05 8.5 0.95 7.3 0.97 6.7
(a) Marine 0.90 10.0 0.90 9.8 0.98 7.9 0.88 6.8 0.90 6.2
(b) Other 0.06 0.7 0.06 0.6 0.07 0.6 0.07 0.5 0.07 0.5
09 INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS. 0.04 04 0.03 03 0.04 03 003 0.2 0.02 0.1
(a) Bulk Chemicals 0.04 0.4 0.03 0.3 0.04 0.3 0.03 0.2 0.02 0.1
(b) Adhesives - - - - - - _ -
(c) Coatings, etc. - - neg. neg. - - - - -
(G) CONSUMER CHEMICALS. 0.30 33 0.30 1 2 0.30 2.4 0.38 2.9 0.43 3.0
(a) Soap and allied items - - - - - - 0.08 0.6 0.13 0.9
(b) Candles 0.30 3.3 0.30 3.2 0.30 2.4 0.30 2.3 0.30 2.1
(H) SOUND REPRODUCTION. - - - - - - - - -
(D DRINK. FOOD AND PACKING etc
OF AGRICULTURAL ITEMS. 1.18 13.0 1.33 14.3 1.53 12.5 1.68 12.9 2.77 19.1
(a) Brewing 0.04 0.4 0.04 0.4 0.05 0.4 005 0.4 0.05 0.2
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.07 0.8 0.08 0.9 0.08 0.7 0.08 0.6 0.08 0.6
(c) Flour mills 0.03 0.3 0.03 0.3 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.01 0.1
(d) Oils, fats 0.04 0.4 0.03 0.3 0.03 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.03 0.2
(e) Eggs, ete 0,15 1,7 0,25 2,7 0,45 3,7 0,50 3,8 1,60 11.1
(f) Packing, etc of agricultural
items 0.85 9.4 0.90 9.7 0.90 7.3 1.00 7.7 1.00 6.9
(J) MISCELLANEOUS
INDUSTRIES. 0.16 1.7 0.16 1.7 0.17 1.3 0.17 1.3 0.18 1.3
(a) Building materials 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1
(b) Wood processing 0.09 1.0 0.09 1.0 0.10 0.8 0.10 0.8 0.11 0.8
(c) Musical instruments 0.03 0.3 0.03 0.3 003 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.03 0.2
(d) Glass - - - - - - - - -
(e) Electrical industry - . - - - - - - -
(f) Tanning 0.03 0.3 0.03 0.3 0.03 0.2 0.03 0.2 0.03 0.2
* Converted at average exchange rate for the year concerned.
+ Estimated -  see text in chapter on the tobacco industry.
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APFENDIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
TOTAL 15.31 100.0 18.58 100.0 21.30 100.0 25.12 100.0 41.05 100.0
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY. 6.50+ 42.4 9.00+ 48.3 10.00+ 47.1 12.50+49.7 26.42 i64.4
(B) MINING. 3.41 22.3 3.48 18.8 3.60 16.9 3.59 14.3 4.05 99
(C) COTTON TEXTILES. 0.64 41 0.80 A3 1.18 5J. 1.53 1 1  101 A9
(D) NON-COTTON TEXTILES. 0.08 05 0.11 0 6 0.16 08 0.18 0/7 023 0 6
(a) Silk 0.08 0.5 0.11 0.6 0.16 0.8 0.18 0.7 0.23 0.6
(b) Worsted Spinning and
Weaving - - - - - - - - -
(E) ENGINEERING. 0.90 1 9 1.16 1 2 1.48 TO 1.78 2 d  138 M
(a) Marine 0.84 5.5 1.10 5.9 1.42 6.7 1.71 6.8 2.30 5.6
(b) Other 0.06 0.4 0.06 0.3 0,06 0,3 0.07 0.3 0.08 0.2
(F) INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 0.02 <n 0.02 0.1 0.03 0 1 0.03 0 1  005 0J.
(a) Bulk chemicals 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.05 0.1
(b) Adhesives - - - - - - - - -
(c) Coatings, etc. - - - - - - - - -
(G) CONSUMER CHEMICALS., 0.52 1 4 0.52 2,9 0.52 2A 0.60 M  060 L4
(a) Soap and allied items 0,13 0,9 0,13 0,7 0,13 0,6 0,13 0,5 0,13 0,3
(b) Candles 0.39 2.5 0.39 2.2 0.39 1.8 0.47 1.9 0.47 1.1
(H) SOUND REPRODUCTION. - - - - - - - _ -
© DRINK. FOOD. PACKING, etc.. of
AGRICULTURAL ITEMS. 3.09 20.3 3.30 17.8 4.08 19.1 4.20 16.8 4.42 10.8
(a) Brewing 0.05 0.3 - - - - - - -
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.09 0.6 0.10 0.5 0.12 0.6 0.13 0.5 0.17 0.4
(c) Flour mills 0.01 0.1 - - - - - - -
(d) Oils, fats 0.04 0.3 0.05 0.3 0.06 0.3 0.07 0.3 0.10 0.2
(e) Eggs, etc. 1.80 11,8 1,95 10,5 2,40 11,2 2,40 9,6 2,45 6,0
(f) Packing, etc of agricultural
items 1.10 7.2 1.20 6.5 1.50 7.0 1.60 6.4 1.70 4.2
(J) MISCELLANEOUS
INDUSTRIES. 0.15 L0 0.19 L0 0.25 LI 0.71 1 8  089 1 1
(a) Building materials 0.01 0.1 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.02 -
(b) Wood processing 0.11 0.7 0.14 0.8 0.19 0.9 0.63 2.5 0.78 1.9
(c) Musical instruments 0.03 0.2 0.04 0.2 0.05 0.2 0.07 0.3 0.09 0.2
(d) Glass - - - - - - - - -
(e) Electrical industry - - - - - - - - -
(f) Tanning - - - - - - - - -
* Converted at the average exchange rate for the year concerned.
+ Estimated -  see text in chapter on the tobacco industry.
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APPENDIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1920 1921 1922 1923 1924
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
TOTAL
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY. 37.41
(B) MINING. 4.14
(C) COTTON TEXTILES. 2.74
(D) NON-COTTON TEXTILES 0.24
(a) Silk 0.24
(b) Worsted Spinning and 
Weaving
(E) ENGINEERING. 2.76
(a) Marine 2.67
(b) Other 0.09
(F) INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 0.05
(a) Bulk chemicals 0.05
(b) Adhesives
(c) Coatings etc.
(G) CONSUMER CHEMICALS 0.60
(a) Soap and allied items 0.13
(b) Candles 0.47
(H) SOUND REPRODUCTION. -
(I) DRINK. FOOD. PACKING, etc.of 
AGRICULTURAL ITEMS. 4.60
(a) Brewing
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.18
(c) Flour mills
(d) Oils, fats 0.12
(e) Eggs, etc 2.50
(f) Packing, etc. of agricultural
items 1.80
(J) MISCELLANEOUS
INDUSTRIES. 1.02
(a) Building materials 0.02
(b) Wood processing 0,89
(c) Musical instruments 0.10
(d) Glass
(e) Electrical industry 0.01
(f) Tanning
100.0 35.94 100.0 38.94 100.0 34.01 100.0 36.85 100.0
69.8 22.68 63.1 25.55 65.6 20.60 60.6 22.45 61.0
U 3.57 0 9 3.61 03 3.86 11.3 :4.21 11.4
ST 2.04 1 7 2.01 12 1.85 14 2.02 15
05 0.14 04 0T3 03 0.12 04 0.12 03
0.5 0.14 0.4 0.13 03 0.12 0.4 0.12 0.3
52 1.96 15 1.88 1 9 1.48 1 4 1.57 13
5.0 1.87 5.2 1.78 4.6 1.38 4.1 1.47 4.0
0.2 0.09 0.3 0.10 0.3 0.10 0.3 0.10 0.3
or 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.02 or 0.03 or
0.1 0.03 0.1 0,03 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.03 0.1
11 0.60 12 0.60 1 5 1.42 1 2 1.50 4T
0.2 0.13 0.4 0.13 0.3 0.95 2.8 1.00 2.7
0.9 0.47 1.3 0.47 1.2 0.47 1.4 0.50 1.4
&6 4.32 11.9 4.57 11.7 4.06 11.8 4.31 11.6
0.3 0.12 0.3 0.12 0.3 0.11 0.3 0.12 0.3
0.2 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.04 0.1
4.7 2.70 7,5 3,00 7,7 2,65 7,8 2,85 7,7
3.4 1.45 4.0 1.40 3.6 1.25 3.6 1.30 3.5
L9 0.60 17 0.56 1 4 0.60 18 0.64 17
1.7 0.53 1.5 0.48 1.2 0.53 1.6 0.55 1.5
0.2 0.06 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.06 0.2 0,08 0,2
_ 0,01 _ 0,01 _ 0,01 _ 0,01
*Converted at the average exchange rate for the year concerned.
-287-
APPENDIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
TOTAL 37.30 100.0 35.15 100.0 33.35 100.0 35.62 100.0 32.55 100.0
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY. 23.80 63.8 22.29 63.5 21.20 63.8 23.50 65.9 20.75 63.6
(B) MINING. 4.10 11.0 4.07 11.6 4.02 12.1 3.95 11.1 3.90 12.0
(C) COTTON TEXTILES. 1.69 4.5 1.59 4.5 1.48 4.4 1.49 4.2 1.46 4.5
(D) NON-COTTON TEXTILES 0,12 0,3 0,11 0,3 0,09 0,3 0,10 0,3 0,09 0,3
(a) Silk 0.12 0.3 0.11 0.3 0.09 0.3 0.10 0.3 0.09 0.3
(b) Worsted Spinning and
Weaving - - - - - - - -
(E) ENGINEERING. 1.53 4.1 1.46 4.1 1.36 4.0 1.35 3.8 1.24 3.8
(a) Marine 1.38 3.7 1.27 3.6 1.18 3.5 1.18 3.3 1.09 3.3
(b) Other 0.15 0.4 0.19 0.5 0.18 0.5 0.17 0.5 0.15 0.5
(F) INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1
(a) Bulk chemicals 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1
(b) Adhesives - - - - - - - - -
(c) Coatings, etc - - - - - - - -
CG) CONSUMER CHEMICALS 1.42 3.8 1.28 3.6 1.14 3.4 1.17 3.3 1.06 3.3
(a) Soap and allied items 0.94 2.5 0.85 2.4 0.76 2.3 0.78 2.2 0.71 2.2
(b) Candles 0.48 1.3 0.43 1.2 0.38 1.1 0.39 1.1 0.35 1.1
Of) SOUND REPRODUCTION. - - - - - - - -
(I) DRINK FOOD. PACKING, etc. of
AGRICULTURAL ITEMS. 4.02 10.8 3.76 10.7 3.51 10.4 3.51 9.8 3.51 10.8
(a) Brewing - - - - - - - - -
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.12 0.3 0.11 0.3 0.11 0.3 0.11 0.3 0.11 0.3
(c) Flour mills - - - - - - - -
(d) Oils, fats - - - - - - _ _
(e) Eggs, etc. 2.65 7.1 2.45 7.0 2.25 6.7 2.25 6.3 2.30 7.1
(f) Packing, etc of agricultural
items 1.25 3.4 1.20 3.4 1.15 3.4 1.15 3.2 1.10 3.4
CD MISCELLANEOUS
INDUSTRIES. 0.60 1.6 0.57 1.6 0.53 1.5 0.53 1.5 0.52 1.6
(a) Building materials - - - - - - - - 0.02 0.1
(b) Wood processing 0.51 1,4 0,49 1,4 0,45 1,3 0,45 1,3 0,42 1,3
(c) Musical instruments 0.08 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.2
(d) Glass - - - - - - - - -
(e) Electrical industry 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 -
(f) Tanning - - - - - - - - -
♦Converted at the average exchange rate for the year concerned.
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AFFENPIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1933 1934
£mn* % £mn* %
TOTAL. 24.79 100.0 21.40 100.0 26.78 100.0 27.26 100.0 30.30 100.0
(J)
1930 1931 1932
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* %
15.00 60.5 12.31 57.5 16.50 61.7
4.06 16.4 3.97 18.6 3.95 14.7
1.23 5j0 l .I I 52 1.59 52
0.06 0.2 0.05 0.2 0.07 0.3
0.06 0.2 0.05 0.2 0.07 0.3
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY 15.00 60.5 12.31 57.5 16.50 61.7 16.60 60.8 18.10 59.7
(B) MINING. 4.06 16.4  18.6 3.95 14.7 3.93 14.4 4.01 13.2
(C) COTTON TEXTILES 123 5 0  U  i  L59 5.2 1.35 5.0 1.47 4.9
(D) NON-COTTON
TF.XTTTFS 0.06 0.2 . 5 0  0  0 3  - - 075 2J>
(a) Silk 
(h) Worsted Spinning and
Weaving - _ _ _ _  _ _ _ q . 7 5  2.5
(E) ENGINEERING.
(a) Marine
(b) Other
(F) INDUSTRIAL 
CHEMICALS.
(a) Bulk chemicals
(b) Adhesives - - _ _ _ _ _
(e) Coatings, etc. - _ _ _ _  _ _ _  0.08 0.3
(G) CONSUMER
0.79 32 0.72 1 4 0.90 14 0.82 1 0 0.95 11
0.66 2.7 0.61 2.9 0.77 2.9 0.68 2.5 0.80 2.6
0.13 0.5 0.11 0.5 0.13 0.5 0.14 0.5 0.15 0.5
0.01 0.01 _ 0.01 _ 0.01 _ 0.10 04
0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 0.02 0.1
(H)
(I)
CHEMICALS. 0.76 3.1 0.63 29 0.76 28 0.76 1 8 0.83 27
(a) Soap and allied items 0.51 2.1 0.43 2.0 0.51 1.9 0.51 1.9 0.56 1.8
(b) Candles 0.25 1.0 0.20 0.9 0.25 0.9 0.25 0.9 0.27 0.9
SOUND REPRODUCTION 0.11 0.4 0.10 £ 5 0.11 0 4 0.10 04 0.07 02
DRINK FOOD. PACKING etc of 
AGRICULTURAL ITEMS 2.38 2.13 10.0 2.64 M 3.20 11.8 3.46 11.4
(a) Brewing - - - - - - - - -
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.08 0.3 0,08 0,4 0,09 0,3 0,08 0,3
O
'.
oo
0,3
(c) Flour mills - - - - - - - - -
(d) Oils, fats - - - - - 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1
(e) Eggs, etc. 1.55 6.3 1.35 6.3 1.75 6.5 2.10 7.7 2.25 7.4
(f) Packing, etc. of agricultural 
items 0.75 3.0 0.70 3.3 0.80 3.0 1.00 3.7 1.10 3.6
MISCELLANEOUS 
INDUSTRIES. 0.39 1 6 0.37 L7 0.45 L7 0.49 18 0.56 1 9
(a) Building materials 0.02 0.1 0.01 _ 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1
(b) Wood processing 0.30 1.2 0.30 1.4 0.33 1.2 0.36 1.3 0,42 1.4
(c) Musical instruments 0.05 0.2 0.04 0.2 0.05 0.2 0.05 0.2 0.05 0.2
(d) Glass - - - 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.1
(e) Electrical industry 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.04 0.1
(f) Tanning - - - - - - - - -
*Converted at the average exchange rate for the year concerned.
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AFFENDIX TWO -  continued.
ESTIMATED UK INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA.
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
£mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % £mn* % 
TOTAL 33.49 IQQ.Q 26.36 100.0 27.78 IQQ.Q 22.27 100,0 17,76 100,0
(A) TOBACCO INDUSTRY 19.75 58.9 13.74
(B) MINING. 4.00 II.9 4.08
(C) COTTON TEXTILES. 2.26 6/7 1.84
fD> NON-COTTON TEXTILES 0.77 23 0.97
(a) Silk - - -
(b) Worsted Spinning and
Weaving 0.77 2.3 0.97
(E) ENGINEERING. 1.00 3.0 0.81
(a) Marine 0,84 2.5 0.68
(b) Other 0.16 0.5 0.13
<B) INDUSTRIAL
CHEMICALS. 0.12 04 0.09
(a) Bulk chemicals 0.02 0.1 0.01
(b) Adhesives - - -
(e) Coatings,, etc, 0,10 0,3 0,08
(G) CONSUMER
CHEMICALS. 0.90 2/7 0.74
(a) Soap and allied items 0.61 1.8 0.50
(b) Candles 0.29 0.9 0.24
(H) SOUND REPRODUCTION 0.05 0.1 0.04
(I) DRINK. FOOD. PACKING, etc of
AGRICULTURAL ITEMS 4.02 12.1 3.52
(a) Brewing - - 0.37
(b) Non-alcoholic drinks 0.10 0.3 0.08
(c) Flour mills - - -
(d) Oils, fats 0.02 0.1 0.02
(e) Eggs, etc. 2.70 8.1 2.05
(f) Packing, etc of agricultural
items 1.20 3.6 1.00
(J) MISCELLANEOUS
INDUSTRIES. 0.62 L9 0.53
(a) Building materials 0.02 0.1 0.02
(b) Wood processing 0,48 1,4 0,42
(c) Musical instruments 0.06 0.2 0.04
(d) Glass 0.03 0.1 0.02
(e) Electrical industry 0.03 0.1 0.03
(f) Tanning - - -
52.0 15.41 55.4 11.67 52.7 9,49 53.4
15.5 3.20 11.5 3.23 14.5 3.18 17.9
7 3 2.02 73 1.67 73 1.03 1 8
1 1 1.00 M 1.20 54 1.30 73
3.7 1.00 3.6 1.20 5.4 1.30 7.3
3.1 0.94 3.4 0.76 34 0.47 2.7
2.6 0.80 2.9 0.64 2.9 0.37 2.1
0.5 0.14 0.5 0.12 0.5 0.10 0.6
03 0.10 03 0.11 04 0.09 05
- 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 0.1
0,3 0,09 0,3 0,10 0,4 0,08 0,4
Z8 0.77 Z8 0.53 2 4 0.31 1 8
1.9 0.52 1.9 0.36 1.6 0.21 1.2
0.9 0.25 0.9 0.17 0.8 0,10 0.6
02 0.06 02 0.03 O I 0.02 03
13.3 3.72 13.4 2.63 11.7 1.58 M
1.4 0.41 1.5 0.30 1.3 0.18 1.0
0.3 0.09 0.3 0.07 0.3 0.04 0.2
0.1 0.02 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.1
7.7 2.15 7.7 1.50 6.7 0.90 5.1
3,8 1,05 3.8 0.75 3.4 0.45 2.5
23 0.56 23 0.44 1 9 0.29 1 6
0.1 - - - - - -
1,6 0,46 1,7 0,36 1,6 0,23 1,3
0.2 0.05 0.2 0.03 0.1 0.02 0.1
0.1 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.02 0.1
0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1
♦Converted at the average exchange rate for the year concerned.
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STATISTICAL ANNEX -  INDEX
TABLE
A B. AT. -  Sales of Tobacco Products in China.
B Development of Issued Capital and Dividends of British American Tobacco Company (China),
Ltd,
C B.A.T. -  Number of Cigarette Machines Installed.
D 1940 -  Productivity of B. A.T. Cigarette Factories.
E 1937 -  Capacity, Labour Force and Production of B.A.T. Cigarette Factories in Mainland China.
F B.A.T. -  Sales by Area o f Cigarettes in Mainland China.
G Wing Tai Vo Tobacco Corporation.
H Wing Tai Vo Tobacco Corporation -  Sales of Cigarettes.
I Comparison of B.A.T. in China and Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Co., Ltd.
J B.A.T. -  Purchases of American Breed (“Bright”) Tobacco Leaves.
K Consumption and Imports from LTSA of Tobacco Leaves by B.A.T. and Other Companies in
China.
L Development of Net Income in Relation to Sales and Issued Capital of Main B.A.T. Companies in 
China.
M Development of Issued Capital and Dividends of Main B. A.T. Companies in China.
N Yee Tsoong (Yizhong) Tobacco Distributors Company, Limited.
O Yee Tsoong (Yizhong) Tobacco Company, Limited.
P Monthly Net Income- of British American Tobacco Company (China), Limited.
Q UK Investment in Mining in Mainland China.
R Output of Coal by Enterprises in which UK Interests had 49% or more Share.
S Shanghai Exploration and Development Company, Limited.
T Shanghai Exploration and Development Company, Limited -  Output and Deliveries of Coal by
Mentougou Coal Mining Company.
U Pekin Syndicate -  Output and Sales of Coal.
V Pekin Syndicate -  Profit and Loss Account.
W Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited / Kailan Mining Administration -  Coal Sales 
and Production,
X Oriental Syndicate -  Owners of First Issue of Ordinary Shares.
Y Oriental Syndicate -  Shareholders Register as at 17th, September, 1901.
Z Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited -  Initial Allotment of One Million £1 Shares,
AA The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited -  Profit and Loss Account.
BB The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited -  Expenditure on Fixed Assets.
CC Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited (1912 company) -  Proportion of Distributed 
Net Profits of the Kailan Mining Administration.
DD Shares of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited and the Luanzhou Mining 
Company in the Distributed Net Profit of the Kailan Mining Administration.
EE The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited (1912 company) -  Profit and Loss 
Account.
FF Kailuan Mines -  Ratio of Labour Costs to Value of Output.
GG Kailuan Mines -  Ratio of Total Labour Costs at the Mines to Profits of the Whole Enterprise.
HH Estimated Real Wages o f Workers at Kailuan Mines.
II UK Investment in Cotton Textiles in Mainland China.
JJ Number of Spindles in British Mills.
KK Number of Looms in British Mills.
LL Comparative Position of British Cotton Spinning Mills with those of Other Nationalities.
MM Comparative Position of Power Looms at British Spinner-weavers with those of Other 
Nationalities.
NN The Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited (1895).
0 0  The Kung Yik Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited.
PP The Yangtszepoo Cotton Mill, Limited.
QQ The Ewo Cotton Mills, Limited.
RR The Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited.
SS The Oriental Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited.
TT The China Printing and Finishing Company, Limited -  Net Profit after Depreciation, Interest and
Transfers to Reserves.
UU The China Printing and Finishing Company, Limited -  Operations in the First Twelve Weeks of 
1939 and 1940.
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STATISTICAL ANNEX -  INDEX (continued).
W  Boyd and Company, Limited.
WW S.C. Famham and Company, Limited.
XX Shanghai Engineering, Shipbuilding and Dock Company, Limited.
YY S.-C, Farnham,- Boyd and Company,. Limited..
ZZ The Shanghai Dock and Engineering Company, Limited.
AAA The New Engineering and Shipbuilding Works, Limited.
BBB Vulcan Iron Works, Limited.
CCC Shanghai Dockyards, Limited.
DDD Major Brothers, Limited.
EEE The Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, Limited. Distribution of Sales.
FFF The Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, Limited. Production, Sales and Profit / Loss. 
GGG The Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, Limited. Total Sales.
HHH Electric and Musical Industries (China), Ltd. (Profit and Loss Account),
III Electric and Musical Industries (China), Ltd. (Conversion of earnings into Sterling).
JJJ Electric and Musical Industries (China), Ltd. Pattern of Sales.
KKK The Anglo -German Brewery Company, Limited.
LLL The China Flour Mill Company, Limited.
MMM The Lih Teh Oil Mill Company 
NNN AButler Cement Tile Works, Ltd.
OOO The China Import and Export Lumber Co., Ltd.
PPP S. Moutrie and Company, Limited.
QQQ Comparison of (Ordinary) Dividends of B.A.T. Flagship Companies in China with those of 
Leading UK and Chinese Tobacco Firms.
RRR Comparison of Dividends of UK Cotton Mills in the UK and China with those in Japan.
SSS Comparison o f (Ordinary) Dividends of British Marine Engineering Companies in Shanghai with 
those o f UK companies in the same sector.
TTT Comparison o f Profits and Royalties per Ton of Coal Raised. (Between UK mines and the 
Chinese Engineering and Mining Co. Ltd / Kailan Mining Administration).
UUU Ratio of Labour Costs to Value of Coal Output (For UK mines and the Kailan Mining 
Administration).
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STATISTICAL ANNEX.
The tables below buttress the conclusions o f various sections o f this study and also, in many cases, are 
the raw material used in compiling the graphic illustrations.
(1) BACKUP TABLES TO PART ///-CHAPTER ONE -  THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY.
TABLEA
B.A.T. - SALES OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS IN CHINA.
Cigarettes Tobacco plug Chewing tobacco Snuff Cigars
Million Thous.lb. Thous.lb. Thous.lb. Thous,
1909 4,468 31 49 _ 252
1910 5,277 39 49 15 545
1911 6,497 35 57 21 115
1912 7,147 61 48 1 122
1914 9,-398 54 55 275 113
1915 8,956 54 47 - 191
1916 9,649 47 41 300 342
1918 13,360 63 50 4,779 954
1919 15,451 53 34 5,405 865
1920 17,021 44 34 5,061 1,044
1921 17,781 43 23 5,518 658
1922 20,285 45 15 4,644 510
1923 25,474 48 19 2,742 539
1924 31,731 55 19 4,496 494
1925 29,398 54 20 4,123 422
1926 29,021 52 14 2,900 298
1927 28,135 47 12 2,380 291
1928 25,821 37 13 2,740 234
1929 41,022 35 9 1,500 395
1930 43,895 31 8 3,000 220
1931 41,188 21 7 1,200 123
1932 39,857 21 3 n.a. 94
1933 39,598 18 I 240 103
Source: YmgM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibicm - page 1641.
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TABLE B.
DEVELOPMENT OF ISSUED CAPITAL AND DIVIDENDS OF BRITISH AMERICAN 
TOBACCO COMPANY fCHINAl.LTD. — Thous. $ - Financial years to end September- 
Ordinary Preference Total
Capital Dividends Capital Dividends Capital Dividem
% Thous. $ % Thous. $
1919 125,000 3.25 4,062 38,800 4.67 1,812 163,800 5,874
1920 125,000 7 8,750 38,800 8 3,104 163,800 11,854
1921 125,000 2.5 3,125 38,000 8 3,104 163,800 6,229
1922 125,000 6.5 8,125 50,000 8 4,000 175,000 12,125
1923 125,000 10 12,500 50,000 8 4,000 175,000 16,500
1924 125,000 11 13,750 50,000 8 4,000 175,000 17,750
1925 125,000 5 6,250 ) 50,000 8 4,000 175,000) 16,652
128,040 5 6,402 ) 178,040 )
1926 128,040 10 12,804 50,000 8 4,000 178,040 16,804
1927 130,540 6 7, 832 50,000 4 2,000 180,540) 12,352
63,000 4 2,520 193,540)
1928 130,540 7.5 9,791 63,000 8 5,040 193,540 14,831
1929 130,540 7.5 9,791 63,000 8 5,040 193,540 14,831
1930 130,540 5 6,527 63,000 8 5,040 193,540 11,567
1931 130,540 5.5 7,180 63,000 8 5,040 193,540 12,220
1932 130,540 3,25 4,243 63,000 4 2,520 193,540) 10,163
85,000 4 3,400 215,540)
1933 130,540 6.5 8,485 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 15,285
1934 130,540 6.25 8,159 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 14,959
1935 130,540 1 1,305 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 8,105
1936 130,540 5 6,527 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 13,327
1937 130,540 8 10,443 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 17,243
1938 130,540 9 11,749 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 18,549
1939 130,540 20 26,108 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 32,908
1940 130,540 48 62,659 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 69,459
1941 130,540 76 99,210 85,000 8 6,800 215,540 106,010
Source YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian - pages 1602-1603.
-294-
TABLE C.
B.A.T, - NUMBER OF CIGARETTE MACHINES INSTALLED.
1928 1930 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Shanghai 184 184 150 150 170 175 180 175 175
Pudong 154 154 70 70 73 74 74 74 74
Thorburn Rd, 30 30 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
No. 3 factory - - - - 17 21 26 21 21
Hankou 64 66 36 36 39 43 44 44 44
Hanshui - 25 26 26 26 28 28 - -
Tianjin 100 100 58 68 67 68 72 87 87
Qingdao 55 67 51 51 54 58 62 62 62
Manchuria 50 63 86 86 86 87 101 101 101
-Shenyang 50 50 50 50 50 51 51 51 51
-Liaoyang - - 6 6 6 6 - - -
-Harbin - 13 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
-Yingkou - - - - - - 20 20 20
TOTAL 453 505 407 417 442 459 487 469 469
(Hong Kong) (-) (-) (8) (8) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20)
Source: YingM ei Van Gonsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 178 and 185.
TABLE P.
1940-PRODUCTIVITY OF B.A.T. CIGARETTE FACTORIES. 
Labour Working Production of cigarettes
Force Hours per worker per hour
Shanghai
Pudong factory 3,008 1,998 1,131
Thorburn Rd, factory 2,503 2,031 1,479
No. 3 factory 760 2,029 1,901
Hankou factory 529 2,247 1,562
Tianjin factory 2,135 2,198 1,532
Qingdao factory 1,852 2,276 1,408
Manchuria
Shenyang factory 2,797 2,591 706
Harbin factoiy 1,725 2,519 691
Yingkou factory 651 2,576 667
Source: YingM ei Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 1637 -  1640.
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TABLEE
1937 -  CAPACITY. LABOUR FORCE AND PRODUCTION OF B.A.T. CIGARETTE 
FACTORIES IN MAINLAND CHINA.
- Ciaarette Machines Cigarette Number of
Installed^ Operating Percentase Production Workers
Utilisation -Million-
Shanghai 170 164.18 96.6 18.449 6.313
- Pudong factory 73 (74) 71.62 98.1 8,930 3,073
- Thorburn Rd. factory SO (SO) 78.55 9S.2 9,180 2,631
- No. 3 factory 17 (21) 14.01 82.4 339 609
Hankou factory 39 (44) 38.20 97.9 5,761 1,797
Hanshui factory 26 (-) 26.12 100.4 3,776 1,038
Tianjin factory 67(87) 63.71 95.1 8,871 1,783
Qingdao factory 54 (62) 49.95 92.5 6,736 1,647
Manchuria 86 81.67 95.0 11,618 4.469
_ - Shenyang factory 50 (51) 46.85 93.7 6,217 2,137
- Liaoyang factory 6 (-) 5.49 90.1 1,503 687
- Yingkou factory - (20) - - - -
- Harbin factory 30 (30) 29.33 97.8 3,898 1,645
TOTAL 44214691 423.83 95.9 55,211 17.047
(Hong Kong factory) (20) (L017)
♦Mainland capacity in 1940 in brackets. In addition, in 1940 there were 651 employees at Yingkou. 
Source; YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Him qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 1637 to 1640.
TABLEF
B.A.T. -  SALES BY AREA OF CIGARETTES IN MAINLAND CHINA* - MILLION. 
- Financial Years Ending September 30th -
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Shanghai 8,900 9,749 10,400 11,500 7,500 10,300
Nanjing 5,400 7,344 700 2,600 8,-000 4,750
Hankou 7,800 11,185 8,100 2,500 2,350 2,800
Tianjin 9,600 12,099 10,050 12,700 13,450 14,000
South China 2,150 3,283 3,500 3,850 1,850 2,350
Manchuria 9.300 11.551 11.700 9.750 9.700 8.800
-North n.a. 4,480 4,380 3,720 3,660 3,220
- South n.a. 6,543 6,530 5,430 5,440 5,130
- Dalian region n.a. 528 790 600 600 450
Total of above. 43.150 55.211 44.450 42.900 42.850 43.000
♦Including sales via Wing Tai Vo Tobacco Corporation. 
Source: YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian-page  513.
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TABLEG
WING TAf CYongtaihel VO TOBACCO CORPORATION.
Years to Sales of Sales of Profits As Pcrcentaee of Sales
end Ciaarettes* Cigarettes - Thous. $ -
Sept, - Million- - Thous, $ -
1922 n.a. n.a. 722 n.a.
1923 9,045 (35.5) 36,595 1,202 3.3
1924 10,772 (33.9) 39,916 1,146 2.9
1925 9,282 (31.6) 34,299 907 2.6
1926 7,710 (26.6) 26,745 442 1.7
1927 7,740 (27.5) 26,242 287 1.1
1928 8,281 (32,1) 29,406 782 2,7
1929 13,488 (32.9) 40,236 793 2.0
1930 13,965 (31.8) 41,808 557 1.3
1931 11,661 (28.3) 36,598 461 1.3
1932 8,933 (22.4) 27,424 340 1.2
1933 7,755 (19.5) 23,003 245 1.1
1934 6,562 (18.5) 18,033 115 0.6
1935 10,400 (27.6) 23,740 488 2.1
1936 12,773 (29.1) 31,588 1,204 3.8
1937 15,755 (28.2) 42,898 942 2.2
1938 12,031 (26.7) 45,278 n.a. n.a.
1939 14,982 (34.4) 74,810 n.a. n.a.
1940 13,448 (30.3) 119,001 n.a. n.a.
1941 17,097 (38.2) 223,781 n.a. n.a.
’The figures in brackets give the percentage share o f B. A.T. sales.
Commissions of (a) The Chinese concern (b) Their general manager -  Zheng Bozhao were as follows ($ 
thous.)
(a) m
1937 2,509 486
1938 1,925 1,022
1939 1,476 2,455
1940 2,152 4,100
1941 3,338 7,795
Source:- YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 630, 634 and 1529.
TABLEH
WING TAI VO TOBACCO CORPORATION- SALES OF CIGARETTES -  MILLION.
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
TOTAL 11,661 8,933 7,755 6,562 10,400 12,773 15,755 12,031 14,98213,448 17,097
Manchuria 53 35 49 76 - - - - - - _
Border Region 143 97 84 114 165 160 179 79 192 162 60
Northern Region 539 373 348 523 460 482 501 704 829 832 997
Luhan Region 468 369 352 261 408 316 337 115 226 272 338
Beijing Region 255 260 216 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Shandong Region 1,493 1,010 659 339 224 391 574 193 320 398 831
Henan Region 715 753 445 337 259 290 494 267 28 90 n.a.
Hubei Region 1,326 903 810 561 529 638 1,018 525 324 212 259
Hunan Region 56 29 25 11 5 10 25 22 144 741 n.a.
Jiangxi Region 250 207 120 158 148 160 411 63 46 31 7
Shanghai Region 2,589 1,836 1,745 1,420 1,858 2,456 2,608 6,253 6,863 3,124 6,641
Eastern Region 2,102 1,996 2,040 2,117 2,827 3,987 4,072 1,591 2,018 2,213 1,900
Nanjing Region 933 636 572 396 606 1,268 2,215 108 1,172 3,677 3,230
Sichuan Region 281 347 270 249 100 122 236 122 108 82 192
Guangdong Region - - - - - 128 87 38 116
Guangxi Region n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - - n.a.
S. China Region 1 6 - - - - - - 26 4 -
Yunnan Region 80 57 20 - 5 - 50 26 113 3 n.a.
Hong Kong - - - - - - - - 3 - -
Other 377 19 - - 2,806 2,493 3,035 1,835 2,483 1,569 2,526
Source:- YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 734-746.
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TABLEI
COMPARISON OF B.A.T. IN CHINA AND NANYANG BROTHERS TOBACCO CO.. LTD. 
(V) CIGARETTE SALES -  Million
Nanyang Brothers B.A.T,
Sales from Sales from Other* I'll Sales from Sales from (2) (1) as
Hone Kone Shanahai Total Hone Kong other plants Total %12)
output output output and imports
1912 238 - 238 - 7,147 7,147 3.5%
1913 348 348 - n.a. n.a. n.a.
1914 527 - 527 - 9,398 9,398 5.6%
1915 930 930 - 8,956 8,956 10.4%
1916 1,311 - 1,311 - 9,649 9,649 13.6%
1917 1,691 n.a. n.a. - n.a, n.a. n.a.
1918 1,850 c.2,800 c.4,700 - 13,360 13,360 c.35%
1919 1,948 n.a. n.a. - 15,451 15,451 n.a.
1926 c.3,600 5,343 - c.8,900 - 29,021 29,021 c.31%
1927 c.2,100 6,051 - c. 8,200 - 28,135 28,135 c.29%
1928 c.2,500 4,250 - c.6,800 - 25,821 25,821 c.26%
1937 1,075 3,154 389 4,618 1,385 55,144 56,529 8.2%
1938 1,408 2,324 106 3,838 1,508 44,254 45,762 8.4%
1939 1,171 1,429 123 2,723 1,491 42,810 44,301 6.1%
1940 832 1,023 278 2,133 2,529 42,842 45,371 4,7%
*Production in Chongqing, Hankou and Guangzhou.
(2) NANYANG BROTHERS TOBACCO CO.. LTD. -  DEVELOPMENT OF SALES AND NET 
PROFITS -  Thous. $.
SALES NET PROFITS Net Profits as
Total
Years to end 
October
Shanghai
operation
Hone Kone 
operation
Total Shanghai
operation
Hone Kone 
operation
% of Sales 
Total Shangl
1918 n.a. 8,377 n.a. n.a. 800 n.a. n.a. 9.5
1919 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1920 25,013 9,516 15,497 4,858 2,519 2,339 19.4 26.5
1921 28,012 12,175 15,837 4,042 2,185 1,857 14.4 17.9
1922 28,235 12,069 16,166 4,085 1,814 2,271 14.5 15.0
1923 31,919 15,670 16,249 3,095 705 2,390 9.7 4.5
1924 25,211 12,024 13,187 480 -707 1,187 1.9 -5.9
1925 36,456 20,200 16,256 1,220 572 648 3,3 2,8
1926 28,721 17,052 11,669 2,301 1,197 1,104 8.0 7.0
1927 27,278 20,525 7,203 287 238 49 1.0 1.2
1928 17,543 11,033 6,510 -2,247 -1,961 -286 -12.8 -17.8
1929 13,447 8,314 5,133 -3,202 -2,452 -750 -23.8 -29.5
1930 14,150 6,457 7,693 -305 -858 553 -2.2 -13.3
1931 23,780 14,452 9,328 762 224 538 3.2 1.5
1932 28,533 18,372 10,161 1,055 490 565 3.7 2.7
1933 30,254 19,555 10,699 1,360 1,047 313 4.5 5.4
1934 28,650 19,227 9,-423 1,205 635 570 4,2 3,3
1935 26,572 22,033 4,539 601 103 498 2.3 0.5
1936 27,828 23,483 4,345 302 131 171 1.1 0.6
1937 24,547 19,417 5,130 1,034 844 190 4.2 4.3
1938 24,784 17,960 6,824 1,032 689 343 4.2 3.8
1939 22,728 15,763 6,965 2,315 1,532 783 10.2 9.7
1940 30,567 24,949 5,618 5,090 4,186 904 16.7 16.8
Source:- Wang Shijan; Nanyang xiongdi yancao gongsi shiliao. (Source material for the history of the 
Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company). Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1958. Pages 263-266, 275, 586.
CONTINUED
-298-
TABLE I -  continued.
(3) SALES AND PROFITS BEFORE ALLOCATIONS TO RESERVES.PROVISIQNS. etc.-Thous.S
1921 -  25 
1926-30 
1931- 35 
1936-41
Sales
149,833
101,589
137,789
140,044
Nanyang Brothers
Profits As % sales
12,922
-3,166
4,983
21,016
8.6
-3.1
3.6
15.0
Sales
488,075
541,515
542,938
1,702,600
B.A.T. (China). Ltd.
Profits
153,876
178,167
187,500
851,084
As % sales
31.5 
32.9
34.5 
50.0
(4) COMPARISON OF DIVIDEND RATES (Percentage! ON ORDINARY SHARES OF BRITISH 
AMERICAN TOBACCO CO.(CHINA). LTD. AND NANYANG BROTHERS
1920
B.A.T. (Chinal 
7
Nanvang Brothers 
17 1928
B.A.T. (China) 
7.5
Nanvang'
1921 2.5 17 1929 7.5 -
1922 6.5 17 1930 5 -
1923 10 12 1931 5.-5 3
1924 11 4 1932 3.25 5
1925 10 8 1933 6.5 6
1926 10 8 1934 6.25 5
1927 6 2 1935 1 3
1936 5 1
-299- 
TABLE J
B A T. -  PURCHASES OF AMERICAN- BREED (“Bright”') TOBACCO LEAVES.
- METRIC TONS-
Shandong Anhui Henan Hankou Shanghai Tianiin Total
1915 222 - - - - - 222
1916 1,054 - _ - - - 1,054
1917 3,910 96 - 117 - - 4,123
1918 11,287 283 880 422 - - 12,872
1919 10,185 3,875 3,438 49 - - 17,547
1920 12,524 3,227 6,500 99 _ - 22,350
1921 6,185 13 3,768 26 - - 9,992
1922 3,058 1,525 2,539 - - _ 7,122
1923 9,058 2,607 4,295 - - - 15,960
1924 9,-960 5,-593 10,-663 - - - 26,216
1925 9,439 4,585 3,464 - - - 17,488
1926 2,683 1,392 - - - - 4,075
1927 2,356 - - - - - 2,356
1928 7,397 212 - - - - 7,609
1929 7,859 1,779 - - - - 9,638
1930 9,333 1,315 - - - - 10,648
1931 8,098 73 - - - - 8,171
1932 12,218 2,004 - - - 14,222
1933 20,882 5,213 - - - - 26,095
1934 17,009 7,259 20 - - - 24,288
1935 26,314 6,840 7,890 - - - 41,044
1936 21,553 9,080 3,091 - - 33,724
1937 8,232 - - - - - 8,232
1938 7,144 - - n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a,
1939 973 - - 338 1,256 13 2,580
1940 13,489 - - 1,016 5,053 152 19,710
1941 5,924
Source:- YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai
343 1,558 362 
Hna qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 369 and 370.
8,187
TABLEK
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS FROM USA OF TOBACCO LEAVES BY 
B A T. AND OTHER COMPANIES IN CHINA -  METRIC TONS.
B.A.T. OTHER COMPANIES
Consumption Imported %
Imported
Consumption Imported %
Imported
1931 39,794 47,854 j.,. 27,915 25,124 90,0
1932 39,195 14,161 36.1 24,598 21,541 87.5
1933 36,818 10,328 28.1 26,272 13,853 52.7
1934 30,840 9,789 31.7 27,978 17,563 62.8
1935 32,128 186 0.1 25,619 6,477 25.3
1936 38,415 7,879 20.4 23,033 2,263 9.8
1937 49,473 9,072 18.3 25,115 6,128 24.4
1938 36,922 15,245 41.3 11,281 2,835 25.1
1939 37,512 10,179 27.1 16,257 9,385 57.7
1940 37,571 16,792 44,7 22,634 10,206 45,1
1941 38,714 7,058 18.2 20,425 4.028 19.7
Cumulative 417,382 148,543 35.6 251,127 119,403 47.5
Source > YingM ei Yan Gongsi zaiH ua qiye ziliao huibian -  page 1634.
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TABLEL
CAPITAL OF MAIN B.A.T. COMPANIES IN CHINA - Thousands.
NET INCOME SALES (A) as ISSUED (A) as
(A) (b) % m CAPITALfC) %(C)
The American Cigarette Company. Ltd.
1902) 210)
1903) 1,091 5,712 19.1 250) 224.0.
1904) 1,000)
British Cigarette Companv.Ltd
1905 409 2,249 18.2 1,500 27.3
1906 712 2,882 24.7 5,500 12.9
1907 668 3,662 18.2 5,500 12.1
1908 246) 5,500 4.4
1909 627) 46,150 3.2 5,500 11.4
1910 616) 5,500 11.2
1911 767) 5,500 13.9
1912 1,527) 11,000 12.1
1913 1,843) 110,312 n.a. 11,000 16.8
1914 720) 11,000 6.5
1915 n.a.) 11,000 n.a.
1916 n.a. n,a, n.a. 11,-000 n.a
1917 1,841 9,472 19.4 11,000 16.7
1918 3,373 11,739 28.7 11,000 30.7
British- American Tobacco Co. ('China').Ltd,
1919 n.a. n,a. n.a. 163,800 n.a.
1920 19,023* n.a n.a. 163,800' II .6
1921) 163,800)
1922) 175,000)
1923) 90,027 488,075 24.2 175,000) 13.1
1924) 175,000)
1925 28,313 178,040 15.9
1926 30,003 178,040 16.9
1927 23,754 193,540 12.3
1928 26,368 541,515 23.5 193,540 13.6
1929 24,633 193,540 12.7
1930 22,504 193,540 11.6
1931) 193,540)
1932) 193,540)
1933) 125,000 542,938 23,0 215,540) 11,6
1934) 215,540)
1935) 215,540)
1936 26,804 215,540 12.4
1937(2) 28,341 215,540 13.1
1938(2) 32,988 1,702,600 25.0 215,540 15.3
1939(2) 56,150 215,540 26.1
1940(2) 99,802 215,540 46.3
1941(2) 181,457 215,540 84.2
-The figures above relate to financial years to end September
-CONTINUED
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TABLE L (Continued)
* This was split :-
Thous $ %
Parent company 9,-517 50,0
Union Trading Co. Ltd. 76 0.4
Enterprise Tobacco Co. Ltd. 137 0.7
Mustard and Co. Ltd. 97 0.5
British Cigarette Co. Ltd. 9,196 48.4
Total 19,023 100.0
Note (1) Income after allocations to reserves and provisions. Before these deductions the position was as 
follows
Net Income Before Transfers To Reserves.Provisions.etc.
As % of Sates As % Issued Capital
1902-1905 26.3 70.9
1906-1910 15.0 28.2
1911-1915 36.9 82.3
1916-1920 24.2 n.a.
1921-1925 31.5 17,8
1926-1930 32.9 18.7
1931-1935 34.5 18.1
1936-1941 50.0 65.8
Note (2) Profits were split as follows >
1937
Chi Tung Tobacco Co. Ltd. 1,698
Yee Tsoong Tobacco Co. Ltd. 6,906
Yee Tsoong Tobacco Distributors 
Co. Ltd. 17,692
China Packers Supply Co. Ltd 567
Tobacco Development Co. Ltd. 11
Capital Lithographers Ltd. 204
British American Tobacco (China)
Co. Ltd. 1.263
TOTAL 28,341
1938
Thous $ 
1939 1940 1941
4,173 7,515 6,768 3,787
8,380 5,929 18,720 43,863
22,874 38,477 70,827 123,726
647 2,373 1,136 8,422
280 261 456 774
1,159 850 2,285 4,044
-4.525 745 -390 -2705
32,988 56,150 99,802 181,457
Source:- YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 1470,1525,1527,1533, 1,534,1536 
and 1537.
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TABLEM
DEVELOPMENT OF ISSUED CAPITAL AND DIVIDENDS OF MAIN B A T. COMPANIES
IN CHINA -  Thous $ - Financial years to end September.
ISSUED CAPITAL DIVIDENDS PERCENT
The American Cigarette 
Company. Limited (1).
1902
1903
1904 
British Cigarette 
Company. Limited (21.
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
British American Tobacco 
Company (Chinal.Limited (3)
1919 163,800 5,874 3.6
1920 163,800 11,854 7.2
1921 163,800 6,229 3.8
1922 175,000 12,125 6.9
1923 175,000 16,500 9.4
1924 175,000 17,750 10.1
1925 178,040 16,652 9.4
1926 178,040 16,804 9.4
1927 193,540 12,352 6.4
1928 193,540 14,831 7.7
1929 193,540 14,831 7.7
1930 193,540 11,567 6.0
1931 193,540 12,220 6.3
1932 215,540 10,163 4.7
1933 215,540 15,285 7.1
1934 215,540 14,959 6.9
1935 215,540 8,105 3.8
1936 215,540 13,327 6.2
1937 215,540 17,243 8.0
1938 215,540 18,549 8.6
1939 215,540 32,908 15.3
1940 215,540 69,459 32.2
1941 215,540 106,010 49.2
Sources
(1) YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian. Page I486.
(2) YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian. Pages 1486 and 1605.
(3) YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye zilliaohuibian. Pages 1602-3. See also Table B.
210 n.a. n.a.
250 n.a. n.a
1,000 n.a n.a.
1.500 150 10.0
5.500 450 8.2
5.500 660 12,0
5.500 n.a. n.a.
5.500 n.a. n.a.
5.500 n.a. n.a.
5.500 825 15.0
11.000 1,132 10.3
11.000 723 6.6
11.000 n.a. n.a.
11.000 n.a. n.a.
11.000 n.a, n,a,
11.000 1,705 15.5
11.000 1,760 16.0
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TABLEN
YEE TSOONG (Yizhongl TOBACCO DISTRIBUTORS COMPANY. LIMITED -  Thous. $. 
- Financial years to end September -
Years Capital Profits - Percent of Capital Dividends - Percent of C;
1935* 60,700 308 0.5 304 0.5
1936 60,700 8,664 14.3 8,012 13.2
1937 60,700 17,692 29.1 68,500 112.9
1938 60,700 22,874 37.7 18,210 30.0
1939 60,700 38,477 63.4 26,798 44.2
1940 60,700 70,827 116.7 63,735 105.0
1941 60,700 123,276 203.1 114,116 188.0
* November, 1934 to end September, 1935.
Source:- YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  page 1532,
TABLEO
YEE TSOONG fYizhongl TOBACCO COMPANY. LIMITED -  Thous. S.
- Financial years to end September -
- Percent of Capital 
2.1 
7.3 
8.8 
n.a.
2,8 
9.0 
33.1
** Interest on stocks of tobacco leaves accounted 
for the following percentage o f profits
1935 38.3%
1936 14.0%
1937 16.3%
1938 16.8%
1939 52.9%
1940 29.6%
1941 33.2%
Source:- YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao huibian -  pages 1530 and 1599.
TABLEP
MONTHLY NET INCOME OF BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY f CHIN AY LIMITED. 
1936/7 1937/8 1938/9 1939/4Q 1940/41
Years Capital Profits** - Percent of Capital Dividends
1935* 180,000 3,873 2.2 3,869
1936 180,000 13,383 7.4 13,090
1937 180,000 6,906 3.8 15,803
1938 180,000 8,380 4.7 n.a.
1939 180,000 5,929 3.3 4,960
1940 180,000 18,720 10.4 16,130
1941 180,000 43,863 24.4 59,561
*November, 1934 to end September, 1935,
Thous.S Th.£* Thous.S Th.£* Thous.S Th.£* Thous.S Th.£* Thous.S Th.£*
October 2,118 128 2,457 148 5,202 175 5,982 102 11,677 176
November 2,170 131 2,270 137 4,495 150 7,870 154 9,359 145
December 3,247 196 3,870 234 5,585 186 10,227 182 17,037 255
January 2,459 149 3,462 205 6,402 213 14,191 265 17,005 239
February 2,535 153 4,258 252 6,003 200 10,822 185 17,917 249
March 3,885 234 4,783 278 5,920 197 19,128 319 17,592 239
April 2,487 150 3,388 183 4,312 144 11,562 193 18,998 251
May 1,361 82 3,179 176 4,438 148 7,846 118 16,794 221
June 1,676 101 5,357 200 6,949 191 5,823 91 10,986 149
July 1,828 110 4,301 158 3,652 82 6,749 105 18,096 240
August 1,599 97 4,501 147 5,744 84 9,419 143 10,090 128
September 2,976 180 8,838 298 2,552 39 1,829 26 15,906 209
TOTAL FINANCIAL
YEAR 28.341 1.711 32.988 2,416 56.150 1.809 99.802 1.883 181.457 2.501
Source:- YingM ei Yan Gongsi zai Hua qiye ziliao Huibian - -page 1534.
*Conversions into Sterling made at monthly rates.
(2) BACKUP TABLES TO PART III -  CHAPTER TWO -  MINING.
TABLE Q.
UK INVESTMENT IN MINING IN MAINLAND CHINA - £ MILLION.
Chinese Engineering Pekin Shanghai Exploration Other Total
and Mining Company Syndicate and Development Co.
1897 - 0.02 - - 0.02
1898 - 0,07 - 0,02 0,09
1899 - 0.07 - 0.33 0.40
1900 - 0.47 - 0.39 0.86
1901 1.09 0.94 - 0.39 2.42
1902 1.07 0.94 - 0.41 2.42
1903 1.07 0.94 - 0.78 2.79
1904 1.11 0.93 - 0.78 2.82
1905 1,20 1,24 - 0,83 3,27
1906 1.25 1.27 - 0.60 3.12
1907 1.30 1.41 - 0.57 3.28
1908 1.31 1.52 - 0.52 3.35
1909 1.31 1.68 - 0.61 3.60
1910 1.25 1.68 - 0.62 3.55
1911 1.35 1.71 - 0.53 3.59
1.912 1,01 1,73 - 0,53 3,27
1913 1.05 1.75 - 0.53 3.33
1914 1.10 1.77 - 0.47 3.34
1915 1.18 1.82 - 0.41 3.41
1916 1.21 1.88 - 0.39 3.48
1917 1.24 1.94 - 0.42 3.60
1918 1.31 1.94 - 0.34 3.59
1919 L46 1,88 0,36 0,35 4,05
1920 1.54 1.87 0.39 0.34 4.14
1921 1.38 1.80 0.22 0.17 3.57
1922 1.39 1.84 0.21 0.17 3.61
1923 1.56 1.95 0.18 0.17 3.86
1924 1.61 1.98 0.45 0.17 4.21
1925 1.60 1.94 0.39 0.17 4.10
1926 L61 1,90 0,39 0,17 4,07
1927 1.66 1.83 0.37 0.16 4.02
1928 1.65 1.79 0.36 0.15 3.95
1929 1.62 1.78 0.35 0.15 3.90
1930 1.95 1.77 0.19 0.15 4.06
1931 1.97 1.69 0.17 0.14 3.97
1932 1.94 1.72 0.15 0.14 3.95
1933 1,94 1,72 0,13 0,14 3,93
1934 1.97 1.74 0.16 0.14 4,01
1935 1.95 1.72 0.19 0.14 4.00
1936 Z 02 1.76 0.16 0.14 4.08
1937 2.06 0.83 0.17 0.14 3,20
1938 2.14 0.83 0.12 0.14 3.23
1939 2.12 0.83 0.09 0.14 3.18
1940 2,38 0,86 0,07 0,14 3,45
Source : own estimates. The figures relate to shareholders1 equity i.e. issued, paid capital plus retentions.
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TABLE R.
OUTPUT OF COAL BY ENTERPRISES IN WHICH UK INTERESTS HAD 49% OR MORE SHAKE.*'
metric tons Chinese Enaineerina and Mining/ Pekin Syndicate/ Mentougou TOTAL-%total
Kailan Minina Administration Zhonafii Minina Co. output
1901 0.3 - - 0.3 n.a.
1902 0,7 - - 0,7 n.a.
1903 0.7 - - 0.7 n.a.
1904 0.9 - - 0.9 n.a.
1905 0.9 - - 0.9 n.a.
1906 1.0 - - 1.0 n.a.
1907 1.1 - - 1.1 n.a
1908 1.2 neg. - 1.2 n.a
1909 1,4 0,2 - 1,6 n.,a.
1910 1.2 0.4 - 1.6 n.a.
1911 1.5 0.4 - 1.9 n.a.
1912 1.7 0.6 - 2.3 25
1913 2.1 0.3 2.4 19
1914 2.8 0.4 - 3.2 23
1915 3.0 0.4 - 3.4 25
1916 2,9 0,5 - 3,4 22
1917 3.2 0.5 - 3.7 22
1918 3.3 0.6 - 3.9 21
1919 3.8 0.5 - 4.3 21
1920 4.4 0.6 - 5.0 23
1921 4.3 0.6 - 4.9 24
1922 3.7 0.5 - 4.2 20
1923 4,5 0,7 0,1 5,3 22
1924 4.3 0.7 0.2 5.2 20
1925 4.0 0.3 0.1 4.4 18
1926 3.0 0.2 0.2 3.4 15
1927 3.7 - 0.1 3.8 16
1928 5.0 - neg. 5.0 20
1929 5.0 - neg. 5.0 20
1930 5,3 - 0,2 5,5 21
1931 5.4 - 0.1 5.5 20
1932 5.2 neg. 0.2 5.4 20
1933 4.3 0.5 0.3 5.1 18
1934 4.8 0.9 0.5 6.2 19
1935 4.1 1.1 0.3 5.5 15
1936 4.0 1.3 0.3 5.6 14
1937 4,2 1,1 0,2 5,5 n,a.
1938 5.5 - 0.1 5.6 n.a.
1939 5.2 - 0.2 5.4 n.a.
* Excluding very small output up to 1909 by the Kiangpei Ting Coal and Iron Mining Company 
(e.g. 28 thous. tons in the 11 months to end Jan. 1908 -  North China Herald, 6.6.08) and 1896- 
1917 by the Tung Hsing Coalmining Company.
Figures in Columns 1-3 are from TABLES W, U mid T respectively.. National output figures used in 
calculating the final column originate from Yan Zhongping: Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao 
xuanfi. Beijing, 1955. Pages 102-103. As noted in Tim Wright: Coal Mining in China’s Economy 
and Society, 1895 -1 9 3 7  (pages 9-10) this series can only be a very rough approximation as it 
attempts to include the multitudinous small mines, on which reliable data is missing, in its total.
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TABLE S.
SHANGHAI EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. LIMITED.
Balance of Profit and 
Loss at January 1st 
Thous, taels
Net Profits Dividends
Thous, taels (£ thous.l* Thous. taels
Transfer to 
Reserves 
Thous, taels
1920 - -25 (-8) - -
1921 -25 -10 (-2) - -
1922 -35 -28 (-5) - -
1923 -63 -112 (-17) - _
1924 -175 -195(a) (-31) (a) - -
1925 -370 150 (23) - -
1926 -220 105 (15) - -
1927 -115 -68 (-9) - -
1928 -183 -314 (-41) - -
1929 -497 -126 (-15) - -
1930 -623 31 (2) - -
1931 -592 -419 (-29) - -
$ thous. $ thous. $ thous. $ thous.
1932 -1,011 94 (5) - -
1933 -917 229 (14) 167 25
1934 37 403(b) (27) (b) 125 260
1935 55 197 (14) 84 100
1936 68 116 (2) - 175
1937 9 138 (9) 131 7
1938 16 1,126 (49) 1,015 (c) 96
1939 31 1,392 (35) 860 475
1940 88 2,746 (44) 2,222 (d) n.a.
* Converted at average rate of the year.
(a) Of which 123 thous. taels (£20 thous.) actual loss on working the Mentougou mine.
(b) Actual profit on working the mine was $ 451 thous. (£ 30 thous.),
(g) Including $418 thous. in bonus shares (1 in 5),
(d) Including $502 thous. in bonus shares (1 in 5).
Note : The Company included in its profit and loss figures development expenditure. Thus, for 
example, the losses in the early years were not nearly as bad as apparent. The figures net of development 
work are only available for two years.
Sources
1920 and 1921 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1925.
1922 North China Herald (N O i), 22.5.1922.
1923 NCH, 7.4.1923.
1924 NCH, 28.6.1924.
1925 NCH, 23,5,1925,
1926 NCH, 3.5.1926.
1927 NCH, 19.3.1927.
1928 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1929.
1929 NCH, 22.6.1929.
1930 and 1931 NCH, 12.5,1931.
1932 NCH, 27.6.1932.
1933 NCH, 10.5.1933.
1934 NCH, 9.5.1934.
1935 NCH, 19,6,1935,
1936 NCH, 5.8.1936.
1937 NCH, 11.8.1937.
1938 NCH, 3.8.1938.
1939 NCH, 31.5.1939.
1940 Finance and Commerce, 4.9.1940 and 18.12.40
TABLE T.
SHANGHAI EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. LIMITED -  OUTPUT AND
DELIVERIES OF COAL BY MENTOUGOU COAL MINING COMPANY -  Thousand (metricl Tons.
Output Deliveries Recorded sto
1925 149 n.a. n.a.
1926 164 n.a. 120
1927 81 63 178
1928 7 72 n.a.
1929 21 88 n.a.
1930 163 102 n.a
1931 108 105 n.a.
1932 225 240 36
1933 325 278 64
1934 463 346 159
1935 321 210 252
1936 313 287 278
1937 194 277 372*
1938 80 373 79
1939 201** n.a. n.a.
1940 n.a. n.a. n.a.
♦Including 177 thous. tons previously unrecorded stocks. 
**1.1.39 to 16.7.39 when production stopped. Resumed 26.2.40. 
Sources
1925 North China Herald (NCH) 14.5.27 1933 NCH 9.5.34
1926 NCH 14.5.27 1934 Finance and Commerce 19.6.35
1927 NCH 22.6.29 1935 Finance and Commerce 5.8.36
1928 NCH 22.6.29 1936 Finance and Commerce 4.8.37
1929 NCH 12,5.31 1937 Finance and Commerce 3.8.38
1930 NCH 12.5.31 I93SNCH3I.5.39
1931 NCH 27.5.32 1939 Finance and Commerce 6.3.40
1932 NCH 10.5.33
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TABLE U.
PEKIN SYNDICATE -  OUTPUT AND SALES OF COAL THOUSAND METRIC TONS.
Financial Years Calendar Years
Output Sales Output Sales
18 months to 31.12.09 248 101 1908 13 (4 months) n.a.
18 months to 30.6.11 592 561 1909 235 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.12 478 381 1910 363 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.13 409 n.a. 1911 424 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.14 467 n.a. 1912 559 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.15 265 341 1913 288 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.16 489 419 1914 412 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.17 506 n.a. 1915 433 n.a.
12 months to 30,6,18 602 480 1916 456 n,a.
12 months to 30.6.19 559 468 1917 514 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.20 476 434 1918 628 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.21 709 417 1919 495 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.22 574 486 1920 562 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.23 593 674 1921 649 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.24 666 671 1922 505 n.a.
12 months to 30.6,25 621 427 1923 694 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.26 50 n.a. 1924 671 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.27 neg. - 1925 256 n.a.
12 months to 30.6.28 neg. - 1926 IIS n.a.
12 months to 30.6.29 neg. - 1927 - -
12 months to 30.6.30 neg. - 1928 - -
12 months to 30.6.31 neg. - 1929 - -
12 months to 30,6,32 neg. - 1930 - -
14.10.32 to 25.5.33 152 n.a. 1931 - -
1932 n.a. n.a.
26.5.33-31.12.33 513+ 372+
1934 910+ 769+
1935 1,111+ 998+
1936 1,270+ 1,536+
1937* - not available
+ Zhongfu Mining Company.
* Producing at rate o f 1,500 thous. tons per annum before 
in October.
Sources for Financial Years.
18 months to 31.12.09 Economist 13.8.10
18 months to 30. 6,11 North China Herald 25,L 13
1911/12 Statist 21.12.12
1912/13 Colliery Guardian 24.12.13
1913/14 Colliery Guardian 24.12.14
1914/15 Statist 18.12.15
1915/16 Statist 9.12.16
1916/17 Statist 22.12.17
1917/18 Colliery Guardian 18.9,20
1918/19 Colliery Guardian 18.9.20
1919/20 Colliery Guardian 22.1.21
1920/21 Colliery Guardian 3.2.22
1921/22 Colliery Guardian 16.2.23
1922/23 Colliery Guardian 11.4.24
1923/24 Colliery Guardian 12.12.24
1924/25 Colliery Guardian 16.4.26
1925/26 Colliery Guardian 10.12.26
14.10.32 to 25.5.33 Colliery Guardian 16.6.33
curtailment end o f August followed by closure
Sources for Calendar Years.
1908-10 China Year Book, 1912. Page 51. 
1911-17 China Year Book, 1921-22, Page 167, 
1918-24 China Year Book, 1924-25. Page 110. 
1925-26 China Year Book, 1929-30. Page 50. 
26.5.33-31.12.33 Colliery Guardian 15.6.34
1934 Finance and Commerce 19.6.35
1935 Finance and Commerce 5.8.36
1936 Finance and Commerce 4.8.37
1937 Finance and Commerce 10.8.3 8
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TABLE V.
PEKIN SYNDICATE -  PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT - £. THOUSAND 
- Financial Years Ending 30th, June -
1922/3 1923/4 1924/5 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8
Receipts -  interest,- dividends, etc, 28,9 42,1 43,6 29,9 55,8 29,1
Profit/loss on collieries 100.6 114.0 56.3 -31.3 -50,7 -75.0
Expenditure London, Paris and China 25.5 26.4 30.1 28.4 25.8 22.1
Balance o f above 104.0 129.7 69.8 -29.8 -20.7 -68.0
Less : transfer to reserve against shares in
other companies, investments - 6.0 1.1 3.9 - -
: reserve against debtors - 7.5 - - 9.0 -
: reserve account for redemption of capital
expenditure on the collieries 25.0 25.0 25.0 - - -
Exchange losses / gains -33.8 +18.3 -15.8 -8.3 -11.8 +3.9
Net Income 45.2 109.5 27.9 -42.0 -41.5 -64.1
(Accrued interest and repayment of principal o f 
railway and provincial loans in China placed to credit
of a suspense account pending receipt) (-) (-) (-) (-) (30.3) 0
1928/9 1929/30 1930/1 1931/2
Receipts -  interest, dividends,etc. 32.3 32.1 n.a. 36.3
Profit/loss on collieries -45.5 -23.6 -12.6 -24.6
Expenditure London, Paris and China 21.8 18.7 n.a. 26.2
Balance o f above -35.0 -10.2 M -14.5
Less : transfer to reserve against shares in
other companies, investments - (3.3) 22.7 71.6
Exchange losses / gains -4.5 -7.0 +3.1 +5.7
Net Income -39,5 -13,9 -11,6 -80,4
(Accrued interest and repayment of principal of 
railway and provincial loans in China placed to credit
of a suspense account pending receipt) (74.4) (90.4) (108.0) (135.9)
18 months 1934 1935
- Calendar Years 
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
Receipts -  interest, dividends, etc.
to 31. 12. 33 
43.3 32.1 28.1 n.a. 43.9 28.6 24.6 43.9
Profit/loss on collieries -26.1 -20.0 18.5 n.a. 11.8 - - -
Expenditure London, Paris and 
China 34.2 17.5 41.3 n.a. 31.0 24.6 25.2 24.2
Balance of above -17.0 -5.4 5.3 34.5 24.7 4.0 -0.6 19.7
Appreciation in and profit on 
investments 49.0 29.3 (6.0) (17.9) 11.1
Exchange losses / gains +1.8 -7.0 -16.1 - -1.5 -4.1 -1.3 -2.8
Net Income 33.8 16.9 -16.8 34.5* 5.3 -0.1 -1.9 28.0
( Interest and commission 
accrued but not received) (173.8) (173.8) (179.0) 0 0 0 0 0
* Dividends absorbed £27,3 thous.
Sources >
1922/23 China Express and Telegraph 17.4.24
1923/24 Colliery Guardian 12.12.24
1924/25 Colliery Guardian 16.4,26
1925/26 Colliery Guardian 10.12.26
1926/27 Colliery Guardian 3,3,28
1927/28 China Express and Telegraph 30.3.29
1928/29 Colliery Guardian 10.1.30
1929/30 Colliery Guardian 27.3.31
1930/31 Colliery Guardian 6.5.32
1931/32 Colliery Guardian 10.6.33 
18 months to 31.12.33 Colliery Guardian 15.6.34
1934 Finance and Commerce 19.6.35
1935 Finance and Commerce 5.8.36
1936 Finance and Commerce 4.8,37/1*9.37
1937 Finance and Commerce 10.8.38
1938 Finance and Commerce 9.8.39
1939 Finance and Commerce 23.10.40
1940 Colliery Guardian 5.9.41
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TABLE W.
CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING COMPANY.LIMITED / KAIL AN MINING
ADMINISTRATION -  COAL SALES AND PRODUCTION -  THOUSAND METRIC TONS.
SALES PRODUCTION - (Calendar Year!
Twelve Months to end February
1902 441 336 (733)
1903 585 784 (722)
1904 822* 727* (880)
1905 848* 891* (865)
1906 833* 847* (974)
1907 930* 1,016* (1,135)
1908 975* 1,135* (1,246)
1909 1,168* 1,246* (1,381)
1910 1,251* 1,381* (1,-193)
1911 1,235* 1,189* (1,456)
1912 1,463* 1,513* (n.a.)
Twelve Months to end June
1912 1,433 1,484 (1.734-both firms')
K ADLAN MINING ADMINISTRATION
1913 1,756* 1,720* (2,070)
1914 2,450* 2,573* (2,844)
1915 2,733* 2,924* (3,019)
1916 2,711* 2,931* (2,890)
1917 2,811* 2,979* (3,227)
1918 3,045* 3,306* (3,263)
1919 3,179* 3,453* (3,763)
1920 4,075* 4,269+ (4,416)
1921 3,836* 4,434+ (4,320)
1922 3,593* 4,151+ (3,657)
1923 3,772* 3,937+ (4,496)
1924 4,353* 4,536+ (4,347)
1925 3,283* 4,-089+ (3*950)
1926 3,279* 3,639+ (3,039)
1927 4,058* 3,742+ (3,683)
1928 4,288* 5,038+ (4,958)
1929 4,164* 4,485+ (5,000)
1930 4,558* 4,890+ (5,327)
1931 4,237* 5,631+ (5,356)
1932 4,647* 5,347+ (5,205)
1933 3,795* 4,953+ (4,284)
1934 3,732* 4,291+ (4,755)
1935 3,714* 4,774+ n,a.
1936 3,660* 3,961+ n,a.
1937 3,795* 4,664+ n.a.
1938 4,213 4,458+ n.a.
1939 5,466 5,967+ n,a.
1940 5,803 6,629+ n.a.
1941 6,140 6,546+ n.a.
1942 1.7 to 30.11 2,346 n.a. n.a.
Sources for Financial Years,
* See reference to Wang Yuru in TABLE FF.
+ See source for TABLES GG AND HH.
Both series tie up with the original data.
1902. M ining YearbookJ903.
1903. London and China Express, 16.3.04. 
1.7.11-30.6.12. Statist, 6.2.13.
1938/1939. Finance and Commerce, 20.3.40. 
1940-41, 1942 1.7-30 11. M ining Yearbook, 1943.
Sources for Calendar Yeats 
1902-1906. Ellsworth C. Carlson: TheKailan 
Mines (1877-1912). Page 146.
1907-11. China Year Book, 1912. Page 51. 
1912, China Year Book, 1916. Page 67. 
1913-17. China Year Book, 1921-2. Page 167. 
1918/19. China Year Book, 1924-5. Page 110. 
1920-26. Cihna Year Book, 1929-30. Page 50. 
1927. China Year Book, 1931. Page 325.
1928-1930. China Year Book; 1931/2. p. 181. 
1931-34, China Year Book, 1936. Page 332.
TABLE X.
ORIENTAL SYNDICATE - OWNERS OF FIRST ISSUE OF ORDINARY SHARES f£D HAVING 
25 PENCE PER SHARE PAID UP AT 18th FEBRUARY. 1901 (TV
Edmund Davis{3}{5){7) Merchant 220
Walton Fitzjames Turner (2) (5) (7) Chartered Accountant 120
Robert Parry Nisbet (2) Colonel 120
William Wright Shipowner 50
Cecil Henry Arthur Le Bas Gentleman 25
Edward Fuchsbalg Gentleman 50
William Bell Crichton Master Mariner 25
Burke Pardoe Thomas Shipbroker 25
Edwin Arthur Cade Merchant 50
Frederick Verviou& Marment Gentleman 75
Humphrey Charles Wabrand Gentleman 100
George William Neville Gentleman 400
George Todd Symons (3) Shipowner 400
Anglo -  Continental Gold Syndicate (1899), Ltd. 2,507
Ernest Frederick Schiff Gentleman 500
Hetherington White (4) Merchant 100
Other HR shareholders 150
4,917-
Compagme Internationale d ’ Orient 1,800
Banque d’ Outre-mer 983
Albert Nyssens Director of Cie, Int. d’Orient 100
Georges de Laveleye Consul General 100
George Paget Walford Steamship owner 100
Emile Francqui Agent General of Cie Int. d’ Orient 100
Felicien Cattier Lawyer 100
Donat Hovine Engineer 100
Auguste Beernaert President Cie. Int. d’ Orient 100
Daniel Fuhrmann Businessman KK)
Albert Thys (3) Lt. Colonel 100
3,683.-.
Albert Ballin (6) General Director 300
Julius Scharlach (3) Lawyer 300
Siegmund Hinrichsen Banker 300
Adolph Woermann Merchant 300
1,700-
TOTAL 9,800
(1) Companies’ Registration Office Cert. No. 64511/1. Public Record Office BT/8800.
(2) Original directors of the Oriental Syndicate.
(3) Directors of the Oriental Syndicate w.e.f. 6.2.1901
(4) Director of the Oriental Syndicate w.e.f. 1.5.1901
(5) Directors of Anglo -  Continental Gold Syndicate (1899), Ltd.
(6) The very influential director of the Hamburg -  Amerika shipping line.
(7) Davis and Turner were directors o f the London and Hamburg Gold Recovery Company for 
which Bewick, Moreing served a& consulting engineers. This-probably explains the German 
connection.
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TABLE Y.
ORIENTAL SYNDICATE - SHAREHOLDERS REGISTER AS AT 17th SEPTEMBER. I9C>L*
Ordinary f£J Deferred I5p.
Charles Algernon Moreing (4) Civil engineer 37,600 5,000
Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate (1899), Ltd. 14,554 1,115
Ernest Frederick Sehiff Gentleman 2,750 200
George William Neville Gentleman 1,650 120
George Todd Symons (2) (4) Shipowner 3,600 320
Edmund Davis (2) (4) (6) Merchant 2,835 338
Robert Parry Nisbet (1) Colonel 440 20
Walton Fitzjames Turner (I) (4) (6) Chartered Accountant 4,660 588
Chinese Development Syndicate, Ltd. 1,000 -
Alfred William Berry (5) Company Secretary 1 -
Hetherington White (3) Merchant 100 -
Other (13) UK shareholders 1,354 40
Subtotal 70.544
(70.9%)
7,741
(77.4%)
Compagnie Internationale d’ Orient 9,350 680
Banque dr Outremer 3,440 -
Albert Thys (2) (4) Lt. Colonel 2,751 683
Albert Nyssens Director of Cie. Int. d’ Orient 550 -
Auguste Beernaert President of Cie. Int. d’ Orient 550 40
Donat Hovine Engineer 550 40
Daniel Fiihrmann (7) Businessman 550 40
George Paget Walford (4) Steamship owner 550 40
Emile Francqui (4) Agent General of Cie. Int. d’ Orient 550 40
Felicien Cattier Lawyer 550 40
Leon Ryex Barrister 138 10
Leon Trouet (4) Engineer (civil) 55 4
Charles Noel de Vaux Count 27 2
Alphonse Jules Wauters “Man of letters” 55 4
Joseph Neve Lawyer 55 4
Henri Le Boeuf Doctor of Law 55 4
Gaston Perier Lawyer 55 4
Georges de Laveleye (4) Consul General 550 40
Auguste Deppe Artillery Major 55 -
Charles Balser (2) (4) Banker 200 -
Jules Urban Vice President, Banque d’ Outremer 250 -
Georges Systermans Lawyer 55 4
Subtotal 20,981
(21.1%)
1,679
(16.8%)
Continued.
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Table Y ('continued!
Albert Ballin 
Julius Scharlach (2) 
Siegmund Hinrichsen 
Adolf Woermann
General Director 
Lawyer 
Banker 
Merchant
Ordinary
1.650
1.650
1.650
1.650
Deferred tSp.l 
120 
120 
120 
120
Subtotal 6,600
(6.6%)
480
(4.8%)
Banque Russo-Chinoise (Shanghai) 1,375
(1.4%)
100
(1.0%)
TOTAL 99.500 10.000
^Companies’ Registration Office Cert. No. 64511/13. Public Record Office BT/8800.
(1) Original directors o f Oriental Syndicate, Limited.
(2) Directors of Oriental Syndicate w.e.f. 6,2,1901,
(3) Director of Oriental Syndicate w.e.f. 1.5.1901.
(4) Served as director of Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited.
(5) Company secretary of Oriental Syndicate, Limited, Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, 
Limited and Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate (1899), Limited.
(6) Directors o f Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate (1899), Limited
(7) German businessman resident in Antwerp.
-314-
TABLE Z.
CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING COMPANY. LIMITED 
- INITIAL ALLOTMENT OF ONE MILLION £1 SHARES.
Number of Shares
Share numbers 1-7. The original shares on registration of the company 7
on 21.12.1900. These were originally held by 7 secretaries and clerks of 
Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate (1899), Ltd. (4 of them were also £1 
shareholders of the Oriental Syndicate). At the first Board meeting held 
on 26.2.1901 these shares were transferred to the following Belgians 
Charles Balser - 1 
G. Touchard -1  
A J.Wauters -1
G. Perier -1
H. Le Boeuf -1
E. Francqui -1
H. Radermaiker -1
Share numbers 8-375007 
Mining Company of Tianjin.
Share numbers 375008-425007 
Share numbers 425008=575007
(28.3.1901 G. de Laveleye)
To nominees of the Chinese Engineering and
To Charles Algernon Moreing 
To the Oriental Syndicate, Ltd
Share numbers 575008-1000000 To nominees of the Oriental Syndicate, Ltd
375.000
50.000
150.000 
424.993
TOTAL
- of which issued as fully paid up otherwise than for cash 999,993
The split by individuals and organisations was as follows
Connected with Other Total
issue of debentures
(1) To shareholders of the Chinese company r 375.000 375.000
(2) To Charles Algernon Moreing for transfer to
Zhana Yanmou /  Gustav Betrine - 50,000 50.000
13) To the Oriental Syndicate. Ltd.
—
150.000 150.000
(41 Other 250.000 175.000 425.000
Anglo-Continental Gold Syndicate (1899), Ltd - 25,075 25,075
Mrs Helena Marian Moreing - 25,100 25,100
Charles A. Moreing 12,500 - 12,500
George Todd Symons 6,250 4,375 10,625
Edmund Davis 5,000 3,500 8,500
Walton Fitzjames Turner 5,000 3,500 8,500
Coates, Son and Co. (stockbrokers) 5,000 1,500 6,500
A.J.Bott 5,000 - 5,000
Carl Wichmann (22, Austin Friars) 2,500 500 3,000
Alfred Angeli 1,500 1,150 2,650
Ludwig Ehrlich 2,500 - 2,500
Benjamin Newgass 2,500 - 2,500
George Henderson ) 1,700 - 1,700
James S.Fraser ) Same address 1,650 - 1,650
James Steel ) 1,650 - 1,650
Frederick Anderson 1,500 - 1,500
Reuben T, Barrow 1,250 - 1,250
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Table Z Continued).
Connected with Other Total
issue of debentures
Chinese Development Syndicate 1,000 1,000
Benjamin A. Posford 1,000 - 1,000
Arthur J. White 1,000 - 1,000
William F. Courthope 1,000 - 1,000
Marcus van Raalte (22, Austin Friars) 1,000 - 1,000
Mrs Emily West 850 - 850
David Pember McEwan 750 - 750
Retherington White 750 - 750
Aldorf Rosendorff 500 200 700
Thomas J.W.Sargant 500 - 500
Joseph G. Smith 500 - 500
William Thomas Madge 500 - 500
George W. Neville 500 - 500
Hugo Loewy 500 - 500
Helbert, Wagg and Russell (Stockbrokers) - 500 500
Henry Melville Woodhouse 250 - 250
William James Procter 250 - 250
Hemance Bernheim 250 - 250
Patrick Paget Pease 250 - 250
Alfred W.Berry 150 - 150
Sir Vincent Caillard _ 210 210
Frederick Bradbury Winter (Solicitor to the Company) 125 - 125
Miss Eleanor Turner 125 - 125
Henry C.Truman - 10 10
Subtotal UK addresses 66.250 66.620 132.870
Mrs Ida Sanders -  Amsterdam 500 = 500
Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas _ 7,110 7,110
Phillippe Bona Varilla (banker) - 5,000 5,000
Banque d’ Indo-Chine - 3,000 3,000
Victor Defalque - 2,500 2,500
Viscomte Adolphe de Westheimer 2,500 - 2,500
Benard et Jarislowsky (bankers) - 1,500 1,500
Other French Shareholders (12) - 3,575 3,575
Subtotal French addresses 2,500 22.685 25.185
Syndicate Sino Italien _ 1,720 1,720
Banque Franzi - 335 335
Subtotal Italian addresses 2,055 2,055
Union Financiere de Geneve - 280 280
Julius Scharlach -  Hamburg 5,000 1,000 6,000
Von der Heydt -  Berlin 2,000 - 2,000
Subtotal German addresses 7,000 1,000 8.000
General von Hanneken -  Tianjin 11,250 _ 11,250
Herbert C. Hoover -  Tianjin 7,500 - 7,500
Jules Jado (engineer) -  Shanghai - 1,000 1,000
Maurice Joostens (Belgian Minister at Beijing) - 40 40
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Table Z (Continued).
Connected with 
issue of debentures
Other Total
Subtotal Chinese addresses 18,750 1,040 19,790
Balance equals Belgian Shareholders 155.000 81.320 236.320
The Original 7 Shareholders - 7 7
Compagnie Internationale d’ Orient n,a. n.a. 88,261
Banque d’ Outremer 4,840 29,417 34,257
Baron Constant de Goffinet - 9,100 9,100
Baron Auguste de Goffinet - 100 100
Raoul Waroque (industrialist) n.a. n,a. 6,525
Emile Franqui n.a. n.a. 5,500
Societe General pour favouriser F Industrie Nationale 5,200 - 5,200
Albert Thys n.a. n.a. 5,000
Madame Thys n.a. n.a. 100
William Thys (student) n.a. n.a. 10
Edouard Thys n.a. n.a. 500
Societe Reserches Minieres n.a n.a. 5,000
Societe Coloniale Anversoise n.a. n.a. 3,335
Banque Internationale de Bruxelles n.a. n.a. 2,835
Chevalier Raphael de Bauer n.a. n.a. 2,340
Edouard Empain (banker) n.a. n.a. 2,500
Senateur Joseph Devolder n.a. n.a. 2,500
Charles Balser n.a. n.a. 2,170
Balser et Cie n.a. n.a. 1,575
Banque de Bruxelles n.a. n.a. 2,000
Daniel Ftihrmann n.a. n.a. 1,840
Georges Paget Watford n.a. n.a. 1,360
Victor Stoclet n.a. n.a. 1,000
Donat Hovine n.a. n.a. 1,000
La Coloniale Industriell n,a. n.a. 1,000
Emmanuel Wouters d’ Oplinter n.a. n.a. 1,000
Georges de Laveleye n.a. n.a. 750
Baron Leon Lambert n,a. n.a. 835
Auguste Beernaert (Minister of State) n.a. n.a. 835
Prof. Albert Nyssens n.a. n.a. 670
Alphonse Jules Wauters n.a. n.a, 625
Leon Trouet n.a. n.a. 570
Henri Le Boeuf n.a. n.a. 500
Other Belgian Shareholders (183) n.a. n.a. 45,520
These shares were issued in the following tranches
Number of shares (£)
- 21.12.1900. On formation ofthe new company. 7
-25.5.I90I -20 .6 .I90I. I50,000tothe Oriental Syndicate, 50,000 to Moreing 283,750
(for Detring /  Zhang Yanmou). Balance of 83,750 to debenture holders in UK,
Netherlands, Germany and China.
Table Z (Continued).
-21.6.1901 -  16.7,1901. 11,250 to debenture holders in UK and China. Balance 
of 66,500 to shareholders in UK and France.
-8.8,1901 -  8.9.1901, To shareholders in Belgium, France, UK, Italy, Switzerland 
and China.
-8,10,1901 -  31,10 1901, To shareholders in Belgium, 88*261 to Compagnie 
Internationale d5 Orient, 29,417 to Banque d’ Outremer and 3,500 to Baiun Constant 
de Goffinet..
-15.11.1901 -  11.12.1901. To the Oriental Syndicate -  for transmission to  the 
original shareholders in China.
TOTAL
Sources : Chinese Engineering and Mining Co. Ltd. -  Minute Book No. I, 
Guildhall MS 28378/1.
Public Record Office -  BT 31/9233/68532.
77,750
142,315
121,178
375,000
1.000.000
TABLE AA.
THE CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING COMPANY. LIMITED* - PROFIT AND LOSS 
ACCOUNT - £ THOUSAND - TWELVE MONTHS TO END FEBRUARY.
19.2.01 1903 1904 1905
-28.2.02
Profit after all 
charees in China 114.4 113.4 151.7 210.1
Plus interest and 
fees received 1.5 4.4 2.8 4.1
Less
Expenses for salaries, 
stores,etc in Europe 4.3 3.0 5.9 6.1
Interest on debentures 
and Kaiping bonds 21.6 29.1 29.9 29.3
Transfer to reserve 
for redemption pf 
debentures 1.7 10.0 10.0
Remuneration of 
directors 2.2 2.7 3.3 3.2
Write off o f
preliminary
expenses 4.3 4.6 4.7
Legal costs - - - 11.0
Depreciation - - 20,0 40,0
Tax - 5.0 4.6 6.4
NET INCOME 83.5 71.7 76.1 108.2
- Dividends 75.0 50.0 75.0 100.0
-(%) (7.5) (5) (7.5) (10)
- Retained 8.5 21.7 1.1 8.2
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1.3.11 
-27.6.12
178.6 241.2 223.3 244.0 243.3 192.6 n.a.
4.3 6.1 4.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 n.a.
6.4 •a «■» 3.1 4.0 8.8 10.8 n.a.
25.8 25.2 24.6 24.0 23.4 25.2 n.a.
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 n.a.
3.2 6.8 5.5 6.1 7.1 1.2 n.a.
3.0 - 3.5 - - - n.a.
30,0 40,0 25,0 40,0 30,0 35,0 35,0
1.8 6.0 7.0 7.3 9.9 9.8 n.a.
102.7 156.0 148.6 153.6 155.0 101.2 n.a.
100.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 100.0 75.0
(10) (15) 05) (15) (15) (10) (7.5)
2.7 6.0 -1.4 3.6 5.0 1.2 n.a.
* The original UK registered company.
Sources
19.2.01 to 28.2.02 - Minute Book No. 1 of the Company. Reference MS 28378/1, Guildhall Library. 
- North China Herald, 12,11.02.
1903 North China Herald, 16.10,03 and 27,11,03,
1904 Statist, 17.9.04.
1905 Statist, 28.10.05.
1906 Statist, 3.11.06.
1907 Statist, 2.11.07.
1908 Economist, 31.10. 08.
1909 Statist, 30.10.09.
1910 Statist, 29.10.10.
1911 Statist, 28.10.11.
1.3.11- 27.6,12 - Journal No. 1 of the new company. Reference 28386, Guildhall Library.
- Minute Book No 4 o f the Company. Reference 28378/4, Guildhall Library.
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TABLEBB.
THE CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING COMPANY. LIMITED* - EXPENDITURE ON 
FIXED ASSETS - £ THOUSAND -  Twelve months to end February,
TOTAL+ (Compare - DISTRIBUTION DURING PERIOD -
Cumulative During period depreciation Harbour works Hew Mines and
during period) at Oinhuanadao. Electrical depots 
etc. Installations
19.2 01-
28.2.02 55,8 55,8 (■) 54,8 - 1,0 —
1903 165.6 109.8 (-) 83.8 - 26.0
1904 189.8 24.2 (20.0) 15.9 - 8.3
1905 214.7 24.9 (40.0) 20.0 ■ 4.9
1906 282.7 68.0 (30.0). 20.0 28.7 19 3**
1907 444.1 161.4 (40.0) 21.0 110.0 30.4
1908 585.9 141.8 (25.0) 6.5 107.0 28.3
1909' ■633.2 47.3 (40:0) n.a. 35.0 n.a.
191-0 659,8- 26,6 <30,0)- n,a. n.a. n.a.
1911 671.9 12.1 (35-0) 0.3 2.3 9.5
1.3.11-
28.6.12 679.6 7.7 (35.0) n.a. n.a. n.a
* The original UK registered company.
+ Excluding spending on steamers -  58.9 in 1904/5 and 36.0 in 1905/6. This brings total up to 
28,6.19-12 at 774.5 -  very nearly 2 times-depreciation during the same period,
** 7,0 Shanghai wharf* 12,3 Tangshan and Linxi.
Sources
19.2.01 -  28.2.02 Guildhall - Minute Book No.l - MS 28378/1
1903 -Guildhall - Minute Book Nu.T - MS 28378/1
1904 Guildhall - Minute Book No. 1 - MS 28378/1
■1905 Guildhall -Minute Book No,2 -.MS-28378/2
1906 Guildhall - Minute Book No,2 - MS 28378/2
1907 Guildhall - Minute Book No.2 - MS 28378/2
1908 Guildhall - Minute Book No.2 - MS 28378/2
1909 Guildhall - Minute Book No.3 - MS 28378/3
1910 Guildhall - Minute Book No.3 - MS 28378/3
1911 PRO BT 31/9233
1.3 .11— 28, 6 .12 Guildhall -  Minute Book No.4 -MS 283-78/4
Guildhall - Journal No, 1 of the new company - MS 23386/1
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TABLE CC.
CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING COMPANY. LIMITED (1912 company! -  PROPORTION* 
OF DISTRIBUTED NET PROFITS OF THE KAIL AN MINING ADMINISTRATION (After debenture 
interest, debenture redemption reserve, depreciation, share of Chihli Provincial Government. etc.V
Years to June 30th $ thous. Pence (new) per dollar £ thous.
1913 993 10.2 101
1914 1,757 9.4 165
1915 1,972 7.9 156
1916 1,907 9.6 186
1917 2,147 12.3 264
1918 3,299 15.9 524
1919 3,163 19.1 603
1920 4,582 24,4 1,118
1921 3,850 13.7 527
1922 2,529 12.3 311
1923 3,313 11.4 377
1924 3,927 11.5 450
1925 1,816 11.4 206
1926 1,663 10.9 181
1927 3,323 9.2 305
1928 4,503 9.5 427
1929 3,-323 9.-2 298
1930 3,232 6.9 224
1931 2,363 4.7 112
1932 3,407 6.2 212
1933 298 6.1 18
1934 133 6.4 9
1935 -1 7.9 .
1936 -9 6.0 -1
1937 2,116 6.0 128
1938 3,733 5,6 208
1939 11,283 2.8 314
1940 9,429 2.1 199
1941 10,042 2.7 272
1.7.41-7.12.41 8,269 1.0 82
20.11.45-31.12. 46 - 2,282,046 neg. -143**
1.1.47-31.12.47 2,292,590 neg. 10
1.1.48-31.12.48 n.a. n.a. -159
1,1.49 - 31,12.49, n,a. n.a. -910
* Until 30th, June, 1934, c.60% of the profits up to £300 thous. — after this 50%. Thereafter all 
profits equally divided,
** Subsequently assessed as loss of £10 thous.
Sources :-
1913-1920 Guildhall - Journal No. 1 - MS 23386/1 
1921 Guildhall - Journal No. 2 - MS 23386/2
1922-1924 Guildhall - Journal No, 3 - MS 23386/3 
1925-1928 Guildhall - Journal No. 4 - MS 23386/4 
1929-1933 Guildhall - Journal No. 5 - MS 23386/5 
1934 -1937 Guildhall - Journal No. 6 - MS 23386/6 
1938 - 1941 Guildhall - Journal No. 7 - MS 23386/7 
1.7.41 -
31.12.47 Guildhall - Journal No. 8 - MS 23386/8
1.1.48-
31.12.48 Guildhall - Ledger No. 26 - MS 28381/6
1.1.49-
31.12.49 The Stock Exchange Official Year-Book, 1950. Page 1896.
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TABLE DP.
SHARES OF THE CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING COMPANY. LIMITED AND THE 
LUANZHOU MINING COMPANY IN THE DISTRIBUTED MET PROFIT OF THE KAIL AN MINING 
ADMINISTRATION - $ THOUSAND-
to June 30th Total Distributed 
Profits
Percentage of 
Capital
CEMC -% Luanzhou -%
1913 1,656 6.7 993 60.0 663 40.0
1914 2,928 11.8 1,757 60.0 1,171 40.0
1915 3,286 13.2 1,972 60.0 1,314 40.0
1916 3,178 12.8 1,907 60.0 1,271 40.0
1917 3,806 15.3 2,147 56.4 1,659 43.6
1918 6,881 27,9 3,299 47,9 3,582 52,1
1919 5,996 24.1 3,163 52.8 2,833 47.2
1920 8,917 35,9 4,582 51.4 4,335 48.6
1921 7,313 29.5 3,850 52.6 3,463 47.4
1922 4,594 18.5 2,529 55.1 2,065 44.9
1923 6,110 24.6 3,313 54.2 2,797 45.8
1924 7,330 29.5 3,927 53.6 3,403 46.4
1925 3,116 12.5 1,816 58.3 1,300 41.7
1926 2,839 11.4 1,663 58.6 1,176 41.4
1927 6,004 24,2 3,-323 55.-3 2,681 44,7
1928 8,369 33.7 4,503 53.8 3,866 46.2
1929 5,813 23.4 3,323 57.2 2,490 42.8
1930 5,655 22.8 3,232 57.2 2,423 42.8
1931 4,064 16.4 2,363 58.1 1,701 41.9
1932 5,924 23.9 3,407 57.5 2,517 42.5
1933 519 2.1 298 57.4 221 42.6
1934 265 1.1 133 50.2 132 49.8
1935 -2 - -1 50.0 -1 50.0
1936 -18 - -9 50,0 -9 50,0
1937 4,232 17.1 2,116 50.0 2,116 50,0
1938 7,466 30.1 3,733 50.0 3,733 50.0
1939 22,566 91.0 11,283 50.0 11,283 50.0
1940 18,858 76.0 9,429 50.0 9,429 50.0
1941 20,084 81.0 10,042 50.0 10,042 50.0
Sources
- Total Distributed Profits. A useful compilation for the figures up to 1934 is given in Chen Zhen: 
Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (Source material for history of modem industry of China).
Volume Two. Pages 874-875.
- Figures for the CEMC from TABLE CC.
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TABLE EE.
THE CHINESE ENGINEERING AND MINING COMPANY. LIMITED (1912 company! -  PROFIT 
AND LOSS ACCOUNT - £ thous, - Twelve months to end June.
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923
Proportion of Net
Income of K.M.A. 101.2 165.1 156.1 186,2 263.9 524.1 602.9 1,118.0 527.4 310.8 376.6
Plus >
Interest in China less
sundry expenses 3.5 4.3 5.3 9.0 14.2 22.4 33.9 51.8 37.3 41.5 45.5
Interest in Europe - 4.4 6.0 10.6 18.8 37.0 34.0 41.9 72.2 25.7 5.0
Fee for agency for
K.M. A. in Europe 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Sundry receipts 1,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,6 0,6 13,2 2,1
Less :-
Expenses in Europe 6.9 6.3 6.0 3.5 5.2 5.1 10.0 19.0 9.1 20.4 23.4
Board remuneration 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 23.2 13.3 6.0 4.7
Write-off o f preliminary 
expenses 6.0 11.9 .
Tax 7.1 9.2 12.2 25.5 132.0 404.0 374.4 636.7 261.2 176.6 164.2
Sundry expenses - - - 2.0 3,0 86.3 42.6 1.4 -
Exchange losses/gains - - - - - - -5.4 - -16.3 -19.4 -12.4
NET INCOME 86.0 146.8 149.1 176.7 159.6 172.4 278.1 451.1 299.0 171.4 228.5
- Dividends 80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 125.0 150.0 200.0 300.0 220.0 189.0> 224.0
-(% ) (8) (10) (10) (10) (12.5) (15) (20) (30) (22) (13.5) (16)
- Retained 6.0 46.8 49.1 76.7 34.6 22.4 78.1 151.1 79.0 -17.6 4.5
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 ]1933 1934
Proportion of Net
Income of K.M.A. 461.1 206.5 180.6 305.5 427.5 298.3 224.1 111.7 212.1 18.1 8.6
Plus
Interest in China less
sundry expenses 33,5 49,5 50,1 44,6 50,1 53,9 43,5 30,9 44,1 45,8 49,6
Interest in Europe ) \
8.4 4.7
Fee for agency for ) 27.0 30.5 25.8 21.5 21.2 39.1 39.8 n.a.
)
n .a .)
K.M.A. in Europe ) ) 6.1 6.2
Sundry receipts ) )
Less :-
Expenses in Europe 21.4 19.8 19.8 20.0 20.4 20.7 20.8 n.a. n.a. 15.5 14.6
Board remuneration 20.8 7.7 7.7 9.3 18.7 12.0 6,3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Tax (net) 27.1 68.0 93.9 84.1 59.4 83.4 109.1 98.1 71.8 49.2 57.3
Sundry expenses 0.6 ■- 1.8 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 1.1 -
Exchange losses/gains; n.a. n.a. -1.1 -36.7 -0.1 - -21.1 n.a. n.a. +10.6 +4.3
NET INCOME 451.7 191.0 132.2 220.5 399.2 272.2 149.1 43.1 167.4 18.9 -2.7
- Dividends 280.0 140.0 140.0 210.0 350.0 280.0 176.4 49.0 147.0 49.0 -
-(% ) (20) (10) (10) (15) (25) (20) (9) (2.5) (7.5) (2.5) (-)
- Retained 171.7 51.0 -7.8 10.5 49.2 -7.8 -27.3 -5.9 20.4 -30.1 -2.7
Continued.
1935 1936
TABLE EE (continued!. 
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
Proportion of Net 
Income of K.M. A. -0.1 -0.5 127.7 208.0 314.4 198.9 272.0 _ *
Plus:-
Interest in China less 
sundry expenses 52.4 56.0 47.4 44.9 23.5 19.5 26.9
Interest in Europe 5.8 4.5 14.2 13.5 13.9 n.a. 12.1 8.1
Agency fee / sundry 
receipts 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.3 n.a. 6.0 2.6
Less
Expenses in Europe 13.9 11.4 10.6 11.2 12.6 n.a. 13.2 10,3
Board remuneration 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 13.0 6.4 4.2 4.2
Tax (net) 16.3 9.9 12.6 30.7 106.5 165.3 134.6 144.3
Sundry expenses - 2.4 0.3 0.5 - n.a. 0.8 2.9
Exchange losses/gains - -13.5 - -41.4 -2.2 n.a. +93.1 -
NET INCOME 29.7 24.7 167.8 184.5 223.8 54.0 257.3 -151.0*
- Dividends - 49.0 98.0 147.0 147.0 73.5 - -
-(% ) (-) (2.5) (5) (7.5) (7.5) (3.75) (-) (-)
- Retained 29.7 -24.3 69.8 37.5 76.8 -19.5 257.3 -
* Excluding share o f profits of K.M.A. 1.7.41 to 7.12.41 
for calendar year 1946.
£81.9 thous. -  included in accounts
Sources
1913 - Minute Book No. I. Reference MS28378/3, Guildhall Library. 
- Colliery Guardian ,5.12.13.
1914 Colliery Guardian, 18.12.14.
1915 Colliery Guardian, 17.12.15.
1916 London and China Express^ 20,12,16,
1917 Colliery Guardian, 26.4.18.
1918 Colliery Guardian, 13.12.18.
1919 Minute Book No.4. Reference MS28378/6, Guildhall Library.
1920 Colliery Guardian, 10.12.20.
1921 Colliery Guardian, 9.12.21.
1922 Colliery Guardian, 8.12.22.
1923 Colliery Guardian, 30.12.23.
1924 Colliery Guardian, 5.12.24.
1925 Colliery Guardian, 27,11,25,
1926 The China Express and Telegraph, 9.12.26.
1927 The China Express and Telegraph, 8.12.27.
1928 The China Express and Telegraph, 20.12.28.
1929 The China Express and Telegraph, 12.12.29 and 19.12.29.
1930 Collieiy Guardian, 12.12.30. 
!931 Colliery Guardian, 18.12.31.
1932 Colliery Guardian, 16.12.32.
1933 Colliery Guardian, 8.12.33.
1934 Colliery G uardian^A 2.34.
1935 Colliery Guardian, 20.12.35
1936 Colliery Guardian,\ 1.12.36.
1937 Finance and 
Commerce, 2.2.38.
1938 Colliery Guardian,22.12.38.
1939 Finance and 
Commerce, 20.3.40.
1940 Colliery Guardian, 9.5.41.
1941 Colliery Guardian, 27,4,42,
1942 CollieryGuardian, 11.12.42.
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TABLE FF.
KAILUAN MINES - RATIO OF LABOUR COSTS TO VALUE OF OUTPUT -  12 months to end Jane
Average annual Number Total Labour Output Price per Value o f Output (A) as
earnings per Employed Costs - $ thous. Th. tons ton**- $ $ thous. % of m i
mine worker -$ (A) (B)
1905* 96.12 8,943 859.6 891 4.861 4,331.0 19,9
1914 99.96 11,428 1,142.3 2,573 3.454 8,887,9 12.9
1920 99.96 22,295 2,228.6 4,269 4.304 18,374.9 12.1
1921 110.88 24,083 2,670.3 4,434 4.467 19,807.7 13.5
1922 110.88 25,899 2,871.7 4,151 3,946 16,378.8 17.5
1923 122.04 26,091 3,184.1 3,937 4.337 17,863.6 17.8
1924 133.32 30,804 4,106.8 4,536 4,615 20,935.5 19.6
1925 144.24 28,674 4,135.9 4,089 5,258 21,500.7 19.2
1926 149,76 22,084 3,307,3 3,639 4.561 16,597,7 19,9
1927 149.04 26,481 3,946.7 3,742 5.270 19,720.4 20,0
1928 152.16 31,084 4,729.7 5,038 5.496 27,687.5 17.1
1929 150.12 29,359 4,407.4 4,485 4.908 22,011.2 20.0
1930 176.40 30,935 5,456.9 4,890 5.061 24,747.0 22.1
1931 176.16 33,581 5,915.6 5,631 5.374 30,258.2 19.6
1932 206.40 33,844 6,985.4 5,347 5.342 28,563.8 24.5
1933 202.92 37,357 7,580.5 4,953 4.889 24,216.7 31.3
1934 164.28 33,934 5,574.7 4,291 4.320 18,539.1 30.1
1935 215,52 33,410 7,-200,5 4,-774 4.169 19,905.-0 36,2
1936 217.80 26,504 5,772.6 3,961 4.388 17,381.2 33.2
1937 217.32 25,354 5,509.9 4,664 5.111 23,835.9 23.1
1938 211.68 34,563 7,316.3 4,458 6.465 28,820.4 25.4
1939 280.44 37,651 10,558.8 5,967 9.064 54,096.2 19.5
1940 471.00 41,535 19,563.0 6,629 11.287 74,823.8 26.2
1941 675.96 44,037 29,767.3 6,546 14.544 95,208.2 31.3
Source : Jiu Zhongguo Kailuan meikuangde gongzi zhidu he baogongzhidu (The wage and contract 
system for workers in the Kailan coal mines in Pre-Communist China) -  Tianjin, 1983, Page 142,
* Twelve months to end February. Refers to Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Ltd. data.
** Prices per ton in the early years o f the Kailan Mining Administration developed as follows :-
$
1912/13 3.53
1913/14 3.45
1914/15 3.51
1915/16 3.39
1916/17 3.32
1917/18 3.43
1918/19 3.92
Prices per ton for the original British company were as follows
$
1903/04 4.91
1904/05 4.86
1905/06 4,83
1906/07 5.18
1907/08 4.87
1908/09 4.82
1909/10 4.45
1910/11 4.20
1911/12 3.02
Source : Capital Formation and Operating Profits o f the Kailuan Mining Administration (1903-1937). 
Wang Yuru: Modern Asian Studies 28.1 -  1994. Page 122.
TABLE GG.
KAILUAN MINES -  RATIO OF TOTAL LABOUR COSTS AT THE MINES TO PROFITS 
OF THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE -  Twelve months to end June.
(A) (B)
•Output of-Goal -Profit Profitsofthe as-% o f value Total labour Gosts Ratio-offA1
Th, tons per ton whole enterprise of output at the mines tofB l
■ S.. Th. S. Th. $.
1905* 891 2,499 2,226,9 51,4 859,6 2,59
1914 2,573 1.838 4,730.1 53.2 1,142.3 4.14
1920 4,269 2.701 11,530.0 62.7 2,228.6 5.17
1921 4,434 2.489 11,036.3 55.7 2,670.3 4.13
1922 4,151 1.594 6,614.4 40.4 2,871.7 2.30
1923 3,937 1.103 4,343.8 24.3 3,184.1 1.36
1924 4,536 1.947 8,831.4 42:2 4,106.8 2:T5-
1925 4,089 2.894 11,833.1 55.0 4,135.9 2.86
1926- 3-,639. 2.-175 7,915.6 47.7 3,307.3. 2.39-
1927 3,742 2,608 9,760,7 49,5 3,946,7 2,47
1928 5,038 3.090 15,569.3 56.2 4,729.7 3.29
1929 4,485 2.244 10,065.3 45.7 4,407.4 2.28
1930 4,890 2.106 10,299.2 41.6 5,456.9 1.89
1931 5,631 2.431 13,688.3 45.2 5,915.6 2.31
1932 5,347 1.949 10,419.4 36.5 6,985.4 1.49
1933 4,953 1:545 7,653.0 3T.6 7,580:5 1.01
1934 4,291 1.063 4,560.9 24.6 5,574.7 0.82
1935 4,7-74 0.965 4,6Q5;0 23.-1 7,200,5 0:64
1936 3,961 1,132 4,482,7 25,8 5,772,6 0,78
1937 4,664 2.263 10,557.0 44.3 5,609.9 1.92
1938 4,458 3.051 13,602.8 47.2 7,316.3 1.86
1939 5,967 4.646 27,720.6 51.2 10,558.8 2.63
1940 6,629 5.501 36,469.2 48.7 19,563.0 1.86
1941 6,546 6.427 42,072.8 44.2 29,767.3 1.41
* Twelve months to end February. Refers to Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited data.
Source Jui Zhungguo Kailuan meikuang de gongzi zhidu hebaogongzhidu. (The wage and' contract 
system for workers in the Kailuan coal mines in pre-Coimrnimst China). Tianjin, 1983. Pages 144 and 145.
TABLE HH.
BSTBVtATED KEAL WAGES OF WORKERS AT KAILUAN MENES -  Ch. ±
Price of Unskilled underground labourers Underground coalworkers Skilled Machine workers 
flour per bag Monthly eamings-Equivalent in Monthly -Equivalent in Monthly Equivalent-in
bags of flour earnings bags of flour earnings bags of flour 
(.1920 (1920 (1920
= 100) =  100) = 100)
(1905)* (1.63) (5.34) (3.28) (160)
00t"-' (4.59) (168) (14.15) (8.68) (175)
1920 3.12 6.41 2.05 (100) 8.54 2.74 (100) 15.49 4.96 (100)
1922 3.21 -6:94 2.16 (105)- -9:35 2:91 (106) 17:09 -5.32 (107)
1924- 3,15 7.74 246- -(-120). 1-0,15 3.22 (-1-18)- 23.32 7,40 (149)
1927 3.91 8.54 2.18 (106). 11.21 2.87 (105) 25.91 6.63 (134)
1929 3.72 10.68 2.87 (140) 13.35 3.59 (131) 28.04 7.54 (152)
1931 3.36 14.40 4.29 (209) 17,40 5.18 (189) 30.80 9.17 (185)
1925 2:93 14.40 491 (240) 17.40 -5:94 (217) 29:88 10.20 (206)
1936- -499 14:52 2.91 (-142). 18,91 3.79 (1-38)- 38:17 7,65 (154)
1938 5.39 18.39 3.41 (166) 23.02 4.27 (156) 43.44 8.06 (163.)
1939 8.60 27.50 3.20 (156) 34.74 4.04 (147) 55.90 6.50 (131)
1941 22.40 80.28 3.58 (175) 87.58 3.91 (143) 112.67 5.03 (101)
'*■ Refers to  Chinese Engineering and MimngCompany, Limited data.
Source --JiuZhonggtioKailuanmeiktiang de gongzi zhidu he baogong zhidtL (The wage and- contract- 
system for workers in the Kailuan coal mines in pre-Communist China),Tianjin* 1983, Pages 123*126 and 
127.
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(3) BACKUP TABLES TO PART I I I -  CHAPTER THREE -  TEXTILES.
TABLE II.
UK INVESTMENT IN COTTON TEXTILES IN MAINLAND CHINA
£ MILLION
TOTAL JARDINE MATHESON CONCERNS OTHER
1897 0.21 0.13 0.08
1898 0.24 0.15 0.09
1899 0.30 0.20 0.10
1900 0.27 0.18 0.09
1901 0.28 0.19 0.09
1902 0.27 0.18 0.09
1903 0,18 0,09 0,09
1904 0.19 0.10 0.09
1905 0.20 0.10 0.10
1906 0.29 0.13 0.16
1907 0.32 0.15 0.17
1908 0.27 0.13 0.14
1909 0.23 0.13 0.10
1910 0,26 0,16 0,10
1911 0.38 0.28 0.10
1912 0.42 0.32 0.10
1913 0.45 0.34 0.11
1914 0.48 0.37 0.11
1915 0.64 0.54 0.10
1916 0.80 0.70 0.10
1917 1,18 0,90 0,28
1918 1.53 1.18 0.35
1919 2.01 1.56 0.45
1920 2.74 1.98 0.76
1921 2.04 1.55 0.49
1922 2,01 1.59 0.42
1923 1.85 1.40 0.45
1924 2,02 1,50 0,52
1925 1.69 1.33 0.36
1926 1.59 1.22 0.37
1927 1.48 1.16 0.32
1928 1.49 1.17 0.32
1929 1.46 1.11 0.35
1930 1.23 0.84 0.39
1931 1,11 0,72 0,39
1932 1.39 1.00 0.39
1933 1.35 0.96 0,39
1934 1.47 1.05 0.42
1935 2.26 1.13 1.13
1936 1.84 0.91 0.93
1937 2.02 1.05 0.97
1938 1,67 0,80 0,87
1939 1.03 0.51 0.52
Source : own estimates. The figures relate to shareholders’ equity i.e. issued, paid capital plus 
retentions.
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TABLE JJ -  NUMBER OF SPINDLES IN BRITISH MILLS.
EWO COTTON MILLS.LIMrrED LAOU ORIENTAL CPA NEW ANGLO TOTAL
1897
(1)
29,400
(2) (3) Total
29,400
KUNG
MOW
23,100
CHINA CHINESE
52,500
1898 41,752 - - 41,752 25,296 - - - - 67,048
1899 50,144 - - 50,144 30,296 - - - - 80,440
1900 50,144 - - 50,144 30,096 - - - - 80,240
1901 50,144 - - 50,144 30,096 - - - - 80,240
1902 50,144 - - 50,144 30.096 - - - - 80,240
1903 50,144 - - 50,144 30,096 - - - - 80,240
1904 50,144 - - 50,144 30,096 - - - - 80,240
1905 50,144 - - 50,144 30,096 - - - - 80,240
1906 50,144 - - 50,144 30,096 - - - - 80,240
1907 50,176 - - 50,176 30,096 - - - 11,678 91,950
1908 51,500 - - 51,500 30,096 - - - 11,678 93,274
1909 51,500 - - 51,500 30,096 - - - - 81,596
1910 72,354 25,376 - 97,730 31,976 - - - - 129,706
1911 72,354 25,376 - 97,730 31,656 - - - - 129,386
1912 72,264 25,376 - 97,640 33,336 _ - - - 130,976
1913 72,264 25,376 - 97,640 33,376 - - - - 131,016
1914 72,264 25,376 9,936 107,576 40,096 - - - - 147,672
1915 73,952 25,376 55,632 154,960 40,096 - - - - 195,056
1916 73,952 25,376 55,632 154,960 40,096 - - - - 195,056
1917 73,952 25,376 55,632 154,960 40,096 50,768 - - - 245,824
1918 73,952 25,376 55,632 154,960 40,096 50,768 - - - 245,824
1919 75,756 25,376 55,632 156,764 40,096 50,768 - - - 247,628
1920 73,512 25,376 55,632 154,520 40,096 50,768 - - - 245,384
1921 73,512 25,376 55,632 154,520 45,566 50,768 - - - 250,854
1922 71,992 25,376 55,632 153,000 45,566 51,908 - - - 250,474
1923 72,512 25,376 55,632 153,520 45,516 51,908 - - 250,944
1924 72,312 25,376 55,632 153,320 45,516 51,908 - - - 250,744
1925 72,404 25,376 55,632 153,412 - 51,908 - - - 205,320
1926 72,312 25,376 55,632 153,320 - 51,908 - - - 205,228
1927 72,312 25,376 55,632 153,320 - 51,908 - - - 205,228
1928 72,312 25,376 55,632 153,320 - - - - - 153,320
1929 78,312 25,376 55,632 159,320 - - - - - 159,320
1930 78,312 25,376 55,632 159,320 - - - - - 159,320
1931 78,312 36,666 55,632 170,610 - - - - - 170,610
1932 78,312 49,252 55,632 183,196 - - - - - 183,196
1933 78,312 50,964 55,632 184,908 - - - - 184,908
1934 78,312 50,964 55,632 184,908 - - - - - 184,908
1935 84,672 50,964 55,632 191,268 - - - - - 191,268
1936 81,170 50,964 55,632 187,766 - - 42,240 - - 230,066
1937 78,312 50,964 55,632 184,908 - - 42,240 - - 227,148
1938 78,312 50,964 55,632 184,908 - - 42,240 5,000 - 232,148
1939 78,312 50,964 55,632 184,908 - - 42,240 35,000 - 262,148
1940 78,312 50,964 55,632 184,908 - - 42,240 36,000 - 263,148
(1) Original Ewo company, (2) Kung Y ik, (3) Yangtszepoo.
CONTINUED.
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TABLEJJ- Continued. 
Sources of the above data {North China Herald = NCH)
Kung Yik.
1910 China Stock and 
Share Handbook, 1915 
1932 NCH 22.3.33
Yangtszepoo.
1914 NCH 17.10.14
1915 NCH 4.3.16
Ewo -  Original Company.
1897 NCH 26.11.97
1898 NCH 24.12,98
1899 NCH 18.12.99 
1907 NCH 19.12.08
1909 NCH 13.11.09
1910 NCH 23,12.10 
1912NCH 20.11.12 
1915 Far Eastern Review,
September, 1923
1922 NCH 25,2,22
1923 China Stock and Share 
Handbook, 1925
1928  NCH 18.5.29-----------
1930  China Year Book, 1933---------
1931-7 — The Historical Statistics o f China's Cotton Textile Industry, 1950 — 
1938-40  China Year Book, 1939---------
Oriental. CPA.
1917 Ralph M. Odell. 1936 China Year Book,
Cotton Goods in China. 1939.
1922 China Stock and Share 
Handbook, 1925
New China. 
1938 Finance and 
Commerce 20.3.40 
1939-40 Finance and 
Commerce 18.9.40
Note (See Bibliography)
- Ralph M. Odell: Cotton Goods in China. US Dept, of Commerce.
- Kang Chao: The Development o f Cotton Textile Production in China.
Laou Kung Mou.
1897 NCH 28.2.98
1898 NCH 6.3.99
1899 Celestial 
Empire 21.3.25
1910 -1913- NCH 
15.13.13 
1914 Celestial 
Empire 21.3.25 
1921 Celestial 
Empire 21.3.25
Anglo Chinese. 
1907/8 Kang Chao. 
Pages 303, 304.
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TABLE KK -  NUMBER OF LOOMS IN BRITISH MILLS.
EWO COTTON MILLS LIMITED LAOU ORIENTAL CPA NEW CHINA TOTAL
1897
(1)
200
(2) (3) Total
200
KUNG
MOW
200
1898 200 - - 200 - - - _ 200
1899 200 - - 200 - _ _ 200
1900 200 - - 200 - - - _ 200
1901 200 - - 200 - - - _ 200
1902 200 - - 200 - - - _ 200
1903 200 - - 200 - - _ _ 200
1904 200 - - 200 - - _ _ 200
1905 200 - - 200 - - _ * 200
1906 200 - - 200 - - _ 200
1907 200 - - 200 - - _ 200
1908 200 - - 200 - - _ 200
1909 200 - - 200 - - _ _ 200
1910 500 - - 500 - - _ _ 500
1911 500 - - 500 - - _ 500
1912 500 314 - 814 - - _ 814
1913 500 314 - 814 - - _ _ 814
1914 580 400 - 980 - - _ _ 980
1915 580 400 136 1,116 - - _ _ 1,116
1916 580 500 415 1,495 - - - _ 1,495
1917 580 500 416 1,496 110 - _ _ 1,606
1918 679 500 416 1,595 130 - _ _ 1,725
1919 736 500 416 1,652 200 - _ 1,852
1920 824 500 441 1,765 500 440 _ _ 2,705
1921 712 500 441 1,653 500 440 2,593
1922 973 500 441 1,914 500 440 - - 2,854
1923 712 500 441 1,653 515 440 _ _ 2,608
1924 712 500 441 1,653 515 448 - - 2,616
1925 712 500 441 1,653 - 448 - 2,101
1926 896 412 542 1,850 - 448 _ 2,298
1927 896 412 690 1,998 - 454 _ _ 2,452
1928 896 314 690 1,900 - - - 1,900
1929 896 314 690 1,900 - _ _ _ 1,900
1930 912 500 800 2,212 - - - ■ _ 2,212
1931 n.a. n.a. n.a 2,480 - - - 2,480
1932 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,691 - - - _ 2,691
1933 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,891 - - - _ 2,891
1934 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,891 - - - 2,891
1935 n,a. n a n.a. 2,891 - - - - 2,891
1936 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,891 - - 1,130 - 4,021
1937 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,891 - - 1,130 - 4,021
1938 n.a. n.a n.a. 2,470 - - 1,130 - 3,600
1939 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,470 - - 1,130 200 3,800
1940 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,470 - - 1,130 210 3,810
(1) Original Ewo company, (2) Kung Yik, (3) Yangtszepoo.
CONTINUED.
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TABLE KK — Continued,
Sources of the above data {North China Herald -  NCH) ;-
Ewo -  Original Compamv. Kung Yik. Yangtszepoo.
1897-1900 NCH 20.11.09 1912 Kang Chao. 1915 NCH 4.3.16
1910-1913 N CH 27.11.09 Page306. 1916NCH 10.3.17
1914 China Stock and Share 1914 China Stock and
Handbook, 1915 Share Handbook, 1915
1920 Celestial Empire 18.12.20 1916 NCH 8.1.16
1923-28 — The Historical Statistics o f China s Cotton Textile Industry, 1950 —
1929-30 — The Growth and Industrialisation o f Shanghai. D.K.Lieu. Page 421. 
1931-32 — The Historical Statistics o f China’s Cotton Textile Industry, 1950 — 
1933-34 NCH 22.3.33 —
1935-36 — The Historical Statistics o f China rs Cotton Textile Industry, 1950 — 
1937-40 — China Year Book, 1939 —
Laou Kung Mow. 
I9I7NCH 2.3.18
1918 NCH 11.3.19
1919 NCH 28 2.20
1920 NCH 28.2.20
Oriental. CPA New China.
1920 NCH 3,4.20 China Year Book, 1939 1939 Finance and Commerce 20,3 .40
1924 China Year Book, 1929-30 1940 Finance and Commerce 18.9.40
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TABLE LL.
COMPARATIVE PO Sm O N  OF BRITISH COTTON SPINNING MILLS WITH THOSE OF OTHER 
NATIONALITIES -  NUMBER OF OPERABLE SPINDLES.
National Total -British* 
- No. o f spindles (thous.) - British
“ Percentage -- 
Other Western** Japanese Chinese
1897 395 53 13.3 24,0 - 62,7
1898 467 67 14.4 21.6 - 64.0
1899 497 80 16.2 20.3 - 63.5
1900 497 80 16.2 20.3 - 63.5
1901 497 80 16.2 20.3 - 63.5
1902 497 80 16.2 16.1 4.8 62.9
1903 501 80 16.0 16.0 4.8 63.2
1904 525 80 15,3 15,2 4,6 64,9
1905 540 80 14.9 14.8 4.4 65.9
1906 586 80 13.7 13.7 7.6 65.0
1907 63 3 92 14.5 12.6 7.7 65.2
1908 661 93 14.1 12.1 8.4 65.4
1909 685 82 11.9 11.7 8.1 68.3
1910 718 130 18.1 11.1 7.8 63.0
1911 736 130 17.-6 10,9 10,6 60,9
1912 738 131 17.7 10,8 10.6 60.9
1913 823 131 15.9 10.8 13.6 59.7
1918 1,134 246 21.7 . 21.2 57.1
1919 1,236 248 20.0 - 26.9 53.1
1922 2,386 250 10.5 - 26.1 63.4
1924 2,934 251 8.5 - 31.8 59.7
1925 3,340 205 6,1 - 38,0 55,9
1927 3,516 205 5.8 - 36.7 57.5
1928 3,610 153 4.2 - 38.7 57.1
1929 3,762 159 4.2 - 38.9 56.9
1930 4,102 159 3,9 - 38.7 57.4
1931 4,340 171 3,9 - 39.5 56.6
1932 4,599 183 4.0 - 38.9 57.1
1933 4,731 185 3.9 - 38.1 58.0
1934 4,939 185 3.7 - 39.4 56.9
1935 5,022 191 3,8 - 38,7 57,5
1936 5,103 230 4.5 - 41.8 53.7
1937 5,082 227 4.5 - 44,5 51.0
*See Table JJ.
**USA and Germany.
Figures in the main originally from Shanghai Association of Cotton Mills: The Historical Statistics o f 
China's Cotton Textile Industry, 1950 - reproduced in part (the National total) in China Fiber Yearbook, 
1990. Page 74.
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TABLE MM.
COMPARATIVE POSITION OF POWER LOOMS* AT BRITISH SPINNER-WEAVERS 
WITH THOSE OF OTHER NATIONALITIES.
National Total -British.** 
- Number of looms - British USA
-Percentage—
Japanese Chinese
1897 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1898 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1899 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1900 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1901 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1902 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1903 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 85.3
1904 3,418 200 5,9 8,8 - 85,3
1905 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1906 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1907 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1908 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 - 85.3
1909 3,418 200 5.9 8.8 85.3
1910 3,918 500 12.8 12.8 - 74.4
1911 4,798 500 10.4 10.4 18.5 60.7
1912 4,798 814 17.0 10.4 18.5 54.1
1913 4,798 814 17.0 10,4 18.5 54,1
1918 7,038 1,725 24.5 - 23.2 52.3
1919 7,959 1,852 23.3 - 25.0 51.7
1922 19,228 2,854 14.8 20.6 64.6
1924 22,477 2,616 11.6 - 26.4 62.0
1925 22,924 2,101 9.2 - 31.4 59.4
1927 29,788 2,452 8.2 - 46.9 44.9
1928 29,579 1,900 6.4 - 36.8 56.8
1929 29,272 1,900 6.5 - 38.8 54.7
1930 33,580 2,212 6,6 - 41,9 51,5
1931 42,596 2,480 5.8 - 45.3 48.9
1932 42,739 2,691 6.3 - 42.8 50.9
1933 42,834 2,891 6.7 - 44.4 48.9
1934 47,064 2,891 6.1 - 45.9 48.0
1935 52,009 2,891 5.6 - 44.5 49.9
1936 58,439 4,021 6.9 - 49.5 43.6
1937 59,900 4,021 6.7 - 51.4 41.9
* Excludes power looms operated by finishers and by independent weaving 
mills -  estimated at about 10,000 looms in 1934.
** See Table KK.
Figures in the main originally from Shanghai Association of Cotton Mills: The Historical Statistics o f 
China's Cotton Textile Industry, 1950.
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TABLENN.
THE EWO COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY. LIMITED 08951. 
- Thous. taels / Years ending Oct. 3 1st -
1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
Capital paid up
Ord. 1,000.0 1,134.3 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 750.0 750.0 750.0
Pref. - - - - - - - - -
Dividends (%) -
Ord. 3.5 - - - - - 8 - 16
Pref. - - - - - - - - -
Net profits 37,3 15.4 8.7 -120.5 104.5 9.4 75.9 1.1 253.1
+balance b.f _ 2.3 17.7 14.4 -118.1 -13.6 -4.2 11.7 12.8
- transfers to
reserves _ - - - - - - - 145.9
- depreciation - - 12.0 12.0 - - - - -
- dividends 35.0 - - - - - 60.0 - 120.0
Balance c.f. 2.3 17.7 14.4 -118.1 -13.6 -4.2 11.7 12.8 -
(Reserves) (-) (-) (-) (-) (“) (-) (-) (-) (-)
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914
Capital paid up
Ord. 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0
Pref. - - - - 135.6 396.4 400.0 400.0 400.0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 20 5 10 22 8 14 22 30 24
Pref. - - - - 7 7 7 7 7
Net profits 365.0 -18.7 107.4 298.4 67.4 203.4 339.7 552.3 370.1
+balance b.f. - 65.0 8.8 14.9 17.0 8.9 9.0 12.5 9.3
- transfers to
reserves 150.0 - 25.0 130.0 6.0 70.0 140.0 225.0 75.0
- depreciation - - 1.3 1.3 - 0.7 0.2 72.5 84,8
- dividends 150.0 37.5 75.0 165.0 69.5 132.6 193.0 253.0 208.0
- staff bonuses,
superannuation - - - - - - 3.0 5.0 4.5
Balance c.f. 65.0 8.8 14.9 17.0 8.9 9.0 12.5 9.3 7.1
(Reserves) (145.9) (295.9) (295.9) (320.9) (450.9) (456.9) (526.9) (666.9) (891.9)
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
Caoital Daid up
Ord. 750.0 750.0 750.0 750,0 750.0 1,000.0
Pref. 400.0 400.0 400.0 400.0 400.0 400.0
Dividends (%\
Ord. 32 18 40 34 130 180
Pref 7 7 7 7 7 7
Net profits* 530.3 122.6 799.4 554.4 1.431.7 2.109.7
+balance b .f 7.1 18,9 4,9 4,6 6,0 3,7
- transfers to
reserves 150.0 (125.0) 325.0 130.0 180.0 50.0
- depreciation 90.0 96.1 126.7 125.0 151.0 153.7
- dividends 268.0 163.0 328.0 283.0 1,003.0 1,828.0
- staff bonuses,
superannuation 10.5 2.5 20.0 15.0 100.0 70.0
Balance c.f. 18.9 4.9 4.6 6.0 3.7 11.7
(Reserves) (966.9) (1,116.9) (991.9) (1,316.9) (1,446.9) (1,626.9)
* After donations to War Funds e.g. 50.0 in 1917.
CONTINUED
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TABLB NN Continued.
Sources (all from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated) >
1897 26.11.97.
1898 24.12.98.
1899 18.12.99.
1900 12.12,00,
1901 31.12.01.
1902 24.12.02.
1903 11.12.03.
1904 23.12.04.
1905 8.12.05.
1906 7.12.06.
1907 20,12,07,
1908 19.12.08.
1909 20.11.09.
1910 23.12.10.
1911 23.12.11.
1912 30.11.12.
1913 20.12.13.
1914 5,12,14,,
1915 4.12.15.
1916 23.12.16.
1917 6. I.IS.
1918 14.12.18.
1919 6.12.19.
1920 4.12.20.
-336-
TABLE OO.
THE KUNG Y1K COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY. LIMITED.
Thous. taels / Years ending November 30
Capital paid up 
Ord. (10 taels 
each) 536.5 
Dividends (%) 12
Net profits*'* 108.2 
+balance b.f. 
-transfers to 
reserves 
-depreciation 
-dividends 
-staff bonus,
- superannuation - 1.4 1.4 1.7
Balance c.f. 11.7 7.0 M 5.4
(Reserves) (-) (-) (37.5) (57.0)
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
750,0 750.0 750,0 750.0 750.0 750.0
15 9 20 16 50 80
184.5 95.6 289.5 198.3 695.1 913.0
5.4 5.1 7.7 6.6 4.4 8.6
25.0 (20.0) 75.0 25.0 230.0 190.0
44,3 44,3 60,6 52,0 60,5 101,9
112.5 67.5 150.0 120.0 375.0 600.0
3.0 1.2 5.0 3.5 25.4 37.5
5.1 7.7 6.6 4.4 8.6 -7.8
(77.0) (102.0) (82.0) (157.0) (182.0) (412.0)
1912 1913 9141911*
32,1
64.4
750.0
15
176.9
11.7
37.5
30,2
112.5
750.0
15
170.3
7.0
19.5
35,3
112.5
750.0
12
150.7
8.6
20.0
42,2
90.0
♦Accounts cover from 17.10.10 to 30.11.11 
♦'♦After donations to War Funds 
Sources (all from the following editions of the North China Herald) :-
1911 6.1.12 1916 3.2.17
1912 11.1.13 1917 19.1.18
1913 10,1,14 1918 18,1,19
1914 7.1.15 1919 11.1.20
1915 8.1.16 1920 8.1.21
TABLE PP. 
YANGTSZEPOO COTTON MILL. LIMITED. 
- Thous. Taels -
1915* 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
Capital paid up
Ord. (Tl. 5 each) 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Pref. (Tl. 100 each) 500 500 500 500 500 500
Dividends (%)
Ord. - - 25 16 70 100
Pref. 7 - 14 7 7 7
Net profits ** 107.2 64.3 692.5 396.5 1.232.4 1.463.2
+balance b .f - 23,3 5,0 2,0 4,5 6,9
- transfers to reserves - 250.0 90.0 335.0 270.0
- depreciation 43.1 82.6 113.5 100.0 105.0 115.5
- dividends 40.8 320.0 195.0 735,0 1,035.0
- staff bonuses,
superannuation - - 12.0 9.0 55.0 45.0
Balance c.f 23.3 5.0 2.0 15 4.6
(Reserves) (-) (-) (-) (250.0) (340.0) (675.0)
* 14 months ending 31.12.15
** After donations to War Funds 
e.g. 15.0 in 1917.
Sources (all from the following editions o f the North China Herald)
1915 12.2.16
1916 24,2,17
1917 2.2 18/16.2.18
1918 1.2.19/8.3.19
1919 7.2.20/24.2.20
1920 22.1.21/19.2.21
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TABLE OO.
THE EWO COTTON MILLS. LIMITED.
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
Capital paid up
Ord. -Tl. 5 4000 4500* 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 5000** 5000 5000
Pref-Tl. 100 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
Dividends (%)
Ord. 60 30 11 5 5 13 8 12 48 15 36 24
Pref, 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Net profits 3180.7 1703.6 858.8 ■-19.8 317.7 1135.4 714.9 1086:9 2962.0 ]1659.3 :2610.5 1770.7
+balance b .f 8,5 10,9 3,3 1,1 7,1 1,5 5,0 5,5 449,8 118,8
- transfers to
reserves 201.9 27.0 40.0 (498.4) (185.0) 225.0 62.0 225.0 385.0 140.0 766.5 152.1
-depreciation 387.0 204.7 239.4 184.9 189.6 203.4 201.5 206.4 234.5 203.0 283.0 282.0
- dividends 2453.3 1422.0 567.0 297.0 297.0 657.0 432.0 612.0 2232.0 822.0 1872.0 1272.0
- superannuation
fund (Chinese) 30.0 10.0 - 14.0 - 10.0 30.0 10.0 20.0 15.0
- staff bonus 80.0 37.5 20,0 - 15.0 30.0 25.0 30.0 80.0 40.0 - 75.0
- donations to
charities 20.0 - - - - - - - -
Balance c.f. 8.5 10.9 3.3 - 1.1 7.1 1.5 5.0 5.5 449.8 118.8 93.4
Reserves 3711.2 3913.1 3940.1 3980.1 3481.7 3296.7 3521.7 3583.7 3808.7 4193.7 4333.7 5100.2
*100,000 ordinary shares at T1.5 premium offered to shareholders in March. All taken up. 
**100,000 ordinary shares offered to shareholders on 12.4,30 at T1.5 premium. All taken up.
- $ Thous -
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Caoital paid up
Ord. - $7 each 6993.0 6993.0 6993.0 6993.0 8378.7* 9225.0** 9453.8
Pref. - $140 each 1258.7 1258.7 1258.7 1258.7 1258.7 1258.7 1258.7
Dividends (%)
Ord. 5.7 4.3 3.6 8.6 20.0 50.0 71.4
Pref. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Net profits 676.6 472.3 284.3 1021.3 2716.9 6180.6 10983.3
+ balance b. f. 130.7 34.0 10.1 9.6 5.2 188.8 274.8
- dividends 500.7 400.7 350.7 700.7 1780.7 4713.2 6850.7
- depreciation 252.6 200.5 200.0 250.0 - 450.0 900.0
- transfers to reserves - (120.0) (273.4) 55.0 602.6 751.4 1867.8
- general reserve - - - - - 0.7 367.8
- equalisation of
dividend fund - (150.0) (298.4) - 110.0 150.0 -
- repairs and renewals 30,0 25,0 55,0 150,0 200,0 500,0
- machine modernisation - - - - 200.0 400.0 1000.0
- cotton fluctuation fund - - - - - 0.7 _
- “old debts due by
Chinese Government” - - - - 142.6 - -
- Staff bonus and
contingencies 20.0 15.0 7.5 20.0 100.0 150.0 350.0
- Chinese superannuation - - - - 50.0 30.0 60.0
Balance c.f. 34.0 10,1 9.6 5.2 188.8 274.8 1229.6
(Reserves) (7345.8) (7345.8) (7225.8) (6952.4) (7007.4) (7610.0) (8361.4)
* August, 1937 -  a new issue o f200,000 shares was completed at a premium of c.$5.50.
** December, 1938 -  a new issue o f 150,000 shares was launched at a premium of c.$7.00. 
Sources (all from the following editions o f the North China Herald)
1921 18.2.22/25.2.22 1926 19.3.27 1931 3.5.32 1936 7.4.37
1922 17.2.23 1927 17.3.28 1932 22.3.33 1937 11.5.38
1923 8.3.24 1928 16.3.29 1933 28.3.34 1938 3.5.39
1924 14.3.25 1929 183.30 1934 15.4,35 1939 3,4,40
1925 20.3.26 1930 17.3.31 1935 15.4.36
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TABLE RR.
THE LAOU KUNG MOW COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY. LIMITED.
- Thous. taels -
1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906
Capital paid up
Ord, (Tl.100) 599,6 715.8 715.8 715.8 715.8 715.8 715.8 715.8 715.8 715.8
Dividends (%) 4 - - - - - 8 8
Net profits 21.1 24.1 54.6 -22.1 44.4 54.2 19.9 28.5 163.7 115.8
+balance b.f. - 21.1 10.6 29.6 -17.5 - 44.8 15.5 10.0 30.7
- depreciation - 10.6 35.6 25.0 26.9 9.4 49.2 34.0 75.9 51.4
- dividends - 24.0 - - - - - 57.3 57.3
- paid to general
managers* - - - - - - - 9.8 6.4
Balance c.f. 21.1 10.6 29.6 -17.5 44.8 15.5 10.0 30.7 31.4
1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915
Caoital Daid up
Ord. (Tl.100) 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0
Dividends (%) 4 4 6 - 5 11 12 - -
Net profits 1A 76.4 82.1 53 62.7 136.5 109.3 33.9 - I I .8
+ balance b.f. 31.4 6.4 4.8 4.9 10.2 0.6 6.4 8.8 11.8
- depreciation - 43.0 28.6 - 28.3 32.3 - 30.6 -
- dividends 31.7 32.0 48.0 - 40.0 88.0 96.0 - -
- paid to general
managers* 0.7 3.0 5.4 - 4.0 10.4 10.9 0.3 -
Balance c.f. M 48 4 9 10.2 0 6 0 4 M 11.8 -
1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924
Capital paid up
Ord. (Tl.100**) 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0
Dividends f%> - 2.5 7 50 65 20 - - -
Net profits -106.0 153.1 109.4 888.4 848.8 329.7 -259.9 -301.2 -276.3
+ balance b .f - -106,0 3,9 4,5 2,6 4,4 15,0 5,1 -86,1
- transfers to
reserves - - 230.0 180.0 50.0 (250.0) (210.0) -
- depreciation - 20.5 46.5 172.6 61.0 61.0 - - -
- dividends - 20.0 56.0 400.0 520.0 160.0 - - -
- staff bonus - - - 4.5 5.7 5.0 - - -
- paid to general
managers* - 2,7 6,3 83,2 80,3 43,1 - - -
Balance c.f. —106.0 3.9 4.5 2.6 4.4 15.0 -86.1 -362.4
(Reserves) (-) O (-) (-) (230.0) (410.0) (460.0) (210.0) O
* 10% o f net profit minus depreciation.
*'*' With effect from April, 1921 divided into 10 shares o f Tl. 10 each. 
Sources (all from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated) >
1897 28.2.98 1907 24.1.08 1917 2.3.18
1898 6.3.99 1908 13.2.09 1918 15.2.19
1899 28.2.00 1909 28.1.10 1919 28.2.20
1900 23.1.01 1910 10.2.11 1920 5.2.21
1901 22.1.02 1911 10.2.12 1921 11.3.22
1902 11.2.03 1912 15.2.13 1922 17.3,23
1903 25.2.04 1913 7.2.14/14.2.14 1923 8.3.24
1904 17.2.05 1914 27.2.15 1924 Celestial Empire 21.3.25
1905 9.2.06 1915 26.2.16.
1906 8.2,07 1916 3,3,17
-339-
TABLE SS.
THE ORIENTAL COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY. LIMITED.
Thous. taels
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 19271918 1919 1920 1921
Capital paid up
Ord. -  Tl. 30* 600.0 600.0 659.8 659.8
Dividends (%) 8.3 50 106.7 50
Net profits 269.5 849.1 1.489.1 256.0
+ balance b.f - 134.0 128.2 322.8
- transfers to
reserves - 420.0 183.9 -
- depreciation 75.0 50.0 258.0 -
- dividends 50.0 300.0 703.7 329.9
- general managers
commission 10.5 84.9 148.9 25.6
Balance c.f. 134.0 128.2 322.8 223.3
(Reserves) (-) (-) (420.0) (603.9)
-57.6
-31.0
-335.1 -165.0 -277.6 -264.5
10.0
(98.6) (325.1) (165.0) (277.6) (264,5)
10.0
  (603.9) (603.9) (505.3) (180.2) (15.2) (-262.4)
* Taels 3 each from 1920 onwards.
Sources (all from the North C him  Herald unless otherwise stated)
1918 22.2.19
1919 3.4.20
1920 China Stock and Share Handbook 1925,
1921 1.4.22
1922 24.3.23
1923 16.2.24
1924 14.3.25 Celestial Empire.
1925 13.3.26
1926 7.4.28
1927 7.4.28
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TABLE TT.
THE CHINA PRINTING AND FINISHING COMPANY. LIMITED -  NET PROFIT 
AFTER DEPRECIATION. INTEREST AND TRANSFERS TO RESERVES.
Thous $ fthou
1932 -945 -46
1933 686 43
-1.1 to 17.5 324
- 18.5 to 6.9 163
-7.9 to 31.12 199
1934 843 56
1935 -314 zl9
1936 794 48
-L I to 16,5 231
-17.5 to 4.10 192
-5.10to  31.12 371
1937 1.059 64
-1.1 to 15.5 1,024
- 16.5 to 31.2 35
1938 3,000 130
-1,1 to 14,5 600
- 15.5 to 31.12 2,400
1939 1.061 18
-1.1 to 13.5 1,653
-14.5 to 28,10 -626
-29.10 to 31.12 34
1940 7,131 104
- 1.1 to 13.4 7,356
- 14.4 to 28.9 814
-29,9 to 31,12 - l f039
1941
-1.1 to 12.4 2,894
-13.4 to 10.5 -1,494
-11.5 to 2.8 3,021**
*As translated by the company.
**The figure for the same period of 1940 was 532 thous. $ 
Source CPA Board Minutes Numbers 15 to 27.
TABLE UU.
THE CHINA PRINTING AND FINISHING COMPANY. LIMITED -  
OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST TWELVE WEEKS OF 1939 AND 1940 (1).
1939 1940
Production - million yards 
-cotton mill 11,5 11,5
-finishing works 16.7 15.2
Deliveries - million yards 14.3 13.8
- £ thous. 127.5(2) 124.0(3)
Profit (4) -£  thous. 33.6 83.1
- as % o f sales 26% 67%
(1) Source CPA Board Minutes No, 26.
(2) Converted by the company at $28 = £.
(3) Converted by the company at $60 = £.
(4) After depreciation but before transfers to reserves.
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(4) BACKUP TABLES TO PART I ff  -  CHAPTER FOUR -  ENGINEERING.
TABLE W .
BOYD AND COMPANY. LIMITED.
Twelve months endina 30th. Anrii -  Thous. Taels.
1896 1897 1898 1899 1900
Capital paid up
Ord. (Tl. 100) 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0 780.0
Founders (Tl. 100) 20.0 20,0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 15 12 15 14 13
Founders 117 - 117 78 39
Net profit 247.8 113.1 182.3 167.8 163.9
+ balance b.f. 9.8 37.2 11.7 8.6 6.6
- transfers to reserves 60,0 30,0 30,0 30,0 30,0
- dividends 140.4 93.6 140.4 124.8 109.2
- depreciation 20.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15,0
Balance c.f 37.2 11.7 8.6 6.6 16.3
(Reserves) (125.6) (185.6) (215.6) (245.6) (275.6)
Sources > North China Herald, 31.7,1896, 13.8.1897, 20.6.1898, 3.7.1899, 4.7,1900.
TABLE WW.
Twelve months endina 3 0thJune -- Thousand Taels.
Capital paid up
1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900
Ord. (Tl. 100) 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0 750.0 800.0
Dividends (%) 12 14 12 12 15 30
Net profits 164.8 190.6 180.3 176.1 197.8 279.3
+ balance b,f. 7,6 7,4 13,0 18,3 19,4 19,7
- transfers to reserves 65.0 70.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 30.0
- dividends 90.0 105.0 90.0 90.0 112.5 240.0
- depreciation 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Balance c.f. 7.4 13.0 18.3 19.4 19.7 19.0
(Reserves) (65.0) (130.0) (200.0) (275.0) (350.0) (425.0)
Sources:- North China Herald, 30.8.1895,25.9.1896,3.9.1897,12.9.1898, 11.9.1899,10.9.1900.
TABLE XX
SHANGHAI ENGINEERING. SHIPBUILDING AND DOCK COMPANY. LIMITED. 
Twelve months ending 30tll.April - Thousand Taels.
Capital paid up (Tl. 100) 
Ord.
Founders 
Preference 
Dividends (%)
Ord.
Founders 
Preference 
Net profits 
+ balance b.f.
- transfers to reserves
- dividends
- depreciation 
Balance c.f.
1897*
491.3
20.0
14.9
14.9
1898
600.0
20.0
10.4
14.9
25.3 
Eight months.
1899
600,0
20.0
130.0
3.5 
31.9 
25.3
4.7
52.5
1900
600.0
20.0
130.0
7
78.2 
52.5
9.1
7.4
114.2
Sources .-North China Herald, 6.8.1897, 26.9.1898, 28.8.1899, 25.7.1900.
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TABLE YY.
SC. EARN HAM. BOYD AND COMPANY. LIMITED.
Twelve months ending 30th. April - Thousand Taels.
1901* 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906
Capital paid  up (Tl, 1001
Ord. 4,830.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0
Dividends
Ord. 28 17 15 12 13 8
Net profits 1.287.3 1.691.5 910.9 717.5 804.3 410.7
+ balance b.f. - 51.1 60.2 43.1 48.2 34.9
- transfers to reserves - 750.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 -
- dividends 1,236.2 938.4 828.0 662.4 717.6 441.6
- depreciation - - - - - -
Balance c.f. 51,1 60,2 43,1 48,2 34,9 4,0
(Reserves) (-) (-) (750.0) (850.0) (900.0) (1,000.0)
* Only 10 months in the case of S.C. Famham.
Sources (all North China Herald) 3.7.01, 23.7.02,27.7.03, 30.6.05, 16.6.05, 20.7,06.
TABLE ZZ.
THE SHANGHAI DOCK AND ENGINEERING COMPANY. LIMITED. 
Twelve months ending 30th. April -  Thousand Taels
1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914
Capital paid up (Tl. 100*)
Ord. 5,520,0 5,-520.0 !5,520,0 5,520,0 5,520,0 5,520,0 5,520,0 5,520,0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 3 5 5 6 2.5 3 3 5
Net profits 172.1 305.0 248.6 373.0 101.4 158.3 175.9 299.0
+ balance b.f. 4.0 10.5 33.7 6.3 48.1 11.5 4.2 14.5
- transfers to reserves - - - - - (500.0) - -
- dividends 165.6 276.0 276.0 331.2 138.0 165.6 165.6 276.0
- depreciation - 5.8 - - - 500.0 - -
Balance c. f. 10.5 33.7 6.3 48.1 11.5 4.2 14.5 37.5
(Reserves) (1,000,0) (1,000,0) (1,000,0) (1,000,0) (1,000,0) (1,000,0) (500,0) (500,0)
* Reduced to 75 Taels in 1922 and 50 Taels in 1929.
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922
Capital paid up
Ord. 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0 5,520.0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 3 7.5 9 14 14 20 16 10
Net profits 162,3 568,9 639,8 1,082,0 975,6 1,660,1 996,7 732,1
+ balance b.f. 37.5 34.2 59.1 72.1 70.7 46.2 89.0 102.5
- transfers to reserves - (370.0) 130.0 240.0 150,0 400.0 100.0 100.0
- dividends 165.6 414.0 496.8 772.8 772.8 1,104.0 883.2 552.0
- depreciation - 500.0 - 70.6 77.3 113.3 - 115.0
Balance c.f. 34.2 59.1 72.1 70.7 46.2 89.0 102.5 67.6
(Reserves) (500.0) (500.0) (130.0)i (260.0)1 (500.0) (650.0) (1,050.0) (1,150.0)
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Capital paid up
Ord. 4,140.0 4,140.0 4,140.0 4,140.0 4,140.0 4,140.0 4,140.0 2,760.0
Dividends (%1
Ord. 10 12 14 11 9 10 10 14
Net profits 449.9 545.0 653.3 387.3 391.6 380.9 659.6 825.6
+ balance b.f. 67.6 102.5 98.7 172.4 104.3 123.3 90.2 135.8
- transfers to reserves - - - - - - 100.0 450.0
- dividends 414,0 496,8 579,6 455,4 372,6 414.0 414,0 386,4
- depreciation 1.0 52.0 - - - - 100.0 -
Balance c.f. 102.5 98.7 172.4 104.3 123.3 90.2 135.8 125.0
(Reserves) (1,250.0) (1,250.0) (1,250.0) (1,250.0) (1,250.0) (1,250.0X1,250.0)(1,350.0)
Continued
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TABLE ZZ (Continued).
THE SHANGHAI DOCK AND ENGINEERING COMPANY. LIMITED
- Twelve months ending April.30111 -
1931 1932 
Thous, Taels -
1933 1934
- $ Thous,
1935
Capital paid up
Ord. 2,760.0 2,760.0 2,760.0 3,860.0 3,860,0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 12 10 10 8 3
Net profits 295.5 133.0 271.8 172:0 69.0
+ balance b.f. 125.0 89.3 96.3 128.8 129.7
- transfers to reserves - (150.0) - (137.7) -
- dividends 331.2 276.0 276.0 308.8 115.8
- depreciation - - - - -
Balance c.f. 89.3 96.3 92.1 129.7 82.9
(Reserves) (1,800.0) (1,800.0) (1,650.0) (2,308.2) (2,170.5)
Note : In the financial year to April 30th, 1936 the Company made net profits of $101.5 thous. after 
excluding trading profits from 1.10 35 to 30.4.36 due to the Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd.
Sources (from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated) >
1907 26.7.07
1908 4.7.08
1909 3.7.09
1910 8.7.10
1911 8.7.11
1912 12.7.12
1913 19.7.13
1914 25.7.14
1915 24.7.15/31.7.15
1916 5.8.16
1917 28.7.17/4.8.17
1918 Celestial Empire 3,7,18
1919 26.7.19
1920 24.7.20/31.7.20
1921 9.7.21
1922 15.7.22
1923 28.7.23
1924 2.8.24
1925 Celestial Empire 8.8.25
1926 7.8.26 / Celestial Empire
1927 23.7.27
1928 4.8.28
1929 13.7.29/3.8.29
1930 15.7.30/5.8.30
1931 4.8.31
1932 3.8.32
1933 2.8.33
1934 1,8,34
1935 26.8.36
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TABLE AAA.
THE NEW ENGINEERING AND SHIPBt JILDING WORKS.
- Thous Taels -
1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Capital paid up
Ord. (T1.5) 190.5 190.5 190.5 218.5 318.5 318.5 318.5 419.8 419.8
Pref.(T1.5) - - - - - - - -
Dividends (%)
Ord. 20 10 20 14 16 10 18 20 40
Pref - - - - - - - - -
Net profits 15.1 13.9 36.3 30.2 74.6 45.1 132.0 313.4 401.5
*t- balance b.f. 49.3 18.1 12.9 11.1 10.7 9.3 7.6 21.3 39.9
- transfers to reserves - - - 15.0 - 21.0 180.0 115.0
- dividends 38.1 194 38.1 30.6 51.0 31.-8 57.3 84.0 167.4
- depreciation 8.2 - - - 10.0 15.0 40.0 30.8 100.0
- other deductions* - - - - - - - - 15.0
Balance c. f. 18.1 12.9 11.1 10.7 9.3 7.6 21.3 39.9 44.0
(Reserves) (180.0) (180.0) (180.0) (243.9) (243.9) (358.9) (358.9) (458.9) (638.9)
* Donations to patriotic funds,etc. and appropriations from balances subsequent to general meetings.
1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926
Capital paid up
Ord. (T1.5) 496.7 646.7 750.0 1,050.0 1,050.0 1,050.0 1,050.0 1,050.0 1,050.0
Pref.(T1.5) - - - 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 30 60 100 20 12 5 15 - 5
Pref. - - - 8 8 8 8 8 8
Net profits 537.0 797.9 1.226.5 590.8 291.8 175.0 352.8 3.4 176.9
+ balance b .f 44.0 33.7 39.1 55.6 68.4 82.4 48.5 87.4 10.8
- transfers to reserves 353.3 284.5 425.0 250.0 - - - (65.0) (35,0)
- dividends 149.0 388.0 750.0 303.0 246.0 172.5 277.5 120.0 172.5
- depreciation 25.0 100.0 25.0 25.0 31.8 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
- other deductions 20.0 20.0 10.0 - - 11.4 11.4 - _
Balance c.f. 33.7 39.1 55.6 68.4 82.4 48.5 87.4 10.8 25.2
(Reserves) (753.9) (1,184.1) (1,618.6) (1,082.0)(1,082.0) (1,082.0)(1,082.0)(1,082.0)(1 ,017.0)
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
- Thous. Taels - - $ Thousand -
Capital paid up
Ord. (Tl.5) 1,050.0 1,050.0 1,050.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 2,098.0 2,098.0 2,098.0
Pref.(T1.5) 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 2.098.0 2,098.0 2,098.0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 8 8 10 5 5 6 - - -
Pref. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 -
Net profits 225.7 264.3 329.1 167.6 80.9 448.6* 47.7 -116.8 ■-164.4
+ balance b .f 25.2 19.1 37.8 61.9 24.5 50.4 100.3 59.9 -83.6
- transfers to reserves - - 50.0 - (155.0)** 175.0 (79.7) -
- dividends 204.0 204.0 225.0 195.0 195.0 210.0 167.8 - -
- depreciation 27.8 25.0 30.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 - - -
- other deductions - 16.6 - - - 27.3 - (-26.7)
Balance c.f. 19.1 37.8 61.9 24.5 50.4 71.7 59.9 -83.6 -248.0
(Reserves) (982.0) (982.0) (982.0) (1,032.0) (1,032.0) (877.0)(1,471.7)(1,392.0)(1,392.0)
*Of which 319,6 Thous. Taels sale of land at Pudong.
** To cover write-off of expenditure on Yichang venture.
Sources (from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated)
1909-11 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1914, 1918 8/29.3,19 1925 20.3.26
1912 3.5.13 1919 27.3.20 1926 2.4.27
21.3.14 1920 12.3.21 1927 3.3.28
10.4.15 1921 12.3.22 1928 2.3.29
31.3.16/15.4.16 1922 10.2.23 1929 25 2 30.
17.2.17 1923 16 2.24 1930 10.3.31
23.2.18 1924 Celestial Empire 28.2.25 1931 15.3.32
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1932 22.3.33
1933 11.4.34
1934 24.4,35
1935 29.4.36
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TABLE BBB.
VULCAN IRON WORKS. LIMITED. 
Years to end August -  Thousand Taels.
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
Capital paid up
Ord. (500 Taels) 311.0 311.0 500.0 500.0 500.0
Dividends 1%)
Ord. 10 3.5 7.5 - -
Net profits 43.3 53.6 33.3 -29.2 -17.8
+ balance b.f. - 12.2 21.4 16.9 -12.3
- write-off of goodwill - 18.7 - - -
- write of prelim, expenses - - - - 1.5
- depreciation - 14.5 - - 15.7
- dividends 31.1 11,2 37.8 - -
Balance c.f. 12.2 21.4 16.9 -12.3 -47.3
1911
500.0
11.0
-47.3
Sources (all from the North China Herald) :-
1906 2.11.06 1909 11.11.10
1907 10.1.08 1910 11.11.10
1908 26.6.09 1911 11.11.11
TABLE CCC.
SHANGHAI DOCKYARDS. LIMITED -  Twelve months ending September 30th - $ Thousand
Capital paid up
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
Ord. ($10) 10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 10,000.0 11,250.0
Dividends (%) - 4 9 25 30
Net profits 100.8 580.3 1.392.8 2.424.5 4.410.7
+ balance b.f. - 100.8 281.1 573.9 198.4
- transfers to reserves - - 200.0 300.0 1,000.0
- dividends - 400.0 900.0 2,500.0 3,375.0
Balance c.f 100.8 281.1 573.9 198.4 234.1
(Reserves) (1,313.6) (1,313.6) (1,313.6) (1,516.6) (1,816.6)
Sources :-
1936 Finance and Commerce 16.2.38
1937 Finance and Commerce 16.2.38
1938 Finance and Commerce 7.12.38
1939 Finance and Commerce 7.12.39
1940 North China Herald 25.12.40
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(5) BACKUP TABLES TO PART III -  CHAPTER FIVE -  CHEMICALS
TABLE PDD.
MAJOR BKOTHEKS.LTD. 
Calendar Years -  Thous. Taels.
1895* 1896** 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903
Capital paid up
Ord, (Taels 50) 275,0 275,0 275,0 275,0 275,0 275,0 275,0 275,0 275,0
Dividends (Vo)
Ord. - - - 4 5 6 _ 6 6
Net profits -4.6 1 2 12.1 5jl 27.7 19.2 0,9 18.6 18.2
+balance b.f. -5.1 -9.7 -2.5 9.6 - - - 0.9 3.0
- transfers to
reserves - - - 4.0 13.9 2.7 - - -
- dividends - - - 11.0 13.8 16.5 - 16.5 16.5
- depreciation - - - 0.4 - - - - 4.7
Balance c.f. -9.7 -2.5 9.6 - - - 0.9 3.0 -
(Reserves) (-)
*Twelve months
(-) (-) 
to 31.10.95. **
(-) (4.0) (17.9) (20.6) 
Fourteen months to 31,12.96.
(20.6) (20.6)
1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912
Capital paid up
Ord. (Taels 50) 275.0 275.0 275.0 275.0 275.0 275.0 275.0 275.0 275.0
Dividendsf%)
Ord. 8 - - - - - - -
Net profits 32.5 -5.8 5.8 8.3 18.1 -9.1 -8.1 -6.4 -6.0
+balanee b.f, - - -5,8 - -2,7 15,4 5,8 -3,1 -17,4
- transfers to
reserves - - - - - - - - -
- dividends 22.0 - - - - - - - -
- depreciation 10.5 - - 11.0 - 0.5 0.8 7.9 8.3
Balance c.f. - -5.8 - -2.7 15.4 5.8 -3.1 -17.4 -31.7
(Reserves) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6)
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Capital paid up
Ord. (Taels*) 275.0 110.0 110,0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0
Dividends(%)
Ord. - - - - - - - - -
Net profits -1.9 39.9 ± 0 18.5 23.7 M -0.4 10.5 21.3
+balance b.f. -31.7 -42.2 -2.3 1.7 15.5 39.2 7.6 7.2 7.7
- transfers to
reserves - - - - 20.0 - - -
- dividends - - - - - - _ - _
- depreciation 8.6 - - 4.7 - 20.0 - 10.0 20.0
Balance c.f. -42.2 -2.3 1.7 15.5 39.2 7.6 7.2 7.7 9.0
(Reserves) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (20.6) (40.6) (40.6) (40.6)
Capital paid up 
Ord. (Taels 20) 
Dividends(%) 
Ord.
Net profits 
+balance b.f.
- transfers to 
reserves 
-dividends 
-depreciation 
Balance c.f. 
(Reserves)
*50 taels until reconstruction of 1914 -  then 20 taels each.
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0
- 2.0
9.0
- 0.1
7.0
7.0 6.9
5T
6.9
5.0
7.0
XA
7.0
8.4
42
8.4
5.0
7.6
-1.9
7.6
5.7
n.a.
5.7
5.0
n.a.
20
n.a.
n.a.
22.0
n.a.
4.5
(40.6) (40.6) (40.6) (40.6) (40.6) (40.6) (40.6) (40.6) 
(No further information available)
10
13.6 22.8
4.5 8.1
2.1 
11.0 
10.0 10.0 
M  7J5
(40.6) (40.6)
CONTINUED.
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TABLE DDD -  Continued.
Data for 1909- 1913 
Datafbr 1914
Sources o f the above data (all from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated )
27.12.95
28.3:98
28.3.98
20.5.99
21.3.00
13.3.01
26.3.02
26.3.03 
25.3:04 
24.3.05
6.5.06
5.4.07
1.5.08 
24.4.09
The China Stock and Share Handbook, 1914.
Hie China Stock and Share Handbook, 1915.
31.3.16 
1-0.3.17
22.3.19
22.3.19
16.4.21
16.4.21
18.3.22 
7.4.23
29.3 ,24 Also The ChmaStockandShar-e Handbook, 1929.
14.3.25 Also The China Stock and Share Handbook, 1929.
10.4.26 Also The China Stock and Share Handbook,. 1929. 
9.4.27 Also The China Stock and Share Handbook, 1929.
28.4.28 Also The China Stock and Share Handbook, 1929. 
4.5.29 
18.3.30
3.3.31
4.4.32
Celestial Empire 
Celestial Empire
-348- 
TABLE EEE.
THE ORIENT PAINT. COLOUR ANO VARNISH COMPANY. LIMITED 
- DISTRIBUTION OF SALES -
fAl BY VALUE
Financial vear Financial vear November June
to 30.9.38 (a) to 30.9.39 (b) 1940 Cel 1941(d
% % % %
m  SHANGHAI 74.5 67.9 51.2 53.4
(2) REST MAINLAND
CHINA 8J> 6 3 10.1 L9
Tianjin 3:9 2.5 n.a. n.a.
Qingdao 1.2 0.9 n.a. n.a.
Congquing 0.5 0.5 n.a n.a.
Zhifu 0,6 0,4 n.a. n,a.
Beijing 0.6 0.6 n.a. n.a.
Xiamen 0.2 0.2 n.a. n.a.
Fuzhou 0.4 0.3 n.a. n.a.
Nanjing 0.1 - n.a. n.a.
Guangdong 0.2 0.2 n.a. n.a.
Other 0:8 0.7 n.a. n.a.
f3> HONG- HONG 17.0 25.7 14.6 13.9
141 “SOUTHERN
MARKETS” - 03 24.1 30.8
Singapore - 0.1 17.2 14.2
Penang - - - 4.8
Kuala Lumpor - - 2.7 0.8
Rangoon - - 4.2 -
Bangkok - - - n.o
fa) Swire archives. Letterfrom Shanghai to  Heat} -Office November 10th, 193 9. Box: 2053.
(b) Letter from Shanghai to  Head Office February 23rd, 1940. Box 2053.
(c) SalesReport for November, 1940. Box 2058.
(d) Letter to Head Office on July 18th, 1940 from Shanghai, Box 2058,
(B) BY QUANTITY
Financial Years ending 30th September -  Sales ex Production. * 
1940 1-941
Metric tons % Metric tons %
TOTAL 1.786.2 100,0 1.904.1 100.0
Shanghai 896.2 50.2 1,148.3 60.3
Rest Mainland China 109.7 6.1 109.7 5.8
Hong Kong 292.6 16.4 341.3 17.9
Exports 487.7 27.3 304.8 16.0
* Sales Report for September, 1941. Box 364A.
The best three months for 
Shanghai 
June, 1939 1-69 tons
November, 1938 168 tons
August,. 1939 153 tons
sales were *
Rest Mainland/Hong Kong 
January, 1939 66tons
February, 1939 62 tons
October, 1939 62 tons
“Southern Markets” 
June, 1941 92 tons- 
October,1941 77 tons 
November, 1939 73 tons
Overall Sales 
October, 1939 189 tons
July, 1941 187 tons
August, 1940 186 tons
* Letter from Shanghai on November 22nd, 1947 to Butterfield & Swire, Hong Kong. Box 364 B.
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TABLE FFF.»
THE ORffiNT PAINT. COLOUR AND- VARNISH COMPANY. LIMITED. 
- Financial Years ending 30th September -
Production for sale Total Sales Profit/loss
Metric tons Metric tons $ thous,(£ thous,!
1935 54.7 19.7 -57.9 (-3.5)
1936 759.6 548.7 -157.6 (-9.6)
1937 1,196.5 1,053.9 -51.9 (-3.2)
1938 746.9 786.37 -24.9 (-1.3)
- First half n.a. n.a. -368.7 (-19.2)
- Second half n.a. n.a. 343.-8 (17.9)
1939 1,589.2 2,037.8 537.1 (15.5)
1940 1,607,0 1,758.0 1,279,2 <21.7}
1941 1,612,0 1,874.0 1,976,0 (27,8)
*Letter from Shanghai on November 22nd, 1947 to Butterfield and Swire, Hong Kong. Box 364B.
TABLE GGG.
THE ORIENT FAINT. COLOUR AND VARNISH COMPANY. LIMITED 
TOTAL SALES (i.e. including resafe items2) - $ THOUSAND
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
January 43,6 36,6- 161,5 <5.4} 370,0 <6,9} 390,9 <5,6}
February 45,4 30,1 122,9 (4,1) 326,7 (5,6) 577,3 (8,2)
March 93.5 43.5 147.0 (4.9) 357.9 (6.0) n.a.
April 76.1 77.8 127.5 (4.2) 480.0 (8.0) n.a.
May 86.2 93.0 158.1 (5.3) 400.9 (6.0) 751.1 (9.9)
June 103.0 105.0 214.7 (5.9) 317.1 (5.0) 698.4 (9.5)
July 80.3 133.6 251.8 (5.6) 464.2 (7.3) 969.8 (12.9)
August 29:5 135.6 323.7 (4.7) 448.5 (6.9) 715.6 (9.1)
September 25.6 150.6 250.6 (3.8) 355.5 (5.1) 807.6 (10.6)
October 23,1 124.1 345.3 <6.9) 390.9 <5,9} 844.9(11.1}
November 21.4 144.4 302.4 (5.9) 355.4 (5.5) n.a.
December 34.3* 140.4 368.2 (6.6) 370.9 (5-6) n.a.
TOTAL 662.0 1,214.7 2,773.7 4,638.0 n.a.
(£ thous.) (41.2) (52.7) (69.5) (73.7)
Financial years
1.10. 3 7 - 30.9.38 884.6 (44.3)
1.1-0. 38- 30.9.39 2,166.7 (62v6)
1.10.39 - 30.9.40 4,536,7 (77.1)
* December, 1936 was $42 thous.
The figures in parentheses are in £ thousand converted at 
the monthly or 12 monthly exchange rates.
Sources (Swire archives) >
1937 Attachments to letter o f February IS* 1938 from Shanghai to Head Office. Box 175.
1938 Monthly Sales Reports. Box 176.
1939 Monthly Sales Reports. Box 177.
1946 Monthly SalesReports, Boxes 2056 and 2061.
1941 Monthly Sales Reports,
January. Box 2061
February and May to October. Box 364A.
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(6) BACKUP TABLES TO PART III - CHAPTER SIX - SOUND REPRODUCTION. )
TABLE HHH
Years to end June - Thous $.
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
Capital paid up.
($70)* 1000 700 700 700 700 700
Dividends (%) 14 35 44 43 44.5 105.5
Net profits (after
depreciation! 145.9 244.2 529.6 85.2 314.6 738.5
- trading profit n.a. n.a. n.a. 38.1 256.2 n.a.
- exchange
profit** n.a. n.a. n.a. 47.1 58.4 n.a.
+ balance c.f - 4.0 3.2 224.8 10.0 14.6
- transfers to
reserves 1.9 - - - - -
- dividends 140.0 245.0 308.0 300.0 310.0 740.0
Balance e,£ 4,0 M 224,8 10,0 14,6 13,1
1941
700
197
1.387.1
1,356.8
30.3 
13.1
1,380.0
20,2
* $100 shares in 1935 financial year.
** Due to devaluation of dollar in relation to Company’s currency balances
TABLE III
ELECTRIC AND MUSICAL INDUSTRIES f CHIN AT LTD. 
Years to end June.
Net profit $ per£ Sterling Exchange loss “Final”
$ thous. £ thous. £ thous. £ thous.
1935 145.9 12.7 11.5 _ 11.5
1936 244.2 19.121 12.8 - 12,8
1937 529.6 19.121* 27.7 0.6 27.1
1938 85.2 19.121* 4.5 7.3 -2.8
1939 314.6 27.042* 11.6 6.9 4.7
1940 738,5 15.5 JA T9
First Half 353.3 36.226* 9.3 7.6 1.7
Second half 403.2 65.0* 6.2 - 6.2
1941 1,387.1 65.0* 21.3 - 21.3
4 months to
31.10.41 1,270.5 65.0* 19.5 - 19.5
TABLE JJJ.
ELECTRIC AND MUSICAL INDUSTRIES f CHIN AY LTD. 
PATTERN OF SALES -  Years to end June.
1938* 1939 1940 1941
$ thous. % $ thous. % $ thous. % $ thous. %
)TAL 1,341.7 100 1,838.0 100 4.052.2 100 7.533.1 100
E5LCHINA 954.1 21 860.3 46 h j l n.a. 2.293,1 30
In Shanghai 394.6 29 571.5 31 n.a. n.a. 2,188.6 29
Other 559.5 42 288.8 15 n.a. n.a. 104.5 1
EXPORT 387.6 29 977.7 54 n.a. n.a. 5.240.0 70
Ex Shanghai factory n.a. n.a. 653.2 36 n.a. n.a. 2,269.4 31
Ex Hayes, Calcutta, Kawasaki
and Detroit n.a. n.a. 324.5 18 n.a. n.a. 2,970.6 39
* Average monthly sales were as follows in this period
Julv/August. 1937 September to December January - June
Prior to crisis 1937 1938
Sales in Shanghai 54.9 12.6 39.1
Sales in rest o f  China 122.8 10.1 46.6
Export sales  29.2----------------  35.4
+ Source -  Archives o f the EMI Group held at Hayes, Middlesex,
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(7) BACKUP TABLES TO PART III -  CHAPTER SEVEN -  DRINK. FOOD. PACKING ETC OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
TABLE KKK.
THE ANGLO-GERMAN BREWERY COMPANY. LIMITED 
Calendar Years -  Thous. $
1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915
Caoital paid up 
Ord. ($100) 400.0 400.0 444,1 444.1 444.1 444.1 444.1 444.1 444.1 444.1 444.1 444.1
Dividends (%)
.Ord. - 7 7 7 - 5 5 6 8 8 6 -
Net profits 2.1 49.9 49.4 49.4 20.9 66.0 74.7 85.2 93.0 70.8 64.4 -49.0
+baiance b.f - - 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.4 3.0 3.3 4.7 5.6 5.0 18.6
- transfers to 
reserves - - - - - 10.0 20.0 25.0 25.0 10.0 - -30.0
-dividends - 28.0 30.3 31.1 - 22.2 22.2 26.6 35.5 35.5 26.6 -
-depreciation - 12.0 7.0 17.7 21.0 32.2 32.2 32.2 31.6 25.9 24.2 -
-write off of
prelim, expenses 2.1 8.9 - - - - " - - - - -
-write off of
Victoria Brewery* - - 12.2 - - - - - - - - -
Balance c.f. 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.4 3.0 3.3 4.7 5.6 M 18.6 -0.4
(Reserves) 0 (-) (-) (-) 0 0 (10.0) (30.0) (55.0) (80.0) (90.0) (90.0)
*A small and uneconomic brewery in Shanghai purchased in 1905 as an intended auxiliary to Qingdao.
Sources (all from the North China Herald) >
1904 24.2.05
1905 9.2,06
1906 8.2.07
1907 13.3.08
1908 27.2.09
1909 18.3.10
1910 10.5.11
1911 2.3.12
1912 15.3.13
1913 7.3.14
1914 3.4.15
1915 5.8.16
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TABLE LLL.
THE CHINA FLOUR MILL COMPANY. LIMITED.
Calendar Years -  Thous. Tads
1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906
Capital paid up 
Ord. (50 taels) 132.0 196.9 196.9 196.9 196.9 200.0 296.9 299.3 300.0 300.0
Dividends (%) 
Ord. 6 20 12 10 20
Net profits 1.2 0.5 1.8 15.8 28.8 61.0 55.7 41.5 93.1 6,5
+balance b .f 1.2 1.7 3.5 3,6 4.3 2.5 1.9 O.S 1.0
- transfers to 
reserves 5.0 15.0 5.0 5.0 20.0 (7.0)
- depreciation - - - 7.7 11.3 1.9 11.3 4.0 4.0 -
- dividends - - - 11,8 40,0 35,6 29,9 60,0 -
- agent’s share 
in profits 5.9 4.4 3.7 8.9
- write off of 
prelim, expenses - •» 8.0
Balance c.f 1.2 1.7 3.5 3.6 4.3 2.5 1.9 O.S 1.0 0.5
(Reserves) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (5.0) (20.0) (25.0) (30.0) (50.0)
1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916(1.1
Capital paid up 
Ord. (50 taels) 500,0 500,0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0
to 19.7) 
500.0
Dividends {%) 
Ord. 6
Net profits 15.0 -37.9 30.4 -30.2 -67.4 -42.4 6.1 -24.7 -46.7 -29.1
+ balance b.f. 0.5 6.0 12.2 0.2 -20.4 -86.2 -128.6 -122.5 -147.2 -193.9
- transfers to 
reserves 8.6 (50.0) 10.0 (10.0) (1.6) .
- depreciation 0.9 5.9 12.0 - - - - - - -
- dividends - 18.0 - - - - - - -
- agent’s share 
in profits _ 2.4 _ . .
Balance c.f. 6.0 12.2 0.2 -20.4 -86.2 -128.6 -122.5 -147.2 -193.9 -223.0
(Reserves) (43.0) (51.6) (1.6) (11.6) (1.6) (-) (-) (-) (-) (->
Sources (from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated)
1897 28.2.98
1898 27.2.99
1899 28.2.00
1900 20,3,01
1901 19.2.02
1902 21.1.03
1903 25.3.04
1904 31.3.05
1905 9.3.06
1906 22.3.07
1907 13,3.-08
1908 China Stock atid Shm'e Hmidbook,
1908 18.3.10
1909 1.6.11
1910 China Stock and Share Handbook,
1911 3.5,13
1912 2.5.14
1913 24.5.15
1914 6.5.16
1916 1,1-19,7 4,11,16
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TABLE MMM.
1910(a)
THE L1H TEH OIL MILL COMPANY.
Years to end Mav -  Thous. Taels. 
1911(a) 1912 1913(b) 1914 1915 1916 1917
Capital paid up
Ord. (50 taels) 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0
Dividends (%)
Ord. 8 - - - - -
Net profits 54.3 -9.2 -20.8 95.4 18.8 16.3 4.5
+ balance b.f. - 3.8 -7.3 -46.9 5.9 24.7 41.0
- transfers to
reserves 10.4 (9.4) (0.2) 25.4 - - 28.1
-depreciation 19,3 11,3 19,0 17,2 - - 3,5
-dividends 20.8 - - - - -
Balance c.f 3.8 -7.3 —46.9 5.9 24.7 41.0 13.9
(Reserves) (-) (10.4) (1.0) (0.8) (26.2) (26.2) (26.2)
Capital paid up
1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924
Ord. (50 taels) 
Dividends
260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0 260.0
Ord. 15 15 15 - - 10 -
Net profits 76,6 111,0 113,6 -101,0 M 85,4 -79,3
+ balance b.f. 
- transfers to
13.9 11.5 31.6 26.2 -24.8 -20.2 14.2
reserves 15.0 25.0 50.0 (50.0) - - -
- depreciation 25.0 26.9 30.0 - - 25.0 -
- dividends 39.0 39.0 39.0 - - 26.0 -
Balance c.f. 11.5 31.6 26.2 -24.8 -20.2 14.2 -65.1
(Reserves) (54,3) (69,3) (94,3) (44,3) (44,3) (44,3) (44,3)
(a) Calendar years.
(b) Seventeen months.
Sources (from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated) :-
1910 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1914.
1911 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1914
1912 No data.
1913 30,8,13
1914 11.7.14
1915 28.8.15
1916 15.7.16
1917 28.7.17
1918 6.7.18
1919 26.7.19
1920 24,7,20
1921 23.7.21
1922 15.7.22
1923 14.7.23
1924 Celestial Empire, 11.10.24 
1925-1927 No data.
1928 A loss of 15.1 Thous. Taels was made. North China Herald, 24.11.28,
1929 A working loss of 34,8 Thous, Taels was made. North China Herald, 26,10,29,
1930 Company wound up. North China Herald, 9.9,30,
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(8) BACKUP TABLES TO PART ///-C H A PT ER  EIGHT -  MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES
TABLE NNN.
A. BUTLER CEMENT TILE WORKS. LTD 
Years to March 31 -  Thous, Taels
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914
Capital paid up
Ord,(50 taels) 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 i60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0
Dividends (%) 6 5 n.a. 6 8 - -
Net profit 43) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.1 .-4.2 33) M
+ balance b.f. - 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.0 0.8 -5.4 -3.7
- transfers to
reserves - n.a. n.a. n.a. _ - -
- depredation - n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.3 -
- dividends 3.6 3.0 n.a. 3.6 4.8 - -
Balance c.f 0 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 23) 0.8 -5.4 -3.7 -01
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
Capital paid up
Ord.(50 taels) 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Dividends (%> 6 12 12 - -
Net profit 5.3 9.7 9.4 -0.9 0.4 -0.4
+balance b .f -0.1 0.6 3.1 I.i 0.2 0.6
- transfers to
reserves - - 4.2 - -
- depreciation 1.0 - - - -
- dividends 3.6 7.2 7.2 - -
Balance c. f. 0 6 3A 1 1 02 M  0 2
(The company went into liquidation in January, 1921)
Sources (all from the North Chma Herald unless otherwise stated) >
1906 8.6.06
1907 Far Eastern Review, September, 1908.
1908 Far Eastern Review, September, 1909.
1909 8.7.10
1910 10.6.11
1911 18.5.12
1912 21.6.13
1913 9.5.14
1914 15.5.15
1915 27.5.16
1916 2.6.17
1917 11,5,18
1918 31.5,19
1919 15.5.20
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TABLE OOP.
THE CHINA IMPORT AND EXPORT LUMBER CO. LTD. 
Years to end February -  Thous. Taels
Capital paid up
1903* 1904** 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
Ord. (Taels 100) 
Dividends (%)
77.2 215.0 278.0 322.0 356.5 356.5 356.5 356.5 356.5 356.5 400.0
Ord. 10 10 10 10 10 10 - 5 8 8 8
Net profits 23.2 23.2 34.9 47.8 793 29.5 -7.5 38.4 53.0 57.8 66.9
+ balance b.f. 
- transfers to
" 3.1 2.6 3.5 8.0 17.2 11.1 1.7 5.5 6.3 6,1
reserves 10.0 - 3.9 - 20.0 - - 12.3 15.0 29.5 35.0
- dividends 7.7 21.5 26.4 32.2 35.6 35.6 - 17.8 28.5 28.5 32.0
- depreciation
- write off of
0.8 2.2 3.7 11.1 15.1 - 1.9 4.5 8.7 - 1,4
prelim.expenses 1.6 - - - - - - - - - -
Balance c.f. 3.1 2.6 3.5 8.0 17.2 11.1 1.7 5.5 6.3 6.1 4.6
Reserves - 10.0 10.0 13.9 13.9 33.9 33.9 33.9 46.2 61.2 90.7
* Year to 31.1.1903 
**13 months
Capital paid up
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923
Ord.(Taels 100) 
Dividends f%>
400.0 400.0 400.0 400.0 400.0 478.7 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0
Ord. 8 8 10 20 33 33 33 - - 8
Net profits 76.4 73,4 90,9 137,1 137,2 210,6 488,6 -402.1 301,6 202,7
+ balance b.f. 
- transfers to
4.6 5.5 6.9 7.8 10.9 11.1 58.7 91.1 -11.0 290.6
reserves 36.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 - - 250.0 (300.0) - 291.5
- dividends 32.0 32.0 40.0 80.0 132.0 158.0 165.0 - - 40.0
- depredation
- contribution to
7.5 - - - - - 36.2 - - -
War Funds, etc- - - - 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 - - -
Balance c. f. 5.5 6.9 7.8 10.9 11.1 58.7 91.1 -11.0 290.6 161.8
Reserves 125.7 161.7 201.7 251.7 301.7 1950* 1950 2200 1900 1900
*Increased on revaluation of property and buildings.
CONTINUED.
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T ABLE QOC> (ramtmacflV
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928. 1929 1920 1931 1932 1933
Capital paid up 
Ord.(Taels 100/ 
Taels 10) 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 n.a. n.a.
Dividends(%l
Ord. 8 8 8 8 12 24 24 n.a. n.a.
Net profits 188.6 86.7 125.6 159.5 239.8 132.5 n.a n.a. n.a n.a.
+ balance b.f. 161.8 290.4 187.1 222.7 216.3 176.1 188:6 n.a. n.a. n.a
- transfers to 
•reserves- 50,0 n,a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
- dividends 40.0 40.0 40.0 - 40.0 60.0 120.0 120.0 n.a. n.a.
-depreciation 20.0 150.0 50.0 115.9 240.0 60.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Balance c.f. 290.4 187.1 222.7 216.3 176.1 188.6 n.a. njL n.a. 240.8
Reserves 2400* 2400 2400 2400 2450 2450 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a
* After revaluation.
 _$ million-
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Capital paid up
Ord, 2796 2796 3002 3245 3245 3245 3245 3245
Dividends (%)
Ord. 8.5 8 - 6 6 20 46.5 46.5
Net profits 49.3 696.3 -18.2 519.2 511.9 910.9 2845.5 3443.4
+ balance b, f. 336.8 57.5 351.1 332.9 425.1 510.0 762,5 748.0
- transfers to
reserves - - 232:5 232:5 (13-5:0) 11-58.7 n.a.
- dividends 230.0 223.7* - 194.5 194.5 648.9 1506,7 1506.7
-depreciation - 179.0 - — -144.3 •175,6 n.a.
- foreign staff bonus - - - - - - 59.0 n.a.
Balance c. f. 57.5 351.1 332.9 425.1 510.0 762.5 748.0 n.a.
Reserves 2070 2070 2070 2070 2303 2535 2400 n.a.
* As bonus share issue.
Sources (from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated)
1903 12.3.03 1923 3.6.23
1904 25.3.04 1924 Celestial Empire, 7.6.24
1905 10.3.05 1925 Celestial Empire, 16.5 .25
1906 23.3.06 1926 Celestial Empire, 5.6.26
1907 28.3.07 1927 14.6.27
1908 1.5 08 1928 2.6.28
1909 12.6.09 1929 1.6.29
1910 29.4 mid 6.5.10 1930 20.5.30
1911 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1914. 1931 Little data.
1912 4.5,12 1932 Little data
1913 21,6.13 1933 Little data
1914 18/25 4.14 1934 Finance attd Commerce^ 11.4.34
1915 27.3.1915/3.4.15 1935 5.6.35
1916 31.3.16/8.4.16 1936 Finance and Commerce, 5.5.37
1917 31.3.17 1937 Finance and Commerce, 5.5.37
1918 4.5.18 1938 Finance and Commerce, 17.5.39
1919 3:5.T9 1939 Financeand'Commerce, 175.39
1920 1.5.20 1940 8.5.40
1921 304.21 194-1 ChenZhen et.al.: Zhongguo jindai gongye
1922 29.4.22 shi ziliao. Volume 2; Page 862.
TABLE PPP.
S.MQUTKIE AND COMPANY. LIMITED.
Y ears to  endMHrdi -  Thutrsand $
1.7.99 1.7.00 1.7.01 1.7.02 1.7.03 1.7.04 1.7.05 1.7.06 1908 1909 
30.-6,00 30,6,0-1 30.6,02 30.6,03- 30,6.04 30.6,05 30.6.06. 31.3.07
Ord. ($50) 104.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 202.0 250.0 250.0 307.9 307.9 308.4
Dividends (%)
Ord. 10 10 10 10 10 12 12 - 8 4
Net profits 15.1 20.4 22.8 25.2 26.6 52.1 34.7 12.6 22.4 11.0
+ balance b.f - 2.5 0.6 0.9 0 9 O.S 1.2 1.4 10.3 6,0
-transfers to
reserves - - - - 5.0 20.0 - - - -
—di-vidends- 
- write off o f
1-0,2 12.3 12.5 12.5 19.7 30,0 30,0 — 24,6 12.3
goodwill and
flotation expenses 2.1 8.5 10.0 12.5 - - - - - -
- staff bonus - 1.5 - - 2.0 1.7 3.0 3.0 2.1 -
- depreciation 0.3 - - 0.2 - - 1.5 0.7 - -
Balance c.f 2J> 0 6 0 9 0 9 o s 1 2 1 4 103 6t> 1 2
Reserves - - _ - - 5:0 25:0 25.0 25:0 25:0
1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
Capital paid up 
Ord. ($50) 308.4 308.4 3084 308.4 308:4 308.4 308.4 308.4 308.4 308.4 308.4
Dividends (%) - - - 5 10 5 10 10 10 12 12
Net-profits- -40.9 4.7 35.2 44.1 75.1 29*0- 55,7 54,0 -82.7 72,6 .61,6.
+ balance b .f  4,7 -12,2 -28,0 -5,2 8,4 12,9 12,2 14,9 14,2 16,0 15,8
- transfers to 
reserves (26.0) 25.0 5.0 16.0 34.0 27.0 21.0
- dividends - - 15.4 30.8 15.4 30.8 30.8 30.8 37.0 37.0
- staff bonus - - - 7.4 0:8- 6:9 7:9- 7.2' 3.3 5.5
- depreciation 2.0 205 12.4 15.1 7.4 13.5 9.3 - 8.9 5,5 _
~ warcharities - — — - - - ■1,0 — — .
Balance c.f. -12.2 -28.0 -5.2 8.4 12.9 12.2 14.9 14.2 16.0 15.8 13.9
Reserves 25.0 - - - - 25.0 25.0 30.0 46.0 80.0 107.0
CONTINUED.
-358-
TABLE PER fcontinued!
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Capital paid up
Ord, ($50) 308,4 308,4 308,4 u> O 00 'a 308,4 409,8 409,8 409,8 409,8 498,5
Dividends (%)
Ord. 16 16 18 18 n.a. 15 22 22 22 22
Net profits 94.9 108.1 141.3 49.8 n.a. 70.9 99.4 94.5 91.9 127.3
+ balance b.f. 13.9 12,7 11.5 20.3 12.6 18.6 13.7 16.8 15.4 17.2
- transfers to
reserves 40:0- 49.5 •65:0 72.0 (51.1) 10:0 - - - 15.0
- dividends 49.3 49.3 55.5 55.5 n.a. 61.5 90.1 90.1 90.1 109.7
~ staff bonus- 6 ,8 1-0,5 1-2,0 — •n,a. — — —
- depreciation - - - - n.a. 4,3 6,2 5,8 - -
Balance c.f. 12.7 11.5 20.3 12.6 18.6 13.7 16.8 15.4 17.2 19.8
Reserves 128.0 168.0 217.5 282.5 354.5 303.4 313.4 313.4 313.4 313.4
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
Capital paid up
Ord. ($50) 498.5 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985
Dividends (%)
■Ord, - 1 2 ................................................................5  - -8. 15
Net profits 67.1 -55.7 -34.4 -32.2 -19.8 -49.6 89.8 76.1 115.1 197.6
+ balance b.f. 19.8 27.1 -28.6 2.1 -30.1 -49.9 - 8,9 33.0 30.3
- transfers to
reserves - - (65.1) - - (107.0)51.0 52.0 65.0 114.8
- dividends 59.8 - - 29.9 - 39.9 79.8
-depredation - - - 2:T 4.3
-write off of
-baddebt-s — — — — — 5r4 — — 8,6 —
Balance c.f, 27-1 -28.6 Z l  -30.1 -49.9 - £ 9  3£0  303 33.3
Reserves 328.4 328.4 328.4 263.3 263.3 263.3 156.3 207.3 259.3 324.3
Sources (from the North China Herald unless otherwise stated)
1.7.99-30.6.00 3.10.00 1920 10.6.20
1.7:00 -30:6:01 25:9:01 1921 -9:7:21
1.7.01 -30.6.02 17.9.02 1922 17.6.22
-1.7.02-40,6,03 2.-10,03- -1-923- 9,6.23
1.7,03 -30,6,04 23,9,04 1924 14,6,24
1.7.04-30.6.05 29.9.05 1925 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1929.
1.7.05-30.6.06 5.10.06 1926 Celestial Empire,3.7.26
1.7.06-31.3.07 5.7.07 1927 25.6.27
1908 20.6.08 1928 China Stock and Share Handbook, 1929.
1909 3.7.09 1929 29.6.29
1910 15.7:10 1930 1.7:30-
1911 15.7.11 1931 7.7.31
19-12 29,6,1-2 1932 -6.7,32
1913 21.6.13 1933 7.6.33
1914 6/13.6.14 1934 Finance and Commerce. 27.6.34
1915 26.6.15 1935 24.7.35
1916 30.6.16 1936 15.7.36
1917 23/30:6.17 1937 Finance and'Commerce: 14.7.37
1918 29.6.18/6.7.18 1938 Finance and Commerce. 20.7.38
-1919- 5.7,19 1939- 2,859
1940 Finance and Commerce, 14,8.40
-359-
(9) BACKUP TABLES TO PART V -  FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE.
COMPARISON OF (ORDINARY) DIVIDENDS OF B A T. FLAGSHIP COMPANIES 
IN CHINA WITH THOSE OF LEADING UK AND CHINESE TOBACCO FIRMS.
Percent
British Cigarette Company. Ltd./ Imperial Tobacco Gallacher. Ltd. Nanvang Brothers
British American Tobacco Company, Ltd, Tobacco Co,
Company (China! Limited.
1905 10.0 8.0 n.a. n.a.
1906 8.2 10.0 n.a n,a.
1907 12.0 12.0 n.a. n.a.
1908 n.a. 12.0 n.a. n,a.
1909 n.a. 20.0 n.a. n.a.
1910 n.a. 25.0 n.a. n.a.
1911 15.0 30.0 n.a. n.a.
1912 10,3 30,0 n,a. n,a,
1913 6.6 35.0 n.a. n.a.
1914 n.a 35.0 n.a. n.a.
1915 n.a 40.0 n.a. n.a.
1916 n.a. 22,5 n.a. n.a.
1917 15.5 22 5 n.a. n.a.
1918 16.0 66.25 n.a. n.a.
1919 3,25 15,0 n,a. n,a.
1920 7.0 17.5 n.a. 17.0
1921 2.5 17.5 n.a. 17.0
1922 6.5 22.5 n.a. 17.0
1923 10.0 53.5 n.a. 12.0
1924 11.0 22.5 n.a. 4.0
1925 10.0 24.0 n.a. 8.0
1926 10,0 24,0 n,a. 8,0
1927 6.0 25.0 n.a. 2.0
1928 7.5 51.0 n.a. -
1929 7.5 23.0 6.5 -
1930 5.0 24.5 8.0 -
1931 5.5 22.5 10.0 3.0
1932 3.25 20.0 10.0 5.0
1933 6,5 20,0 11,0 6,0
1934 6.25 22.5 18.0 5.0
1935 1.0 24.0 25.0 3.0
1936 5.0 25.0 25.0 1.0
1937 8.0 25.0 27.5 n.a.
1938 9.0 25.0 27.5 n.a.
1939 20.0 23.0 27.5 n.a.
1940 48,0 20,0 27,5 n,a,
Sources:
The figures for the B.A.T companies are taken from TABLE M above (British Cigarette 
Company, Ltd.) and TABLE B above (British American Tobacco Company (China), Limited) 
while those for Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Co. are from TABLE I.
The figures for the UK registered companies are taken from 1905 to 1932 from sucessive issues of 
the well indexed Stock Exchange Year-Book. A rival source is the Stock Exchange Official 
Intelligence but this is less easy to use as it does not give dividend history over a few years. In 
1934 the two publications merged into the Stock Exchange Official Year-Book.
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TABLE RRK.
COMPARISON OF DIVIDENDS -  PERCENT.
UK Cotton Spinning UK Cotton Spinners and Dividends of the Japan Cotton
1897 3,00 2,19 n,a,
1898 4.50 1.30 n.a.
1899 6.13 - n.a.
1900 7.25 n.a.
1901 7.50 - . n.a.
1902 4.67* - n.a
1903 3.00* 4.09* 8.2
1904 2,50 - 8,0
1905 7.00 12.10 21.9
1906 9.67 14.14 24.4
1907 15.87 4.46* 21.5
1908 11.75 6.90 10.6
1909 7.87* 13.74 11.3
1910 5.75* 4.12 8.3
1911 4,75 9,55 10,4
1912 7.25 14.58 13.9
1913 7.25 17.09 14.5
1914 6.87 11.04 13.5
1915 5.00* 10.03 15.5
1916 6.00 5.49* 23.5
1917 7.50 19.48 41.1
1918 16,25 14,67 49,7
1919 21.25 58.60 51.0
1920 40.21 91.72 26.5
1921 9.97 46.28 26.6
1922 4.01 20.73 23.5
1923 2.27 7.41 16.7
1924 2.43 3.88* 16.3
1925 4,65 4,33* 16,4
1926 4.08 9.59 14.8
1927 2.73* 6.30 14.7
1928 2.19* 11.33 14.2
1929 2.07* 41.33 13.7
1930 1.91* 13.93 17.6
1931 1.46* 31.73 9.4
1932 1,55* 21,56 10,0
1933 1.50* 6.07 10.8
1934 1.57* 4.86 12.2
1935 1.75 4.25 12.0
1936 1.91 3.01 11.2
1937 4.28 7.23 12.0
1938 5.53 28.90 11.9
1939 5.39 24.85 12.5
* Years of average loss per company. + Source : F.W.TattersalPs Cotton Trade Review.
The figures for UK Cotton Spinners and Weavers in China are taken from TABLE FIFTEEN in the 
main text, The data for UK Cotton Spinning Companies originates from the journal indicated above. A 
useful compilation o f this series is given in R.Robson: The Cotton Industry in Biitain, Macmillan and 
Company, Limited, 1957. Page 338. Apart from the percentage dividends this series also gives the average 
profit or loss per company for each year apart from 1920-25. The data for the Dividends of the Japan 
Cotton Spinners’ Association is given, apart from 1938 and 1939 (from The Japan Yearbook\ in Keizo 
Saki: The Cotton Industry o f Japan, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1956, Page 315,
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TABLE SSS.
COMPARISON OF ^ORDINARY! DIVIDENDS OF BRITISH MARINE ENGINEERING COMPANIES 
IN SHANGHAI WITH THOSE OF UK COMPANIES IN THE SAME SECTOR - PERCENT.
UK Companies John Brown Swan Hunter and Cammell Laird Had and an
in Shanghai and Co.. Ltd Wigham Richardson and Co.. Ltd Wollf. Ltc
1895 14.5 7.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1896 9.1 7.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1897 9.7 7.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1898 10.6 10.0 n.a n.a. n.a.
1899 16.4 15.0 n.a. n.a n.a.
1900 25.6 20.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1901 17..0 15,0 »,a. n,a. n,a.
1902 15.0 10.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1903 12.0 8.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1904 13.0 8.3 n.a. 7.5 n.a.
1905 8.0 8.3 n.a 10.0 n.a.
1906 3.4 10.0 6.25 10.0 n.a.
1907 4,9 10.0 5.0 2.5 n.a.
1908 5,2 7,5 2,5 - n,a.
1909 5.9 7.5 2.5 - n.a.
1910 2.5 7.5 5.0 - n.a.
1911 3.3 7.5 7.5 - n.a.
1912 3.4 7.5 7.5 - n.a.
1913 5.6 10.0 10.0 2.5 n.a.
1914 3.4 12.5 10.0 7.5 n.a.
1915 8,1 12,5 12,5 10,0 n,a.
1916 9.8 12.5 12.5 10.0 n.a.
1917 15.8 12.5 15.0 10.0 n.a.
1918 15.3 12.5 12.5 10.0 n.a.
1919 24.2 12.5 10.0 10.0 n.a.
1920 26.0 10.0 8.0 7.5 n.a.
1921 11.6 5.0 8.0 5.0 n.a.
1922 10,4 5,0 8,0 5,0 n,a.
1923 10.6 5.0 8.0 - 5.0
1924 14.2 5.0 8.0 - 5.0
1925 S.S - 7.0 - -
1926 8.2 - 7.5 - -
1927 9.6 - 7.5 - -
1928 9.6 - 7.5 - -
1929 12,9 - 7,5 - -
1930 9.5 - 6.0 - -
1931 8.2 5.0 - -
1932 8.6 - 2.5 - -
1933 5.2 - - - -
1934 1.9 - 3.0 - -
1935 - 16.7 5.0 3.5 -
1936 - 81,7 7,0 5,0 -
1937 3.6 17.5 9.0 8.5 -
1938 8.0 17.5 12.0 10.0 -
1939 28.9 15.0 15.0 10.0 6.0
1940 41.0 12.5 10.0 10.0 6.0
Notes
The figures for UK Companies in Shanghai differ from those in TABLE FIFTEEN in the main 
text in that they eover ordinary dividends only. The dividend figures for the UK registered companies have 
been compiled in a similar fashion to those in TABLE QQQ.
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TABLE TTT.
COMPARISON OF PROFITS AND ROYALTIES PER TON OF COAL RAISED
Pence (new) per ton
United Kingdom mines Chinese Engineering and Mining Co.. Ltd
Av, 1904-6 4,8 22,9
1907 9.0 19.7
1908 8.5 19.6
1909 5.6 17.6
1910 5.9 16.2
Kailan Mining Admini:
1914 8.0 17.3
1920 19,6 65,9
1921 -10.5 34.1
1922 6.9 19.6
1923 12.2 12.6
1924 7.7 22.4
1925 3.6 33.0
1926 8.1 (Jan.-April) 23.7
1927 - 24,0
1928 -1.9 29.4
1929 3.9 20.6
1930 3.9 14.5
1931 3.9 11.4
1932 3.3 12.1
1933 3.6 9.4
1934 4,4 6,8
1935 4.9 7.6
1936 7.1 6.8
1937 8.7 13.6
1938 8.9 17.1
1939 10.2 13.0
1940 10.3 11.6
Notes:-
The figures for the Chinese Engineering and Mining Co., Ltd. are derived from division of "Profit 
after all charges in China" as in TABLE AA above by the equivalent production figures given in TABLE 
W. The figures for the Kailan Mining Administration are similarly derived from “Profits of the whole 
enterprise” given in TABLE GG above and the production figures given in the same table. Conversion into 
Sterling is made by utilising the parities used by the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company itself as 
given in TABLE CC.
The UK figures are derived from the convenient consolidation of Government figures given in the 
Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory. Figures for 1920-1940 are given in the 1949 edition (pages 
588 and 590) and those for 1910 and 1914 in the 1924 edition. The earlier figures are given in A 
Compilation o f Statistics o f the Coal M ining Industry o f the United Kingdom, Prepared by Finlay A.
Gibson. Cardiff: The Western Mail, Limited, 1922. Page 149.
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TABLE UUU.
RATIO OF LABOUR COSTS TO VALUE OF COAL OUTPUT -  PERCENT.
United Kingdom Mines Kailan Minina Administration
1914 62.4 12.9
1920 68.9 12.1
1921 77,0 13,5
1922 63.5 17.5
1923 62.4 17.8
1924 67.0 19.6
1925 64.4 19.2
1926 60.9 19.9
1927 70.3 20.0
1928 71,4 17,1
1929 65.9 20.0
1930 71.2 22.1
1931 66.5 19.6
1932 65.5 24.5
1933 64.9 31.3
1934 64.7 30.1
1935 63,3 36,2
1936 62.7 33.2
1937 61.8 23.1
1938 60.7 25.4
1939 60.5 19.5
1940 62.4 26.2
Sources:-
The figures for the Kailan Mining Administration are taken from the last column of 
TABLE FF above. The UK figures are derived from the Colliery Year Book and Coal 
Trades Directory. Figures for 1920-1940 are given in the 1949 edition (pages 588 and 
590) and those for 1914 in the 1924 edition.
